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Abstract of Thesis: The Concept of Self (tmin) in Nyãya-
Vaiá'eika Philosophy.
Nyaya, one of Hinduism's six orthodox schools of philosophy has
been of interest to western philosophers largely because of its
sophisticated analysis of logical and linguistic problems. In
India, the purpose of the orthodox school (or dar'ana - "view")
has been to lead the student toward liberation (moka). Hence
Nyaya's preoccupation with logic should not in itself preclude a
real concern with moka. The broad aim of my thesis therefore,
is to determine how Nyya functions as a complete darana, to
see if indeed the various aspects of the system stand together as
a coherent mokamãrga (way to release). Because Hindus conceive
of salvation as the realization of a transcendental Self (tman),
and because the nature of such a Self has been a prime focus for
Indian philosophical debate, this thesis will concentrate on the
Nyãya understanding of ãtman, and the logical arguments for its
existence.
Nyãya philosophers played a leading role in arguing against
their Buddhist opponents in India who denied the existence of any
such transcendental Self. The debate, which endured for many
hundreds of years, culminated in the eleventh century A.D. with
the works of Udayana, a leading Nyãya philosopher, and his
Buddhist opponents, JnaIrimitra and Ratnakirti, after which
time the Buddhist challenge waned in India, and the Nyãya school,
known in its later phase as Navya-Nyãya, became more concerned
with the method rather than the substance of the arguments.
In this thesis I concentrate on one particular text of
Udayana, the Atmatattvaviveka (The Discrimination of the Reality
of the Self), for in this text Udayana arranged most of the major
disputes that had engaged Nyãya and Buddhist philosophers in the
preceding centuries in such a way as to clearly display their
relevance for the debate about ãtman. The main body of my thesis
consists of translations from this hitherto largely untranslated
work, and discussions of some of the important arguments found
therein. The concluding part of my thesis uses my findings for
the broader discussion of the importance of ãtman in Nyãya, and
the place of Nyãya within the wider spectrum of Indian
soteriological thought.
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1Introduction
Can one accept, as such, the distinction
between the major types of discourse, or
that between such forms or genres as
science, literature, philosophy,
religion, history, fiction, etc., and
which tend to create certain great
historical individualities? We are not
even sure of ourselves when we use
these distinctions in our own world of
discourse, let alone when we are
analyzing groups of statements which,
when first formulated, were distributed,
divided, and characterized in a quite
different way.
Michel Foucault (1972) p. 22
According to Indian tradition, a fundamental purpose of
philosophy is the discovery of a means by which the individual
can achieve release (moka) from the limitations of this
world.' A philosophical system is known as a "dar 'ana" or
tt view tT
 (from the Sanskrit verb .Jdr - to see), a darana being
a branch of knowledge which deals especially with the quest
for moka. Since about the twelfth century A.D. the brah-
manical orthodoxy has classified the different schools of
Indian philosophy into orthodox (stika) and non—orthodox
(nstika) dar 'ana.	 The Buddhist, Jam	 and Cãrvãka schools
were among those rejected by the brahmanical orthodoxy, whilst
.,
six schools, the so—called	 aç1darsana (Nyaya, Vaiseika,
Sãthkhya, Yoga, Purva—MImãthsã and Vednta) were accepted as
orthodox. The question of orthodoxy was a much debated issue2
and in other ways Indian philosophy, both orthodox and non—
orthodox, was far more complex than this simple classification
would suggest. 3 Yet the acJdarana classification did exert a
powerful influence on orthodox thinkers who would often align
2themselves with one or other of these schools. Each school
viewed itself as a complete system and superior guide to
reality in which the realization of moka often played an
important role.	 Thus, although the six schools were united in
their opposition to certain aspects of non-orthodox thought,4
all the schools vigorously debated with each other. 5 Hence
the philosophical arguments of all the schools, orthodox and
non-orthodox alike, were developed in relation to the counter-
arguments of rival schools. 	 So, while each school might have
developed its own distinctive terminology, such close rivalry
indicates a common philosophical platform. 	 In addition to
this, all the schools developed within a common cultural
milieu (see Chapter One, below). Thus, the philosophical
arguments of all the schools are understandable only in the
context of their philosophical rivalry with each other and
their shared cultural presuppositions.
My intention in this thesis is to present:
(1) A study of the concept of tman (Self) in just
one of the	 açIdar 'ana, the Nyya system, focus-
sing on the arguments articulated in its defence
in one particular work, the Atmatattvaviveka,
written by Udayana in the eleventh century A.D.
This study is the major concern of my thesis, but in order to
achieve a comprehensible account of gtman in Udayana's work it
has been necessary to consider two further questions:
(2) How Nyya functions as a complete darana, i.e.
as a system whose function is to lead the
3.
aspirant towards mok.a and provide him with an
overall view of reality.
(3)	 The place of Nyya in the broader cultural
context of Indian religious and philosophical
thought.
I address these three issues in the belief that the coinpara-
tive philosopher needs to understand the significance of the
arguments within their original context in order to present
them accurately and interestingly to a contemporary western
audience. 6 A philosopher trained in the western analytical
tradition, such as myself, is likely to encounter several
problems when he or she undertakes a study of an Indian
darana. A brief look at the way in which Nyya thought has
fared with a western audience is particularly illustrative of
some of the central methodological concerns of comparative
philosophy.
In recent times the Nyya system has been the focus of
considerable interest for philosophers trained in the western
analytical tradition because it is considered to be more
technically "philosophical" than some of the other systems,
and is especially noted for its contributions to logic and
inferential reasoning. This interest of philosophers trained in
the western tradition in the more technical literature of Indian
philosophy has already proved valuable since it has helped to
counteract the tendency of the West to view Indian philosophy as
something purely "mystical". This stereotype was the result,
firstly, of the fact that the West largely sought the mystical in
4India and secondly, that few of the technical texts were widely
available in translated form to western philosophers without
training in such languages as Sanskrit.
Yet ironically this interest in the logical aspects of
Nyya has led some scholars to claim that Nyya lacks a
genuine concern for soteriological matters, 7 and scant
attention is paid to those passages which are not concerned
with logic and epistemology. These scholars discount any
references to moka as resulting from the fact that, in India,
philosophical legitimacy was wedded to a concern with spiri-
tual enlightenment, and hence the Nyãya philosophers sought to
gain greater acceptability for their system by this kind of
window—dressing. 8
 But the preoccupation of Nyãya with
l.ogic and epistemology should not in itself lead us t , o the
conclusion that this system has little to do with moka.
Rather, what is needed here is an understanding of the role
which logical reasoning plays in this particular philosophical
system. The exposition of the more technical philosophy of
Nyya needs to proceed hand in hand with a discussion of the
place of those ideas within the wider context of Nyya's claim
to be a complete dars'ana. 	 In this sense, a fundamental
purpose of my thesis is to determine whether the Nyya system
is truly a mokamãrga (way to release) or whether this is
purely a lip—service ideal, while the true structure of the
system serves some non—soteriological socio—religious purpose.
Whilst I present this thesis as a philosophical study and
will use the tools of modern western philosophical analysis
5where this helps to clarify the ideas of the Nyya philoso-
phers, I intend to be cautious about the ability of such tools to
show clearly the full significance of Nyya thought. 	 A brief
survey of comparative philosophy in this century shows the
need for such caution.
In this century western philosophers have been especially
self–conscious about defining the nature of their discipline,
and as they have changed their minds about "what constitutes
the proper business of philosophy" their perception of how the
study of Indian philosophy should proceed has also changed.
Hence scholars of various persuasions have approached the
Nyya system in ways illustrative of their attitude to
philosophy and its nature in general, an attitude forged by a
century of self–conscious reflection on western philosophical
problems. In the earlier part of this century some philoso-
phers set out to "purify" philosophy of its cultural and
historical accretions.	 Bertrand Russell declared that the
purely philosophical attitude is one in which:
without regard to dates or influences, we seek
simply to discover what are the great types of
possible philosophies, and guide ourselves in the
search by investigating the systems advocated by the
great philosophers of the past . . . And since the
philosophies of the past belong to one or another of
a few great types —types which in our own day are
perpetually recurring— we may learn, from examining
the greatest representative of any type, what are
the grounds for such a philosophy. (Russell (1937)
p. xii Preface)
Later on Russell states that, "Philosophic truth and false-
hood, in short, rather than historical fact, are what primari-
ly demand attention in this enquiry" (As above).	 The argument
6that it is possible to abstract philosophical thought from all
cultural context, that philosophical problems are somehow
"universal", was one reason why many philosophers in the west
concentrated on problems in logic, language and epistemology,
and turned away from metaphysical speculations in the belief
that these were more dependent upon culturally bound theologi -
cal and cosmological propositions. 	 We see this especially in
the work of the logical positivists.	 Such philosophers,
whether examining their own philosophical past or that of
another culture, tended to concentrate on those ideas which
were felt to contribute to contemporary analytical debate. As
a result, Indian philosophy was at first largely ignored by
this type of philosopher, leaving its study to those who
retained a professional interest in more religious, metaphysi-
cal and existential problems. Once it became widely known,
however, that Indian philosophy too contained a great deal of
rigorous, "hard—core" philosophical analysis, a new interpre-
tive danger arose, the danger that analytical philosophers
would take an interest in Indian philosophy but once again
study it in light of their own understanding of what consti-
tutes legitimate philosophical debate. Put simply, we can say
that Indian philosophy has been mistakenly characterized as
"mystical" and "metaphysical" by western idealist philosophers of
the nineteenth century and their successors, and is now perhaps
being interpreted for its interest in logical and linguistic
questions which are currently raised in western philosophical
circles.	 In this approach there is little regard for
7understanding Indian philosophy in terms of its own intrinsic
values and concerns.
In very recent times there has been a change of attitude
in the western tradition and once again the interests of
philosophy have broadened to include historical and cultural
issues. In such works as Barry Stroud's recent study of David
Hume [Stroud (1977)] we have a good example of how philoso-
phers are adopting a broader approach to their subject.
The philosophical study of our own past in the West is similar
to the philosophical study of another culture since both
studies take the philosopher into an alien intellectual
environment. Stroud's study has resulted in a significant
departure from the standard interpretation of Hume, and his
methodological considerations contain important lessons for
the cross-cultural philosopher.
In the first place, he points out that the reasoning
behind the positivists' distinction between a priori and
empirical analysis is itself now philosophically suspect,9
being "based on an epistemological and semantical theory that
is now largely discredited" [Stroud (1977) p. 8]. Hence the
programme of the positivists:
rests on the questionable assumption of a clear and
recognizable distinction between a priori and
empirical investigations, and on the further
contention that philosophy falls on the a priori
side of the line. Only the positivists' confidence
in that distinction allowed them to make such
sweeping claims about the history of philosophy. It
is true that Hume himself distinguishes between
knowledge based on 'relations among ideas' and
knowledge of 'matters of fact', and that was taken
as precursor of the positivists' distinction between
analytic and synthetic judgments.	 But Hume would
8certainly deny that philosophy, or what he is
writing in the Treatise and Enquiries, is a priori,
or is based on 'relations among ideas' alone. A
purely a priori mode of philosophizing is precisely
what he is trying to supplant in recommending the
experimental method of reasoning for investigating
the nature of man. [Stroud (1977) p. 7]
In the second place, because many philosophers have used
this distinction between a priori and empirical analysis to be
selective in their reading of Hume, they have mistakenly
characterized him as arch skeptic and a purely negative
philosopher. Stroud argues that we should take seriously
Hume's self proclaimed interest in giving a general empirical
theory of human nature, rather than dismiss large portions of
his work as being amateur attempts at psychology and hence of
no interest to the professional philosopher. 10
 In the
eighteenth century when Hurne was writing there was no clear
demarcation between philosophy and psychology, and Stroud
argues that for a philosopher to impose such a distinction now
is both arbitrary and misguided. He therefore includes the
more psychological portions of Hume's work in his study, and
by doing so draws our attention to a more positive and
hitherto largely ignored side of Hume's philosophy. Stroud
demonstrates convincingly that Hume's scepticism represents
only the initial phase of his philosophy for, once Hume has
undermined the role of reason in human life as traditionally
understood, he then proceeds with the more positive side of
his philosophy which is to explain our most fundamental
beliefs about the world on the basis of the nature of our
experience and natural dispositions of the human mind.	 In
9this way Stroud has given us an account of flume's philosophy
more in accord with flume's original intentions and clearly his
broader approach is a better tool for understanding flume's
work as a whole. Even if the positivists' distinction between
a priori and empirical analysis could be defended, their
characterization of Hume as a sceptic cannot. This would be
to confuse the "doing" of philosophy, according to a particu-
lar view of what constitutes legitimate philosophizing,
with the historical study of a major philosophical thinker
where the aim is to present a comprehensive survey of the
person's ideas. The presence of certain arguments in Hume's
work similar to those employed by the positivists does not
therefore justify them taking these arguments out of context
and using them to include Hume among their philosophical
number.
Philosophers who work with more than one culture are now
beginning to encounter problems similar to those that Stroud
found in many of the contemporary studies of Hume. The first
problem, Stroud's disenchantment with analytical philosophy, is
parallelled by a more general disenchantment on the part of
philosophers working across traditions who are beginning to
realize that the tools used in western philosophical analysis may
be flawed. Stroud's difficulty with analytical philosophy is but
a specific illustration of a broader problem —that philosophy
is not a static discipline but is constantly evolving new ways
of "philosophizing", some of which may prove to be fallible or
limited in their usefulness.
10
In a sub-discipline, such as logic for example, there has
been a continuous development in the way in which logical
analysis is done. Such changes in a discipline obviously
influence the way in which philosophers working in the field
engage in cross-cultural studies. Unfortunately, as Douglas
Daye has pointed out, developments that take place in western
philosophy often take longer to filter through to cross-
cultural studies:
My first hypothesis is that there is at least a 15-
year lead time between certain developments in
Western logic and their subsequent incorporation in
interpretations of Buddhist logic. For example,
interest in ideal-language methodology stemming from
analyses such as those of Russell and Carnap, were
not "picked up" in the studies of Buddhist logic
until 1950 although the machinery was available in
the 1920's and 1930's: it was only incorporated by
Indological studies in the 1950's and the middle
1960's. However, during the 1930's with such
writers as Randle, Keith and Stcherbatsky, all were
still using the (so-called) "Post Classical"
Syllogistic logic with which to describe the Indian
schemas. Also there was very little discussion of
the philosophies of logic on either side of the
comparison in such studies. [Daye (1981) p. 63}
Daye goes on to point out that in the literature of contempo-
rary cross-cultural studies there is little sign of the demise
of the ideal language methodology which took place over ten
years ago in western philosophy. 11 Comparative scholars need
a rigorous training if cross-cultural studies are to avoid the
air of being "old-fashioned". In addition to a philosophical
training that includes an understanding of the latest develop-
ments in the field, the scholar also needs specialized
language skills as well as a more general knowledge of the
cultures involved.	 Acquiring these necessary skills can be
11
problematic especially in the context of western academic
institutions, and until such time as there are enough adequa-
tely trained individuals, the collaboration between Indolo-
gists and philosophers may be a possible solution.'2
Stroud's second point is that even if the presuppositions
of analytical philosophy were well-founded, this does not mean
in itself that Hume's work is fully explicable in these terms.
This point is also applicable to cross-cultural studies.
Just as in Hume's day there was no clear demarcation between
philosophy and psychology, so too in Indian thought there is no
clear demarcation between philosophy, religion and psychology.
A philosopher who insists on such a clear demarcation will be
unable to give a satisfactory account of Indian thought.
However sophisticated a philosopher's training in western
philosophy, he or she needs to be fully considerate that the
"divergent developments in the sociology of knowledge in India
and the Anglo-European-Greek lineage" [Daye (1981) P. 61] may
limit the usefulness of such training in an analysis of Indian
thought.	 Again, the field of cross-cultural logic provides us
with a good example. Unlike modern western logic, in India
the division between logic and mathematics was severe 13 and it
is difficult to translate the psychologism and metaphysical
assumptions which are part of Indian logic into a formal
mathematical language. Such attempts often obscure the point
of the argument 14
 or are disappointing in their results
inasmuch as they do little to help the philosopher appreciate
the real significance of a particular argument. 	 In her book
12
An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Logic of "Exists", Charlene McDer-
mott presents the arguments of Ratnakirti (a Buddhist opponent
of the Nyya philosophers) in a formal manner resulting in the
following comment from David Seyfort Ruegg, one of her
reviewers:
While it would seem that the means brought to bear
in this volume may not wholly suffice for an
explicit philosophical 'defense of the Buddhist
position', it does not seem either that the formal
problem was per se particularly obscure and in need
of being explicated by the 'utilization of formal
logical structures'. What is on the contrary in
need of explication is the systematic context
and also the historic context in which the systema-
tic problems fit. [Ruegg (1970 p. 307]
In his recent work, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian
Theories of Knowledge, Bimal K. Matilal has noted just such a
puzzlement on the part of a contemporary western philosopher
unfamiliar with the Indian tradition. He was asked by
Arthur Danto in private correspondence as to the exact
relationship between the quest for moka, supposedly the main
goal of the ancient Indian philosophers, and the highly
technical arguments which Matilal had brought to his atten-
tion. When Indian philosophy is discussed out of context,
"sanitized" as if it were just one more view being presented
at some contemporary philosophical conference, it might be all
too easy to overlook such questions. 	 When, however, the
cultural milieu of those philosophers is recalled, this kind
of puzzlement becomes very real. 	 As Matilal himself says,
"How do these questions become relevant here at all?"
[Matilal (1986) p. 17 ] .	 Hence philosophers working with
different traditions need a broad conception of their task if
13
they are to understand Indian thought in terms which are
intelligible to the western intellectual tradition but which do
not distort the material. In my thesis I have always tried to
trace the roots of the arguments back to the Upaniadic
tradition, and indeed begin my thesis with an introductory
chapter on Upaniadic philosophy. I have included such passages
not just for the benefit of readers unfamiliar with Indian
philosophy but because only by relating the later technical
developments to the much earlier Upaniadic speculations can we
begin to understand the meaningfulness of the debate for the
original protagonists.
In cross-cultural philosophy Stroud's approach is
mirrored by those who insist that in order to understand
Indian thought philosophers have to broaden their intellectual
base. This is clearly illustrated in the work of Steven
Collins who argues at the beginning of his book on the
Buddhist notion of the person that:
• . . philosophical reflection should not proceed in
abstraction from intellectual history and anthropo-
logy, from the investigation and comparison of
cultures. Just as anthropology hopes, by means
of the ethnographic study of other societies,
eventually to illuminate both the specific nature of
our own society and the general nature of all
societies, so I think that philosophy should hope
eventually to illuminate both the specific nature of
its own inherent concerns and presuppositions and
perhaps the general nature of human thought (if such
exists) by studying the intellectual history of its
own, and other traditions. 	 [Collins (1982) p. 1]
This type of approach is particularly important when the
subject of investigation is a concept such as tman which is
so closely bound up with the beliefs and institutions of a
14
particular society. There are certain concepts in any
society, those which Geertz calls "experience—near concepts",
which people use so naturally and spontaneously that "they do
not, except fleetingly and on occasion, recognize that there
are any 'concepts' involved at all" [Geertz (1983) p. 58]
Philosophers are often accused of presuming that the catego-
ries with which they operate are somehow natural:
No doubt, in so far as the philosophers suppose
themselves to be working a priori, purely by means
of reasoning from first principles, they exemplify
the characteristic error of non—sociologists who,
unaware of the history and pre—history of the
fundamental notions with which they operate, naively
regard them as natural. [Allen in Carrithers,
Collins and Lukes (1985) p. 30]
Philosophers, anthropologists and sociologists have pondered
the question of whether there are any categories which are
necessary and hence universal to human thought, but to nave1y
presuppose that the western categories of thought such as
"person", "self", "individual" et cetera are universal can
lead to a great deal of ambiguity and confusion when investi-
gating a culture other than one's own. These concepts
are very much rooted in our culture and its history and we
should not presume their direct equivalents in other socie-
ties.	 This is especially the case when studying Indian
culture where the organization of its society into castes, for
example, is so different from our societal institutions. The
work of Louis Dumont has shown that a true understanding of
the caste system is possible only when we leave behind our
preconceived notions of what it means to be an individual.'5
15
Although a western philosopher may detect something of a
Cartesian element in the Nyya view of the tman ("self") or a
Humean element in the Buddhist view of anãtman ("no—self"), a
philosopher who presumes from the outset that "tman" and
"self" are direct equivalents is liable to make comparisons in
which the supposed Indian concept of "self" is a chimera. The
concept of self is not a fixed entity that "pops up" in
different cultures where thinkers can affirm or deny it, but
rather it is a culturally determined idea, an organic part of
the presuppositions and concerns of a particular culture. Hence
a broader understanding of the cultures from which such notions
as "self' and "tman" derive is a task prior to valid compara-
tive philosophy.
Given the critical nature of the philosophical disci-
pline, it is only to be expected that the study of Indian
philosophy is often wedded to a critical assessment of the
views found therein.	 Indeed, it is this which makes such
studies attractive to most contemporary philosophers. Whilst
in the preceding comments I have been concerned to show the
complexities involved in treating this subject matter and the
need for caution in the application of tools of contemporary
philosophical analysis, it seems inevitable that a philosopher
with an analytical background will engage upon the tasks of
comparison and criticism:
For while the basic philosophical motivation of the
ancients might have been very different from those
of present—day philosophers, several important
questions do seem to coincide to a considerable
extent with those discussed today. [Matilal (1968)
p. 2]
16
There will always be a tension between the accurate presenta-
tion of the classical theories of Indian philosophy and their
critical assessment and comparison with modern theories.
Obviously before a philosophical system can be assessed it
must be understood and hence the balance should be weighted
heavily towards a careful analysis of the texts. It would be
unrealistic to expect a philosopher to transcend his or her
intellectual background and in my thesis it is obvious,
I think, that my training in analytical philosophy has been
central for my understanding of the texts involved. I have
also engaged in some comparative work and I hope this has
served to present the material in a way which makes it
interesting for the western philosopher yet is fair to the
material involved.1.6
17
Chapter One
THE UPANISADIC BACKGROUND
In the last decade, some of us have become
increasingly aware that modern individualism,
when seen against the background of the other
great civilizations that the world has known,
is an exceptional phenomenon.
Louis Dumont (1985) p. 93
The Nyya philosopher, in common with most of the other
philosophers of India, accepted as fundamental a world view which
can be mapped out by means of the following three ideas:
(1) sarhsãra, the round of rebirth; the cycle of temporal
existence, usually associated with the experience of
suffering.
(2) karma, a significant action; actions, both good and
bad, result in appropriate retribution, a principle
which provides fuel for the sarhsãric process.
(3) mok.a, liberation from the plane of existence
circumscribed by the sathsãra/karma dyad.
Together these ideas form a view of man's place in the world
which became the sine qua non for nearly all post—Upaniadic
religious speculation. The problems of existence to which
philosophers addressed themselves, such as how to escape an
endless cycle of birth and death were generated by this framework
of beliefs. There were some schools of thought, such as the
materialist Cãrvãka school, that rejected this bedrock of
beliefs, and posited a radical alternative in which the
traditional problems of existence made no sense. Such schools,
however, did not ultimately survive. So crucial was this set of
beliefs to Indian thought that Weber declared it to be one of
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"the rare dogmatic beliefs of Hinduism".' Its acceptance went
beyond the boundaries of the orthodox schools of Hinduism, for it
lies at the heart of non-orthodox schools such as Buddhism and
Jainism too. Dumont's comment on the Buddha's teaching that
"without transmigration the liberation or extinction which he
recommends would lose all meaning" [Dumont (1980) p. 277 11 would
also hold true of most Indian religious thought.
The ideas that together make up this world view which seems
so much part of Indian thought were formed in northern India
during the first millennium B.C. This was a period of great
upheaval associated with the breakdown of the old tribal
institutions of the Aryans, as society became increasingly
urbanized and specialized. Such major societal changes led to an
upsurge in religious creativity which resulted not only in the
transformation of the sacrificial Vedic religion of the Aryans
into something more recognizably "Hindu", but also in the
.tcrzratioz o.f	 wo new major religious traditions in India,
Buddhism and Jainism.
The Upaniads, texts composed over a period of several
hundred years from about 800 B.C., record the major changes which
took place in Vedic thought during this time from a sacrificial
and mythological idiom to one which was more speculative and
"philosophical". Although the Upaniads introduce important new
ideas into Indian speculation, at the same time they show a
significant continuity with the Brãhmaias (Vedic texts composed
by the orthodox priests which dealt specifically with ritual
performance and meaning).	 Certainly the Upaniads include
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important contributions made by thinkers other than the orthodox
priests —kings such as Jaivali Pravhana (B.U. VI ii), women
such as Grgi Vacaknav (B.U. III viii), ascetics such as the
wandering vrãtyas 2 - but a careful reading of the Upaniads and
Br ghmaias shows that such material was incorporated into changes
that were already developing from the logic of the Vedic
sacrificial world view.
This cultural heritage provided the framework against which
Nyãya activity took place. We have also seen that some
contemporary commentators, such as Daya Krishna (see Introduction
footnote 7), question the relevance of this complex of ideas to
the actual philosophy of the Naiyãyikas. Whilst the interests of
the Nyãya philosophers sometimes seem to stray from this cultural
heritage, I intend to show that this world view forms an integral
and important aspect of their system. The Upaniads, though
still tied to a sacrificial idiom, developed a conceptual
apparatus crucial to our understanding of Indian philosophy in
general, and the Nyaya system in particular. The Upaniadic
categories of sathsra, karma, and moka were especially important
in shaping the intellectual vocabulary of the Nyya and other
Indian philosophers. I shall now discuss each of these in turn.
S a th s ãr a
The Upaniads introduce to Indian philosophy the view that
an individual's destiny is to be one of repeated rebirth into the
world unless some means of escape is found.
In the Brhmaias the correct performance of the sacrifice
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could win for the practitioner firstly, amttam (non-dying, which
in the case of human beings means a full life) and secondly,
rebirth into the devaloka (world of the gods) after death. Just
as worldly life had to come to an end, so too did life in the
devaloka, and we find the development of the idea that the end of
man's sojourn in that world was brought about by his return to
earth. 3 In the B.U. and C.U., where the idea of saihsra is first
introduced, its manner of presentation is full of allusions to
the brahmanical sacrifice (C.U. V x verses 1-10 and B.U. VI ii
verses 13-15). The Upaniadic doctrine of transmigration is a
development out of brahmanical sacrificial thought itself and
thus represents a transition from the Brhmaxas to the fully
fledged doctrines of classical Hinduism. The exact mechanism of
the process, just what it is that transrnigrates and the
attainment of a final state which transcends all spatio-temporal
context are still not clearly articulated. These are all options
left open which were taken up and made more precise by the later
Indian schools such as Nyãya.
Karma
Another central belief of Indian thought, the idea that the
quality of future lives is governed by present actions, is one
which makes its appearance from the time of the Upaniads,
onwards. In the B.U., when Yãjavalkya is questioned by
Artabhga as to the whereabouts of a man after his death and
dissolution, Yãjavalkya introduces him to the idea that by good
works a man becomes good and by evil works he becomes evil (B.U.
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iii ii verse 13).
Again, the relevance of ideas already present in the
Brãhmaiias should not be overlooked. In the Brãhmaias, karma is a
central idea but its meaning there is much more specific, being
confined to ritual actions performed during a sacrifice. Such
actions were believed to have great power since the correct
performance of the sacrifice sustained the order of the universe
—this power being an automatic consequence dependent only on the
ritual being carried out correctly. The re—creation of the
individual after his death in another loka is also an important
theme in the Brhmaias —an example of future life being
governed by actions in the present, although in this case by a
priest on the individual's behalf (Kauitak! Brhmaiia Upaniad II
vi).
The broader meaning that karma has in classical Hinduism
represents an extension of the power associated with ritual
action to all actions, or conversely, all our actions become
ritualized. This extension came about partly as a result of
developments in sacrificial thought which placed more emphasis on
the interior aspects of the sacrifice and partly as a result of
the attempt by brahmanical priests to incorporate various ascetic
practices into the schema of sacrificial thought (see pp. 40-41
below). The teachings of the Buddha with their ethical emphasis
were also an important influence on brahmanical thought. His
ethical interpretation of karma gave it a more universal meaning
in contrast to the physicalist understanding found in the
Brhmaas and early Upaniads, where karma was bound up with the
22
The Upaniadic Background
sustaining power of the sacrificial mechanism.
In later Indian philosophy the concept of karma became a
crucial point of debate, especially between the Buddhist and
orthodox schools. Although both parties accepted karma as an
operative principle and needed to accommodate it within their
respective systems, they dealt with the questions left unanswered
by the Upaniads —such as how karma is actually carried forward
from one life to the next— in markedly different ways. 	 The
arguments between the Nyãya school and the Buddhists were
particularly vigorous on this issue. The Nyãya philosophers saw
karma to be a crucial element in the defence of their particular
anthropology —an anthropology wedded to the beliefs of an
eternal tman and the discreteness of personal identity— against
the Buddhist contention that ethical causality and retribution
could be explained without relying on a concept of ttself?t.
Indeed, according to the Buddhists, not only was this a possible
explanation but also an ethically superior one.
Moka
Whilst the Vedic hymns celebrated the joys of life, the
Upaniads increasingly developed a disdain for things of this
world, culminating in the extreme worldly pessimism of the Maitr!
Upaniad (I verses 1-4). Although we read of the Upaniadic
sages competing against each other in verbal contests for gold
and cattle (B.U. III i verse 1), more and more, such worldly
possessions are characterized as being merely transitory and of
no ultimate worth —a reflection, perhaps, of the tumultuous
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changes taking place in society at that time. The doctrine of
transmigration which was developing alongside this increasing
pessimism hence condemned the individual to an endless repetition
of suffering and disappointment with death offering no solution.
The main concern of the Upaniads was therefore to find a
solution to the problem generated by this world view, and
repeatedly we see individuals, in search of release from their
worldly condition, passing—up the offer of worldly goods in
favour of spiritual instruction.6
The worldly pessimism pervading the Upaniads was taken up
with varying degrees by later Indian philosophers. The urgency
of the spiritual quest which we see in the Upaniads was balanced
against the need for the preservation of order in society and the
value of the worldly life. In later texts, such as the Laws of
Manu, we see an attempt to counter the urgency of the Upaniadic
teachings by making the individual's quest for moka subservient
to the needs of society as a whole. 7 I aim to demonstrate that
the "intellectualism" of the Nyya school was another such
attempt to contain the potential anarchy and spiritual
egalitarianism implied by the Upaniadic teachings.
The Upanisadic teachings concerning the nature of moka and
the means by which to attain it are again typically fluid,
showing a speculative rather than a dogmatic approach. At first,
the logic of sacrificial thought governed their approach to the
problem, but gradually we see the Upaniadic thinkers evolving
new ways of thinking which took them further from the sacrificial
idiom.	 This can be seen from an examination of some of the
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elements crucial to the Upanisadic understanding of moka.
Knowledge in the Upaniads
In the fully fledged doctrine of the Upaniads, the esc
from repeated birth and death, or any kind of temporally bo
existence, is declared to be man's final goal. 	 Just as we
see elements of the transmigratory doctrine in the development
the Vedic sacrifice, so we can discern in the Upaniac
conception of final release ideas which have also evolved out
earlier Vedic thought.
The way in which final release is to be attained is by me
of knowledge, knowledge of brahman, the abiding princi
.thder2ying the changing universe. Moreover, and this is one
the great Upaniadic insights, in equating brahman, I
underlying principle of the universe, with tman, the underly
principle of the individual, this saving knowledge is brou
within human grasp. These beliefs in the power of knowledge
the possibility of knowing one thing through knowing anoti
reveal the strongest possible link between the Upaniads and
Brhmaias, not only in matters of specific doctrine but also
the wider sense of sharing the same epistemological framework.
The importance of knowledge in Upaniadic thought and
understanding of the specialized nature of the knowledge invol
were points first emphasized by Franklin Edgerton:
What I am now concerned with is a more general and more
fundamental matter, and one which has been commonly
ignored by modern writers, both Hindu and western. The
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philosophy, that is the dogmatic theories of the
Upaniads.
I refer to the instinctive and unquestioning
belief in the inherent power of knowledge, as such,
which underlies the whole intellectual fabric of the
Upaniads, as it appears to me, and furnishes the
motive force behind their speculations. Typical
passages found constantly in all parts of them seem to
me to make it abundantly clear that the reason why they
seek the "truth", any truth, is precisely this, that by
knowledge of the truth they expect to master their
destiny, wholly or partly; and not by any course of
action dictated by that knowledge itself; in brief we
may say magically. [Edgerton (1929) pp. 97-98
By the time of the Brähmaias, the Vedic sacrifice had
developed from a ritual whose successful outcome depended upon
propitiating the gods to one in which success was assured by the
ritual's correct performance. The sacrifice could either compel
the gods to do what the sacrificer desired or could produce the
desired result directly without any supernatural intermediary.
The gods themselves merely became part of a spatio—temporal world
whose order and enduring existence were dependent upon and
manufactured by the regular performance of the sacrifice. This
was because the sacrifice was thought to emulate the original act
of creation, which was itself a sacrifice. 	 In the myth of the
Purua Skta ( Veda X xc), we are told of the sacrifice of the
Primal Man performed by the gods, from which the world arose.
Creation therefore, coming originally from a sacrificial act, was
regenerated only through repeated performances of the sacrifice
at the human level. Hence, for example, the performance of the
fire sacrifice at both dawn and dusk, in correspondence with the
rising and setting of the sun, was carried out in order to ensure
the orderly progression of days and nights.
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In what way did the brahmanical priests think that the
sacrifice achieved its end? A closer look at the Purua Sffkta
reveals the kind of reasoning involved. There, appropriately
enough, we find that in answer to the question, "When they
divided Primal Man into how many parts did they divide him?", it
is said:
The Brahman was his mouth, The arms were made the
Prince, His thighs the common people, And from his feet
the serf was born.! From his mind the moon was born,
And from his eye the sun, From his mouth Indra and the
fire, From his breath the wind was born.! From his
navel arose the atmosphere, From his head the sky
evolved, From his feet the earth, and from his ear the
cardinal points of the compass: So did they fashion
forth these worlds. (g Veda X xc verses 12_14)8
This hymn, having identified purua with the universe, goes on to
systematically correlate the various features of the universe
with the different parts of purua. The purua is an appropriate
reference point by means of which identities established between
him and the universe can at the same time be ranked into some
kind of hierarchy. Thus, for example, the hierarchical nature of
society is appropriately reflected in a symbolism which relates
the üdras (the servile class) to his feet, the vaiyas (the
artisan class) to his thighs, the katriyas (the warrior class)
to his arms, and the brhmans (the priestly class) to his mouth.
Although the idea of creation as sacrifice is one which appears
repeatedly throughout the Vedas, the symbolism of this hymn is
important for its all—embracing logic which relates the natural,
human and divine aspects of creation to the phenomenon of the
sacrifice. The linking by systematic identities of the different
orders of creation was not thought to be merely a matter of
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convention, but rather the discovery of some natural and
essential connection. Those who knew the analogues between the
sacrifice and other levels of reality had a method whereby they
could bring creation under their control. This analogical basis
to the efficacy of the sacrifice became the basis of an
increasing priestly power. The priests were not just officials
performing the sacrifice on behalf of wealthy patrons, but were
the custodians of ritual secrets, knowledge of which made them
the powerful masters of the cosmos. Knowledge became imbued with
a magical power, to know the sacrificial equivalent of any
phenomenon was to have power over it. This explains why in the
Brhmatias we see such a preoccupation with establishing the
ritual's equivalences. Also, it must be remembered that this
interpretation of the sacrifice was part of a more widespread
pattern of belief which made use of spells and incantations for
the achievement of every kind of human desire. These formulae
were recorded in the fourth book of the Vedas, the Atharva Veda,
and it is interesting to note that this was also the most
speculative book of the Vedas. The speculative nature of the
Atharva Veda is no mere accident since it represents an extension
of the logic underlying the belief in the efficacy of spells and
incantations to more metaphysical areas. A large portion of
Upaniadic thought is very clearly prefigured in the speculations
of the Atharva Veda and on closer inspection the doctrines of the
Upaniads also reveal a pattern of thought whose logic is the
same as that which underlies the magical thought of the Atharva
Veda.
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As Franklin Edgerton has cogently argued, the rationale
behind this pattern of thought is based upon a belief in the
power of knowledge. This power which was attributed to knowledge
is often called "magical" because it is the very act of knowing
that is effective rather than being able to do something because
of that knowledge:
The knowledge of a procedure, its psychic image, is
magically connected to the procedure. The knower,
precisely thru the fact that he knows, - not because
thru his knowledge he acts skillfully and correctly,
but by reason of the power of the knowledge itself ....
possesses power over the entity known. 	 [Oldenberg
(1919) p. 5 quoted in Edgerton (1929) p. 98]
This belief is the basis of those Vedic incantations whose
efficacy lies in grasping the name of the object to be
manipulated (for example Atharva Veda VII xii verse 2). Yet it
is also operative in those early metaphysical speculations which
seek to identify the underlying principle of the universe. The
sacrifice, the use of spells, and the metaphysical quest are all
therefore connected.	 Just as the relationship between the
sacrifice and the world was considered to be a natural
efficacious connection, so was the relationship between language
and the world. They are all based on a logic of equivalences
which gives power to those who know the identities to control one
of the pair by means of their knowledge of the other. Hence
those who know the sacrificial analogues have power to control
the natural world through their knowledge of the sacrifice, and
those who know the "real" name of an object have power over that
object in virtue of knowing its name. 	 Moreover, this power of
language became important in the sacrifice itself and increased
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the importance of the use of sound in the sacrifice. The hymns
became fixed formulae to be sung according to a strict meter and
they became chants imbued with an efficacious power all of their
own.
This emphasis on knowledge pushed to its extreme implication
would have endangered the actual performance of the sacrifice
for, when knowledge becomes the all—important element, a mental
re—enactment of the ritual would of itself be efficacious.
Although the physical performance of the sacrifice wasn't usurped
in this way, we constantly read in the Brhmaxas that he who
performs the ritual "knowing thus" (evath vidvãn) obtains the
benefit.	 This is an idea that is also ever present in early
Upani.adic thought (B.U. IV i verse 2). 9	Conversely, the
performance of the ritual without the appropriate knowledge
becomes a dangerous enterprise (C.U. I xi verse 4).
	 Elsewhere,
in the B.U., we read of the unfortunate kalya whose ignorance
resulted in his head falling off and robbers making away with his
bones (B.U. III ix verse 26).
We conclude then, that the philosophy underlying the Vedic
sacrifice became increasingly "magical":
Here is, if you like, a true "blend"; but not a blend
between magic and philosophy. Rather, a blend between
ritual religion on the one hand and magical philosophy
or philosophic magic on the other. And in this blend,
ritualistic religion is the moribund element. Magical
philosophy constantly tends to get the upper hand.
[Edgerton (1929) pp. 107-108]
Many aspects of Upanisadic thinking are essentially a
continuation of the earlier Vedic sacrificial thought. We find
in the early U pani?ads the same belief in the power of knowledge:
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Now, there are verily, three worlds, the world of men,
the world of the fathers, and the world of the gods.
The world of men is to be obtained through the son
alone, .... the world of the fathers by works (rites),
the world of the gods by knowledge. The world of the
gods is verily the best of the worlds. Therefore they
praise knowledge. (B.U. I v verses 16_17)10
We find in many places the same belief in the special power of
language, of knowing the identity of something:
Brahman, indeed, this was in the beginning. 	 It knew
itself only as "I am Brahman". Therefore it became all
This is so even now.	 Whoever knows thus, "I am
Brahman", becomes this all. (B.U. I iv verse 10)11
and:
Whoever knows that this quarter of brahman is in four
parts and that it is called the "luminous", whoever
reveres it as such, himself becomes luminous in this
world. Yes, whoever thus knows that this quarter of
brahman is in four parts and that it is called the
Luminous", whoever reveres it as such, wins for
himself luminous states of being (loka). (C.U. IV v
verse 3)12
The same belief in the theory of equivalences persists also into
the early Upaniads.	 Yãjflavalkya, when defending his right to
drive away king	 cows, gave instructions on the ritual
equivalences:
"Yj?ava1kya" said he, "since everything here is
pervaded by death, since everything is overcome by
death, by what means does the sacrificer free himself
from the reach of death?"	 (Yj?avalkya said) "By the
hotj priest, by speech.	 Verily speech is the hott of
sacrifice.	 That which is this speech is this fire.
This fire is hotr.
	
This is freedom, this is complete
freedom." (B.U. iii i verse 3)13
The Upaniadic thinkers in their quest for release from the
temporal world sought knowledge of the identity of that which
transcended that world, something which was not subject to birth
or death, not subject to suffering and something which was not
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subject to change. The basic logic underlying such a quest
represents an extension of the logic underlying the quest for the
correct sacrificial analogues.
The identification of this entity as brahman is again
something which evolved out of Vedic thought. The term "brahman't
seems originally to have meant a sacred utterance or incantation,
and gradually came to signify the power residing in the utterance
which was responsible for its efficacy. Brahman was thus the
natural choice for those seeking some unifying principle
underlying the whole of creation.
It is at this point that the Upaniadic tradition begins to
break away from Vedic sacrificial thought. One would expect that
the final identification of the underlying principle of the
universe as "brahman" would yield power over all to those who
know this identification. The seekers of such knowledge,
however, do not stop their search at this point but go on to
identify brahman with an equivalent entity. The further
identification of brahman with tman, the underlying principle of
every individual (C.U. III xiv verses 3-5 for example), is also
obviously an extension of Vedic analogical reasoning. Yet what
this does is to introduce a new experiential dimension into
Upariisadic thought. When, for example, Yãjiavalkya is
discoursing to an assembly of priests in a bid to win a herd of
cows, we can detect a new insistent desire for a more immediate
kind of knowledge among some of his questioners.	 Uasta
Ckrãyana asked him:
"explain to me the brahrnan that is immediately present
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and directly perceived who is the self in all things."
(B.U. III iv verse
The equating of brahman with tman is not therefore just a
theoretical proposition but one which suggests the possibility of
experiencing brahman. From this time onwards we find a great
deal of Upaniadic thought is concerned to identify just exactly
which experiential aspect of the individual is equivalent to
brahman - it is not enough to know brahman, the aim is rather to
know that one is brahman:
....But the man who does not desire, he who is without
desire, who is freed from desire, whose desire is
satisfied, whose desire is the self, his breaths do not
depart. Being brahman, he goes to brahman (brahmaiva
san brahmãpyeti). (B.U. IV iv verse 6)1
Thus we find in the Ifpaniads long discourses on sleeping,
rea1Diig id death, since these seecn to be states of being that
in some way transcend the limitations and sufferings of the
world. Eventually in the MicJkya Upaniad, a fourfold
classification of states of consciousness is arrived at, namely:
waking, dreaming, deep sleep and turya or fourth state in which
brahman is directly realized. Once the experience of brahman is
taken out of the range of normal everyday states of consciousness
the need for specialized yogic practice becomes necessary. Hence
the immediacy lies in the fact that knowledge of brahman is
experiential but it is now an experience which is hard to attain.
Thus we see in the Upaniads a shift away from the
ritualistic knowledge of the Vedas to an experiential knowledge.
The adept is not so much one who knows as one who experiences.
This distinction is obviously not a clear one, for sacrificial
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thought still informs these later developments. The reason for
this shift in the Upaniads probably came from factors external
to the Vedic sacrifice (previously alluded to on p. 18) namely
the social changes of the newly urban world of northern India in
the sixth century B.C. which conspired to reduce the group
solidarity of the old tribal units. This meant that there was a
demand for solutions which helped the aspirant transcend the
limitations of this newly created social order where each person
faced the problems of the world alone rather than as part of a
larger unit. With the breakdown of the old world of meaning,
individual persons (used here descriptively) sought
psychologically satisfying answers to perennial problems in terms
of religious experience and metaphysical propositions capable of
standing up to the sort of criticisms more cosmopolitan thinkers
might level. For any solution to be satisfactory the aspirant
would need to experience something that did indeed take him
beyond the limitations of the social world. This was the impetus
behind the quest to "be brahman".
Because of this, ritualistic knowledge becomes in the
Upaniads more of an experiential knowledge. To know that
brahman was the unifying principle of the universe, and to know
that brahman was the equivalent to the tman, was insufficient
unless these formulae were realized at the experiential level.
One might see here a similarity to Russell's distinction between
"knowing that" and "knowledge by acquaintance". Brahman was to
be known in the same way that one can know other things in the
range of personal experience, that is, it was to be known by
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acquaintance.	 The analogy does not completely hold, however,
because of the very nature of moka. To experience the
equivalence of tman and brahman is to enter into a state of
being in which the preconditions for what would normally
constitute knowing do not exist, that is, the distinction between
knower and object of knowledge. As Yãjiavalkya says in his final
answer to Uasta Ckrãyana:
"How should you see the seer of seeing? How should you
hear the hearer of hearing?	 How should you think on
the thinker of thought? How should you understand
(vijf—) the understander of understanding? This Self
that indwells in all things is in you. What is other
than it suffers".	 Then Uasta Cãkrãyana held his
peace.	 (B.U. III iv verses 1_2)16
Language
To characterize the Upaniadic belief in the power of
knowledge as "magical" implies that Upaniadic thinkers were
fundamentally mistaken about the nature of the world, given the
common interpretations of magical thought. Hence we need to be
aware of our own presuppositions about magical thought and
examine more closely the nature of this Upaniadic belief.
Most modern anthropologists have rejected the Frazerian
account of magic which reduced the practice of magic to two
principles, those of homeopathy and contagion, 17 both of which
are empirical beliefs about the world which happen to be false
but which might have been true. More recent interpretations of
magical thought base it upon a misconception about the
relationship between nature and culture. In this analysis,
magical thought is seen to be based upon a misunderstanding of
35
The Upanisadic Background
the relation between language or symbolism and the world. There
are two versions of this so-called symbolic account of magic, the
first of which still seems Frazerian in nature. According to
this version, the magician sees the symbolic action and the
resulting event as two distinct entities, in which the former has
some kind of causal power to produce the latter. On this account
the symbolic enactment in the sacrifice brings about a
corresponding change in the world. According to the second
version, known as the identificationist version, there is no
such distinction for it takes:
its ultimate logic to be that of identification, so
that the ideal-typical magician takes himself to be
really performing the action which he symbolically
enacts. He does not therefore, envisage two distinct
events, the rite and the effect, with some kind of
causal relationship between them. [Skorupski (1976) p.
1411
In this interpretation the symbol participates in the reality
which it represents; symbols are taken to be their objects, and
there is no clear distinction between the symbol and the thing
symbolized. On this account the symbolic enactment is itself the
creative act. John Skorupski, who offers an account of this
identificationist version of the symbolic theory of magic, thinks
it offers some understanding of why a symbolic enactment might be
thought to be efficacious:
We think and speak in words about things: symbols in
contrast stand in for their objects - they make them
present to perception and action. The picture
associated with the first of these two relationships is
one of language which mirrors the world, but remains
independent of it. Such pictures are notoriously
misleading, but in this case it is precisely the
misleading character of the picture which is
suggestive. Words in language refer to objects in the
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world. But symbols are objects in the world - which
stand in for other objects. The relation between words
and things is of conventional reference, in which words
somehow got hooked onto things, and the things 'are
brought to mind'. The relation between symbols and
things is that of conventional identification: symbols
are taken to be their objects. The final piece of the
jigsaw is an often noted point: namely, that
traditional cultures are relatively insensitive to the
distinction between the conventionally constituted and
the naturally given ... [Skorupski (1976) P. 143]
This type of explanation may seem to provide the correct analysis
of Vedic sacrificial thought. The sacrifice was surely based on
the belief that the elements of the sacrifice are symbols which
stand in for objects symbolized. The use of language, which
becomes more and more important in the performance of the ritual,
was but an extension of this belief, for words were seen as
symbols of the objects to which they referred. Indeed, much
earlier than Skorupski, Herman Oldenberg had written of
sacrificial thought in the Vedas that:
We should import something foreign into these plays of
thought if we attempted to trace in them any sharply
defined line of demarcation between the being and the
signifying, between the reality and its representative,
the one overlaps the other. [Oldenberg (1928) p. 21]
To stop short with this explanation, however, still presupposes
that Vedic sacrificial thought rests on an unconscious mistake.
The fault in this kind of explanation is that it analyzes so-
called magical thought in isolation from any kind of supporting
metaphysical context there might be. In Vedic sacrificial
thought the blurring of the distinction between nature and
convention was not an unconscious confusion. 	 Rather, it was
based upon a self-consciously held belief about the nature of the
Sanskrit language.	 Sanskrit was considered to be a perfect
37
The Upanisadic Background
language in which the word and the object were thought to share
the same essential nature. They well recognized the conventional
nature of the vernacular languages and only favoured Sanskrit
with having some essential connection to the world. This belief
in the power of the Sanskrit language and its natural relation to
the world persists in Upaniadic thought. Yet more and more, as
interpretations of the Upaniads came to favour some form of
monistic idealism, this provided a philosophical basis for
identities between words and things and for the brahman/ãtman
equivalence.
Psychology
We have already seen that the Upaniads became increasingly
concerned with psychological questions once moka was located
within the range of human experience.
Sometimes the quest for moksa was framed in terms of
reaching a particular state of consciousness and earlier
Upaniadic thinkers were concerned with exploring the range of
experiences common to individuals in their everyday life. This
led to a threefold classification of human experience into
waking, dreaming and deep sleep states of consciousness (B.U. IV
iii verses 7-22; C.U. viii—xi). These three were arranged in a
hierarchy that conferred greater reality on the dreaming over the
waking state, with the greatest reality of all being conferred on
the deep sleep state which was seen to resemble most closely the
condition of moka. This demotion of the external world was an
important theme which was to strongly influence some, but not
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all, of the later Indian systems. Finally, the Upanisadic
thinkers rejected all three of these states in their quest for
the experiential equivalent of moka (C.U. VIII xi verse 2) and
postulated a further fourth state of consciousness (turiya).
Because of the specialized nature of turTya, moka was removed
from the range of experiences easily accessible to the ordinary
individual:
Conscious of neither within nor without, nor of both
together, not a mass of wisdom, neither wise nor
unwise, unseen, one with whom there is no commerce,
impalpable, devoid of distinguishing mark, unthinkable,
indescribable, its essence the firm conviction of the
oneness of itself, bringing all development to an end,
tranquil and mild, devoid of all duality, such do they
deem this fourth to be. (MiJikya Upaniad verse 7)18
At other times the quest was seen more in terms of
identifying that entity in each individual which transcended all
spatio—temporal limitations and was equivalent to brahman, the
underlying principle of the cosmos (B.U. III iv verses 1-2; C.U.
III xiv verses 3-5). This meant that the Upaniadic thinkers
were interested in the individual as a composite entity made up
of different elements, one of which was crucial for the
attainment of moka. Perhaps the best known analysis is that
which occurs in the Katha Upaniad where the individual is
analyzed as consisting of body (arira), senses (indriya), mind
(manas), will (buddhi) and the all important transcendental Self
(tman) (Katha Upaniad III verses 3-4).
Obviously these two approaches are intimately connected for
it is the experience of that transcendental aspect in the
individual that constitutes mok?a:
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the fourth is beyond all letters: there can be no
commerce with it; it brings all development to an end;
it is mild and devoid of duality. Such is Om, the very
Self indeed.	 He who knows this merges of his own
accord into the Self, -	 es, he who knows this.
(Mãicükya Upaniad verse 12)1
All these speculations were enormously influential for later
Indian thought, for they develop a psychological vocabulary and
understanding which became a common currency for subsequent
philosophers. In a more general way too, Upaniadic psychology
is considered crucial for the development of classical Hinduism.
Following Mauss, many anthropologists have seen a general
pattern in the emergence of the great religious traditions of the
world:
in the evolution of prayer and other religious
phenomena the two great currents were spiritualisation
(i.e., interiorisation) and individualisation. [Mauss
in Carrithers, Collins and Lukes (1985) p. 35]
These "two great currents" are an important part of the
development of Upaniadic psychology.
We have already seen that in the development of the Vedic
sacrifice the key to its success came to be associated with
knowledge, knowing the sacrificial equivalents and knowing how to
perform the ritual. Although the rituals continued to be
actually performed, this emphasis on knowledge made the
"interior" aspects of the sacrifice all important. Logically it
would seem that the mental performance of the sacrifice should
itself be efficacious. We can see this emphasis at work in the
emergence of a new priestly role, that of the brhman. His role
was essentially that of a supervisor, and he had no active part
in the ceremony. He performed his role of correction through the
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recitation of appropriate mantras from his place near the main
fire altar.2°
Once the emphasis was shifted away from the manual portion
of the sacrifice, the idea of the inner sacrifice allowed for the
assimilation of asceticism into the sacrificial tradition.
Indeed, asceticism was no stranger to Vedic thought and had an
important role in the sacrifice. In order to prepare for the
ritual, the sacrificer had to undergo a period of fasting and
meditation, known as the dik	 ceremony [Hubert and Mauss (1964)
p. 20-21]. The practice of asceticism was thought to bestow
great power on the ascetic, and the association of asceticism
with power (tapas) 21- was a widespread belief which persisted far
beyond the time of the Vedas. During the time of the Upaniads
it seems that many ascetics practiced various forms of austerity,
such as breath control, and these were gradually incorporated
into the sacrificial idiom. In addition to the interiorisation
of the sacrifice, the myth of the Purua Sikta also aided this
process since it provided a mediating link between the Vedic
sacrifice and the performance of bodily austerities. The Purua
Skta had already formulated the body as a site of sacrifice and
hence it was natural to replace the physical elements of the
sacrifice with the physiological functions of the body (C.U. V
xix—xxiv). Yet once again, there is in the Upaniads a further
development for the role of asceticism beyond the knowledge/power
complex that was at the root of the sacrificial idiom. The
practice of asceticism was given a new experiential importance
once it became part of the psychological framework developed in
41
The Upaniadic Background
the Upaniads. The Upaniads had moved towards a psychology in
which moka was equated with some state of consciousness or
transcendental entity that had no discourse with the world.
Hence for an individual to achieve moka it was necessary for him
to cut the ties that bound him to the world. Asceticism was the
means by which the aspirant could overcome the constitutional
attraction his senses felt for worldly things, leaving him free
to turn his senses inwards and pursue his goal of moka.22
Asceticism and its role in world renunciation were to remain
important themes in later Indian thought.
Regarding the second of the "two great currents", Mauss
believed that India was one of the earliest civilizations to
intellectually express the idea of individuality. In his essay,
"A category of the human mind: the notion of person; the notion
of self" he states:
India appears to me indeed to have been the most
ancient of civilizations aware of the notion of the
individual, of his consciousness 	 may I say, of the
'self' (moi). Ahathkãra, the creation of the 'I' (j),
is the name of the individual consciousness, aham
equals 'I' (je): It is the same Indo European word as
'ego'.	 [Mauss in Carrithers, Collins and Lukes (1985)
p. 13}
What we have to be careful of in this discussion is to
distinguish between the different connotations of the word
"individual": it can be used to refer to the empirically distinct
biological organism and in this sense the term carries no
cultural baggage and is universally applicable to all
societies. 23
 It is clear, however, that Mauss is concerned in
his essay with examining the concept of the individual which is
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embodied by the institutions and value systems of any particular
society. His remarks on ancient India propose that Indian
thinkers formulated notions of the individual similar to those
found in modern western society. Mauss then goes on to make the
further point that India ".... invented it, only to allow it to
fade away almost irrevocably" (Ibid). Mauss believed that the
Upaniads denied the value of the individual, "esteeming that the
'self' (mol) is the illusory thing" (Ibid). Because this theme
was taken up by later systems (he cites Saihkhya, Buddhism and
Upaniadic monism), Mauss proposed that individualism as an ideal
was never allowed to become the basis of Indian civilization - a
fact made apparent in the organization of Indian society into
castes.
The Upaniads do indeed develop the notion of the ego
consciousness 24 but if we look at the soteriological teachings of
the Upaniads the same point is made time and time again, that
liberation can only come about when the aspirant transcends this
ego consciousness. There are several cosmogonic myths in the
Upaniads that describe the creation of the manifold world coming
about when the undifferentiated brahman or Being calls itself "I"
(C.U. VI ii verses 1-3; C.tJ. VI iii verses 1-3).
For the first time Being calls itself aham, "1", and
enters the created elements through the individual
self; the jTvtman is the tman of the living being,
that is as being made individual and separated from
other beings. It is eternal as one with Being or
Brahman, but not as being individual. At the same time
its individualizing function is taken into account: the
individual self is what will differentiate names and
forms, that is, the empirical world.	 [Biardeau (1965)
p. 75]
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Hence liberation from the spatlo—temporal world comes about by
reversing this process, overcoming one's individuality, one's
sense of I—ness:
Implicitly, it means that liberation from the empirical
world, liberation from rebirth, must come through the
negation of empirical individuality. (Biardeau Ibid)
This relationship between the creative process and the path
to liberation is seen clearly in a passage from the C.U. where
Uddãlaka Aruni gives instruction to his son Svetaketu. First,
he explains to his son that the empirical world rests upon the
separation of an individual consciousness:
That same primal substance had this thought: "Come, let
me enter into these three secondary substances with
this my living Self and thereby differentiate name and
form. (CdT. VI iii verse )25
He then goes on to teach him by a series of metaphors that in
truth there is no separation between him and the primal substance
of the universe. The following is just one example:
As bees, my son, make honey by collecting the juices of
many trees and reduce this juice to a unity, yet those
juices cannot perceive any distinction there so that
any of them might know: "I am the juice of this tree,"
or "I am the juice of that tree," so too, my son, all
these creatures here, once they have merged into Being
do not know that they have merged into Being ... This
finest essence, - the whole universe has as its Self;
That is the, Real: That is the Self: That you are stat
tvam asi), Svetaketu. (C.U. VI ix verses 1-2 & 4)2
Biardeau believes that all the metaphors employed by Uçldãlaka
point to one truth, that one's personal identity and sense of ego
have to be shed in order to achieve moka:
there is no reality apart from Being and the individual
self must realize this truth even in the wakeful state
in order to merge with Being forever at the time of
death, and thus never be born again. vetaketu must
forget even his personal identity if he wants to become
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one with l3rahman. Conversely the empirical beings that
are reborn again and again forget that they have come
out of Being once they are born as such and such an
individual being with its own name. But this must not
hide the truth of their common origin, of their
fundamental unity and identity in Brahman. [Biardeau
(1965) p. 7411
There is no doubt that this way of thinking has an important
place in Indian thought but the relationship between the
speculative thought of India and the organization of its society
into castes is more complex than Mauss's work suggests.
Firstly, it would seem that Mauss is proposing a direct
correlation between the metaphysical denial of the individual and
its denial in the caste oriented society. Louis Dumont also
examines this issue and notes firstly that "what one is in the
habit of calling Indian thought is for the very great part the
thought of the sathnysi, that is to say of someone who has denied
society ..."[Dumont (1970)]. 	 Dumont then goes on to locate the
idea of the individual in the institution of world renunciation:
now if we bring together society on the one hand and
the renouncer on the other, we have a whole containing
an equilibrium between quite different things: on the
one hand a world of strict interdependence, in which
the individual is ignored, and on the other hand, an
institution which puts an end to interdependence and
inaugurates the individual. [Dumont (1982) pp. 231-
232]
Dumont therefore locates the idea of the individual with those
responsible for the speculative thought which Mauss has
characterized as being destructive of that idea. Without wishing
to decide the issue at this point, since this will be the subject
of my concluding chapters, I would suggest that Dumont's thesis
certainly indicates a more subtle relationship here than is
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contained in	 thesis.
Secondly, Mauss's overview of Indian Philosophy has been
criticized for being oversimplistic:
Mauss recognizes India as the scene of man's first
formal conception of the self as an individual
conscious entity. Seeing that this discovery was not
followed by the developments which lead in his
evolutionist scheme to the perfection of the category
of the person in the minds of Europeans, he seeks an
explanation for this failure and finds it in the
influence of the Samkhya dualists, Buddhist
impersonalists and Upanishadic monists. Since these
doctrines belong to the earliest accessible stratum of
Indian metaphysics, gaining prominence in the middle of
the first millennium B.C., it appears to Mauss that the
proper growth of the Indian self was prevented at its
birth by views which recognized it only to reject it as
a fiction constitutive of an undesirable worldly
consciousness. What is striking in his cursory
treatment is not so much his evolutionism as the
inadequacy of his evidence and his lack of sociological
and historical perspective.	 Firstly the relevant
intellectual culture of India was much more than these
three renunciationist doctrines. 	 They were important
but they were also vigorously opposed.
	
[Sanderson in
Carrithers, Collins and Lukes (1985) p. 190]
Indian philosophy is certainly far more complex than the three
early systems alluded to by Mauss and it is important to remember
that not all systems were so clearly renunciationist as the ones
which he mentions. Inevitably Indian thought became more complex
as the areas of debate became more clearly defined.
The style of Upanisadic thought is poetic and metaphorical.
It would be inaccurate to impute to the Upaniads a single
dogmatic position since their spirit was so much one of enquiry
and speculation. It was this open—mindedness that allowed for
subsequent philosophers to draw different interpretations from
the texts to support their viewpoints.
Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the Upanisadic
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teachings concerning the relationship between the individual
consciousness and the attainment of moka and we need to be aware
of some of the finer distinctions that are not laid bare in the
Upani?ads. For example, the declaration by Uãlaka to his son
Svetaketu, "tat tvam asi" became known as one of the great
sayings of the Upani?ads (mahvkya) and became the focus of much
heated debate in the later philosophical schools. Sañkara's
advaita—vedãnta school posited just one cosmic self from the
point of view of absolute reality and hence the point of this
saying is to identify tvam (you) with tat (that, i.e., the cosmic
brahman). Ramãnuja's viitãdvaita—vedãnta school posited that
even from an absolute point of view there is still some
distinction between the individual self and the cosmic self and
hence the references to tat and tvam in this saying were not
exactly coterminous. In the Sãthkhya system the individual
consciousness is absolutely discreet and is known as purua. In
the passages from the Upaniads used to illustrate the necessity
of transcending the "separated" consciousness in order to attain
moka the distinction between individual consciousness and the
ego or "1" consciousness is not always clear. In the Sãthkhya
system the individual consciousness or purua stands in isolated
purity on the attainment of liberation but it is an individual
consciousness free of any consciousness of "I".
This is not to say that Upaniadic thought was muddled or
incoherent. Its nature was essentially enigmatic and we have
seen that there is a definite pattern in the evolution of a whole
complex of ideas relating to language, knowledge, psychology and
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soteriology.	 Hence it is possible to speak in general terms of
an Upaniadic world view.
The transition from the classical Upaniads to the clearly
demarcated philosophical schools of a later period was obviously
a complex process. Broadly speaking, the emergence of systematic
thought in India may be seen as a consequence of such a milieu of
variant soteriological and metaphysical speculation as is found
in the Upaniads. Out of the need for apologetic defence,
traditions became more sharply defined schools, developing
rational systems whereby their claims to religious understanding
could be justified and the claims of others refuted. The move
towards distinct schools, in both orthodox and non—orthodox
traditions, was an inevitable transition when the original ideas
of the enigmatic sages of the Upaniads fell prey to later
thinkers concerned to clarify those ideas. The Nyãya system was
one such school to emerge out of this crystallization of ideas.
The Nyya system is counted as one of those systems which is
less closely associated with the Upaniads than some of the
others, such as Sãthkhya and Advaita Vednta. Indeed, the early
Nyya philosophers themselves seemed concerned to distance
themselves from the Upaniadic tradition. For example, in his
commentary of the Nyya Sfftras, Vatsyayana wants to make clear
that the Nyya system is dealing with a branch of knowledge that
is something more than the tmavidy (knowledge of ãtman) of the
Upaniads. 27 Yet in some areas it will be seen that the Nyãya
system continued to be influenced by the Upaniads in ways which
went beyond the sarhsãra/moka complex of ideas. 	 There is the
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same concern with developing a coherent framework of ideas
relating to ontology, language, epistemology, psychology and
soteriology, and in each of these areas the Upaniads continued
to exert their influence. By examining Nyãya thought in each of
these areas we will be able to arrive at an understanding of the
Nyãya world-view.
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Chapter Two
INTRODUCTION TO UDAYANA'S ATMATATTVAVIVEKA
The Nyya school opted for a belief in a plurality of Selves
(ãtmnab), thus rejecting an interpretation of the Upaniads in
which, from a absolute point of view, there was only one,
universal ãtman, an interpretation taken up later by the Advaita
Vedãnta school. The main opposition to the Nyaya school,
however, came from the Buddhist philosophers in India who
rejected completely the idea of an enduring Self - a thesis known
as anãtmavãda. So crucial was this Nyãya/Buddhist debate that it
became the focus for a wide range of philosophical argumentation
and it is, in effect, possible to examine Nyya thought in all of
its important aspects —ontology, language, epistemology,
psychology and soteriology - by looking at the arguments the
Naiyãyikas 1 used to defend their belief in an enduring tman
against the antman theory of their Buddhist opponents. Hence a
study of the Nyãya view of ãtman is an appropriate window through
which to view the various aspects of Nyãya thought and, given the
traditional soteriological significance of ãtman in Indian
thought, it is also a possible means by which to assess the
soteriological intentions of the Nyya system. One text in
particular illustrates the way in which this Nyaya/Buddhist
controversy concerning the existence of tman permeates almost
every area of debate. This is the Atmatattvaviveka (Discernment
of the Reality of Xtman) also known as Bauddhadhikkrarahasya
(The Secret of Defying the Buddhists), written by Udayana in the
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eleventh century A.D.
Traditionally Nyya texts were modelled closely after the
Nyãya Siitras, either in whole or part, and purported to be
commentaries on this work, a collection of terse aphorisms upon
which the school was founded. Udayana himself wrote such a
commentary, the Pariuddhi, which marked the end of the era of
works based on the yya Sütras. 2 In the ATV, TJdayana broke
completely with this mould and instead created a work whose
structure was governed specifically by his desire to introduce
and systematically arrange all the arguments relevant to the
Nyya defence of ãtman. In this text, Udayana draws on all the
major disputes between the Naiyyikas and the Buddhists and
articulates them in such a 'way as to clearly show their relevance
to the tman/anätman debate. He attacks the Sautrãntika,
Vaibhãika, Yogãcãra and Mãdhyamika schools of Buddhism in the
course of this work, and he is credited with producing a work of
such great power that the Buddhists lost their foothold in India
and retreated to Tibet. The demise of Buddhism in India was
certainly a product of more than just this one polemic, the loss
of grassroots support and the Islamic invasions having a great
deal to do with it, but after this work Buddhism suffered a
decline in India and was unable to produce any scholar capable of
refuting Udayana. Thus, a period of fruitful and intense debate
which had lasted for hundreds of years between the Nyya and
Buddhist thinkers came to an end, and Udayana was the last of the
Nyãya thinkers to enjoy the stimulus of a powerful Buddhist
opposition.
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After Gautama, the legendary author of the Nyãya Sütras,
Udayana is probably "the most revered" of all the Nyãya
philosophers. 3 Tradition has it that Udayana came from Mithilã
in northeast India which was a centre of great learning,
especially for the Nyãya school. 4 His skill in debate was of
great repute and was celebrated in mythic tales of his victories
in philosophical disputation, in which he is portrayed as a
figure with almost supernatural powers. In one such tale we read
of his contest with a Buddhist scholar concerning the existence
of tman which took place at the royal court at Mithilã. The
debate was settled by a final contest in which they both flung
themselves from a palm tree. 	 Udayana's views were vindicated
since he survived the fall whereas the Buddhist died. Udayana
was honoured for his victory over the Buddhist by Viiu at Purl
(Lord Jagannatha). Several versions of this story exist: in one
Udayana is shunned because of his responsibility for the death of
another human being and the doors of the temple at Purl were
closed to him. Udayana killed himself by self—burning , rebuking
the god for his ingratitude. 5 Another great victory is recorded
in which he defeated the Advaita Vedãnta philosopher, Srihra, in
debate. SrThara wrote the famous Khaanakhaijakhãdya in which
he vehemently attacks Udayana's views supposedly to avenge the
death of his father, Srihlra. The picture of an academic contest
held at a royal court is one which has been familiar since
Upanisadic times.6
Udayana holds an important place in the Nyäya system not
just because of his brilliance but because his work is an
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important landmark in the evolution of Nyãya thought. In its
later period Nyãya thought became characterized by an increasing
subtlety of argument and a greater preoccupation with the method
rather than the content of the argument. Navya-Nyya, as the
school in its later period is known, is usually said to date from
the fourteenth century with the ground-breaking Tattvacintmaiii
of Gañgea. The subtlety of Udayana's work, however, is such
that many critics regard him as the real source of Navya-Nyya.7
Certainly Udayana's style and rigour look forward to Navya-Nyãya
but at the same time his work brings to fruition arguments that
had been developed by traditional Nyaya philosophers over a
period of several hundred years in their efforts to defeat the
Buddhist opposition.
Although in the ATV Udayana sets out to refute the major
schools of Buddhism, his arguments are directed specifically
against one philosopher, JnarTmitra, whose ideas supplied the
key objections (prvapaka) for most of Udayana's arguments. The
close links between Jiãnarimitra's works and the ATV help us to
arrive at a date for Udayana since scholars have been able to
determine fairly precisely dates for Jinas'ri.
Jnari was one of the leading Buddhist philosophers of his
time and worked in the great Buddhist monastic university at
VjkramaTl where he was one of the "Two Great Pillars of
Wisdom". VikramaIlã had been founded in the eighth century by
Dharmapla, and by the time of Jfiãnas'ri it had become a major
centre for Buddhist learning, attracting scholars from all over
the Buddhist world and exporting its own brand of Buddhism beyond
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the boundaries of India. It was such an interchange that gives
us a precise date for Jiiãnari. Atia, another of Vikraniail's
noted scholars, had been asked to go to Tibet to revitalize
Buddhism there. The members of a second Tibetan mission to
Vikramailã recorded a reception there for the famous Bengali
adept, Naropant. J1ãnar and Atia were noted helping the old
man down from his carriage, implying his seniority to both of
them. 8 Atis'a finally left for Tibet at the age of fifty—nine in
1041 A.D. and we can presume from the evidence that Jiãnari was
his near contemporary. Bhattacharya has used this and other
evidence to argue convincingly that the date given in the
Lakaiiiãvali (See below p. 54) is mistaken and that Udayana was
active in the latter part of the eleventh century A.D. 9 Jiãna6ri
had a younger contemporary in RatnakTrti who was the author of
many texts in which he was responsible mainly for presenting
-	 - _,	
•	 1Jnanasri s teachings in a clearer form. Ratnazirti is also
frequently criticized and quoted by Udayana in his ATV. It was
with these three scholars that a great era of debate between the
Naiyyikas and the Buddhists came to an end. The exchange had
been beneficial to them both in that it had injected each side
with rigour and creativity, and pushed Indian philosophy to ever
increasing levels of insight and sophistication.
The Texts of Udayana
Udayana wrote commentaries on both the Nyya and Vaieika
Sütras as well as independent treatises such as the ATV.	 His
works in order of composition are:'°
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(1) The Lakaivali (The Garland of Definitions):
A manual on the categories of the Vaieika
school. In one manuscript of the Lakaivali
/
its date of composition is given as 906 Saka,
that is, 984-5 A.D., a date which has to be
disputed.
(2) The Lakaarnãlã (The Wreath of Definitions):
A manual on the categories of the Nyya
school.
(3) The Atmatattvaviveka
(4) The Nyyakusurnjali (A Handful of Nyya—tree
Flowers): an independent treatise to prove
the existence of God. It remains a classic
work on the subject in India.
(5) The Nyyapariita (The Nyya Appendix): a
commentary on the fifth chapter of the Nyya
Sütras.
(6) The Nyyavrttikatãtparya!kãpariuddhj: A
commentary on the Nyãya Siitras.
(7) The Kiraiiãvali (The Garland of Rays): A
commentary on the Padãrthadhartnasathgraha, an
early work of the Vai6esika system upon which
the system was built.
Udayana's Atmatattvaviveka
The structure of this thesis Is based loosely on that of the
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ATV. This text was chosen because:
(1) Udayana's position in the Nyãya school is
such that his work is an ideal vantage point
from which to review the thought of the
traditional Nyãya philosophers. He stands at
the end of the era in which I am interested
and he is its culmination.
(2) The ATV serves admirably to carry out my
stated intentions of studying the concept of
tman and understanding how Nyãya functions
as a complete darana. Because of its
breadth of conception it treats its subject
matter in such a way as to give us an
overview of Nyya in all its aspects, as is
shown in the following brief survey of the
work.
Udayana opens the ATV with a short statement concerning the
importance of the study of the ãtman:11
iha khalu nisargapratikülasvabhvaxh sarvajana-
sathvedinasiddharh dubkhath jihãsavab sarva eva
taddhãnopayamavidväthso' nusarantaca sarvAdhy5tma
videkavãkyatayã tattvajffãnameva tadupyam-
ãkartiayanti na tat& nyath, pratiyogyanuyoitay
ca ãtmaiva tattvato jiieyab, tathhi yadi
nairãtmyath yadi vtmãsti vastubhital, ubhayathãpi
naisargikamãtmajianamtattvajnameva ityatrãpy-
ekavãkyataiva vãdinãmata ãtmatattvaih vivicyate.
In this world surely, all people, desiring to abandon
and overcome misery, which is in its very nature
adverse to human nature and well established in human
experience, and not knowing how to discard it, yet
seeking a way to do so, hear through the unanimous
statements of all those who have knowledge of the tman
that the means of avoiding suffering is by knowledge of
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its real nature and none other than that. Hence the
ãtman alone is to be known in its real aspect in order
to counter and overcome suffering. Whether there is no
ãtman or whether there is an tman which is a real
entity, both sides are unanimous in saying that the
knowledge of the tman current amongst the ordinary
people is never the real knowledge.	 Hence the true
nature of the tman is being expounded in this work.
In India philosophical enquiry was meant to have a rational
purpose (prayojana), and in this opening statement Udayana is
presenting the purpose of his enquiry - to know the truth about
tman since this is essential in order to escape the suffering of
life. Given that this is the purpose of the ATV, the legitimacy
of Udayana's work also requires there to be a very real doubt
concerning this issue. Here we see that philosophical debate
should not be argument for argument's sake but rather, according
to the rules of traditional Indian logic, should proceed on the
basis of an initial doubt (sathaya) and have a clear purpose.
The idea of an enduring tman is thus presented at the beginning
as a thesis which is yet to be ascertained because the Buddhists'
counter-arguments to it create a doubt concerning its truth.
Hence TJdayana establishes the propriety of his text in the
opening passage by stating clearly the nature of both the
prayojana and the sarfi'aya.
There are four main obstacles or counter-arguments
(bãdhakas) with respect to establishing the existence of an
enduring tman:'2
tatra bdhakafi bhavadtmani kaiabhañgo v
bahyarthabhañgo v guiagurjibhedabhañgo vã
anupalambho veti.
In respect to the existence of tman, the thesis of
universal momentariness (kaabhañga), or the thesis
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that there are no objects external to our judgements
(bhyrthabhañga), or the thesis that there is no
difference between an object and its qualities
(uiaguibhedabhañga), or the thesis that the ãtman is
not perceived (anupalambha), constitutes a counter-
argument.
Until these counter-arguments are refuted, the doubt concerning
the existence of the ãtman will remain. It is in the course of
refuting these four counter-arguments of the Buddhists that
Udayana has cause to consider most of the important philosophical
debates of his time. This is because, as we shall see, each of
the bãdhakas has a wider significance than its relevance to the
specific debate concerning the existence of the tman.
Hence the ATV falls into four main sections, each one
respectively discussing one of the badhakas.	 The reaiairzing
chapters of my thesis broadly correspond to the structure of the
text itself:
(1) Kaiabhañgavãda. In this first chapter Udayana attacks
the Buddhist thesis that everything which exists is momentary.
This is the first bãdhaka of the Buddhists - that if everything
which exists is momentary then ãtman, being one such existent,
cannot be counted as enduring (nityam). Udayana's refutation of
this thesis would not itself prove the existence of an enduring
tman, but it is necessary to remove this bdhaka in order to
allow for the possibility of such an entity. Udayana therefore,
attempts to remove this bdhaka by demonstrating in general its
falsity.	 In doing this he establishes a pattern which is
repeated in his treatment of the other three bdhakas.
	 It is
this which gives his work such a breadth of scope: he first
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establishes the relevance of the bdhaka for the specific
question of the tman, and then argues against the bdhaka in
general terms. In the course of this section Udayana is
concerned to defend not only the Nyya view of ãtman but also the
realism of the school in general which was similarly threatened
by the Buddhist thesis of momentariness.	 The sequence of
arguments is long (See below pp. 61-66) and I have chosen to
treat this section in two chapters. In Kaiabhañga I, I shall
examine those arguments dealing with the nature of existence and
causality, using it as an opportunity to discuss in general the
ontology of the Nyãya system. In Kaiabhañga II, I shall examine
the arguments relating to theories of meaning, and will use this
as an opportunity to discuss more generally the Nyya
understanding of language.
(2) Bãhyarthabhañga. The bdhaka here is that no objects
exist apart from judgements. 13 Specifically, this bdhaka is an
obstacle to the Nyya view of ãtman inasmuch as tman is
considered to be separate from and external to our judgements.
The more general issue here which Udayana discusses is how we can
know the existence of an external world separate from our
judgements, indeed whether it makes sense at all to talk of an
external world. His specific targets here are (1) the idealism
of the Yogãcara school and their thesis that the separation of
subject and object is merely a mental construction arising out of
ignorance, and (ii) the scepticism of the Mdhyamika school
concerning the possibility of knowledge about an external world.
(3) Guiaguibhedabhañga. The bdhaka here is that there is
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no difference between a quality and the thing which has that
quality. If this were admitted, then there will be no tman over
and above its qualities, that is, the ãtman will no longer be
posited as the locus of judgements. All that will remain is a
stream of momentary judgements:14
astu tarhi uiaguiinorabhedãnnairãtmyam,
kaiika jnamtrapariediti.
Let then, the absence of an tman be due to there being
no difference between the quality and that which
possesses the quality, because this results in the
momentary cognition alone.
In this chapter Udayana examines the idea that there is no guiin
(quality possessor) over and above the guas (qualities). Again
his arguments continue to be directed against the Yogcras but
also the Sautrãntikas who, despite accepting the existence of an
external world, were also phenomenalists.
The arguments in these two chapters, that is Bhyrthabhaña
and GuaguQibhedabhafla, are related inasmuch as Udayana in both
chapters is concerned to examine the nature of our perception and
its relationship to the external world. Hence I have chosen to
treat these two sections together in one chapter.
(Guiaguibhedabhañga is a very short chapter, forming almost an
addendum to the very long Bãhyãrthabhañga chapter to which it
constantly refers. Interestingly enough, there is also no
corresponding section in JfãnarT's works). In discussing these
two chapters my concern will be with the epistemology of the
Nyãya system.
(4) Anupalambhavãda. The bädhaka here is that there is non—
perception of the
	
tman.	 In the Upaniads, it should be
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remembered, moka consisted in just that, a direct perception or
realization of the tman. In this section we find the first
arguments specifically connected with the Nyãya understanding of
tman.	 These positive arguments give us an opportunity to
examine the psychology of the Nyya system.
(5) Conclusion.	 Udayana ends the ATV with more general
reflections on the nature of tman, moka, ivara (God) and the
authority of the Vedas. Like Udayana, I end my study of the
Nyya system with reflections on its soteriology. Hence the ATV
is an admirable vehicle for studying the Nyãya system in its
various aspects - ontology, language, epistemology, psychology
and soteriology. In this concluding chapter of my thesis I will
look at the ways in which these complement each other and assess
how Nyãya functions as a complete darana.
The Style of Argument
The presentation of arguments in the ATV conforms to a set
of precise rules which governed such discourse. One argument
follows another in a carefully ordered sequence that has its own
rationale and, rather like chess, one false move can result in
defeat.	 This reveals the close relationship between public
debate and philosophical discourse in India. For those
unfamiliar with such discourse it can often seem overly complex
and empty, but it was the role of a skilled philosopher to make
sure there were no loopholes in his own arguments and to look for
flaws in those of the opposition. 	 Some familiarity with Indian
logic is essential in order to appreciate the manner in which the
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arguments are presented.
First of all, the overall structure of any chapter can be
shaped by the form of the Indian syllogism, as is clearly seen in
the first chapter of the ATV, the kaiabhañgapariccheda (the
chapter on the thesis of momentariness). An explanation of this
type of inference will therefore provide the key to understanding
the rationale behind the presentation of Udayana's argcuuerzts
here.
The standard form of the Nyya syllogism can be illustrated
by the following example:
There is fire on that hill,
For there is smoke there.
Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen.
There is smoke on that hill, accordingly.
Therefore there is fire there.
In our everyday reasonings we often employ an argument whose
general form is: A is B because of C. For example: "the kitchen
is on fire because there is smoke pouring through the window".
The middle term C or reason (hetu), which in this case is smoke,
can be either adequate or inadequate, and the soundness of the
argument depends on the adequacy of C. In our example the
soundness of the argument and the adequacy of the reason given,
smoke, would depend on the truth of the universal proposition
that wherever there is smoke there is fire. 	 It may appear then
that this is after all a deductive argument whose form is:
There is smoke in the kitchen.
Wherever there is smoke there is fire.
Therefore there is fire in the kitchen.
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But consider:
There is smoke in the kitchen.
Wherever there is smoke there is absence of fire.
Therefore there is absence of fire in the kitchen.
Both of the above arguments are well—formed deductive inferences
and hence, from a logical point of view, valid. Which
conclusion is true depends not on logical form but on the truth
of the premises involved. 	 In assessing these two arguments we
turn our attention away from matters of logical form and judge
the truths of the conclusions on the basis of experience. The
point to be made here is that an argument of the form, "A is B
because of C" may be turned into a deductive type argument by the
introduction of the universal proposition "wherever there is C
there is B". From a formal point of view this may seem to
tighten up the argument, but it merely shifts the problem because
it raises the question of how the truth of the universal
proposition can itself be established.
It was with this problem that Indian logicians became
chiefly preoccupied and hence they did not concern themselves
with developing a purely deductive logic.' 5 Rather, the Indian
form of inference is concerned to give grounds for the assertion
of the universal proposition.
The Buddhist proof of ka1)atva opens with the universal
proposition that whatever exists is momentary (yat sat, tat
kaiiikam). Here "existence" is given as the reason (hetu) for
the inferable property (sãdhya) of "momentariness". According to
the rules of Buddhist logic, the universal proposition cannot be
asserted unless it is supported by both an agreeing example
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(sãdharmva-drtnta) and a disagreeing example (vaidharrnya-
dnta). In the sdharmya-dçãnta the reason (hetj) and the
inferable property are both present, and in the vaidharmya-
dtnta the reason and the inferable property are both absent.
Thus the correct form of the proof, when presenting the case to
other people, would have the form:
A is B because of C.
Wherever there is C there is B.	 (1)
Like x.	 (2)
Unlike y.
	 (3)
This kind of proof was formulated by the great Buddhist logician,
Dignga, and is characterized by the threefold logical mark
(tririipaliñga), inasmuch as the hetu must be concomitantly
present with the sdhya, present in the similar example and
absent in the dissimilar example. The differences to modern
western logic lie in the use of empirical examples and in the
metaphysical assumptions which play a role in the argument.'6
The exigencies of this type of proof give rise to further
logical problems, and both the Buddhists and Naiyyikas in
discussing kaI)atva were very much concerned with the
difficulties generated by the proof itself. Udayana then begins
his refutation of kaiiatva by examining the first part of the
proof:
yat sat, tat kaiiikam. 	 That which exists, that is
momentary.
yath ghaa.	 Like a pot.
This is the positive form (anvaya) of the proof, which seeks to
establish an invariable concomitance (pratibandha) between
existence and momentariness. In this section Udayana examines
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the Sautrãntika/Yogacrä notion of existence, especially the
metaphysical assumption which equates existence with the capacity
to produce an effect (arthakriykãritva). Udayana counters this
idea with the Nyãya account of causality where change and
endurance are not seen as incompatible properties. In the anvaya
form of the inference Udayana is concerned to defend the Nyaya
belief in enduring substances which may perdure through surface
changes. It is essentially an argument with the Buddhists "on
what there is", that is an ontological argument. Hence I devote
one chapter to this first step in the argument, and use it as an
opportunity to examine the ontology of the Nyãya system.
Having dealt with the positive form of the inference,
Udayana then turns to the negative form (vyatireka). The
citation of a negative example would support a contraposed form
of the thesis:
Whatever is non—momentary does not exist.
Like a [?].
This form of the thesis gave rise to a major Nyaya/Buddhist
controversy, namely the status of expressions which purport to
refer to unreal entities. The Naiyyikas contend that it is
impossible for the Buddhist to give an example here for, in
citing an example of something which is non—momentary, he would
be contradicting his own position. Udayana considers the
arguments put forward by the Buddhists to defend their position
on this matter and this forms the second major portion of this
chapter on k$aI)atva.
Udayana's examination of the negative form of the argument
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eventually leads him to consider a much wider topic, the nature
of language. He argues against a Buddhist theory of menaing
known as apohav5da. This characteristically Buddhist theory of
meaning claims that, since words are bound up with mental
conceptualization, they cannot be directly associated with
external reality. The very nature of external reality composed
of unique point instants (svalakaias) eludes linguistic
categorization. Apohavãda associates the meaning of word with
the corresponding mental concept whose range is determined by its
distinctness from all other concepts. This theory of meaning
clearly seeks to avoid any commitment to the hypostatizatiort of
dubious entities such as permanent objects, universals, Selves,
et cetera. Such a brief exposition of apohavda indicates why
Udayana moves onto this subject immediately after his
consideration of empty subject terms. According to the Buddhist
opposition here, all the entities referred to by language are, in
some sense, fictitious. Hence apohavda is a theory of meaning
which the Buddhists claim is adequate to explain how we manage to
talk about unreal entities whether they be Selves, pots or the
non—momentary entities necessary for the vyatireka portion of
their argument for katiatva. Thus, the second part of Udayana's
kaiabhañga chapter is a discussion about how words get their
meaning and the relationship between language and the world. I
devote one chapter to the vyatireka portion of the argument and
use it as an opportunity to examine the Nyãya theory of language.
The structure of the Indian inference governs the overall
shape of the ka1abhañgapariccheda.	 Within this overall
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structure, however, there is a second operative element which
works on a smaller scale to govern the order of the
sub-arguments. This component is known as tarka, which is a type
of argument designed to demonstrate some absurdity in the
opponent's thesis. We shall see this clearly in the opening
passages of the kaiabhañgapariccheda where the Buddhist
opposition employs a form of argument known as prasañga to show
the absurd consequences of the Nyãya supposition that there are
enduring entities.
Hence we can see that the structure of the ATV, from
Udayana's statement of purpose and doubt in the opening passages
to its conclusion, conforms to a precise set of rules which
governed philosophical debate in India.
	
A complete description
of these rules would be too lengthy here, but wherever a
particular rule governing fallacious argument is invoked
indicate this in the footnotes supplied with the translations.'7
Related Texts
(I) Jna'rimitra
Jflnari's works were lost to western scholars until fairly
recently, which made the task of interpreting the ATV especially
difficult. Fortunately, in the 1950's texts written by Jfiãnari
became available, providing a key for understanding the
development of Nyya philosophy from Vãcaspati Mldra to Udayana.
JiãnarI was concerned to defend the Pramãiavrttika of
Dharmakirti Cc. 600-700 A.D.) from the attacks of Vcaspati
Nira, Trilocana, the Naiyyika Sathkara and Bhãsarvajia, who were
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known as the "Four Pillars" of the Nyãya school. Since there are
no extant works of Sathkara and Trilocana, Jfnas'rI's references
to them in his texts provide valuable information on this period
of Nyäya philosophy.
JffãnaIri belonged to the Yogcra school, supposedly founded
on a vision Asailga received of the future Buddha, Maitreya. He
followed Prajffakaragupta's interpretation of the Pramavãrttika
and was also influenced by the Tãntrikas who were active in his
monastery. It was, however, a tantra imbued with an academic
discipline in accordance with the ideals of his monastery. From
our point of view, Jfnar!'s most important works are:
(1) Kaabhañgãdhyãya. Despite its name, this work does not
seem to be a chapter in a larger work, but itself consists
of four chapters (adhikra). These are:
(i) pakadharmãdhikãra - a d i s c u s s i o n o n t h e
relationship between the
justification property,
existence, with that which is
to be proved, impermanence.
(ii) anvayãdhikãra	 - the conclusion drawn through
positive concomitance.
(iii) vyatirekdhikar	 - the conclusion drawn through
negative concomitance.
(iv) ahetukavinãdhikAra - the Buddhist theory of
automatic destruction.
(2) Apohaprakaraia. In this work Jfãnari defends the apoha
theory of meaning from such philosophers as Vacaspati Mira.
All of these works have been collected together along with his
other works by Ananatalal Thakur and are published collectively
as the JãnarmitranibhandvalI.
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(II) Ratnakirti
Especially relevant for us are three works:
(1)	 Kaabhañgasiddhi Anvaytmikã.	 In this work the
relationship between existence and momentariness is drawn
through positive concomitance.
(2)	 Kaiabhañgasiddhi Vyatirekãtmikã.	 In this work the
relationship between existence and momentariness is drawn
through negative concomitance.
(3) Apohasiddhi. In this work Ratnakirti defends the apoha
theory of meaning.
Once more, all of Ratnakirti's works have been edited and
published collectively by Anantalal Thakur as the
Ratnakirtinibhandvali.
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Chapter Three
KSAI ABHANGAVADA I: ON THE NATURE OF CAUSALITY
If you are already in possession of a 'given'
world, with isolable, identifiable objects
such as people, physical environment and
actions, then quite clearly you have already
solved, or prejudged any issues in the theory
of knowledge. You already know the world,
you possess a world-home and an identity.
Geliner (1974) p. 41
The Philosophical Background
Since the world of change, sarhsãra, was a place of
suffering, of repeated births and deaths, only by positing an
entity such as brahrnan, which totally transcended the plane of
temporal existence and yet was potentially accessible to t'fle
individual by means of the brahman/tman equivalence, could the
Upaniadic seer envisage moka. His was a quest for something
different in kind, not merely in degree, from all other objects
in the world.
	 Knowledge of brahman was salvific,' the central
goal in the quest for mok
	
only because brahman was unchanging
and abiding. It was by assuming these qualities that the seer
could find release from the vagaries of a sarhsric existence.
Brahman was the "Real of the real", and to be continuously
preoccupied with worldly affairs was to invite worldly suffering.
As portrayed in the Pli Canon, the Buddha wrestled with
many of the same problems that were central to the Upaniads, yet
his solutions were strikingly different from the magico-
metaphysical solutions found therein. 	 He too saw the changing
world to be a place of suffering.
	
Rather than postulate a
substantive, transcendental, unchanging reality beyond the
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phenomenal world, he saw that freedom from suffering would come
about only by absolute acceptance of the fact that everything
does indeed change. It was only when the aspirant absorbed this
realization into every level of his being that his desires would
be extinguished and his sufferings cease. 2 Thus from the
beginning, Buddhism embraced the ideas of impermanence and non—
substantiveness as an important part of its soteriological
teachings.
Both the Buddha and the Upaniadic seers presented
descriptions of the world that were radical departures from the
common sense view. Inevitably the philosophical ramifications of
their teachings were enormously complex and it was left to later,
more scholastic—minded thinkers to unravel and debate their
consequences. The Buddha taught that existence is characterized
by impermanence (anitya), the Upaniads that there is an absolute
existence which is eternal (nitya) and unchanging - thus
initiating a controversy that was to preoccupy successive
generations of Indian thinkers. The notion of change versus
permanence became as important a problem in the Indian tradition
as it had been in the western tradition since the time of the
Greek philosophers. In India though, the roots of the debate
went back to the differing responses of the Buddha and the
Upaniadic seers to the problem of the sathsãric world of
suffering.
The arguments which Udayana presents in the ATV against
JiiãnarImitra's thesis of momentariness represent just one aspect
of a complex debate between the Buddhists and the Hindus on this
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subject. The thesis of momentariness which had developed from
the Buddha's teaching of the world as impermanent (anitya) had
become increasingly diverse and sophisticated, as had the
orthodox response to it.	 JIiãnari, no doubt, saw himself as a
legitimate heir and defender of the Buddha's proclamation that
-
all existence is marked by impermanence, although Jnanasri s
thesis of momentariness represents but one strand in the diverse
treatment that the Buddhist tradition subsequently gave to the
Buddha's original teaching. For his part too, as we have already
seen (See pp. 55-56), Udayana saw himself to be defending an
authentic Upanisadic notion of the enduring tman. Yet the Nyãya
school in general, and Udayana in particular, held one amongst
several interpretations of Upaniadic thought.
Udayana's Predecessors
In the Upaniads a two—fold distinc.tioti is v taLl
between the unchanging brahman and the spatio—temporal world of
change. This raises further questions: What then is the
relationship between brahman and the changes which take place in
the world? What is the status of the world as we see it?
Typically fluid and exploratory in nature, the Upaniads only
suggest possible answers. We read that the world is created out
of brahman just as a web is created from a spider (B.U. II I
verse 20); that the world is fixed onto brahman like the spokes
of a wheel onto the hub and felloe (B.U. II v verse 15); and that
brahman is a fine essence pervading the universe, invisible but
real, like salt dissolved in water (B.U. iv verse 12, see also
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C.U. ix—xvi).	 The Upaniads make a distinction eventually
between the unformed and the formed brahman:
Assuredly there are two forms of brahman, the formed
(mürta) and the unformed, the static and the moving,
the actual and the beyond.3
It was left to later thinkers, though, to replace metaphor with a
more critical discussion of the problem of change and continuity,
to deal with the further questions raised by these metaphors: How
can an unchanging brahman be reconciled with the evolution of the
created world out of that supposedly unchanging brahman? Is the
apparent change in the world real or illusory? In the
terminology suggested by the Upaniads, what is the relationship
between the formed and the unformed?
As Indian thought crystallized into the different schools,
each school adopted a different resolution of the problem
concerning creation and causation. Two rival theories emerged in
ancient India, both offering proposed solutions to this dilemma:
(1) satkãryavãda: the theory that the effect pre—exists in
the cause.
(2) asatkãryavãda: The theory that new effects can be
created which were not pre—existent before.
The philosophers of the Sãihkhya school were strong advocates of
the satkãryavãda position. For Sãthkhya thinkers, change does not
result in the creation of a new substance but rather, is a change
in form of an enduring substratum (a theory of change known as
parirjma—vãda). Vedntic philosophers also subscribed to the
satkãrya—vãda, but they went one step further in holding that
change is illusory (a theory of change known as vivarta—vãda).
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In the terminology of Advaita Vedãnta, from the absolute point of
view, saguabrahman (brahman with qualities, that is, the
phenomenal world) would be unreal; nirguiabrahman (brahman
without qualities) alone would be real. Opposing these schools
of thought were the philosophers who upheld the asatkryavda.
This theory holds, in opposition to the above, that the
production of an effect from a cause represents the creation of
something new. Both Buddhist and Nyãya philosophers upheld this
position, yet despite this were bitter opponents regarding the
nature of change and the status of the phenomenal world.4
The idea of an unseen substance (brahman) pervading the
universe was one Upaniadic option not taken up by the Nyya
system. Rather, they tried to establish a position midway
between this and the extreme anti—substantialism of their
Buddhist opponents. They defended vigorously the idea of
substance (dravya), not the all pervading substance of the
Upaniads but rather, they developed a theory of substance which
lent itself to the realism of the school. 	 The Nyya theory of
substance is the basis of their defence of a stable external
world against the Buddhist thesis of momentariness.
The ontology of the Nyya system relied heavily on that
developed by the closely related Vaieika system.	 Included in
the category of substance are three kinds of objects. Firstly,
there are the invisible, indivisible atoms which are the basic
constituents of "middle—sized" material objects. There are five
kinds of atoms: earth (pthivi), air (vayu), fire (tejas), water
(apas) and the internal organ (manas), which is also considered
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to be atomic. Secondly, at the other end of the spectrum, there
are the substances which are "ubiquitous" or immaterial. There
are four substances of this type: time (kãla), place (dis'), tman
and a substance known as	 which is often translated as
"ether".	 All of these substances, both the immaterial and the
atomic are not subject to decay, and are classified as the
eternal substances.	 The third type of substance includes such
everyday objects as pots and pieces of cloth (stock examples used
by Nyya philosophers).	 These substances, unlike the previous
two categories, are not eternal. 	 They are effect substances
(kãryadravya) inasmuch as they are produced, they have a duration
and will ultimately be subject to decay. These "middle—sized"
substances are constructed from the basic elements of matter,
the atoms. Although constituted from the atomic substances, this
type of object cannot be fully analyzed in such terms. This is
the most original and important aspect of the Nyya theory of
substance, that an object such as a pot is considered to be an
entity in its own right. The reason for this is an important
Nyya doctrine which holds that an object such as a pot is more
than the sum of its parts —it exists as a whole (avayavin),
distinct in essence from the mere aggregate of its parts. The
pot resides in its parts by means of a relation which the
Naiyãyikas call inherence (sarnavãya), and its existence as a
distinct entity is thought to be based in objective reality and
is not just the product of a mental synthesis on our part.
According to Nyya, change is compatible with continuity because
a whole is something which can persist through certain
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qualitative changes, and hence provide a basis for continuing
identity .5
The Nyya school shows a continuity with the Upaniads in
its upholding the notion of ãtrnan as an eternal substance present
in each individual. According to the Nyya interpretation of the
Upaniads, there is a plurality of tman, one for each
individual, and there is no equivalence postulated between the
tman and some underlying cosmic essence (brahman). The Nyãya
system does not develop the idealist tendencies of the TJpaniads.
Nyya philosophers maintain that the everyday world of pots et
cetera is a real world, and this is a world in which real change
is possible. In this respect the Nyya (and Vai 'eika) system is
distinctive among the Indian schools and it will be the task of a
later chapter to discuss this realism in the context of their
soteriological theory.
By characterizing existence as impermanent (anitya) and
without Self (antman), the Buddha had denied not just the notion
of the ãtman in the human individual, but also the substantiality
of external objects. Hence this theory of the Buddhists, in its
wider application, strikes at the very basis of the realism of
the Nyya school. The arguments in Udayana's kaiiabhañga section
are only related indirectly to the argument over the existence of
tman, for obviously, since the tman is posited as an enduring
entity, it would have no existence in a world where everything is
impermanent. Although the refutation of momentariness (kaiiatva)
is essential to the proof of the existence of ãtman, it is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for that proof, since two
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separate questions need to be distinguished:
(1) The more general question —is everything in the world
impermanent?
(2) The more specific question which follows from (1)-
Given that there are permanent entities in the world,
is the tman to be counted among them? The proof of a
stable external world is not a sufficient condition to
prove that the ãtman is to be counted as part of that
world.
The more general question is logically prior to the more specific
question and it is this issue which Udayana tackles first. Hence
in the first part of the kaabhañgapariccheda he is not
concerned specifically with tman but rather he examines the
general arguments put forward by the Buddhist opposition for the
momentary nature of the world (the positive arguments to
establish the existence of ãtman come towards the end of the
ATV). One may wonder at the role of Nyya realism within the
soteriology of orthodox thought (that seems to fit more naturally
with an idealist understanding of the world), but Udayana
harnesses his defence of realism here with the defence of tman.
in establishing his brand of realism as against the Buddhist
thesis of kaiatva he is at the same time overthrowing one
bgdhaka cited to refute the existence of an eternal ãtman.
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Jãna 'rTmitra 's Predecessors
The history of kaiiatva in Buddhist thought is extremely
complicated and its evolution cannot be traced here without a
great deal of generalization. There is no doubt that kaiiatva is
a concept central to the Buddhist tradition 6 although it was
given different forms by various schools. Two important
responses can be mentioned before we look specifically at
Udayana's opponents. The teachings of the Buddha were given a
more precise formulation in the canonical Abhidharma literature
(from about the fourth century B.C.) where they were explicated
with the rigour of scholasticism.	 The main concern of the
Abhidharmic thinkers was to construct a language which would be
less distorting than the language of the community. Their aim
was not a linguistic revision in the sense that their language
would replace the natural language spoken by the community but
rather, training in Abhidharmic language would aid the individual
in resisting the metaphysical and ontological presuppositions of
ordinary language.	 As they correctly perceived, ordinary
language seemed to imply concepts such as permanence, individual
persons, et cetera, which Buddhists rejected. And whereas
ordinary language sees change as the interaction of relatively
stable objects, Abhidharrna language attempts to portray the world
as a sort of staccato process of point instants in continual
flux. From the point of view of conventional truth, ordinary
language was adequate, but dharmic analysis (dharmavicaya) was an
important soteriological device in aiding the individual to
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experience the world as momentary in nature. The basic epistemes
of this new language, dharmas, were to correspond to the basic
elements of reality, and using them, they claimed, it was
possible to construct an alternative but complete description of
the world as it really is.
A different response to the Buddha's teaching is seen in the
Mahãyãna school of Mdhyamika, especially in the writings of
Nãgãrjuna Cc. 150 A.D.). Nãgrjuna did not accept the ultimate
reality of phenomenal pluralism whether it be the radical
pluralism of the Abhidharmists or the pluralism of common
experience and thought. The ontologies of both these conceptual
systems contain only objects which are dependent for their
existence on external conditions. Nãgãrjuna is only stating here
the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of "dependent origination"
(pratTtya-samutpãda) but he uses it to stress the mutual
interdependence of all things. In Nãgrjuna's thought this
relativity means that from an absolute point of view all things
must be considered empty (nya) since they lack "own-being"
(svabhãva), an existence that is inherent to the object. In
Nãgãrjuna's opinion the opposition hold views which already
carried within them the seeds of their own downfall and Nagãrjuna
saw his task to be that of bringing his opponents to a point
where they too could see this. In the Mdhyamikakrikas,
Nãgãrjuna systematically examines such general concepts as time,
agent, action, motion and causation as well as specifically
Abhidharmic terms such as elements of existence (dhãtu), the
components of the individual (skandhas) and momentariness.	 In
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each case he sets out to demonstrate that logical inconsistency
will be the result of assuming the enduring or substantive
reality of any of these objects.
In Abhidharmic thought, the elements were related but real.
This interdependence of dharmas (dharmãnth pratityasarnutpãda) in
Mãdhyamika becomes the basis for their unreality. The radical
pluralism of the Abhidharmists is superceded in Mãdhyamika and
with it the idea of the momentary entity, the dharma, so central
to early Buddhist thought. Nãgrjuna's Mdhyamika did not
permanently disable the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, but
it was not until the time of Dignga (c. 5th century A.D.) that
it again became an important Buddhist philosophical concept.
(This is not to say that Abhidharma disappeared from India.) It
is with the work of Dignga that we really see a complete
reworking of the doctrine of kaiatva and a renewed effort to
establish momentariness on a firm logical foundation. Perhaps in
response to the danger inherent in Nãgãrjuna's system, namely
that his conceptual emptiness (ffnyat) be interpreted in
metaphysical rather than critical—analytical terms, Dignga
returned to the more characteristically Buddhist concept of
momentariness.	 Katiatva is more than a critical tool of
analysis; it does lend itself to the construction of a
characteristically Buddhist ontology. Unlike in the case of
s'iinyat, one is not tempted to interpret kaiiatva in the language
of metaphysical non—dualism.7
Udayana is concerned with refuting this doctrine of
momentariness that had its origins in Dignãga's Pramãiasamuccaya.
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In Dignga's system, each momentary particular is self-sustained
and self-destructive, and their very uniqueness and momentariness
means that they are not amenable to expression in language, not
just conventional language but any kind of language. The momen-
tary particular is cognized only by means of perception. This
departure from Abhidharma theory means that Dignga was not
subject to Ngrjuna's criticisms of that theory. 8 Dignga's
work was communicated to later generations of philosophers
largely through the commentary of Dharmakirti, the
Pram avrttika, in which the momentary particular is known as
the svalaka12a.	 As well as commenting on Dignga's ideas,
DharmakTrti was also an innovator and he defined existence as
causal efficacy. For Dharmakrti the very notion of existence
implied change. Once an object ceased to be effective it ceased
to exist, and this implied constant change since causal efficacy
was, according to this position, an immediate capacity.
	 In
opposition to this, the Naiyyikas were concerned to reconcile
change with continuity. Udayana argues against the doctrine of
momentariness as presented in the works of the Buddhist philo-
sophers Jffna 'rTmitra and RatnakTrti who were the intellectual
descendants of Dignga and Dharmakrti (see pp. 52-53).9
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TEXT A: Jna 'rImitra's proof of universal momentariness examined
by Udayana
(This text is translated on pp. 106-127. As in all the
translations included in this thesis, the footnotes for
the translation are supplied separately at the end of
each text and should be read in conjunction with the
translation in order to make sense of Udayana's terse
method of argumentation.)
J7fna 'rTmitra was responsible for the most comprehensive
version of the uddhist thesis of uioinentaririess. 	 is strate	 s
summed up in the opening lines of his KaI)abhañgdhyya thus:
yat sat, tat kaiikath yath jaladharab, santastu bhãv
ime. sattã 4aktir ihrthakarmaii. [Jãnarimitra
Kaabhañgdhyya p. 1, edited by Thakkur (1959)]
That which exists is momentary, like a cloud, and
things around us are all existents. Existence here
lies in the power to produce effects.
RatnakTrti states his teacher's position in the opening of his
Kaabhaixgasiddhi thus:
yat sat, tat kaiiiikath, yath ghaaI); santacm!
vivdspad!bht	 padrth iti svabhvahetub.
[Ratnakrti Kaiabhañgasiddhi p. 62, edited by Thakkur
(1957)]
That which exists is momentary, like a pot; and the
objects being disputed are existents. Thus the proof
is by means of svabhãvahetu.'°
It is this version of the thesis that Udayana alludes to at the
beginning of his chapter on momentariness:
yat sat, tat kaI2ikarh, yath ghaia; sath'ca
vividdhysita	 abddiriti cet.
That which exists is momentary, like a pot; and
whatever is an object of dispute, such as sound and so
on, is an existent.
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Udayana's strategy at the beginning of his chapter on
momentariness is to examine this proof more closely in order to
declare it obsolete in its very formulation.
Jãnari's opening lines contain the metaphysical kernel of
his proof which rests on three main theses arranged sequentially
thus:
(1) There is a universal concomitance between existence
and momentariness.
(2) Existence is the power to produce effects.
(3) Causal potency is equivalent to the immediate
production of the effect.
It can be seen from this sequence of argument that existence is
equated with a capacity which must be discharged immediately.
Hence any entity's existence will immediately be extinguished
along with the immediate production of the effect. JfãnarT, in
equating existence with the power to produce effects (satt
/	 .	 .-	 .
saktir iharthakarmati), was incorporating the connection made by
DharmakTrti between existence and causal efficacy:11
That which has real existence is that which has the
capability to produce effects.
arthakriyäsamartharh yat tad atra paramrthasat
(Pramiavrttika 2 verse 3)
Udayana declares immediately that there is no concomitance
between existence and momentariness (na, pratibandhsiddheb).
His attack on momentariness (kanatv) concerns itself not so
much with this definition of existence, but rather concentrates
on the subsidiary idea, that of causal efficacy. It is only when
causal efficacy is also understood to mean the immediate
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production of the effect that the concomitance between existence
and momentariness is established (or as Jnari states, an
enduring entity is incapable of causal efficacy and so lacks
existence).
In reply to Udayana's declaration that there is no
concomitance between existence and momentariness, the Buddhist,
or at least the Buddhist as portrayed by Udayana, replies that
indeed there is, and this can be established through the
association of opposite properties, capability (smarthyam) and
incapability (asãmarthyam). The idea is that an object cannot be
incapable at one moment and capable the next. Both the
Buddhists and the Naiyãyikas upheld some form of the law of
contradiction, that an entity cannot be associated with
contradictory properties. The Buddhist statement of this law is
thus:
[We say that] an object is different because [otherwise
there would be] the ascription of contradictory properties
[to one object].
viruddhadharmasathsargãdhyanyadvastu
[Dharmottara, Nyãyabinduik (1929) p. 5]
Yet the idea that p and not—p cannot be asserted of the same
object can be subject to all sorts of qualifications, and indeed
this is the case in the Nyãya treatment of the law of
contradiction. Nyya philosophers make a distinction between an
object and its attributes and hence it can at different times
enter into relationships with other entities, without itself
changing. There is no contradiction in one thing being related
to many different things, just as one thread may be related to
many different jewels (see Chapter Five).	 The claim that an
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enduring cause would have a contradictory nature gives Udayana
reason to look more closely at the nature of contradiction, and
he distinguishes between different ways in which pairs of
properties may be opposed to each other. 12 Despite the
distinction between an object and its attributes, it would be
impossible for an object to enter into relations with certain
contradictory attributes.	 Udayana cites the example of
eternal/non—eternal as a pair of such mutually exclusive
attributes. This pair of properties are mutually exclusive
irrespective of time, since if an object is eternal then that
rules out for all time the possibility of that object becoming
non—eternal. Distinct from this pair, there are pairs of
properties, like hot/cold, which are only mutually exclusive with
regard to a specific time and place. An object being hot at time
t1 rules out the possibility of it being cold at time t' Unlike
the previous example, however, that same object may become cold
at time t2. Udayana would like to present the causal efficacy of
an object in these terms. He sets up the pair of properties
samartha/asamartha with the intention of showing that an object
which is dormant (asamartha) one moment may become efficacious
(samartha) at another time according to its association with
outside conditions
The Buddhists hold a stricter interpretation of the law of
contradiction but the argument on momentariness is not so much
about the correct formulation of that law but rather on the
nature of causal efficacy.' 3 The Buddhist understanding of
causal efficacy is such that it is impossible for an object to be
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causally impotent one moment and potent the next.	 Yor the
Buddhist the sarnartha/asamartha dichotomy is akin to lJdayana's
eternal/non—eternal dichotomy. Hence the metaphysical arguient
which Jffnar offers aims to prove that an enduring cause would
have a contradictory nature, even on the basis of the Nyya
formulation of the law of contradiction.'4
The Buddhist argument, as presented by Udayana, is in the
form of a prasadga, that is, an argument designed to demonstrate
an absurd consequence of the opponent's position: if an object is
efficacious, then it will produce. The example of a seed, which
is used throughout their long dispute, illustrates this point for
them. If the seed in the granary (kuülasthabTja) were
efficacious (with regard to the sprout) then it would produce a
sprout, and it does not. On the other hand, the seed in the
field (ketra—bija) does produce a sprout. With reference to the
production of a sprout the granary seed is non—efficacious
(asamartha) and the field seed is efficacious (samartha). Hence
they are two different entities.
Udayana focusses his argument on the nature of sãmarthyam,
understanding that the Buddhist argument is dependent upon a
particular view of causal efficacy (smarthyam). For the
Buddhist argument to succeed, the nature of causal efficacy must
be such that it creates a difference in identity between the non—
sprouting granary seed and sprout producing field seed. Udayana
proposes and will argue for an interpretation of causal efficacy
which will uphold the continuity of the granary seed with the
field seed.
	 Udayana examines and rejects several possible
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interpretations of causal efficacy. Finally the dispute between
Udayana and his Buddhist opponent is reduced to two different
interpretations of this term.
One possible interpretation of smarthyam sees causal
efficacy to be a combination of the object plus the accessorial
causes (sahakrins) which are necessary for the production of the
effect. In the case of the seed, it will be the seed in an
environment of earth, light, water and so on which will produce
the sprout. This is the interpretation of sãmarthyam which
Udayana finds acceptable, an interpretation which of course would
be inimical to the Buddhist position since it destroys the basis
for their opposition (virodha) between the granary and the field
seed. The difference between the granary and the field seed is
now a product of the presence or absence of factors external to
the seed itself, rather than something intrinsic to the
respective seeds.
The other interpretation of smarthyam is that one which is
representative of the Buddhist position. Here causal efficacy is
intrinsic to the object itself. The sprout, for example, is
produced only from the seed ripe for production, in possession of
some special excellence known as the kurvadri!pa. When the seed
is productive then that productivity is intrinsic to it and is no
longer dependent on any external factors. At this point in time
the seed has to produce the sprout without delay and nothing can
stop it. Obviously, on this interpretation, the productive field
seed, being in possession of some special excellence, is a
different entity from the granary seed.
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TEXTS B AND C: Udayana's attack on kurvadrüpa and his own account
of causality
(The texts discussed below can be read in full in the
translations of TEXTS B and C found at the end of this
chapter, pp. 128-182.)
In the remaining portion of this section of the ATV which
deals with the nature of causality Udayana is concerned to
criticize more closely the idea of kurvadrüpa whilst at the same
time giving his own account of causality. As we have seen,
Udayana's account of causality takes note of the fact that the
production of an effect depends on other factors beside the main
cause.' 5	The seed, for example, will not produce i.ts sprout
without the full complement of necessary accessories (smagr9).
The idea of necessary accessories is the basis for Udayana's
attack on his Buddhist opponent, that to be causally potent does
not mean that the cause need produce its effect immediately but
rather that it has the potentiality to do so given the presence
of the right accessories.	 Hence a full account of causality
needs to encompass potentiality (svarpayoyat) as well as
actuality (phalopadhayakat). Although such views are found in
the works of Nyya philosophers prior to Udayana, his account of
causation and his detailed critique of kurvadripa or causal
excellence were accepted as definitive by subsequent Nyya
philosophers.
Udayana's arguments against the possession of a special
causal excellence have as a common theme the purpose of exposing
the unacceptable consequences which follow from a Buddhist
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position in which seedness is divorced from the production of the
sprout. Udayana's most important arguments are discussed below.
(1) Naming a 'seed' a "seed"
[ATV pp. 16-17 (1940 edition); pp. 58-61 (1939 edition);
translated pp. 128-130]
The question here concerns the basis on which we call a seed
a "seed". Ratnakirti argues that the basis of such a
nomenclature must be the production of the sprout. On the basis
of this argument Ratnakirti must account for the undeniable fact
that we do actually refer to the non—sprouting seeds in the
granary as "seeds". Ratnakirti argues that they are only
referred to as such in a secondary sense because of their
continuity with the field seeds in virtue of belonging to the
same series of point instants (sathtna). Only the productive
field seeds can really be the referents of an expression of
capability. Udayana would agree with Ratnakirti that the naming
of a seed must have some basis otherwise we might as well refer
to a piece of stone as such. Even if Udayana and Ratnakirti
could agree that the production of the sprout is the basis on
which a seed is to be called a "seed", this would revive the
basic argument of whether or not such a production has to be an
immediate production. Udayana, of course, denies at this point
that the Buddhist has established his position of causal efficacy
as immediate production. For Udayana, a granary seed is a "seed"
in a primary sense because it too, as well as the field seed, is
related to the production of the sprout. The granary seed, when
taken out of storage and placed under suitable conditions, will
indeed produce a sprout. 	 It is because of this very fact that
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granary seeds are "seeds". Udayana will attempt to establish
that this capability of the granary seed to produce a sprout is
due to the presence of seedness in each individual seed.
(2) The cause of the sprout
{ATV pp. 18-30 (1940 edition); pp. 64-98 (1939 edition);
translated pp. 132-157]
We store seeds in the granary, not stones. This is an
undeniable fact accepted by both parties. The disagreement is
over the role played by the granary seed in the production of
the effect, and by the so-called accessorial or co-causes
(sahakrins). For Udayana, the seed in the field is the same
seed as when it was stored in the granary. The production of
the sprout is brought about by the accessorial causes which are
responsible for activating a pre-existing nature present in both
granary and field seed.
eedness	 seedness'	 V
ANARY SFJD
	
IELD SEE	 \SPROUT
sahakrins	 sahakrins
lldayana attacks the obvious Buddhist retort that 'seeds' are
stored in the granary because of belonging to the same seed-
series (saihtna). He demands that the Buddhist explain why
the sprout is produced when it is, that is, when the seed is
placed in the right environment. Udayana argues that when the
kurvadrpa alone is invested with the full responsibility for the
production of the sprout then this destroys the very notion of
accessorial causes. We can imagine the Buddhist position thus:
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SEED SERIES	 KURVADRUPA	 SPROUT
The idea is that the kurvadrilpa, as the efficacious seed-moment,
has to go ahead and produce the sprout. Once the kurvadrpa
comes into being then the immediate production of the sprout
becomes inevitable. The question which Udayana persistently asks
is why the kurvadrpa makes its appearance in the seed-series
when it does. It cannot be the action of the accessorial causes
on the seed-moment prior to the coming into being of the
kurvadrUpa, for then the kurvadrUpa becomes an unnecessary
postulation and this position would be to concede Udayana's main
point, that it is the seed along with the accessorial causes
which is responsible for the production of the sprout.
sahakrins	 -
SEED SERIES	 KURVADRUPA	 SPROUT
sahakrins
SEED SERIES	 KURVADRflPA	 SPROUT
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The questions which concern Udayana here is why the kurvadrpa
should appear at this particular moment along with the
accessorial causes, the role of the accessorial causes in the
production of the sprout and the role of the seed (or series) in
the production of the sprout.	 Udayana objects to the random
nature of this Buddhist account of causality. The kurvadrpa is
not caused by the accessorial causes. Rather it just is the case
that the sprout appears in the moment following the conjunction
of kurvadrpa and accessorial causes (sahakrins). 	 Hence the
accessorial causes are no longer accessorial causes in the sense
that they are responsible for triggering the production of the
sprout from the seed.
	 Rather, they just
	
appear alongside the
kurvadrpa prior to the production of the sprout. The seed is no
longer a seed in the sense of having some particular nature which
is inherently responsible for and relatecL to the codctia zE
the sprout, which is common to all seeds and made actual by the
accessorial causes.	 Rather, it seems that the seed or seed—
moments in the series prior to the appearance of the kurvadrUpa
are divorced from the production of the sprout.
Udayana brings this out even more clearly when he examines
the relationship between kurvadrpatvam and añkuratvam (sprout-
ness). 16 The framework of Udayana's argument obscures the very
different theory of universals which would have been held by his
Buddhist opponent but I do not believe that this affects the main
point of his argument.	 Udayana aims to demonstrate that if
sprouts are related to kurvadrpas rather than seeds then it
would be possible for a sprout to appear even in the absence of
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the seed. Udayana argues strongly against all the attempts of
his Buddhist opponent to tie the kurvadrüpa in some way to the
seed (see pp. 148-153 of the translation of TEXT C).
(3)	 The nature of the seed
[ATV pp. 30-36 (1940 edition); pp. 99-110 (1939 edition);
translated pp. 156-166]
Most of the same points are made when Udayana looks at the
argument not from the perspective of the production of the sprout
but from the perspective of the nature of the seed. If it is not
the nature of the seed to produce a sprout then it must be
efficacious in some way given that an existent is defined as an
arthakriykãrin, that is, as something which produces an effect.
Udayana argues against all the suggestions which his Buddhist
opponent offers as suitable effects from the seed—moment. If the
Buddhist contends that the 'seeds' in the granary are not stored
there because of their efficacy in producing sprouts then,
Udayana argues, they are not really seeds. The essence of
Udayana's argument here is that it is with reference to the
production, whether real or potential, of sprouts that all seeds
are seeds. The nature of seedness is common to all seeds and
when it is associated in some cases with the relevant accessories
then it will result in the production of the sprout.
According to Udayana's account of causality, the seed in the
granary has the capacity for producing a sprout. To say of a
seed that it has such a capacity commits one to accepting as
true, statements about what that seed will do or would have done
in circumstances that have not yet occurred, statements such as,
"If you plant this seed and water it, then it will produce a
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sprout". Statements of the above form are known as contrary—to-
fact conditionals, statements which are used to explicate terms
of disposition or capability. Such statements have been
problematic for western philosophers inasmuch as a purely truth—
functional analysis of them does not bring out their full import.
In the example of the seed producing the sprout, both of the
following statements would be true:
(1) If x is a seed, then it will grow in soil
and water, warmth and light.
(2) If x were a seed then it would grow in soil
and water, warmth and light.
Compare this with the following two statements;
(3) If x is a shoe in my closet then it will be
brown.
(4) If x were a shoe in my closet then it would
be brown.
The relationship between seeds and sprouts seems to be such that
it can sustain both the indicative and the subjunctive
conditional. The relationship between being a shoe in my closet
and being brown, however, is not such that it can sustain both
types of conditional statement. Contemporary philosophers have
drawn a distinction between law—like and accidental relationships
where only law—like relationships can sustain the subjunctive
type of conditional.' Hence the relationship between seeds and
sprouts is law—like, whereas the relationship between shoes in my
closet and being brown is accidental.
Now, according to Udayana, the capacity of a seed to produce
a sprout ultimately depends on the universal ttseednesstt which
must be present in all objects called "seeds". 	 The law—like
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relationship between seedness (bT jatvamj and sproutness
(añkuratvam) is, a,ccording to Nyãya thought, a real and not mind-
dependent relationship, which is discovered through a process of
observation of their regular connection:
Therefore, that, which being of a particular nature,
makes something else of a particular nature, through
its own presence and absence, that one has smarthyam
(capability) with reference to that effect.
(See p. 153 of TEXT C)
Udayana's Buddhist opponent challenges this basic assumption,
that seeds se are related to the production of the sprout.
Udayana had attempted to demonstrate the absurdity of the
Buddhist position with a prasañga type of argument (see p. 155 of
TEXT C). Using the following:
(5) If x were a seed it would be productive of a
sprout
he claims the Buddhist will have to accept as a consequence of
his position that the 'seeds' in the granary are not, after all,
really seeds.	 The Buddhist, of course,will claim that this is
not at all the case.	 He has two responses available to him to
counter Udayana's prasañga.
	 Firstly, he can respond as Udayana
says he must or secondly he can respond with the following
statement:
(6) It is not the case that if x were a seed it
would be productive of a sprout.
Udayana's prasahga therefore, forces a choice, that x (the
granary seed) is not a seed or, that there is not an invariable
concomitance between seeds and sprouts.	 It is this second
response that the Buddhist chooses.
	 Hence Udayana and the
Buddhist respectively support the following pair of contradictory
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statements:
(5) If x were a seed, it would be productive of
a sprout.
(6) It is not the case that if x were a seed, it
would be productive of a sprout.
Compare this to the following two statements:
(7) If wood were denser than water, it would not
float.
(8) If wood were denser than water, it would
float.
In the above example, (7) would be preferred over (8) because the
law—like statement, "Nothing denser than water floats in water"
is preferred over the statement, "All wood floats in water". Our
response in this case is governed by the fact that whenever our
"web of belief" is challenged in any way we make changes to our
set of beliefs in such a way as to cause the least disturbance
and least disastrous consequences to those beliefs. The Buddhist
responds to Udayana's prasañga not by relinquishing his belief
that 'seeds' in the granary are indeed seeds but rather, by
challenging the relationship between seeds and sprouts which
Udayana is so concerned to uphold. Udayana's arguments are
concerned to show the disastrous consequences which would ensue
if this belief were incorporated into our beliefs. Udayana has
already attacked the attempt by his Buddhist opponent to relate
the production of the sprout to some other cause (kurvadrflpa)
(see pp. 146-153 TEXT C). He concludes his argument against the
Buddhist here by challenging him to say what the nature of a seed
can consist in, if not sprout production. For Udayana, the
Buddhist position represents a lapse into chaos where sprouts can
be produced with or without seeds, and where seeds are deprived
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of their very nature (see p. 165 TEXT C).
Concluding Remarks
Let us now discuss the original problem of change versus
continuity. The Naiyyikas were, on the one hand, concerned to
refute the Buddhist thesis that all existence is momentary, and,
on the other hand, were concerned to demonstrate that real change
is possible in accordance with the asatkryavda theory (see
p. 72). Irving Copi has stated the problem very succinctly thus:
If an object which changes really changes, then it
cannot literally be one and the same object which
undergoes the change. But if the changing thing
retains its identity, then it cannot have really
changed.
Copi in Schwartz (1977) p. 177
The Buddhist maxim that existence is momentary depends on an all-
embracing theory concerning the nature of causality and existence
that decides the issue for every particular case. Without such
an all-embracing theory, the problem of change is different for
different types of objects and hence it is not surprising that
Nyya philosophers, who supposedly accept the world as it is,
developed a complex theory in response to considering the notion
of change in relation to a variety of objects
	
I shall examine
three of their main responses below.
(1) Natural kinds
In western philosophy, since the time of Aristotle, a
distinction between accidental and essential properties has been
made in order to adjudicate questions of identity. The identity
of an object can survive if it changes with respect to properties
which are accidental.	 If it changes with respect to some
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property which is considered essential then its identity will
also be destroyed. Naturally the problem then arises as to how
we can distinguish between accidental and essential properties.
As C.I. Lewis says:
Traditionally any attribute required for application of
a term is said to be the essence of the thing named.
It is of course meaningless to speak of the essence of
a thing except relative to its being named by a
particular term.
Lewis (1946) p. 41
Irving Copi has defended the essence/accident distinction with
his version of scientific naturalism. According to Copi, science
seeks to discover real essences and is in a position today in
which this is becoming increasingly possible. He admits that, to
some extent, what constitutes a real essence is relative to the
particular science of our day, but in Copi's view, this
relativity is different from the relativity implied in criticisms
such as that by Lewis. The real essence is seen to be that
property which is fundamentally responsible for all the other
properties of the object.	 For Copi this helps to resolve the
problem of change:
The real essence of a thing will consist very largely
of powers or, in modern terms, dispositional
properties. An essential change in a thing will
involve the replacement of some of its dispositions or
powers by other dispositions or powers. But a change
which is nonessential or accidental would involve no
such replacement; it would rather consist in
differently actualized manifestations of the same
dispositional property or power.
Copi in Schwartz (1977) p. 191
I believe that we can see something akin to this in Udayana's
account of causality in relation to the seed.
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If we consider a science such as chemistry, it is easy to
understand the nature of Copi's thesis. The essence of a
substance will consist in its chemical formula, for example water
as H20, which would be the root cause for the range of possible
behaviour associated with that substance. We can detect
something akin to the scientific naturalism of Copi in Udayana's
examination of the nature of a seed. Firstly, there is the idea
that for each object there is a range of possible effects, which
effect becoming actual being dependent on which accessorial
causes come into play:
for, as in the case of a pot, from the time it was
created until being struck with a hammer, what we see
is the creation of many effects, of the same or of
different types, in succession, due to the variety of
accessorial causes, and not an association with another
jãti (that is, through a change in its essential
nature). [ATV (1939 edition) p. 81; (1940 edition)
p. 24; translated TEXT C p. 147]
Secondly, like Copi, Udayana places great importance on the idea
of a dispositional property in his account of causality and in-
deed, his proof of stability in the world hinges on this notion.
For Udayana, a dispositional property is one in which the absence
of the relevant effect is solely due to the absence of acces-
sorial causes and not to some deficiency in the object itself:
The seed which is the object of dispute (the granary
seed) is one which has the absence of the effect,
sprout cetera, brought about by the absence of the
accessorial causes, because it belongs to the species
of "seed" which is within the cause and effect rela-
tionship.	 That one which is not an instance where the
absence of the effect, sprout	 cetera, is brought
about by the absence of accessorial causes is not a
member of the seed species of this nature. [ATV (1939
edition) p. 111; (1940 edition) p. 36; translated TEXT
C p. 165]
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Hence a granary seed possesses the dispositional property of
being able to produce a sprout whereas a stone does not. There
is nothing lacking in the granary seed, rather, the non—
production of the sprout is due to an external deficiency.
This is said in the case of the granary seed - there is
some excellence favourable to the production of a
sprout which makes it different from a piece of stone.
[ATV (1939 edition) p. 68; (1940 edition) p. 20;
translated TEXT C p. 137]
Thirdly, like Copi, Udayana understands that change without loss
of identity can occur in those cases where it is not the
dispositions themselves which are being changed but rather, the
change is a matter of a dispositional property being made actual.
Hence for Udayana (and maybe for Copi too), the seed in the
field is the same seed as when it was in the granary, because all
seeds have the capability of producing a sprout:
Therefore, that one which is in the absence of the
accessorial causes, that one does not produce the
sprout, but in the presence of the accessorial causes
will produce the sprout. And it is this fact which is
at the root of the proof of permanence and this is the
heart of the matter. 	 [ATV (1939 edition) p. 57; (1940
edition) p. 16; translated TEXT A p. 119]
Of course, one must not push this analogy too far and there
are some important differences between Udayana and Copi to be
noted. First of all, one might regret the choice of a seed as
the object to be featured in this dispute because of the
complexity of the process of biological change. I do not think
though that this affects the logic of the argument between
Udayana and his Buddhist opponent, and to wish that Udayana had
chosen something more easily comparable to the science of
chemistry is to wish the Periodic Table onto the world hundreds
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of years prior to its eventual evolution.
Secondly, one can detect a greater degree of essentialism in
Udayana's account of causality than in Copi's. Although a seed
can produce a range of effects (a sprout, fodder for animals,
counting beads for children and so one), Udayana sees that the
seed has an essential nature (svabhva) which is to produce a
sprout, an essential nature which must be common to all seeds.
Hence the essence of a seed becomes bound up with the production
of just one effect rather than a range of effects (see TEXT C pp.
156-165).	 This may well be due to the nature of the seed, that
the production of a sprout does indeed seem to be its primary
function. It is worth noting that when he discusses the idea
that an object can be associated with a range of effects
according to its nature, he chooses a pot as his example (see p.
147).
To conclude —for Udayana the capacity of a seed to produce
a sprout ultimately depends on the presence of the jti
"seedness" which must be present in all those objects called
seeds. According to Nyya thought, some universals at least are
real, and it is the presence of the jti inhering in each
individual object that is responsible for the regular way in
which objects behave, a behaviour which we can acquire the
knowledge to predict as we, through a process of observation,
come to discover the pattern of causal relationships which bind
these jtis together. In my next chapter, I discuss Nyaya views
concerning the nature of language, particularly the so–called
problem of the universal.	 "-1ti" is often translated as
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"universal", but in doing this I think we should be careful not
to confuse the role which jãti plays in Udayana's account of
causality and proof of a stable world with the Nyaya account of
the universal in relation to the problem of resemblance. The
Naiyyikas are often called realists inasmuch as they hold a
theory of the reality of the universal. I hope it will become
clear in my next chapter that Udayana was a realist with respect
to the jti just because of its role in explaining causality and
in this I think it is clear he had in mind an idea similar to the
contemporary notion of the natural kind (see Chapter Four). When
Udayana comes to discuss the logical problem of how we come to
form the idea of resemblance, he was not necessarily a realist.
For Udayana "seedness T' is akin to a natural kind (giving credence
to Copi's idea that our understanding of real essences will be
relative to the science of the day). An individual seed is the
cause of an individual sprout but what any individual seed can do
is governed by its essential nature, that of "seedness":
Therefore, that which being of a particular nature
makes something else of a particular nature, through
its own presence and absence, that one has efficacy
with reference to that effect. And we find it proper
that the particulars of that one, such as in the case
of being rice seeds and so on, are productive of
particular effects.
	 [ATV (1939 edition) p. 94; (1940
edition) p. 28; translated TEXT C p. 153]
(3) Identity of Artifacts (kryadravya)
An examination of Nyãya doctrine in this respect shows that
change is less tolerated than the common sense understanding of
such artifacts as tables and chairs. 	 It was also in regard to
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artifacts that the Nyãya philosophers ran into their greatest
problems trying to reconcile change with continuity. I believe
this came from confusing an important insight into the way in
which language functions with certain physical facts about the
world.
We have already encountered the Nyãya thesis that the whole
(avayavin) is something over and above the parts out of which it
is made. Thus, a piece of cloth inheres in the threads out of
which it is composed and is something more than just the sum of
its parts out of which it is woven.	 Consider the following
passage from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations:
Then does someone who says that the broom is in the
corner really mean: the broom is there and so is the
brush, and the broomstick is fixed to the brush? —If
he were to ask anyone if he meant this he probably
would say that he had not thought specially of the
brush at all. And that would be the right answer for
he meant neither to speak of the stick nor of the brush
in particular.
Wittgenstein (1972 edition) p. 29
The fact that a particular arrangement of a stick and a brush
creates a new artifact is less a matter of physics than of a
convention which reflects human interests. We do not have a name
for a random bundle of threads because there is not much use for
us in such a bundle whereas once woven they become a piece of
cloth. The manufacture of a piece of cloth involves
rearrangement of the threads rather than any change in
"substance". Wittgenstein's point here is that such objects are
not necessarily better understood when analyzed into their
component parts —a broom is a broom. 	 Too much analysis can
actually lead to confusion as, for example, when people claim
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that solid artifacts such as tables are really mostly space, a
statement made on the basis of discoveries in quantum physics.
In the case of artifacts, our vocabulary clearly reflects human
interests and it is with regard to such objects that Lewis's
dictum regarding changes seems applicable. The distinction
between essence and accident here is a matter of terminology and
definition.	 In the case of an object such as a table its
identity depends upon it conforming to a set of descriptions
rather than on any underlying essential "substance". The
relevant descriptions govern what we would say regarding whether
a particular object survives some change. Thus, for example, we
would usually say that a table survives a new coat of paint since
its identity is not dependent on it being a particular colour.
It is not that we don't recognize that a change has occurred, but
we regard the change as unimportant. There are cases where we
would not be sure what to say —what of a table lying in pieces
in our attic?
The Nyya view on change with respect to these objects takes
us far from this common sense view. Their position here is
reminiscent of the Buddhists inasmuch as they equate physical
change with a change in identity. The first question the Nyya
philosopher needs to settle is - when does an arrangement of
parts produce a new whole (avayavin) as opposed to a mere
aggregate (samudãyamãtra)?	 The only answer given seems to be
that a new whole is produced when the resulting conglomerate is
able to perform a new function.	 Experience here will tell us
whether or not a new whole has been produced. Hence it is not so
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much a matter of physics as conventions which reflect our human
interests.	 Yet at the same time the Naiyãyikas equate the
smallest physical changes with loss of identity. For example,
the addition of every new thread to a piece of cloth results in
the destruction of the old piece and the creation of a new piece.
In stating this, they are accepting a basic premise of the
Buddhist position, that change in such objects implies
destruction. The common sense view would be to agree with the
Buddhists in concurring that the world is in a constant state of
physical change but to disagree with them by expressing the view
that the identity of many objects at least can tolerate such
minute physical changes.	 According to the Nyya theory of
avayavin, this is not the case, and physical change, however
minute, becomes the criteria for a change in identity. The
result will be that only those objects with unchanging underlying
substances will retain an enduring identity. It can be seen that
this is a result of not clearly seeing the role which convention
plays in determining which arrangements of elements constitute
the formation of a new whole. These ideas create a source of
tension for the overall consistency of the Nyya system inasmuch
as they undermine the idea of a stable external world.
L3) Personal Identity
in what does a person's personal identity subsist? Like a
seed, a person changes considerably in his/her lifetime, passing
through various stages from babyhood to old—age, changes which
are, on the surface at least, quite dramatic. 	 Questions of
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personal identity centre on questions concerning what it is which
makes someone who they are. We have already seen that a person
on a Buddhist analysis is no more than a series of momentary
events. There is no abiding entity which can be the carrier of
personal identity. Rather, a person is a series of related
events and the idea of personal identity becomes like a
continuum, the links between babyhood and old—age being rather
tenuous. In this theory personal identity becomes an idea which
is subject to degrees —my relationship to 'myself' as a baby is
more tenuous than my relationship to 'myself' yesterday.
According to Nyãya thought, personal identity is wholly discrete
since an eternal ãtman is postulated as the carrier of an
identity.	 The ãtman is an eternal substance and
hence subsists through all surface changes. There are a
plurality of ãtman in the Nyya system, as opposed to the idea of
one cosmic ãtman or brahman. Each individual is possessed of one
tman which remains the same through all the other changes that
occur in a person's life, and is the carrier of identity of that
person. We shall see that this was an important element of the
soteriological aspects of Nyãya thought (see Chapter Six).
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PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT'
Statement of the Proof
yat sat tat kaiikath, yath ghaa, sariIca vivddhyãsita1i
abddiriti cet.
na, pratibandhãsiddheb.
sãmarthyasãmarthyalakaIaviruddhadharmasathsarge1)a
bhedasiddhau tatsiddhiriti cet.
na, viruddhadharmasathsargsiddhe.
prasañgaviparyaybhyth tatsiddhir iti cet.
na, sniarthyath hi karaatva v yogyat v.
First alternative (karaatvam) considered
ndyab, sãdhyviitatvaprasañgt
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION2
Statement of the Proof
"Whatever exists is momentary, like a pot, and whatever
is an object of dispute, such as sound and so on, is an
existent. "3
No, there is no proof for this concomitance.
"Through the association of opposite properties in the
form of capability (sãmarthyam) and incapability
(asmarthyam), difference is established, and that is
the proof."
No, the association of opposite qualities cannot be
established .4
"The proof of that (association of opposite qualities)
is by means of the prasañga and prasañgaviparyaya types
of argument."5
No, for smarthyam is here either active productiveness
(karal2atvam) or productive capability (yogyatã).
First alternative (karaiatvam) considered
It is not the first, because otherwise there is the
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vyvrttibhedãdayamado?a iti cet.
na, tadanupapatte, vyvartyabhedena virodho hi
tan miii a fl.
sa ca na tãvanmitho vyvartyapratikepd gotv'vatvavat,
tath sati virodhdanyataripye bdhiisiddhayoranyatara-
prasañgiit.
npi tadãk?epapratikSepbhyth vrkatva'irh'aptvavat,
parãparabhvnabhyupagarnãt. abhyupagame vã
samarthasypyakaraamasamarthasypi v karaiarh
prasa jyeta.
nãpyupdhibhediit kryatvãnityatvavat, tadabhiiv g t. na ca
abdamtramupãdhi, yathãrthaabdocchedaprasaiigt.
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contingency of the non-distinction of the sdhya
(sãdhyaviita) •6
"There is no mistake because of the difference in the
exclusions (vyvttis)."7
No, that is illogical, for the basis of that difference
in the vyvttis is the opposition between that which
is to be excluded (vyvartyas).
Such an opposition is not at all through the opposition
of things to be excluded mutually, like "cowness" and
"horseness". Because, if this were so, the possibility
that in absence of any one of the two the other will be
there, on account of the mutual opposition, is not established
and is contradictory.8
Nor is it possible through the inclusion and exclusion
(of vyvttis), as in the case of Titree_nesst? and
"ithapa-ness", for there is no acceptance in this
case of inclusion and exclusion. Or, in the event of
acceptance here, in the presence of efficacy (smarthya) there
will be non-productivity, or in the non-presence of
smarthya there will be productivity.9
Ior can it be because of a difference in properties
(updhi), as in the case of being an effect and being
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npi vikalpabhedab, svarpakçtasya tasya vyvçtti-
bhedakatve' samarthavyvrtterapi bhedaprasañgt,
viayaktasya tu tasya bhedakatve' nyonyrayaprasañgt.
na ca nirnimitta evyath vyvttibhedavyavahro,
atiprasafigãt.
Second alternative (Yogyata) considered
npi dvitTyab, sa hi sahakãriskalyath v prtisvikT v.
First option (sahakãriskalyam) of second alternative
na tãvadãdyati paka, siddhasdhant, parãnabhyupagamena
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non-eternal. There is no possibility of that, for the
property is not merely the word itself, because then
the possibility of synonyms will be destroyed.1°
Nor can a difference in ideas (vikalpas) [constitute
a difference for the exclusions (vyvtttis)]. In the
case of the difference in the ideas being brought
about by the mental episode itself,when this
becomes the differentiating factor, then there will be
an unwanted difference in the case of asamarthavyvrtti
itself)- 1 In the case of the difference in ideas being
brought about by the objects themselves, when this is
responsible for the difference, it will lead to a
mutual dependency. And the statement of difference
concerning the exclusions cannot be based on nothing at
all, for then anything could count as the basis for it.12
Second alternative (yogyatã) considered
Nor can it be the second possibility (yogyat), for that
is either the totality of the accessorial causes
(sahakriskalyam) or something specific to that particular
thing (prãtisvik).
First option (sahakriskalyam) of second alternative
The first position is not possible, because (1) that
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he t v as i d d he s'c a.
(1) yat sahakrisamavadhnavat taddhi karotyeveti
ko nma nbhyupaiti yarnuddiya sdhyate
(2) na cãkaratiak1e sahakãrisamavadhãnavattvam-
asmbhirabhyupayete yatab prasainigah pravarteta.
Second option (prtisvik) of second alternative
prtisvikT tu yogyat anvayavyatirekaviayibhiitath
bijatvath Va syat tadavantarajatibhedo v,
sahakarivaikalyaprayuktakaryabhavavattvath v5.
,
(1) na tavadadyal, akurvato pi bijajatyasya
pratyaksasiddhatvãt, tavpi tatravipratipatte.
(2) na dvitTyab, tasya kurvato'pi mayãnabhyupagamena
dçntasya sdhanavikalatvt.
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leads to the establishment of what is already proved
and (2) the reason (hetu) is not established and is
not accepted for argument's sake by the opponent.
(1) That which has the presence of all the accessorial
causes, that alone definitely produces. In this case,
who does not accept this? You are arguing with someone
who already accepts this point.13
(2) And at the time of not producing, its possession of
all the accessorial causes is not accepted by us.14
Therefore, you cannot proceed with the prasañga type of argument.
Second option (prãtlsvikT) of second alternative
And the productive capability (yogyatã) as some excellence
specific to that thing (prtisvikT) could be (1) seedness, which
is known through concomitance and difference, or (2) it
could be some different genus subsidiary to it 15
 or
(3) it could be possession of the absence of a product
brought about by the absence of the accessorial causes.
(1) The first position is not possible, because of
a proof by perception —in the case of [a seed] which
does not produce but possesses "seedness". Even with
you, there is no difference of opinion here.16
(2) The second alternative is not possible, because even
in the case of [a seed] which produces, I do not accept
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ko hi nma susthtm pramanyamabhyupagacchet?
sa hi na tvat pratyakenãnubhiiyate, tathnavasyt.
napyanumnenaj liñgbhvt.
yadi na kacidviea katharh tarhi karakaraie iti cet?
ka evarnha neti?
pararh kith jtibhedarpab sahakrilãbhãlbharpo veti,
niyãmakath prarnãamanusaranto na payãmab.
tathãpi yo yath sahakãrimadhyamadhysTho kepakaratiasvabhãvo
bhvai sa yadi prgapyãsit tad prasahya, kryaih kurvãl)o
na akyate iti cet.
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the example, because of the absence of a reason.'7
Who of sound mind will accept something which is without a proper
epistemological basis? It is not subject to perception,
thus there is no basis for it. Nor can it be by means of
inference, because of the absence of a reason (liña)
for you.'8
"If there is no difference, how can there be production
and non—production?"
Who says in this matter [there is no difference]?
Whether this in the form of a separate genus (jti), or whether
it is of the form of the presence and absence of the accessorial
causes, we who are searching for the epistemological basis
do not see the deciding factor (niymakam).
"Even then, this [seed in the field], when present along
with all its accessorial causes, is an entity whose
nature is producing an effect without delay and this
[seed] is such that, even if it were existent earlier,
then, because of the sheer force of it, it is not
possible, even with hundreds of oaths made by gods,
to prevent the bringing about of the effect."9
This can only be stated if the entity's possessing the
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yuktam etat yadyakepakaraasvabhãvatvath bhvasya
pramagocara syãt, tadeva tu kutab siddhamiti
n d hi g a c c h in a b.
prasa?igatadviparyayãbhym iti cet.
na, paraspar'rayaprasar!igt. evarbsvabhãvatvasiddhau hi
ta y ob pravrttib, tatpravçttau caivathsvabhvatvasiddhiriti.
syd etat, kãryajanmaivã sminnarthe pramQam,
vi1ambakãrisvabhãvnuvttau kryanutpatti sarvadeti cet.
na, vi1ambakrisvabhävasya sarvadaivkararje
tattvavyghtãt.
tata'ca vi1ambakrtyasya yvatsahakãryasannidhnarh
tãvannakarotTtyarthab.
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nature of immediate production were within the scope of one of
the instruments of knowledge. How that can be established, we
do not know.
"That can be by prasaflga and prasañgaviparyaya."
No, because there will be a mutual dependence. Their
employment rests on the establishment of the entity
having a particular nature, and the establishment of
its having this nature rests on the employment [of the
prasañga. j20
"Let this be, but in this matter the instrument of knowledge
(pram5a) is the production of the effect itself, because of the
continuance of the nature of delayed production, there
will never be production of an effect at all."
No, because there will be contradiction in your
statement that something can be of the nature of
producing an effect with delay and not being productive
at all.21
And so the meaning of the expression "delayed productivity"
is, "so long as there is absence of all the accessorial
causes, so long will it not produce".
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evaih ca kãryajanma sãmagryãih prarnriayltuñ akyate na tu
I at lb he d e.
te tu kith yathãnubhavafh vilambakãrisvabhãvab parasparath
pratysanni karyath krtavantali, kith va yatha
tvaparikalpanarn ksiprakarisvabhav ityatra
kãryajananarnajãgarffkameveti.
napi ttTya, virodhãt.
sahakaryabhãvaprayuktakryabhavavaths'ca sahakãrivirahe
kãryavarhceti vyãhatarn.
tasmad yad yadabhãve eva yanna karoti tat tatsadbhve
tat karotyeva iti tu syat, etacca sthairyasid hereva
pararh bTjam sarvasvamlti
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And so, in this way, it is possible for the production
of an effect to be a instrument of knowledge for the totality of
the accessorial causes (smagr), but not for a separate
genus (jãti).
But whether [the accessorial causes], according to
experience, having the nature of delayed effectiveness,
come together at a particular place and produce the
effect, or whether, according to your assumption, they
are of the nature of producing without delay, in this
matter the production of the effect is irrelevant.
(3) Nor is it the third alternative because of the
resulting contradiction between the possession of the
absence of the effect brought about by the absence of the
accessorial causes and the possession of the effect in
the absence of the accessorial causes.22
Therefore, that which is in the absence [of accessories]
that alone does not produce [the sprout], and that one
in the presence of [the accessories] will produce the
sprout. And it is this fact which is at the root of the
proof of permanence, and this is the heart of the matter.
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FOOTNOTES TO TEXT A
1. I have tried to present the translations as a dialogue
between Udayana and his Buddhist opposition. Quotation
marks in the translation signify that it is the
Buddhist position which is being presented, a
grammatical device which corresponds to the
construction "....iti cet" in the Sanskrit original.
Of course, this dialogue should not be seen as a
discussion between a Buddhist and Udayana, but rather,
between a theoretical Buddhist position, as constructed
by Udayana, and Udayana himself.
2. The Sanskrit text is based on two editions of the ATV,
the 1939 Bibliotheca Indica edition (pp. 22-57), and
the 1940 Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series edition (pp. 1-17).
Where important discrepancies occur this will be
indicated in the footnotes. The punction is mostly
taken from the 1940 edition. I have tried to arrange
the Sanskrit text, as closely as possible, parallel to
the English translation so that an easy comparison is
possible. The sub—titles in the translation are my own
and I hope they make it easier for the reader to follow
the thread of the argument. (See also the end of the
footnotes for a plan of the argument.)
3. This opening verse of tJdayana's is similar to the
the momentariness as presented by Jãna 'rImitra in
opening of his Kaiiabhañgdhyya:
yat sat tat katikath yath jaladharali
santastu bhãv ime.
satt	 aktir ihãrthakarmai. mites siddheu
siddhä na sal
npyekaiva vidhãnyadpi parakrnnaiva kriy
vã bhaved
dvedpi kaiabharia saihgatir atal2 sãdhye ca
virmyati//
p. 1 in Ed. Thakur (1956)
This position is also stated by Ratnaklrti in the
his Kanabhañgasiddhi:
-	 -	 I --	 sI	 /	 I_	 I -	 _I_	 /
thesis of
the
opening of
p. 78 in Ed. Thakur (1957)
4.	 The Buddhist thesis of momentariness will therefore rest on
the idea that a capable object is different from an
incapable object. One and the same object cannot be
associated with both of these qualities, namely, capability
and incapability. Hence a samarthaghaa (a capable pot) is
different from an asamarthaghaya (an incapable pot), whereas
Udayana would want to say that a pot can be carrying water
one moment and not the next, but it is still the same pot.
The argument between Udayana and his Buddhist opposition
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setiles on the question of whether the seed in the granary
(kuslasthath bTjam) is the same seed as when it is thrown
into the field (ketra-patita) and produces a sprout
(añkura). The Buddhist will argue that the granary seed is
a different entity from the field seed, whereas Udayana will
argue that the granary seed is to be counted as the same
seed as that which eventually produces the sprout when sown
in the field.
5.	 Here the dual case ending indicates that both the prasañga
and prasañgaviparyaya types of argument are to be used here.
The prasañga will be as follows:
If something is capable then it produces.
And the prasañgaviparyaya will be:
If something is not capable then it does not produce.
So, a seed in the granary, if it were capable would produce
a sprout, and conversely, a seed in the field, if non-
capable, would not produce.
"tathãhi kulasthath hi lath yadyañkura samarthath
syd añkurath kuryãt, na ca karoti, tasmnna
samarthamevaih; ketrapatita yadyasamarthath synna
kuryt, karoti ca, tasmnnsamarthamiti
prasañgbhyãñi viparyayãbhyth ca; kulasthaketra-
patitabijayor bhedab / tath kaiikatvameva
paryavasyediti bhãvab I" Sathkara Miára's Commentary on the
j p. 34 (1939)
"For, if the seed in the granary were capable of producing a
sprout it would produce a sprout, and it does not. There-
fore it is not capable in this matter; and if the seed
fallen in the field were not capable it would not produce [a
sprout], and it does. Therefore it is not incapable in this
matter. These two arguments are the prasaña and prasañga-
viparyaya respectively. There is thus a difference between
the granary seed and the seed in the field, and this is a
proof of momentariness."
This prasañga used in the proof of momentariness has be-
come a classic model to illustrate this type of argument.
For example, in the Tarkabhã we read: "We have said before
that the vypti [concomitance] between 'existence' and
'momentariness' is to be understood by prasañga and
prasañgaviparyaya. What is here meant by prasañga? Prasaña
is reasoning for bringing out an absurd conclusion which is
undesirable to the opponent by means of a statement based on
a vypti established by proof. For example, if a jar (at
the present moment) were admitted to maintain one and the
same nature that subsisted in the past and will continue to
do so in the future, then we could point out (the absurdity)
that it is (at the present moment) capable of producing the
effects belonging to the past and future (moments of the
jar)." Tarkabhäã of Mokãkaragupta translated by Kajiyama
(1966) pp. 114-115.
In his translation of the Tarkabh, Kajiyama notes that:
"Prasañga and prasaflaviparyaya are used in order to
establish the vyãpti of another independent syllogism
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(svatantraprayoga). In our present context the independent
inference concerned is:
yat sat tat kai:iikarh, yath ghata; santacmi
vivdãspadibhtãb padãrth.
Thus the vyãpti to be proved by prasañga is: whatever exists
is momentary. We have to keep in mind that since
DharmakTrti's time, Buddhist logicians had defined
'existence' as 'being making effective action'
(arthakriykritva)." Kajiyama (as above), p. 116.
6. Udayana's point here is that, if you take sãmarthyam to mean
karaiatvam, your prasañga will have the following form:
If something is producing then it produces.
prasaff jaka	 pr as aj y a
sdhana	 s d h y a
In this form there is no difference between the sdhana and
the sãdhya (sdhyviita).
7. Udayana here has the opposition evading his previous
criticisms by invoking their particular theory of meaning,
apohavãda, which states that the meaning of a word is given
through what is excluded by that word (see Chapter Four).
A difference between the sdhya and the sdhana
can be maintained, so their argument goes, because of a
difference in their exclusions. Udayana then proceeds to
examine the four possibilities opened up by this line of
argument in order to show the fallaciousness of each one.
8. The point here is that, in the example given, there is a
mutual exclusion. "Horseness" (according to the apoha
theory of meaning) is all that is not non-horse and
"cowness" is all that is not non-cow. Wherever "horseness"
is, then this will excluse "cowness". Hence in the
prasañga, if the difference in their vyvtttis is of this
type, then "smarthyam" and "karaiatvam" would exclude each
other, a situation which Udayana well knows to be
unacceptable for the Buddhists. The situation would be that
the absence of the sdhya could bring about the presence of
the sdhana.
9. (Note: A ithapã is a type of tree.)
Here the example given is that of a 'higher' and 'lower'
genus (jti). The concomitance (vypti) would be as
follows:
Where there is ithap-ness there is tree-ness.
(Where there is smoke there is fire.)
This vypti is not reversible: the presence of the vypya
(ithapã-ness) implies the presence of the vypaka (tree-
ness), but the reverse is not true.
Hence:
Where there is tree-ness there is s'ithapã-ness is not a
valid concomitance. If we take the vyãpti in our example,
it will be as follows:
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Where there is karaiatvam there is sãmarthyam and then
it will be possible for sãmarthyam to be present without
karatiatvam. If the vyãpti is reversed, then it will be
possible for karaiatvam to be present without sãmarthyam.
Both possibilities would be unacceptable.
10. Here Udayana has the Buddhist reverting to the idea of
sarnavyäpti (symmetrical concomitance) having just been
previously refuted on the basis of asamvypti (asymmetrical
concomitance). The properties of being an effect and being
non—eternal are given as examples of properties which always
are present together yet which do not have the same meaning.
(being non—eternal) anityatvam	 kryatvam (being an effect)
samavypti
The Naiyyika makes the point here that the difference in
upãdhis can be described and explained. Sathkara Mira
explains the difference between kryatvam and anityatvam
in the following manner, that being an effect (kãryatvam)
refers to a prior non—existence before coming into being,
whereas being non—eternal (anityatvam) refers to the
termination of existence after coming into being.
kryatvam
dhvathsavicchinnasattyogitvamanityatvamityupdher-
bhinnatvamastu prakrte tu natathopãdhirastityãha."
ATV (1939) p. 43)
kryatvam	 anityatvam
(previous	 1POTI
	
(termination of
non—existence) prãgabhãva	 dhvathsvicchinna	 existence)
It would therefore be incumbent on the Buddhist to introduce
such a difference for the case in question namely, for
karaiatvam and smarthyam. Udayana then goes on to point
out that if the Buddhists attempt to locate the difference
merely in the fact that here there are two different words
used, then this would have the unfortunate result that
synonyms would no longer be possible, that is, it would not
be possible ever to have two different words which have the
same meaning. (It might be noted that a distinction between
sense and reference might have been useful here.)
11. Udayana is here making a logical point. In the standard
Nyya syllogism the reason or justification (hetu) appears
in two different ways namely, in the paka (There is smoke
on the hill.), and then again in the statement of the
concomitance (vypti) (Wherever there is smoke there is
fire.). Because the hetu (smoke in this case) appears in
the paka and in the statement of concomitance with the
sãdhya (fire in this case), this will give rise to two
different types of knowledge concerning the hetu. This
accordingly will mean that there are two different
conceptions (vikalpas) concerning the hetu, and the
inference (anumna) will be completely destroyed because the
basis for the inference is that the hetu should be the same
in both of its appearances. This would also hold true for
the Buddhist form of inference.
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12. Udayana points out here that the difference in the
conceptions (vikalpas) cannot be based on a difference
between the objects themselves, becausethis is the very
thing which needs to be demonstrated here.
13. This section is by way of an explanation of siddhasdhanãt,
that is, the establishment of what is already proved. If
yogyat or productive power is to be explained with
reference to the presence of all the accessorial causes,
then the Naiyyika has no argument with this position. Of
course the acceptance of this interpretation of yogyatã by
the Buddhists in their original prasañga would be fatal in
its usefulness for establishing momentariness:
That which is in the presence of all the
accessorial causes produces.
That which is not in the presence of all the
accessorial causes does not produce.
It can be seen from the above substitution that the
difference between the granary seed and the field seed could
not be substantiated.
( ?? yad sahakãrisãkalyarpasya hetob siddhib tadã
karaiãbhyupagamãt siddhasãdhanam ityarthal." Nãryaiia's
Commentary on the ATV (1940 edition) p. 11.)
14. This section is by way of an explanation of hetvasiddha,
that is, the non—establishment of the hetu or reason. In
the previous section, the capability of the field seed
rested on the presence of all the accessorial causes. In
this section the Naiyyikas are rejecting the idea that the
granary seed is incapable because they point out that in
this case all the accessorial causes are not present, that
is, the hetu is not established.
15. Although Udayana doesn't refer to it as such it would seem
that by 'some other different quality' (tadavntara-
1tibheda) he is referring to the Buddhist idea that an
effect is brought about by the possession of some special
causal excellence (kurvadrUpavattvam) in the object.
("tadavntarajãtibhedah kurvadrpavattvath
parãbhyupagatamityartha." Sathkara Mira's Commentary on
the ATV (1939 edition) p. 48.)
This will be the main position of the Buddhists which
Udayana will be concerned to attack —that the effective
seed, that is, the seed which produces the sprout, possesses
some exceptional quality (kurvadriipavattvam) which sets it
apart from the granary seed.
16. Thus "seedness" cannot be the feature responsible for
capability (yogyatã). Even the seeds in the granary possess
"seedness", are called seeds, yet they are not at that time
capable of producing sprouts:
"If [the seed] in the granary were a seed then it would
produce. This is the argument (prasañga), and [the granary
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seed] does not produce. Therefore in the reverse of this
argument [we would say that the granary seed] is not a
seed."
"yadi kulasthasyath bijarh syt tad kuryditi prasada na
ca karoti; tasmãnna bijamiti viparyayas'ca." Sathkara Mira's
Commentary on the ATV (1939) p. 49. This same argument is
found in Udayana's Nyãyakusumãjali 1.16
17. The argument here now concerns the field seed. Udayana just
seems to be stating flatly that he doesn't accept any
special additional quality in the field seed. The Buddhist
has every right to ask here, "Why not?" —a rejoinder which
has to be supplied by the reader, since Udayana does indeed
go on to defend his rejection. In the example (drnta),
which in this case is the field seed, Udayana does not
accept the presence of the kurvadrpatvam or special
excellence, and hence he rejects the prasañga upon which the
Buddhists' argument is based:
"If the seed in the granary were in possession of the
special causal excellence then it would produce, as in the
case of the seed in the field."
"kuiilasthath bijamyadi kurvadrpatvajãtimat syãt kuryãt
ketrapatitab5javad." To which Udayana would reply:
"In the case of the field seed also there is no possession
of any causal excellence."
"ketrapatite' pi bile kurvadrüpatvam nsti."
Sarhkara Mira's Commentary on the ATV (1939) p. 51.
18. Udayana points out first that this causal excellence is not
perceived. Neither can it be by means of inference because
there is no reason (liñga) upon which to base the iere'cice,
as in the case of the inference of fire from smoke.
19. The Buddhist would want to say here that the production of
the effect should itself be the reason. If there is no
difference in the field seed, so they would want to argue,
how can you account for the production of the sprout?
Udayana counters this argument by saying that of course
there must be some difference in the circumstances of the
field seed, but sees no reason why this should be attributed
to some special kurvadrüpatvam rather than just the presence
of the accessorial causes. The Buddhist emphasizes his
position with regard to the kurvadrpatvam thus —that a
seed possessed of kurvadriipatvam cannot brook delay and must
produce its effect immediately, nothing can prevent it, not
even the oaths of the gods. The kurvadrüpatvam is inherent
to the efficient seed moment. The Naiyyika will only admit
the existenceof such a kurvadriipatvam if the Buddhist can
produce an instrument of knowledge (prama) for it, which
so far they have failed to do to Udayana's satisfaction.
20. Udayana continues to argue that he can see no way for the
Buddhist to establish his case - that production takes place
because of some additional quality essential in the field
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seed (svabhãva). Hence the argument between the Buddhist
and Udayana is over whether there is some 'svabhãva' which
is responsible for the productivity. The Buddhist once
again turns to a prasadga type of argument to prove his
case:
"If the [field] seed were not of the nature of
production without delay, it would not produce and it
does produce. Therefore its nature is of production
without delay."
"bTjarh yadi akepakaraiiasvabhvarh na syãt na kuryãt
karoti ca, tasmãd akepakãrisvabhãvam."
Sathkara Mira's Commentary on the ATV (1939) p. 51.
As Udayana points out, this prasañga fails to accomplish
what it sets out to do since the svabhãva is already assumed
in the prasañga, rather than the prasañga proving the
existence of the svabhva.
21. Here Udayana is making a logical point, "splitting hairs"
some might say, in pointing out that the Buddhist is
contradicting himself in his very use of the phrase
"production by delay" in the same breath as saying that
there is no possibility of this.
22. The idea of this third alternative is to distinguish between
the absence of an effect in say, a piece of stone, and the
seed in the granary. In a piece of stone there is no sprout
just because of the fact that it is a piece of stone
(because of "stone—ness"), whereas in the granary seed the
absence of the sprout is due to the absence of the
accessorial causes. This much is true, but you cannot
define yogyat or productive capability in these terms
because then, as Udayana is here pointing out, you are
ascribing yogyatã to the granary seed as well as to the seed
in the field. Hence the granary seed would supposedly
produce the sprout even though the accessorial causes are
not present because, according to this definition, it is
yogyat and herein lies the contradiction:
"For otherwise [if productive capability] was defined as
that in which the absence of the effect was brought about
by the absence of the accessorial causes, then the seed in
the granary would produce and it does not."
"nanu kulasthath bjam yadi sahkãriviraha-
prayuktakãrybhãvavatsyãt kuryãt na ca karoti."
Sathkara Mira's Commentary on the ATV (1939) p. 57.
"In the case of a piece of stone, the absence of the effect
is not brought about by the absence of the accessorial
causes, but rather by stone—ness. In the case of a seed, in
the presence of the accessorial causes, however, there is no
absence of the effect."
"ilãakale kryãbhvo na sahakärivaikalyaprayukta kith
tu ilãtvaprayukta eva bije sahakãriskalye kãryäbhãvo na
bhavatyava."
Sathkara Mira's Commentary on the ATV (1939) p. 48
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FOOTNOTES TO TEXT A CONTD.
Plan of the argument in Text A
UDAYANA
proof	 No, no concomitance
exists is
THE BUDDHIST
Statement of
"That which
momentary."
UDAYANA
It depends on
by capability47N
karaiatvam (active
rejected by Udayana
as resulting in a
tautology
17
THE BUDDHIST
Yes, because something
mean	 enduring will have
capability and non—
capability associated
with it.
Prasaña: "If capable
roductiveness)	 then will produce.
what you
yogyata
(productive capability)
___________ (something specific to
	
totality of sahakãris
that particular thing)	 (accessorial causes)
(Udayana has no argument
1) seedness	 with this position.)
2) kurvadrpatvam
(possession of some special excellence)
3) absence of effect caused
by absence of accessorial
causes
_prtisviki
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TEXT B
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT'
The seed as an object of a statement of causal efficacy
etena samarthavyavahãragocaratvarh hetur iti
nirastam. tdgvyavahragocarasypi bTjasyñkuräkaraa-
d a r a n t.
nsau mukhyastadvyavahrab., tasya janananimittakatvt,
anyath tvaniyamaprasaiigditi cet.
-	 .
na, kidsam punarjananam rnukhyasamarthavyavaharanimittam.
na tvadakepakararam tasysiddheb.
niyamasya ca sahakriskalye satyeva karaiath karaiamevety-
evathsvabhvatvenpyupapatte, tataca janananimitta
evyath vyavahro na ca vyãptisiddhiriti.
129
Kaiabhañgav5da I
TEXT B
ENGLISH TRANSLATIOI
The seed as an object of a statement of causal efficacy
"The reason [for the difference between the granary and
the field seed] is by means of [the field seed] being
an object of a statement of causal efficacy."2
No. The reason is not there, becatse of tae. osc'ttc
that in the case of a seed which does not sprout it is
still yet an object of such a statement.3
"That statement is not really such a statement, because
the • production of the effect is the basis for [such a
statement], otherwise there will be no concomitant
connection. "4
No. What kind of production would be the basis of a
statement of real capability. It cannot be bringing
about the effect without delay because that has not been
established by you.
And in respect of this concomitance, the cause only in
the presence of the accessorial causes is the cause, and
so because of this feature there is the applicability of
the statement [of capability]. Consequently, such a
statement is only the basis for the production and not
the proof of a concomitance,5
130
Kaiabhaflgavda I
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT B
1. ATV pp. 16-17 (1940 edition)
ATV pp. 58-61 (1939 edition)
2. This refers to an argument put forward by Ratnakirti in his
Kai.iabhafigasiddhi (1957 edition) p. 63. The argument here
is that there must be some basis for calling something
"samartha" (capable). Being an object of a statement of
capability (samarthavyavahragocaratvam) is for Ratnakirti
based on the production of the effect by that object. Hence
there is a concomitance between samarthavyavahãraocaratvam
and jananam or production of the effect. Saihkara Mira
states the Buddhist argument thus:
"For surely, if the seed in the granary were an object of a
statement of capability it would produce, and it does not
produce. Therefore it cannot be the object of a statement
of capability."
nanu kuülasthath yadi samarthavyavahragocara syãt
kuryãnna ca karoti tasmãnna samarthavyavahragocara
iti prasaftgaviparyayau.
Sathkara Mi gra's commentary on the ATV (1939) p. 59.
3. Udayana disagrees with this because of the plain fact that
we just do call seeds in the granary "seeds". This fact
must overrule the prasadga.
4. The Buddhist counters by saying that such statements are not
really statements of capability (mukhyasarnarthavyavahãra).
Granary seeds are only called "seeds" in a secondary sense.
(For the Buddhist opponent the granary seed would be in the
same seed series or sathtna as the field seed.) There must
be some basis for calling something as samartha and this is
the production of the effect; otherwise we might as well
call a piece of stone a seed. The production of the sprout
in the case of the seed has to be the basis for a statement
of real capability.
5. Udayana then asks what kind of production it would be, even
if the concomitance is accepted. It cannot be immediate
production because that has not yet been proved by the
Buddhists. Seeds are just called "seeds" because of their
ability to produce sprouts under the right conditions. The
actual production of the sprout can be the basis for calling
a particular seed as such but it does not establish the
concomitance put forward by the Buddhist.
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TEXT C
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT'
The nature of karaam considered
tathãhi karaath pratyavilamba iti ko'arthai?
kimutpatteranantarameva kararjarn, sahakrisamavadhnãn-
antarameva v. vilamba ityapi ko'arthab? kith yvanna
sahakgrisamavadhnam tãvadakaral2ath, sarvathaivkaraiani
iti vã.
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION
Introduction
This section begins with a challenge from the Buddhists who
demand to know what kind of entity has been established so far
by the Naiyãyikas: "Apart from delay and non—delay in bringing
about the effect, no other nature is possible." Udayana points
out that up until now their role has been to refute the Buddhist
position and only now is it time for him to consider the nature
of the seed in the granary.
The nature of karaiam considered
What do you mean by production (karal2am) with reference to non—
delay? Do you mean (1) production immediately after the moment
of the previous cause coming into being? or, (2) does it mean
production immediately after the presence of all the co—causes?
Is this what you mean by delay in production? (3) Does it mean
that so long as the co—causes are not present, so long will there
be non—production? or, (4) does it mean production never at all?
Though in respect of the first and fourth alternatives
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tatra prathamacaturthayob pram ãbhãvdanicaye p1
dvitTyattiya y ob pratyakameva pramnam.
bjajãtTyasya hi sahakrisamavadhãnnantarameva
kararaiii karaxamevet1 pratyakasiddhameva. tath
sahakr1samavadhnarah1tasykaratiamityapi, 2 atra ca
bhavnapi na vipratipadyata eva, pramãrjasiddhatvt,
viparyave bdhakcca.
tathh1 yadi sahakrivirahe' kurvãl)astatsamavadhäne
'p1 na kuryãt tajjãtTyamakaranaeva syt,
s ama va d hnãs amavad hãna yo rub ha yora p yakara rjã t
evath tatsamavadhnavirahe p1 yadi kuryt sahakrio
na kãratam syuI t5riantarerjpi karait.
tath.
kãryasykasmikatvaprasañgab tath ca kdcitkatva-
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION
there is no conclusiveness due to lack of proof, in respect of
the second and third alternatives, there is proof by perception
(pratyaka).
And in respect of the universal "seedness" (bijajãti), only when
present with all the co-causes is there production, and there is
surely a production, a fact established by perception. Likewise,
when the co-causes are not present, there is no production. And
here you too do not have any opposite notion because there is an
instrument of knowledge (pramãiia) established [for these cases],
whereas in the opposite there is contradiction.
And so, if without co-causes something is non-productive, then,
even when present with co-causes, it will not produce. That
which is of the same type would be non-productive, because of the
ineffectiveness of both presence and absence of co-causes.
Likewise, even if in the absence of the co-causes it will
produce, then the co-causes will not be the cause because they
are no longer the cause for the production.
And so, when this concomitance (anvayavyatireka) [with
reference to the co-causes], which is not otherwise
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vihatiriti
evath ca dvitiyapakavivak ymakepakritvameva bhãvasya
svabhãvab. tttiyapakavivakãym tu kepakãritvameva
bhãvasya svarpamiti nobhayaprakãranivçttiriti.
tathãpi kimasamarthasyaiva sahakãrivirahab,
svarpa1ãbhãnantarath kartureva vã sahakrisamavadhnam
anyath veti. kith niyãmakam iti cet.
idamucyate - ku'ülasthabTjasya añkurãnukulab
'i1ãakalãdvieab kacidasti na v? na cenniyanzenaikatra
pravrtti1 anyasmnnivrtti 'ca tadarthino na syãt.
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established, is not a causal factor then you cannot say how the
production comes about. There will be the loss that the effect
comes at a particular time.3
And so, taking the second case, the essential nature of the
entity will be immediate production. But, taking the third case,
the essential nature of the object will be delayed production.
And thus there is no absence of both natures.4
"Even though you have established that the seed has both natures,
do you mean to say that the absence of the co-causes (sahakrins)
is only related to the non-productive (asamartha) seed or, that
the co-causes come to the [seedl after attaining its effective
nature or, do you mean something else? Where is the decisive
factor?"
This is said in the case of the granary seed - there is some
excellence favourable to the production of a sprout which makes
it different from a piece of stone. Do you accept this or not?
If not, there would not be, as a rule, movement to the one and
not the other in the case of one [who wants a harvest}.
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paramparayãñkuraprasavasamarthabT jakaajananãd
asty eveti cet.
kadã punab paramparayãpi tathäbhtath kariyat!ti?
tatra sandeha iti cet.
sa punab kimkrab? kith sahakãriu samavahitevapi
kari?yati na vet!, utsamavahitevapi teu kariyati
na veti, atha yadã sahakrisamavadhnath tadaiva
kariyatyeva paraii kadã teth samavadhãnarniti
5
na tãvat piirva, sãmãnyatab kãratiatvvadhãrane
tasynavakãt, avakãe v kraratvãnavadhãraiãt.
npi dvit! yab, sahakriiãm tattvvadhãrae
tasynavakt, avaks'e vã terñ tattvnavadhra5t.
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"That movement (pravtti) is because of the production of the
seed moment which is capable of production of the sprout in a
sequence
How does he know when, from the point of view of sequence, it
will produce the seed moment?
"There, there is doubt."6
What is the nature of that doubt? Is it that (1) Even in the
presence of the co—causes, will it produce or not? or, (2) Even
in the absence [of the co—causes] will it produce or not? or else
(3) Given that there is the presence of the co—causes and at that
time alone it will surely produce, whether these co—causes will
be present or not is the cause of the doubt.
(1) It is not the first possibility. Generally, when there is a
conclusive notion of the seed being the cause (kãraia), then
there is no occasion for doubt or, if you have doubt, then it
means that you don't know what is the cause of the sprout.
(2) Nor can it be the second possibility. There is no scope for
doubt once there is a conclusion about the co—causes being just
that, or, if you think that there
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trtiye tu sarva eva tatsantãnãntab ptino b!jaka1)ãb
samna1b pr'ãpnuvanti, yatra tatra sahakrisamavadhne
sati karaiianiyamt, sarvatra ca sahakãrisamavadhna-
sambhavãt.
sarnartha eva kaie kityãdisamavadhãnarnit1 cet.
tat kimasamarthe sahakrisamavadhnarneva nsti,
samavadhne satyapi vã tasmãnna kryajanma?
ndyab, i1aka1ãdvapi kitisa1i1ateja
pavanayogadarant.
na dvitiyab, 'i1aaka1diva kadcit sahakrisak1yavato
'pi bTjãdañkurnutpattiprasañgt.
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is an occasion for doubt, then you don't know the co—causes
(sahakrins) to be such.
(3)	 In the third alternative, all these seed moments which are
in the same series are of the same nature. 	 According to the
rule, somewhere and at some moment, when the co—causes are
present, it will become productive. Hence in all the previous
moments there will be the presence of these co—causes
everywhere.
"When the [seed] moment (karia) is productive (samartha) then
there is the presence of the co—causes, such as ground
c e t e r a."
If you say that, then do you mean to say that, when the moment is
non—productive, there is not at all the presence of the co—causes
or, do you mean, even in spite of the presence of the co—causes,
there is no production of the effect from that seed moment?
The first position is not possible, because we observe the
association of ground, water, warmth and wind in the presence of
a piece of stone.
The second position is not possible either. Just as in the case
of a piece of stone, even in respect of
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evamapi syãt. ko daa iti cet?
na tvadidamupa1abdham.
ã 'añkyata iti cet.
na,tatsamavadhne satyapi akarajavat
kararjamapyañkyeta.
s'ankyatrniti cet.
tarhi bTjavirahepyãañkyeta. tathã ca sati, sdhv,
pratyaknupa1ambhapariiuddhi.
sydetat, na bi jadrnth parasparasamavadhãnavatmeva
kryakaraiamarigTktyAañkyate yena samavadhnãniyamãt
sarveineva	 syãt, npi
yatra tatra saniarthotpattimañg!ktya, yena vikalebhyo'
p1 kadcit kãryajanma sambhvanyh pratyaknupa1ambha-
virodhab syt.
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a [seed moment] which is present with its co—causes, there will
be the contingency of a sprout not arising from the seed.8
"Let this be so. Where is the defect?"
Well, this has never been observed.
"I have a doubt."
No, if there is non—production even though the co—causes are
present, then, even in the absence of the co—causes you can have
a doubt in respect of production.
"Let there be doubt."
Then even without a seed there could be doubt [about the
production of a sprout]. When this is the case, good fellow,
there is no law of concomitance (anvayavyatireka).
"Let it be. I have not doubted the production of the effect with
respect to the seed and so on, which are come together in one and
the same place, so that you can say that, by accepting such a
position, there will be a conclusion of similarity in nature in
respect of all seeds belonging to the same species, because of
the restriction of the presence of the co—causes.
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nãpi yatra tatra samarthotpattimañTkçtya, yena
vikalebhyo'pi kadcit kryajanma sambhvanyi
pratyakãnupa1ambhavirodha syt.
kinnma?
bjãdiu
kryajanma sambhvyata iti.
Udayana's refutation of kurvadrpa
na,	 tatkalpanãyäth
(1) prarnãibhvãt, (2) kalpanãgauravaprasañgaprati-
hatatvt, (3) atTndriyãdivi1opaprasaigãt,
(4) vika1pnupapatte, (5) viesaya vis'earh prati
prayojakatvãcceti.
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Nor have I had all these doubts by accepting the production of
capability at any one place, even in a seed without its co-
causes, so that if I accept it there is the possibility of the
effect coming into being even from those seeds which have the
absence of the co-causes at that particular monient."9
What do you mean?
ttWhen the seed et cetera (that is, the co-causes are all
present), then there is arisal of the effect (karyajanma),
accepting also the kurvadrpa at that moment."'°
Udayana t s refutation of kurvadrpa
No, when the arisal of the effect can be explained merely
by the presence of things which you can see (that is, the seed
plus the co-causes), then (1) there is no basis (pramia) for the
postulation of that other thing (kurvadrpa); (2) there is the
contingency of unnecessary postulation; (3) the postulation of an
imperceptible sense organ is completely annulled; (4) there is
untenability of alternatives (with respect to the kurvadrpa);
(5) there must be a particular cause for a particular effect."
146
K ?a 1) abhañgavda I
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT
(1) There is no prama for the kurvadrUpa
tathhi utpatterrabhya mudgaraprahãraparyantarh
ghatatãvat jãtyantarankrãnta evãnubhyamãna1
kramavatsahakãrivaicitryit kãryakotlb sarpä
virüpã karoti, tatra etvataiva sarvasmin samajase
anupalabhyamnajãtikoikalpan kena pramãiena?
(2) There is no need to postulate the kurvadrUpa
kena vopayogena, yena kalpangauravaprasañgadoo
na syt? yo yadarthath kalpyate tasynyathsiddhireva
tasyãbhãva iti bhavãn evheti
(3) The postulation of an imperceptible sense—organ
must be abandoned.
dtath ca jãtibhedañi tiraskrtya svabhãvabhedakalpanayaiva
kryotpattau sahakrio'pi dtavt kathacit
svkriyante 12 , atindriyendriydikalpana tu vilTyeta
mãnãbhãvãt.
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(1) There is no prama for the kurvadrUpa
For, as in the case of a pot, from the time it was created until
being struck with a hammer, what we see is the creation of many
effects of the same type or of different types in succession due
to the variety of accessorial causes. When everything can be
explained in this way, on what prama do you base your
postulation of many unseen universals?'3
(2) There is no need to postulate the kurvadrpa
For what purpose do you do it since it results in the unnecessary
postulation of some factor? You yourself have said that if
something is posited for the sake of explaining something else,
which is otherwise explicable, then that postulation is
unnecessary. 14
(3) The postulation of an imperceptible sense—organ must be
abandoned.
And if in the matter of producing an effect, the special causal
efficacy (kurvadrffpa) is accepted, having rejected the specific
universal (jtibheda) [seedness] which is perceptible, yet
somehow or other retaining the accessorial causes because they
are seen, then the postulation of a sense—organ which is
imperceptible is completely annulled.15
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(4) The untenability of alternatives
vikalp'nupapatte'ca. sa khalu jtivieab ãlitva
sarhgrhako v syt, tatpratikepako v? 	 dye
kulasthasyãpi	 leb kathath na tadrpatvarn? dvitiye
tvabhimatasypi ãleIj katharh tadrpatvam?
evath	 litvamapi tasya sathgrhakath pratikepakath v.
dye ' ãleratattvaprasañga, dvitiye tu
ãlerevãtattvaprasañga. na
 ca nobhayamapTti vãcyam
virodhvirodhayob prakãrãntarãbhvt.
vyaktibhedena sathgrahapratiksepãvapi na viruddhviti cet
vilTnarnidãnith tadatajjãtiyatãvirodhena,
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(4) The untenability of alternatives
And there is an untenability of alternatives [with respect to the
kurvadrUpa]. For is that property of being efficacious
(kurvadrpatvarn) concomitant with rice—seedness (litvam) or
does it exclude it? In the first case, how can there not be that
kurvadrilpa in the rice seed which is kept in the granary? Or, in
the second case how can that kurvadrüpa be present in that which
you have accepted as a rice seed [in the field]?
Likewise, in the case of rice—seedness itself as pervading or
excluding that [property of being efficacious] it is the same
situation. In the first case there will be the contingency of
the non—production of a sprout from whatever is not a rice seed,
and in the second case, the rice seed itself will be non-
productive. And you cannot say that it needn't be either because
apart from opposition (pratikepaka) and non—opposition
(sariigrhaka) there is no other position.16
"From the point of view of being two different instances there is
no opposition."
If you say that, then in this position, the opposition of
belonging and not belonging to a universal (jãti) is now
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paridryamnakatipayavyaktipratikepe' p1 mithal2
kvacit turagavlhagayorapi sambhedasambhavt.
yaca yasya jãtivi 'esa1 sa cet tath vyabhicared,
vyabhicaredapi ithap pãdapamavis'est, tath ca
gatath svabhvahetun.
viparyaye bdhakarh viea iti cet.
na, tasyehãpi sattvt, tadabhve svabhvatvãnupapatteb,
upapattau Va kirñ badhakanusaratiavyasaneneti.
(5) There must be a particular cause for a particular effect.
viseasya viseam prati prayoiakavacca.
tathhi kãryagatamaflkuratvam prati bTjatvasyprayojakatve
' bijãdapi tadutpattiprasa?iga.
bijasya vi 'eab kathamabije bhaviyatti cet?
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completely gone, for there will be some cases where there is the
possibility of a horse and a bird coming together, even where it
is seen that there is an opposition in respect of certain
individuals.
And that, which is a particular distinction (lãti) of something
else, if it could stray from that, then "ithap" could also
stray from the distinction ?ttreett	 In that case your
svabhvahetu will no longer be possible.17
"In the opposite case the difference lies."
No, because the position here is the same. The non—existence of
that means that it cannot be a svabhva, or in the case of
accepting that svabhva, why do you bother to introduce your
restriction (bdhaka)?18
(5) There must be a particular cause for a particular effect.
For a particular thing should be the cause of a particular
effect.
Otherwise, with respect to the production of the sprout,
"seedness" not being the cause, there would be the possibility of
a sprout arising out of a non—seed.19
"It being a special distinction of seed, how can it be linked
with a non—seed?"
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tarhi s'ã1ervis'eali kathamaã1au syditi.
a 'ã 1 era ñ k u r a nut pa t t I p r as a ñ g.
aAlivadabTje'pyasau bhavatu vieab, tathpi
bijatvaikrthasamaveta evsavankurarh prati prayojaka
iti cet.
na, ia1itvavyabhicre	 1itvaikarthasamavyavad
bjatvavyabhicre bTjatvaikrthasamavãyenãpi
niyantumaakyatvãdavi'et.
tasmd yo yathãbhUto yathabhtamtmano
'nvayavyatirekãvanukrayati tasya tathbhitasyaiva
tathbhiite sãmarthyam.
tadvitestu karyavieaih prayojayanti 'a1yadivd!ti
yuktamutpas'ymab.
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If you say that, then I'll say, "It being a special feature of
rice seed, how can it be linked with a non-rice seed?" There
will be the contingency of a non-rice seed never sprouting.
"Let this special feature [that is, kurvadrpatvam] be in the
non-seed also, even as it exists in a non-rice seed. For it is
this [kurvadrpatvam] existing inherently in the same thing in
which seedness exists (bijatvaikrthasamaveta), and only as such,
which is the cause for the sprout."
No, that is not possible. For, just as the property of being
efficacious (kurvadriipatvam) in straying away from rice-seedness
cannot be restricted by its co-presence with rice-seedness, so
too it cannot be restricted by its co-presence with seedness in
its straying away from seedness.2°
Therefore, that which being of a particular nature takes
something else of a particular nature, through its own presence
and absence, that one has efficacy with reference to that
effect.
And we find it proper that the particulars of that one, such as
in the case of being a rice seed and so on, are productive of
particular effects.2'
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Udayana's attack on kurvadriipa continued
kasya p unati pramasyäyaiii vypãraka1pa iti cet.
tadutpatt1nicayaheto pratyaknupa1arnbhtmakasyeti brUrnj1.
athanyyena vin na te paritoa, 	 tamapi
tadyadañkurath pratyaprayojakath na tadbjãtiyaii
yath	 i1'aka1am, añkurath pratyaprayojakarh ca
kuI1anihitath bijainabhyupetath parairiti
vyãpaknupa1abdh1i prasañahetu1.
vlparyaye' p1 kith bdhakamiti cet?
añkurasya jHipratin1yamkasmikatvaprasañRa ityuktam.
b!jatvath tasya pratyakasiddhamaakypahavamiti ced
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Udayana's attack on kurvadrilpa continued
"To which instrument of knowledge do the various statements which
you have made belong?"
It is based on the reason which determines the cause and effect
relationship which is of the nature of perception and non-
perception.22
If you are not satisfied unless you have an inference, then hear
this - with reference to the sprout, whatever is not a cause does
not belong to the universal "seedness", like a piece of stone.
The seed which is kept in the granary is not the cause in
relation to the sprout —this non—perception of the pervader
(sprout) is accepted by the opponent, and this is the hetu in the
form of a prasañga.23
"In the reverse what is the restriction?"
There will be no causality with regard to the sprout—universal
(añkurajti) •24
"The granary seed's belonging to the seed class is perceptible
and cannot be concealed by a prasatiga."25
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astu tarhi viparyayab - yadbijath tadañkurath prati
prayojakath, yathntyasämagrimadhyamadhysinath hi jam,
bijarh cedath vivdspadamiti svabhvahetub. añkurasya
hi jãtipratiniyamo na tvannirnimittab, sãrvatrikatva-
prasaI!1gt, npyanya n imitta b, tathäbhUtasya tasyãbhãvt.
seyaih nimittavatt vipaksãd vyavartamn
svavypyamdãya bijaprayojakatymeva viIrmyatiti
pratibandhasiddhil.
The nature of the seed considered
athavã ktamañkuragrahena, bijasvabhvatvam kvacit
krya prayojakam na v? na cet na tatsvabhãvaih bijamL
tena rpea kvacidapyanupayogt. evath ca pratyakasiddhath
bijasvabhvatvam nsti, sarvapramãiagocarastu
vieo'stiti viuddh buddhib.
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Let there be the contrary —whatever is a seed is a cause for the
sprout, as in the case of the field seed which is present along
with the totality of accessorial causes, and this one under
dispute is a seed—.
 thus we have the svabh gvahetu. The sprout's
connection with the causal property (lãti) cannot be arbitrary.
Otherwise it would arise everywhere. Nor can it be based on
something other than it, because there is nothing as such like
that. 26
 Possessing some real basis, not existing in its
contrary, results in the sprout having the seed as its specific
causal factor. In this way the concomitance is established.27
The nature of the seed considered
Or, let us stop considering the sprout. Is the nature of the
seed to be a cause of something or not? If not, then the seed is
no more of a seed nature, and in that form it is not useful in
any context. Hence it shows the excellent clarity of your mind
that 'the seed which you see has no essential nature
(bijasvabhãvatvam), but there is an excellence (kurvadrpatvam)
which is outside the scope of all instruments of knowledge.'28
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kvacidupayogepyekasya tena rUpeiia sarvemavi'eas-
tädrpyãt, tath ca kathath kiffcideva bijath svakãryath
kuryãt npari?
na ca vastumãtrath tatkryaih, abTjt tadanutpatti-
prasañgt.
npi bTjamtram, añkurakrizio'pi tadutpattiprasañgt.
nãpyañkurdyanyatamamtrarn, prgapi tadutpattiprasaigt.
yad tadutpannath sat yatkryãriukU1asahakrimadhyamadhiste
tadã tad eva kryath prati tasya prayojakatvam iti cet.
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If it is productive [as cause] in some effect, then because of
its being the cause in the case of one [seed], all others being
of the same class will be productive because of their common
nature. And thus, how is it that only a certain seed is
effective and others not?29
And nor can its effect be a thing in a general sense, because
there will be the possibility of the non—production [of a thing
in a general sense] from what is not a seed.3°
Nor can you say that only a seed is produced from the seed. Then
you have to accept the production of such [a seed] from [the
seed] which produces a sprout.31
Nor can you say that any one amongst the sprout et cetera, can
be the effect, because otherwise there will be the possibility of
[the sprout's] being produced earlier.32
"When something comes into being along with the accessorial
causes favourable to the production of a particular effect, then
at that particular moment there is efficacy with regard to that
e f fec t •"
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tat kimavntarajtibhedamupãdya bijasvabhvenaiva vã?
ãdye sa eva jtibhedastatra prayojakab, kimãyãtaih
bi jatvasya?
dvitiye tu samna!1nämapi sahakrivaika1ydakararjarn
ityãytath, tattatsahakãrishitye sati tattatkryam
prati prayojakasya bijasvabhvasya sarvasdhraiiatvãd-
iti.
atrpi prayoga - yadyena rUperthakriysu nopayujyate
na tat tadriipam, yathã b!jaii kujaratvena
kiffcidapyakurvanna kujarasvarpam, tathã ca 	 1ydayal
smagripraviã bijatvenrthakriysu nopayujyanta
iti vyãpaknupa1abdhib prasañgahetu, tadrpatãy
arthakriyih prati yoyatay vyptatvt,
anyathtiprasañgt.
tadrpatvametasya pratyak?asiddhatvda'akypahnavamiti
cet.
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Then is it by means of the efficacious nature (kurvadripatvam) or
the essential seed—nature (bilasvabhãva) only?
In the first alternative where the efficacious nature alone is
the cause [of the seed], what then happens to seedness?
In the second case it results in the fact that all things (that
is, seeds) being of the same nature, are ineffective because of
the absence of accessorial causes. Hence the nature of the seed,
being common to all seeds, when it is associated with the
respective accessorial causes,is effective with respect to the
respective effects.33
And so the reasoning in this matter is —if a thing with a
particular nature in the matter of producing an effect is not
used, then that thing is not of that nature, just as a seed does
not bring about any effect in terms of having an elephant nature
and so is not of an elephant nature. Similarly, rice seeds
cetera, being present along with the accessorial causes, are not
used as seeds in the production of the effect— this is the
prasañga, that there is no perception of the pervader (vypaka),
because fitness to produce an effect pervades the having a
particular nature.34
"The nature of the granary seed, because of being established by
perception, cannot be contradicted."35
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astu tarhi viparyayab.
yadyadrpai tat tena ruprthakriyspayujyate,
yathsvabhãvena smagrTniveino bhvb bijajt!ycaite
ku1asthdaya iti svabhvahetub, tadrpatvamtr-
nubandhitvdyogyatyb.
tatacãsti kicit kryath yatra bjatvena bijamupayujyata
iti.
bijnubhava evsdhraath kryarh yatra bjatvath
prayojakath tacca sarvasmdeva bijadbhavatiti
kimanupapannam? iti cet.
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Then let the opposite be true.
Whatever is of a particular nature, that one is used with that
nature in the production of a particular effect, like entities
with that nature combining with the totality of accessorial
causes, and these granary seeds et cetera belong to the category
of "seed" (bijajti)— this is the svabhvahetu, because the
possession of that nature alone is connected to efficacy.
And therefore some effect is there with reference to which the
seed is utilized as having the nature "seedness".
"The experience that it is a seed, that alone is the effect
specific to seedness. In this case seedness is the cause and
that cause arises everywhere from all seeds. What is untenable
with this?"
(There now follows Udayana's rejoinder to this argument of the
Buddhist. Udayana first points out that in yogic perception the
perception can take place even in the absence of the seed. Even
in ordinary perception in the presence of a blind man the seeds
will not be perceived or where there are many seeds in the
presence of a sighted man some of those seeds will not be
perceived. )36
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kryãntaramevtTndriyath sarvabjãvyabhicri bhaviyatiti
cet.
tanna tãvadupãdeyam, amrtasya mUrtnupdeyatvt,
mrtntarasya
taddeasynupapatteb.
api caivath sati prayojakasvabhãvo nnvayavyatirekaocarab,
tadgocarastu na pra y oia ka b, dt yarh ca kryajtamadçyen-
aiva svabhvena kriyate, d4yena tvadryameveti,
so'yath yo dhruvityasya vi?ayab.
athavã vyatirekeria prayoga vivdãdhysitarb bTjath
sahakrivaika1yaprayuktñkurãdikryavaika1yath
tadutpattinicayavisayibhütabijajãtTyatvt, yat
punab sahakrivaika1yaprayuktãftkurdikryavaika1yath
na bhavati na tadevambhtabijajt!yaih, yathã
i1aka1amiti.
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"Another effect in a form which is beyond the senses exists which
does not violate any of the seeds."
No, taking that as the effect is not possible, because a thing of
no size cannot be the effect of a thing of visible size, or in
the case of an effect of limited size there is an untenability in
that place being also connected with another effect of visible
size.37
And so, in this way, the causal essential nature is not within
the scope of observation (anvayavyatireka) and whatever is within
its scope is not the cause, and the whole effect which is
perceptible is brought about by a nature which is not
perceptible, and by the nature which is perceptible a non—
perceptible effect is brought about. Here we have a case of '
dhruvãi' 38
And another proof in the form of absence is: The seed which is
the object of dispute (the granary seed) is one which has the
absence of the effect, sprout et cetera, brought about by the
absence of the accessorial causes, because it belongs to the
species of seed which is within the scope of the cause and effect
relationship. That one which is not an instance where the
absence of the effect, sprout	 cetera, is brought about by the
absence of the accessorial causes is not a member of the seed
species of this nature, like the piece of stone.
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[This brings to an end this particular argument. The discussion
moves on to consider another related topic, the nature of
contradiction with respect to efficacy (sãmarthya) and
non—efficacy (asãmarthya).]
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1. ATV pp. 18-36 (1940 edition)
ATV pp. 64-114 (1939 edition)
2. I have followed the 1940 text here since the punctuation in
the 1939 text seems inappropriate here (tath
sahakãrisamavadhnarahitasyãkaraamityapi // atra ca
3. In this passage Udayana is asking the question as to what
the Buddhist means exactly when he talks about causality
(kraI2am) as a phenomenon which must take place without
delay. In examining the four alternatives put forward here,
Udayana is attempting to reveal the absurdity of the
Buddhist position. If the Buddhist means that as soon as
all the co-causes are present then there will be a
production, or, that whilst the co-causes are not present
there will be no production, then this is the position of
the Naiyãyikas and Udayana would not argue against this
viewpoint, which indeed he maintains is established by
perception. Hence whilst in agreement with the second and
third alternatives, Udayana disagrees with the first and
fourth alternatives, which are the ones offered as a
representation of the Buddhist position. If, as the
Buddhist supposedly maintains, something is non-productive
at a particular time, then, according to him, it will remain
non-productive even when the co-causes are present. Udayana
is here attempting to force the Buddhist into a position
where he will have to admit the possibility that the field
seed could be non-productive. ("viparyaye bdhakaih
sphuayati I tathãhiti I ya 1 jãtyarh sahakri-
s amavadhnsamavadhãnayorakãraam taj jtiyamakãraiameva
ilãakalavaditi vyptyupalambhenãha I I" Nãrãyaii
Commentary on the ATV (1940) p. 19 footnote 2.) That is, if
something does not produce in the absence of the co-causes
and still does not produce when they are present, then this
is like a piece of stone and is an admission that the
presence of the co-causes does not bring productivity. And
conversely, according to the Buddhist, if something is
productive, then it will be productive even in
the absence of the co-causes. Here Udayana is trying to put
the Buddhist in a position where he will have to allow that
the field seed could sprout even without the presence of the
co-causes. Udayana's strategy here is to link production or
not with the presence or absence of the co-causes. If
production or not, according to Udayana, is made to depend
on the presence or absence of the kurvadripa, then the
connection between the production of the effect and the co-
causes is broken. Apart from there being no instrument of
knowledge (pramia) for the kurvadrilpa, It will also mean
that the timeliness (kãdcitkatva) of the effect will be
broken and it will become a random event.
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4. The Buddhist's intention in this whole argument has been to
demonstrate that only two natures are admissible —apart
from delay and non-delay no other nature is possible (delay
here means the non-efficacious seed (asarnarthabija) and non-
delay means the efficacious seed (samarthabija), that is,
the granary seed and the field seed are different).
By examining more closely the two different interpretations
of "production without delay" and the two different
interpretations of "production with delay", Udayana
attempted to show the absurdity of the first and fourth
options between which there is a contradiction (virodha),
and which therefore support the Buddhist case In
demonstrating that only the second and third options are
acceptable, Udayana hoped to fortify his position since
there is no virodha between these two options (and hence one
and the same seed can have both natures, that is, there is
no virodha between the efficacious seed and the
non-efficacious seed, and SO no difference between the field
seed and the granary seed). 	 [See next page for the plan of
the argument.]
169
Kanabhañgavda I
Plan of first stage of argument
THE BUDDHIST	 UDAYANA
Apart from delay and	 What do you mean
non-delay, no other	 by delay and
nature is possible. 	 non-delay?
(Delay means non-efficacious
seed, non-delay means
efficacious seed. Hence field
seed and granary seed are different.)
r— ( 1 ) Coming immediately into being
after previous cause
(2) Production in presence of
co-causes
(3) Non-production in absence
of co-causes
(4) Production never at all
(1) & (4) No pramThja
[instrument of knowledge]
(1) If something is
productive then it will
produce even in the
absence of co-causes.
(4) If something is
non-productive then it
will remain non--
productive.
47
Causality becomes
random.
(2) & (3) pratyaka pramia
[knowledge from
perception]
The opposition (virodha)	 Hence there is a third
is due to the presence or	 alternative to delay
absence of the co_causes.1
	
and non-delay.
The seed can therefore
possess both natures.
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5. The Sanskrit device "kim....uta....atha...." used here means
that three alternatives are being offered for consideration.
Hence the punctuation in the ATV (1939) pp. 68-71 seems
inappropriate here.
6. In this part of the argument the Buddhist is attempting to
reintroduce the idea of momentariness in relation to the
co-causes. They are suggesting that the co-causes may be
associated with the seed when it is efficacious and are
absent when it is non-efficacious. In this way the presence
and absence of the co-causes does not destroy the Buddhist
position with regard to momentariness (kaiikatvam).
Udayana counters with the undeniable fact that in some way
granary seeds have to be considered productive in relation
to the sprout. Otherwise, why store them and not pieces of
stone in the granary? The Buddhist reply here is obvious-
that the granary seed is an essential stage in the sequence
of seed moments leading to the production of the sprout.
Hence we are back to the original question: what is the
nature of the seed?
7. The first two alternatives discussed here are fairly clear.
The idea in the third alternative is rather obscure but
seems to be as follows: When a seed moment becomes
efficacious (samartha) the rule is that the co-causes will
be present. Udayana is pointing out here that, according to
the Buddhist's own position, there should not be any doubt
concerning whether the co-causes will be present or not.
This is because all the seed moments should be of a uniform
nature, that is, they will all be the same and hence at each
and every moment the co-causes will be present.
8. The Buddhist counters this by saying that it is only when
the seed moment is capable (samartha) is there the presence
of the co-causes. The main point of the argument seems to
be:	 ., ,, ,,
. )• )•	 s	 ---->s	 ).
series of seed moments, all the same
Because they are all the same, the presence of co-causes
with one should mean the presence of co-causes everywhere.
co-causes
samarthabfla kaia
(efficacious seed-moment)
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IJdayana continues to press his argument by asking exactly
what the Buddhist means when he says the co—causes are
present only alongside the capable seed moment (samarthabija
kaia). The first option he considers is that the co—causes
can never be found alongside an inefficient moment because
they are indeed found alongside a piece of stone which in
this context is a non—capable moment (asamartha katia). The
second alternative seems to be that the co—causes accompany
an efficient seed moment, and even if the co—causes are
present alongside a non—capable seed moment (asamarthabija
k ? alla ) there will still be no production of the sprout (as
in a case of a piece of stone).
• ) S ) S	 p ) 5 )
co—causes	 samarthabija
kana
Udayana rejects this alternative because it means that a
seed could possibly not produce a sprout even in the
presence of the co—causes. The point the Buddhist wants to
make here is that the efficient seed moment itself is
responsible for the production of the sprout, not the
co—causes.
9. The Buddhist seems to accept the doubt that will arise
concerning the production of the sprout when its production
is separated from the presence of the co—causes. Udayana
points out that if there is doubt about the production of
the sprout even in the presence of the co—causes one may as
well doubt whether a sprout could be produced even without a
seed!
10. The Buddhist summarizes his doubt as follows: first he
denies the doubts which Udayana has tried to thrust upon him
so that (yena) he will have to accept the consequences
Udayana outlines. The Buddhist is saying that the
kurvadripa comes into the seed series along with the
co—causes. He does not admit that the kurvadrilpa can come
at random although there is room for doubt concerning its
appearance. When the bTja is with the co—causes then the
kurvadrUpa comes into being and it is this latter which is
effective. It is the kurvadrTipa which has the power
(akti). The capable seed is a kurvadrUpa and it is this
which distinguishes it from the non—capable seed. See
Nrãyaii Commentary on the ATV (1940) p. 23. The Buddhistts
main contention here is that unless lJdayana demolishes the
idea of the kurvadrUpa he cannot establish permanence
(sthiratva).
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Plan of second stage of argument
THE BUDDHIST	 UDAYANA
Admits a doubt as to when
	 What is the nature of
a productive seed moment
	 this doubt?
will be produced in the
series.
1) In the presence of the	 not if you know the
co-causes will it	 nature of the seed
produce or not?
2) In the absence of the	
-not if you have any
co-causes will it
	 understanding regarding
produce or not?
	 the nature of the
co-causes
..(3) Will the co-causes be
	 According to the
present or not?
	 Buddhist's own position,
they should be present
everywhere.
UDAYANA	 THE BUDDHIST
(1) Does this mean there	 only when the seed moment
can be no co-causes 	 is capable will there be
present with a	 presence of co-causes
non-capable moment?
No, because they can be
present with a piece of
stone.
(2) Does it mean that even with
the co-causes present there
will be no production from
a seed which is non-capable?
No, because of the contingency
of the effect not arising from
the seed.
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11. Here Udayana begins his refutation of kurvadrpa and lists
five arguments which he intends to use. Each of these will
be discussed more fully in turn.
12. This passage is a little obscure and it is hard to make
sense of this passage without the insertion of "iti cet"
after "svTkriyante", a suggestion made by Sathkara Mira in
his Commentary on the ATV (1939) p. 73.
13. Here we have a clear statement of Udayana's position
regarding the nature of causality. An entity, such as a
pot, is capable of producing a range of effects depending on
its association with a range of co—causes (sahakrins). This
is all that is required for a full description of the causal
nature of any entity. There is no need to conjure up some
additional entity, such as the kurvadrUpa, for which there
is no instrument of knowledge (pramia). As Nãrãyaia points
out in his Commentary on the ATV (1940) p. 24, because for
each object there is a range of possible effects, the
Buddhist will have to postulate a different kurvadrUpa for
each particular effect.
14. For example, if Devadatta, who is fat, is seen eating sweets
by day then there is no need to postulate that he is fat
because he eats at night. Similarly, the seed plus the
co—causes together are perfectly adequate for explaining the
production of the sprout and hence the additional
postulation of the kurvadrUpa is unnecessary.
15. The best explanation for this passage is probably to be
found in Nryaia's Commentary on the ATV (1940) p. 24 note
1, where he points out that, given the Buddhist's
explanation of causality, he will have to give up the idea
of indriyapratyaka, perception by means o the sense or,an.
The parallel to be drawn is that just as the bija is
dispensed with in the matter of the production of the sprout
so too can the sense organ be dispensed with in the
production of a perception. The kurvadrüpa along with the
sahakrins are responsible for the production of the sprout,
and the knower in conjunction with light (aloca) are
responsible for the arisal of a perception.
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16. Here Udayana is discussing the relationship between
kurvadrpatvam, the sprout-producing effectiveness, and
biHjatvam, seedness.
	 He takes the example of the rice seed
in which litvam or "rice-seedness" inheres. Firstly,
Udayana considers the consequences of the kurvadrUpatvam
(jtiviea) as pervading (sathgrãhako) or excluding
ãlitvam. These two can be expressed respectively by:
(i) Wherever there is rice-seedness (ãlitvam) there is
productiveness (kurvadriipatvam).
(ii) Wherever there is productiveness (kurvadriipatvam) there
is not rice-seedness (ãlitvam).
Both of these alternatives are untenable. In Ci) it will
result in the presence of kurvadrfipatvam in the rice seed in
the granary which would mean that the seed in the granary
should produce a sprout, a position obviously not acceptable
to the Buddhists. In (ii) the result will be that there
will be no kurvadrUpatvam present in the rice seed in the
field which will therefore be impotent with respect to
producing a sprout.
	 Secondly, Udayancrya considers the
consequences of
	 ãlitvam as pervading or excluding
kurvadrTpatvam.	 This will generate the following
alternatives:
(1) Wherever there is productiveness (kurvadrpatvam) there
is rice-seedness (ãlitvam).
(ii) Wherever there is rice-seedness (ãlitvam) there is not
productiveness (kurvadriipatvam).
Again both of these alternatives are untenable.	 In (i) it
will result in the non-productivity of whatever is not a
'ãli seed. Hence a barley seed will be unable to produce a
sprout.	 In (ii) it will result in the non-productivity of
ãli seeds. This, according to Udayana, exhausts all the
alternatives, for apart from virodha (exclusion,
pratikepaka) and avirodha (inclusion, sathgrãhaka) there is
no other option.
17. Udayana here has the Buddhist trying to evade the
consequences for the above argument by saying that the
granary seed and the field seed are two different instances
of seed. Therefore it is possible for the kurvadrüpatvarn to
be present along with ãlitvam in one instance (in the
field) and absent from älitvam in another instance (in the
granary). Udayana disallows this on the grounds that it
will have unacceptable consequences since it destroys the
very notion of what it means for an individual to belong to
a particular species (lati). If on one occasion an object
belongs to the jti of horseness then it cannot in another
instance belong to the jti of birdness. If individuals are
allowed to wander from jatis in this way then why not allow
iths"apãtvam to wander from vçkatvam (tree-ness).
	 If a
"lower" universal is allowed to wander from the "higher"
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universal in this way then the svabhãvahetu will no longer
be possible (Chap. 3, footnote 10). A similar argument is
found also in Udayana's Nyyakusumãijali (1845) pp. 56-58.
18. The Buddhist tries to evade this argument by saying that the
case in question is different, a difference which can be
brought out by considering the opposite circumstance
(viparyaya).	 Without tree—ness there could be no ithap-
ness [ithapã is a type of tree], that is, 	 ithapã—ness
could not exist apart from tree—ness. Hence there is no
possibility of it wandering from tree—ness. The contention
here is that kurvadrUpatvam is able to exist apart from
litvam. This argument of Udayana's, or rather this
representation of the Buddhist position by Udayana, is
rather confusing in that it discusses the relationship
between a particular type of seed, the rice seed, and a
general capacity for producing the sprout, kurvadrpatvam.
Rather, it would seem that the relationship to be considered
should be between ãlitvam and the specific capacity for
producing the rice sprout,	 ãlikurvadripatvam.	 Indeed, in
the next section Udayana does just this.
19. The basic premiss of this argument is that a particular
effect can only be brought about by the same degree of
particularity in the cause. 	 Therefore the relationship of
kurvadrpatvam should be to the sprout—in--general, 	 a rice
sprout is the effect of the li—kurvadripatvam, a barley
(yava) sprout is the effect of the yava—kurvadrüpatvam. By
relating the production of the sprout to kurvadrüpatvarn,
however, the concomitance between seedness and sproutness is
replaced by a concomitance between kurvadrüpatvam and
añkuratvam (sproutness). In this way seedness is no longer
responsible for the production of the añkura and hence
Udayana contends it will be possible for a sprout to arise
even in the absence of a seed.
20. The Buddhist here is portrayed as trying to evade Udayana's
criticism by an attempt to re—introduce the importance of
the seed in relation to the production of the sprout
[without of course actually making seedness (bijatvam)
responsible for sproutness (añkuratvam)}. First of all, the
Buddhist contends here that since kurvadrUpatvam is a
special distinction of bijatvam then it cannot wander from
bijatvam. Udayana's reply to this tactic is somewhat ironic
in that he repeats this argument in case of the rice seed.
Since the kurvadrUpatvam is also a special distinction of
the rice seed, how can it wander from rice seeds? In that
case, as he points out, anything other than a rice seed will
be unable to produce a sprout. The second tactic of the
Buddhist is to allow therefore that kurvadrUpatvam can exist
apart from biTiatvam. This does not mean though that non-
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seeds will be able to produce sprouts since it is only when
kurvadrpatvam exists inherently in the same thing in which
seedness exists (bTjatvaikrthasamaveta) that a sprout will
be produced. This is the closest the Buddhist can come to
re-introducing the importance of the seed as having the
function of restricting the scope of the activity of
kurvadrUpatvam, without making it the cause of the sprout.
Udayana disallows this on the grounds that just as
kurvadriipatvam cannot be restricted by its co-presence with
rice-seedness, so too the Buddhist cannot restrict it by its
co-presence with seedness and hence we return to the
original possibility of a sprout being produced by a non-
seed. In all these arguments Udayana is trying to get the
Buddhist to admit that seedness is the general cause of
sproutness and of course the Buddhist does his best to avoid
such an admission.
21. Here we have a clear statement of Udayana's views concerning
the nature of causality. The capacity of a seed to produce
a sprout ultimately depends on the presence of the universal
"seedness", which must be present in all those objects
called seeds. The law-like relationship between seeds and
sprouts is, according to Nyya thought, discerned through a
process of observing their regular connection
(anvayavyatireka). It is the presence of the seed-universal
(bljajãti) which is responsible for the range of effects
possible for each individual in which the jti inheres.
Hence the universal defines the nature of the causal
behaviour in general (prayojakahetu), whilst it is the
individual seed itself which is responsible for the actual
production of the individual sprout (krarjahetu).
22. The Buddhist now challenges Udayana to produce an instrument
of knowledge for making the above statements. Udayana
replies that observation (pratyakãnupalambha) establishes a
cause and effect relationship (tadutpatti/kryakaraiabhva)
in which one universal is consistently linked with another
at an earlier time (piirvakãlaniyatalãtiyatva).
23. Here Udayana gives the full inference for the Buddhist:
whatever is not a cause with respect to the sprout
(afikurprayojakatvam) does not belong to the b!jajti.
Udayana presents the Buddhist with the following prasaflga:
If the 'seed' in the granary were a seed it would have
efficacy with respect to the production of the sprout; it
does not and so is not a seed.
This non-perception of efficacy with regard to the
sprout is admitted by the Buddhist. The concomitance on
which this argument is based is: Wherever there is seedness
(bTjatvam) [vypya - pervaded], there is productivity with
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respect to the sprout (añkuraprayojakatvam) {vypaka -
pervader ] . The non-perception of the vypaka
(vypakanupalabdhi) is reason for inferring the non-
existence of the vypya.
24. The Buddhist now challenges Udayana to find a restriction
( bãdhaka) to the reverse argument of the prasañga
(prasangaviparyaya). 	 Unless he can do this, the original
prasañga will not be considered valid according to
the rules governing the use of prasañga-type arguments.
Udayana has to produce a counter-argument to a concomitance
between seedness (bijatvam) and no productivity with respect
to the sprout (añkurãprayojakatvam) expressed in the
prasañgaviparyaya: a seed would be non-productive with
respect to the sprout (añkurprayolakatvam bijam syd).
Udayana's argument or bdhaka here is that, if this were
admitted, it would lead to the possibility of a sprout
coming out of anything that does not belong to the b!jajti.
This would mean that one could never specify the exact
cause of the sprout as belonging to any particular class at
all.
25. The Buddhist now counters by saying that granary 'seeds' are
seeds, a fact plaitily revealed	 y perception..	 s
Buddhist rightly points out here, knowledge from perception
(pratyakapramãa) takes precedence over the prasañga.
26. In this inference (anumna), Udayana accepts the presence of
seedness in the granary seed (whereas with the first anumna
Udayana was concerned to get the Buddhist to admit that the
'seed' in the granary could not be a seed). In this anumna,
seedness is made the confirming property or pervader
(vypaka) of efficaciousness with regard to the spro&'t.
If the granary seed is admitted to be a seed then it must
also be efficacious with regard to the sprout (bijatvam is
the svabhvahetu for añkuraprayojakatvam). Añkuraprayojaka-
tvam cannot have an arbitrary basis because otherwise the
sprout could arise at random, nor can it be due to anything
like kurvadrpatvam because Udayana professes to have
already destroyed such a notion.
27. Productivity with respect to the sprout (añkuraprayojaka-
tvam) is thus based on something -	 it has a basis
(nimittavatt). No basis (nirnimitta) and another
basis (anyanimitta) such as kurvadrüpatvam have already been
ruled out and hence the basis is not to be found in the
vipaka.	 This leaves only seedness (bTjatvam) as the basis
for afikuraprayo jakatvam.
(Please see the next page for the plan of the argument.)
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Plan of third stage of argument
THE BUDDHIST
Whatever is not a
cause with respect
to the sprout is
yet a seed.
Udayana counters
with a restriction
against the
prasañgaviraparyaya:
causality of sprout
will become random.
UDAYANA
Whatever is not a cause with
respect to the sprout is not
a seed.
By means of prasañga the
Buddhist will have to
accept that the 'seed' in
the granary is not a seed
at all because of their
non-acceptance of
production of the sprout
(añkuraprayo jakatvam) there.
THE BUDDHIST
knowledge from perception
overcomes prasañga and establishes
that the seed in the granary is
indeed a seed.
d7
UDAYAI'IA
whatever is a seed is productive
of the sprout, like a field seed.
The granary seed under dispute is
a seed.
seed-universal
sprout-universal	 sanimitta
¶	 \	 (having some	 kurvadrpatvam
I
basis)	 already ruled out
pervaded	 \	 pervader
nirnimjtta
(having no basis)
This vipaka already
ruled out.
Hence the basis for the sprout-production is seedness.
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28. Here Udayana is beginning a new type of argument, turning
his attention away from the production of the sprout to the
nature of the seed itself. By disassociating the seed from
the production of the sprout, tjdayana contends that the
Buddhist is depriving the seed of its essential nature.
Udayana is being ironic here in declaring that the Buddhist
has deprived the seed of its essential nature whilst at the
same time he introduces the notion of an unknowable
kurvadripa. [It should be noted here that Udayana had
supposedly got the Buddhist to admit that seedness is within
the scope of perception on pp. 49 and 96 of the ATV (1939)
and had also proved that kurvadrüpatvam is not within the
scope of any instrument of knowledge.] Udayana's argument
here is that the seed, in order to be a seed, must have some
essential nature.
	
If it does not then it is no longer a
seed.	 [For example, a watch which is broken into pieces is
no longer a watch and is called a "watch" only in a
figurative (upacãra) sense. In this theory of meaning an
object is entitled to be referred to by its designator only
if it is in possession of the requisite essential nature
(svabhva).]	 A seed must be productive of something
(arthakriyakrin), otherwise it will be a non—existent
(asat). [See Sathkara Mira's Commentary (1939) p. 100:
brjatvena kvacit krye bflam yadi prayojakath na bhavet
tadã tena rüpeia tad asat syãd iti.]
29. Here the argument is that, as seeds, the field and granary
seeds are the same, that is, they should have the same
essential nature. From the point of view of the Buddhist
therefore there is a difficulty in explaining why the
granary seed should not be considered productive in relation
to the sprout. This would be to deprive the granary seed of
its essential nature.
30. The Buddhist rejoinder here is that the seed is effective in
some way, that is, the seed has an essential nature so it
should produce something if not the sprout. Something else
is the direct cause of the sprout (kurvadrilpa). The seed is
not responsible for the sprout as its effect but rather some
other effect.	 The specific argument here seems rather
obscure and superfluous.	 The use of mtram after vastu
removes the association of añkura as the specific effect of
bIja and replaces it with an object in general. [See
Nãrãyaiia's Commentary on the ATV (1940) p. 31: mãtraabdena
bi jamtrãnvayavyatirekänuvidhyy aftkurvntarakãryath
vyavicchinatti.]
Udayana seems to be saying in this passage that perhaps the
Buddhist might want to say that the effect of the seed is
some object in general, a jar for example. Then the
Buddhist will have to accept that without the seed this
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object will not be produced, and, extending this argument to
other objects, it will mean no object at all will be
produced!
31. Here Udayana is concerned to rule out that the svabhãva of a
seed could be another seed. This would seem to be the most
plausible reply that the Buddhist could offer here, since
for the Buddhist a seed consists of a Continuum of seed
moments. Hence it would seem that the Buddhist could say
that any particular seed moment has for its effect the
production of the next seed moment in the series. Udayana
rules this out on the basis that at the time that the sprout
is produced, the particular seed moment involved will also
produce another seed moment as well as the sprout, that is:
añkura
prout)
biiakana	
• )	 ) ,	 • ) , ) •	 •
(seed moment)	 bTjakaria
(seed moment)
32. Here the Buddhist is saying that the seed moment can produce
any one of three effects:
añkura (sprout)
bljaksana	 bijakaia (seed moment)
(seed moment)	 bljãnubhava (experience of the seed)
From any seed moment a sprout, another seed moment or
knowledge of the seed in a perceiver can be produced.
Udayana counters this by saying that in this case the
Buddhist must then explain why the sprout comes at the time
that it does. There must be some factor which causes the
sprout to be produced and not another seed moment. Of
course Udayana here wants to tie the Buddhist down to the
accessorial causes.
33. If it is the kurvadrUpa alone corning into being at that
moment which is responsible for the production of the sprout
then the Buddhist still has the problem of explaining what
happens to seedness. The seed having a svabhãva of its own
cannot remain ineffective and has to give rise to an effect.
The position of the Buddhist here deprives the seed at that
moment of its svabhva since he postulates an effect, the
sprout, which arises from another cause, the kurvadrilpa. On
the other hand, if the seed essence (bTjasvabhãva) alone is
made responsible for the production of the sprout then this
would contradict the non—productivity of the granary seeds
which do not produce yet possess b!jasvabhãva. Either all
the seeds should be non—productive or they should all be
productive. Udayana concludes it has to be the bjasvabhva
in conjunction with the accessorial causes which is
responsible for the production of the sprout.
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34. The concomitance here is:
where there is 1	 Ifitness to
possession of a	 there is	 j p r o d u c e
particular nature)	 Lthe effect
pervaded <
	
pervader
Hence if the rice 'seeds' stored in the granary are not
taken into the field as seeds in order to sow a crop of
sprouts then they are not really seeds. It is only their
fitness to produce sprouts that makes them seeds.
35. The Buddhist again counters by referring to perception
(pratyakaprama), that seeds in the granary just do not
sprout and this is plain for all to see.
36. The Buddhist has attempted to find another effect (krya)
common to all seeds in virtue of which they are all seeds.
Udayana disallows his proposition, that it is the experience
that seeds are seeds which is their common effect, on the
basis that indeed not all seeds actually share this. The
svabhva of the seeds to qualify as such must always be fit
to produce the effect; non—production may only be the result
of the absence of the accessorial causes. When we glance at
a mass of seeds it just so happens that some of them will
not be perceived whereas when the seeds in the granary do
not produce sprouts it is because of the absence of water,
soil and so on.
37. The Buddhist is portrayed here in one final attempt to find
a suitable effect. Having failed to find an effect which is
within the scope of the senses, he now proposes that it
might be some effect which is beyond the senses. This means
it must be of no size at all or of very small size. Either
alternative is impossible. 	 Something of no size (amrta)
cannot be the effect of something of size (mffrta). If the
effect is then said to be of very small size, which would
qualify it still as mrta, then this would be untenable
because it cannot occupy the same place as another effect
which is also mtirta, that is in this case the sprout already
produced by the kurvadrUpa.
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38. Here Iidayana is being ironic. If the sprout is the effect
of the kurvadrpa, then we have a situation where a visible
effect is said to come from an imperceptible cause. And the
visible cause, that is, the sprout, is said to give rise to
an effect which is not visible.	 The verse referred to by
'yo dhruvãiii' is as follows:
yo dhruvãLli parityajya adhruvni nievate/
dhruvãni tasya nayanti adhruvath natameva hi/I
Nãrãyaiii Commentary on the ATV (1940 edition)p. 36
he who abandons whatever is certain resorts to get
what is uncertain,
he loses even those things which are certain to hi and
the uncertain things are lost already.
The Buddhist loses his momentariness (katiatva), having
already lost the certainty of permanence (sthiratva).
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Chapter Four
KSAIABH A GAVDA II: ON THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE
Moreover, observing that all this nature is
in motion, and thinking that nothing is true
of that which changes, they came to the
belief that nothing indeed may be truly said
of that which changes altogether and in every
way. Now it was from this belief that
blossomed the most extreme of the doctrines
we have mentioned, namely, that of the
followers of Heraclitus, and also such
doctrine as was held by Cratylus, who
finally thought that nothing should be spoken
but only moved his finger, and who criticized
even Heraclitus for saying that one cannot
step into the same river twice, for he
himself thought that one could not even do so
once.
Aristotle Metaphysics 101Oa
The Philosophical Background
• Udayana and his Buddhist adversary differ in their accounts
of the nature of language in ways directly reflective of their
disagreements concerning the nature of the external world.
Differing philosophical problems arose for the philosophers of
each tradition when they attempted to demonstrate the way in
which language could describe the world.
The Sautrntika/YogãcãTra belief that the world is momentary
in nature raises the question of whether language could be
possible in such a world at all. If reality is made up of
absolutely unique point instants (sva1akaas), then their very
nature would seem to make it impossible for them to be expressed
in language. Dignãga accepted this as a consequence of his world
view —that ultimate reality is not amenable to direct linguistic
expression— yet at the same time he recognized the apparent
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effectiveness of linguistic activity.	 In the fifth chapter of
the Prama Samuccaya he developed a theory of meaning,
apohavda, in which he attempted to explain this apparent
effectiveness of linguistic activity without compromising his
commitment to the idea that the real world is transitory in
nature.	 Whether or not apohavda satisfactorily accomplishes
this depends on whether it can answer the question of how
language can "hook on to" a world which of its very nature evades
direct linguistic expression.
In contrast to this, the Naiyäyikas believed in a world
which was made up of relatively stable objects, a world in which
some universals at least were postulated as reals, and finally a
world which was directly amenable to and reflected in linguistic
expression.	 Dignãga obviously rejected the notions that there
are stable objects in the world and that real resemblances among
particulars could be the basis for the application of general
terms.	 Hence he sought to explain how names of objects and
universals function in language without making any ontological
commitment to those objects' actual existence. 	 Thus apohavda
strikes directly at Nyya realism, making apohavãda central to
the Nyya/Buddhist controversy concerning the nature of reality
and its relationship to language.1
In Dignga's system only the particulars (svalakaas) are
real in the absolute sense, each particular being self—sustained,
self—destructive and unique to each moment. 	 The only way in
which these particulars can be cognized is by means of perception
(pratyaka), perception being here a direct grasping of the
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svalakata which is entirely free from conceptual construction
(kalpan). 2 Hence what Dignga means by perception is more akin
to pure sensation and it is a pre—linguistic activity.3
Perception has an absolute truth claim in Dignga's system
because of this very fact, that it is entirely free of any kind
of conceptual construction. Errors are expressed in the form of
a judgement, and since sense—perception is non—judgemental this
precludes the possibility of errors.4
In early Nyya thought sense—perception is also defined as a
means of cognition which is independent of any kind of
verbalization. In his definition of perception Gautama
characterizes perception as a—vyapade4am - what is not or cannot
be verbalized. 5 It is left to Vãtsyyana in his commentary on
the Nyãya SiTtras, the Nyãyabhya, to discuss further the meaning
of this term.	 He explains that the meaning of Gautama's
inclusion of this term in his definition is to make clear that
perception is to be distinguished from its verbal expression, and
that such a distinction is possible. He seems to be arguing
against the view that perception is always inextricably
intertwined with its verbal expression because he points out that
perception is possible even when the name of the object is not
known. Even where the name is known, it is an additional factor
added on to the apprehension, the apprehension itself remaining
as before, entirely independent of the name. The name functions
to communicate the perception to others.6
Hence it would seem that the early Naiyãyikas agreed with
Dignãga in holding that perception itself must be distinguished
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from its verbal expression.	 Gautama's definition, however,
already indicates the possibility of a major disagreement between
them.	 Unlike Dignãga, Gautama includes the term avyabhicra in
his definition, which is intended to exclude erroneous
perceptions. Thus, from the beginning, the Nyya definition of
perception presupposes an objective external world, stable in
nature, which may or may not be successfully cognized by means of
perception.	 This is a world in which it is possible to re-
examine, and hence verify or not, one's perceptions of it. So,
for Gautama, such phenomena as mirages would not be counted as
perception because they do not give us true knowledge about the
object of perception.
This Naiyyika belief in an external world of stable
objects, already reflected in Gautama's definition, became the
basis for increasing disagreements between later Nyãya and
Buddhist philosophers concerning the nature of perception. We
can see how such a difference between the Sautrntika/Yogãcra
Buddhists and the Naiyãyikas on the nature of reality would lead
to very different descriptions of perception. In Dignga's
system, where reality is made up of unique point instants which
have no temporal endurance, there is no possibility for coming
back to take a second look. The svalakaiia, once grasped by
perception, is gone forever from any perceptual analysis. In the
Nyãya system, particular objects like pots and cows, not the
unique point instants, are the reals. Such objects are thought
to be relatively stable and may be examined at different times
from various perspectives; we can come back to the same pot time
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and time again and make new discoveries about it. This Naiyãyika
belief in an objective, accessible external world became the
basis for a more complex understanding of the nature of
perception. From the time of Praastapda onwards, the
Naiyäyikas recognized not only a non—conceptual type of
perception, but also admitted as perception the judgemental phase
following immediately in its wake in which the bare object would
be associated with its various qualifiers. 7 We shall see that
this distinction between a conceptual and non—conceptual type of
perception became a central part of the attempt by Nyya
philosophers to destroy Dignga's world view and there is
therefore in post—Dignga times a greater emphasis placed on the
acknowledgement of these two types of perception. Vãcaspati
Mi 'ra took up this idea, introduced by Pras'astapda, that there
are two types of perception, using for the first time in extant
Nyya texts the terms nirvikalpa—pratyaka (perception without
construction) and savikalpa—pratyaka (perception with
construction), which henceforth became the accepted method of
classification 8
In Nyya thought, the non—conceptual type of perception,
which takes place in the first moment that the senses come into
contact with an object, is known as nirvikalpa—pratyaka. In
this type of perception there is no classification of the object
involved; it is rather perceived as an undifferentiated whole.
This does not mean that the qualifier and qualificand 9 are not
present in this type of perception. 	 Indeed they must be, for,
according to the Nyãya system, the nirvikalpa—pratyaka provides
188
Kariabhañgavãda II
the raw material for the following second type of perception, the
savikalpa-pratyaka. They are, however, only perceived as niere
existents, not in terms of their qualifier-qualificand
relationship.	 This relationship is not perceived until
savikalpa-pratyaka, in which the object is perceived as being of
a particular type.	 The important point here is that the
savikalpa-pratyaka constitutes an arrangement of elements
already present in the nirvikalpa-pratyaka. 	 Hence for the
Naiyäyikas, this type of perception is as valid as the non-
conceptual type of perception. Obviously the formation of the
savikalpa-pratyaka is a complex process in which language and
memory are also operative, but as long as the senses continue to
be in contact with the object involved it is thought to have a
perceptual basis and, as such, is to be counted as perception.
Unlike the nirvikalpa-pratyaka, the savikalpa-pratyaka is
amenable to linguistic expression. Indeed, its very
possibility is intimately bound up with its linguistic structure,
usually expressed in the form of a propositional judgement, "this
is an x".
As would be expected, there is no place in Dignãga's thought
for this conceptual type of perception. In his system there is
an exhaustive classification of objects to be cognized into two
mutually exclusive categories, the unique particular (svalakaiia)
and the universal (smnya-lakaa). Corresponding to this there
are just two means of cognition, perception (pratyaka) and
inference (anumna). 11 Hence svalakaI3as can be grasped only by
means of direct perception, a view we have already noted, and
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sämãnya—lakaiias only by means of inference. This second fact is
clearly the outcome of the first for, since every svalakaia is
absolutely unique and distinct, there can be no place in
Dignãga's system for universals in a real sense, that is,
universals which can actually be perceived. Hence Dignãga
postulates that universals can be known only by means of
inference and by doing so rejects the possibility of any
conceptual type of perception. (Savikalpa—pratyaka presupposes
the actual reality of universals in its claim to be counted as
true perception, the very presupposition strongly contested by
Dignga.)
For Dignãga, this moment of non—conceptual perception is
followed by a process of imaginative construction in which the
percept is associated with a particular qualifier. This will
result, as in the savikalpa—pratyaka, in a propositional
judgement of the form "this is x". Dignga lists five types of
qualifiers, all of which belong to the category of sãmãnya-
lakaa, and as such must be seen as purely imaginative
constructs. 12
All these qualifiers distinguish their objects by
virtue of being MERE names of them without in any sense
implying real entities.
Matilal (1979) p. 35
Hence there is a difference in the way a post—Dignga
Naiyyika and a follower of Dignga would understand a
propositional judgement such as "this is a cow". For the
Naiyãyika, when pronounced in the presence of a cow, this
judgement is based on a perceptual knowledge and has as much, if
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not more, validity than the simple perception that went prior to
it. It can be said to have more validity because in the
savikalpa—prayaka our knowledge of the object becomes deeper as
we come to see its characteristics and classify it as being of a
particular type. 13 It is as if our vision, initially vague and
unclear, becomes clear and detailed, like a person's eyesight
gradually becoming clearer upon entering a dimly lit room after
travelling in the hot sun. The dependence of this type of
perception on language and memory should not reduce its reality,
for, as Jayanta says:
Why should all these so—called extraneous factors
necessarily effect our judgemental perception in such a
way that it will lose contact with reality and slip
into the world of fiction? With some special
illumination we can perceive dust particles which we
would not have seen under ordinary light. But
dependence upon this accessory cannot turn perception
of dust particles into dust fictions or constructions.
Similarly, dependence upon other accessories cannot,
of necessity, turn a veridical perception into a mere
fiction. 14
For Dignga, this type of judgement takes us away from reality.
Our simple perception of the svalakaia is grounded in reality,
the momentary svalakaia is grasped in the first moment of
sensation, and once we begin to impose a linguistic
superstructure upon this we lose contact with that reality. What
is cognized by the intellect following the first moment of
sensation cannot be the original svalakara but rather is the
result of inference (anumna) or conceptualization. It is this
conceptualized world which is referred to by words.
It is by further examining the respective ways in which the
Nyya and Buddhist philosophers analyze a phrase such as "this is
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a cow" that we come closest to piecing together their respective
theories about language. Far from being too narrow an approach,
it will involve us in some of the most fundamental questions
concerning the nature of language, for these philosophers were
asking such questions as: "How is language connected to our
perception of the world?" "What is the structure of the external
world and is that structure mirrored by language?" 	 "Are there
real universals?" and "How do words have meaning?" It is true
that much of our language does not function in the simple
referential manner typified in the phrase "this is a cow".
Language is an enormously complex and rich phenomenon and in
recent times western philosophers have been concerned to broaden
their study to include the wide range of tasks accomplished by
the use of language.' 5
 Yet both western and Indian philosophers
have always considered the referential aspects of language to be
central in their task of understanding the relationship between
language and the world - that if they could understand the way in
which such simple phrases as "this is a cow" secured their
reference then they would also be addressing the more general
problem.
TEXT D: Udayana's arguments against apohaväda
[See translation at the end of this chapter, pp. 232-248.]
First of all, let us examine what is meant by the second
part of the phrase "this is a cow". What could Dignãga mean by
the word "cow" here? It cannot refer to a particular svalakaia
as qualified by cowness since Dignãga denies the existence of any
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real resemblances between particulars. The problem for Dignga
here is to explain why the particular svalakaia should in this
instance be associated with the word "cow" rather than "horse",
without at the same time committing himself to the ontological
reality of such entities as real resemblances, universals and
stable objects.
Dignãga's theory of meaning, known as apohavda, is thus his
attempt to deal with this problem. Apohavãda had derived from
Dignga's understanding of the nature of inference. For example,
in the inference from smoke to fire, what is actually inferred is
not a particular fire, but rather the general idea of fire.
Dignãga, however, makes the point that "fire in general" is not a
real object and what is actually inferred from smoke is that
which is not a non-fire.' 6 In the fifth chapter of the Pramãiia
Sarnuccaya, Dignãga explains that cognition based on a word
(abdarn) should not be considered any different from a cognition
based on inference (anumãn5t) as a means of knowledge.17
Thus, he says, a word refers to its object by means of the
exclusion of things other than it (arthntaranivrtti anypoha).
Hence in the expression "this is a cow", "cow" should be
understood as a sign which acts to exclude everything which is
not a cow. So, in the expression "this is a cow", just as in the
example of the inference of fire from smoke, there can be no cow-
in-general. Rather, it is a mental construction that comes about
from the exclusion of all that is non-cow (apaJiiih - to push away,
to deny). This is a mental activity which has no corresponding
element in reality.	 In this way Dignga hopes to avoid an
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ontological commitment to any real entity such as cowness.
Udayana, in the latter part of the kaiiabhañapariccheda of
the ATV, finds several difficulties with this theory of meaning
and in doing so was actually repeating concerns which had been
voiced previously by both Buddhist and Nyãya philosophers alike.
It was the seemingly negative character of apohavda that many
found problematic. As Udayana says, activity arises with
reference to positive and not negative things. On hearing that
there is smoke on the hill one automatically concludes that there
is fire there, and not that there is not non—fire there. Hence
Udayana is here attacking the very basis of apohaväda which had
had its origins in Dignãga's theory of inference (see p. 235).
Udayana also declared that in order to differentiate between non—
cows and not non—cows one would have to proceed on the basis of
some positive criteria; otherwise the procedure could never get
started. Kumrila, a Mimãthsä philosopher, had been the champion
of this argument previous to Udayana.	 His argui7zeizt in the
Slokavrttika goes as follows: we could only say of a particular
object, x, that it was a non—cow if we already know what it meant
to be a cow. If we are told that to be a cow is to be not a non—
cow, then we are caught in a circular argument.18
Some of Dignga's Buddhist successors also found what they
took to be the entirely negative nature of Dignga's apohavãda
unsatisfactory and sought to introduce a positive element into
the theory. Foremost amongst the Buddhist philosophers who
sought to amend Dignga's apoha theory was Sãntarakita, under
the influence of Kumrila's criticisms.
	 He did so by appealing
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to Dignga's theory of sentence meaning (in which Dignga himself
had been most likely influenced by Bhartrhari). According to
this theory, the meaning of a sentence (which in this context
should be understood as the object denoted by the sentence) is
an immediate intuition which is produced in the mind of the
listener, known as pratibh.. This matter is discussed in
considerable detail by Hattori, from whom the following extract
is taken:
Pratibh is, according to him [Dignãga], the internal
awareness of the idea,which is produced by a sentence.
The ideas that arise in the minds of different persons
on their hearing the same sentence are not the same as
each other, so that each person has his own pratibhã
which is not communicable to any other person.
However, they are generalized and regarded as the
object denoted by the sentence, because they have a
common feature in that they are distinguished from
those produced by another sentence. It is thus to be
affirmed that a sentence denotes its object through the
"differentiation from others" (anyãpoha). Dignãga
admitted as a psychological fact that pratibhã flashed
upon a man immediately after his hearing a sentence,
and at the same time maintained on a logical analysis
that a sentence expressed its meaning through the
exclusion (apoha) of other meanings.
Hattori (1979) p. 66
Kumãrila felt that this revealed an element of inconsistency in
Dignãga's theory. He attacked Dignãga for allowing a sentence to
generate a positive form, pratibh, but to deny this in the case
/
of a single word. Sãntarakita sought to dissolve this apparent
contradiction pointed out by Kumrila and introduced the idea
that in the conceptual construction "cow" there appears an
accompanying image. Apoha thus properly refers to this image
which functions to exclude non—cows.
Sntaraksita was criticized by later Buddhists, such as
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Ratnakirti, and rightly so I believe, for misunderstanding the
nature of Dignga's original theory. 	 It is not clear what the
introduction of an image would accomplish here. In order to
illustrate this point I would like to consider apohavda purely
as a theory of meaning separately from Dignaga's related thesis
concerning the momentariness of the world.
Contemporary philosophers have moved away from theories of
meaning which essentially conceive language, especially in its
referential aspect, to be the simple procedure of attaching
labels to things. For example, the belief was that one could
approach the animal, point and utter "this is a cow " and expect
by that procedure to secure a reference for and explain the
meaning of the word "cow". We are indebted to such twentieth
century philosophers as Wittgenstein for showing the problems of
such a simple view of language. In numerous cases, Wittgenstein
showed the kinds of misunderstanding that could occur in the
simplest of labelling procedures. Hence when we point to an
animal and declare "this is a cow", how can we understand what is
meant by the pointing? We could only understand that as we came
to understand the meaning of the word "cow"!	 "This" could have
meant any four—legged animal, or the colour of the cow or the
tail, if we happened to be pointing in that direction.	 Of
course once the individual has acquired enough of a conceptual
apparatus, a kind of labelling can occur.	 We could say "this
animal is a cow", for example, increasing the chances of our
being understood.	 Otherwise no amount of finger pointing,
repetition or remonstration can demarcate the intended reference.
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What fixes the reference is the acquisition of an ability to use
the word.	 The Nyãya philosophers tend to see the process as a
chronological sequence, that one labels and then proceeds to make
use of that label. So, for example, according to Udayana, the
meaning of the word "cow" does not in itself exclude "horse".
When we are ordered to "tie the cow", no thought of excluding
horses is part of our response. Yet, if we encounter a horse in
following the instruction, we are well able to turn back in the
recognition that a cow is not there.
The use of images as an aid in grasping the meaning of a
word is subject to the same criticism. When understanding the
word "cow", a certain image may appear before the mind, but
surely this is of psychological rather than philosophical
interest. Whether we are talking about the real cow or an image
of a cow, the same problems occur. Just as we could not know
what was meant by "this" when pointing to the cow, so too we
could not know which aspect of the image "this" was meant to pick
out until we arrived at an understanding of the word "cow".
This becomes even more obvious if we consider the use of the
word "cow" in which it is clear that the context concerns cows in
general. How could any image represent a cow in general? As
David Hume says:
the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality
without forming a precise notion of the degrees of
each.
Hume (1969 edition) p. 65
As Hume goes on to say, a particular idea becomes general in its
representation only by being annexed to a general term. 	 And
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moreover, the role of the image becomes superfluous here. 	 Some
people may experience numerous images accompanying their use of
language; others may not. The image is not where the
understanding lies, although for some people it may function as
an aid to understanding.
/
Thus, Sntaraksita's thesis that a positive image is the
primary meaning of the word overlooks the central thesis of
Dignga's apohavãda, that the meaning of a word is dependent on a
process of differentiation. It was this insight which Ratnakirti
and Jf1nari were concerned to reiterate. By introducing a
temporal element into the process, namely the formation of a
positive image followed by a process of differentiation,
/
Sntarakita transformed apohavãda into a theory of meaning which
came much closer to that of the Naiyayikas. 	 Meaning becomes a
procedure of labelling followed by differentiation. Ratnakirti
stresses that the affirmation and negation are simultaneous
processes and their relationship should be understood as a
logical rather than a temporal connection.
Udayana, at the beginning of his critique of apohavãda, had
concentrated his attack on the version of the theory which was
purely negative in nature. Whatever the importance of the
differential nature of language, one must agree here with Udayana
that a language in which words have meaning solely through a
process of exclusion is a language which remains forever turned
in on itself and disconnected from an independent reality. For
example, part of the meaning of the word "blue" might function to
exclude all non—blue things, but that does not exhaust the
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meaning of the word. Intuitively we agree that the full meaning
of such a word must contain a positive sensory content. We have
/
already seen why Sãntaraksita was criticized by RatnakTrti and
Jffnari for making such a positive image the primary meaning of
the word with the differential aspect being subordinate and
sequentially later. Yet both Ratnakirti and Jfiãnar admitted
some positive form (vidhi) as an important aspect of the meaning
of the word and it is this more plausible version of the apoha
theory which Ildayana must refute.
The questions which Udayana must deal with now concern the
relationship between language and our sensory experience of the
world. Since he now has a Buddhist opponent who accepts that a
positive form plays an important role in the meaning of the word,
he must now question the Buddhist closely as to the exact nature
of this positive element, its status regarding the momentary
world of svalakatias and hence the relationship between language
and independent reality. A word like "cow" for this Buddhist
opponent does not describe a world in which cowness is admitted
as real, so presumably any positive idea of cowness does not
correspond to an independent reality.
TEXT E: On the nature of vidhi and the relationship between
language and reality.
[See translation at the end of this chapter, pp. 250-259.]
A statement such as "this is a cow" is normally understood
to mean that the individual being referred to is of a particular
type, in this case a cow, and is called a cow on the basis of
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the implications of Dignga's original philosophical position.
Udayana, in his critique of the above analysis exposed many of
its difficulties.
After rejecting the notion that the positive aspect of apoha
is unreal, Udayana then examines the idea that the positive
aspect of apoha comes about as a result of superimposition. Just
as we can mistakenly perceive a shell as a piece of silver, so
too we can mistakenly perceive a svalak?arja as the mental
construct "cow".
This is a piece of silver	 This is a cow
erimposition
	
JJ ,7Tiperimposition
shell	 svalakatia
Udayana rejects this parallel for three reasons. Firstly, unlike
the shell, the svalakaia supposedly cannot appear in a qualified
cognition.	 Secondly, unlike silver, cowness does not, according
to the Buddhist, have a reality elsewhere. Although silver does
not exist at the site of the shell, superimposition presupposes
that silver has an existence elsewhere (since it should have been
perceived elsewhere), an existence which just happens to be
misplaced in this instance. (It could be argued from the
Buddhist point of view that the difference between these two
models is not as great as Udayana supposed.) Thirdly, unlike the
shell and silver, the svalaka1)a and the mental construct "cow"
do not have any similarity in their appearance.
Udayana then examines another attempt by his Buddhist
opponent to incorporate the svalakaia and the sãinnyalakana
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into one judgement. In this case the Buddhist states that there
is only a statement of superimposition rather than an actual
superimposition. The difference between the sva1akaia and the
mental construct of "cow" is not grasped and hence the latter is
stated to be the former.
superimposition
this is a cow
bhedãgraha
(non—comprehension of difference)
Udayana rejects this too for the following four reasons.
Firstly, in order for non—comprehension of difference to occur
they must both be capable of appearing in the cognition. This
does not seem possible since the svalakara is supposedly not
amenable to appearing in a qualified cognition. Since the nature
of the mental construct (the exclusion aspect of apoha) is wholly
one of exclusion, Udayana questions how an entity lacking any
positive form can appear in a cognition. Secondly, Udayana
questions how two entities so obviously different in form can be
confused. There is no possibility of either of them appearing in
the cognition in another guise and since one is essentially
positive and the other essentially negative, it is hard to see
how non—comprehension of difference could occur. Thirdly,
Udayana points out that since his Buddhist opponent is upholding
a view of apoha which includes both positive and negative
aspects, both the positive element and the negative element must
appear in the qualified cognition.
	 Fourthly, this would mean
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that the statement of superimposition must work on the basis of
imagined properties and must itself be imagined (since the
constituents of the qualified cognition have to be imagined as
other than they actually are and they are both present in the
cognition unlike the case of the shell and silver).19
The reason why the type of analysis given above would have
been proposed is that it seems to be able to relate the momentary
world of svalakaias to the attempts of language to capture that
world. By showing a mechanism whereby both svalakaT)a and mental
construct are incorporated into one cognition, it could provide
the juncture at which language "hooks on tot? the world. In
western philosophy, there are many examples of philosophers who,
like Udayana's Buddhist opponent, hold the view that language is
a complex superstructure that does not reflect the structure of
the external world. For example, Russell in his theory of
Logical Atomism expressed a view similar to Dignga's inasmuch as
he believed that such everyday objects as "tables and chairs,
loaves and fishes, persons and principalities and powers" were
all convenient fictions [Pears (1972) p. 44]. Russell believed
that in a fully analyzed language these entities would disappear.
Russell, however, did attempt to formulate a way in which
language and reality could intersect, with his theory of
logically proper names. This would seem to be a necessary
requirement of languages since, as David Pears says in his
introduction to Russell's Logical Atomism:
Russell assumed that, if any of these non—logical words
have meanings, some of them must signify existent
things. This is a reasonable assumption since, if none
203
Karabhañgavãda II
of them signified existent things, the whole
vocabulary, whatever the connections between its
elements, would lack any connection with anything
outside of itself...Russell brings in the syntactical
distinction between analysable and unanalysable
expressions. An analysable expression may or may not
signify an existent thing, and if it does, the
existence of the thing will amount to no more than
the existence and appropriate combinations of its
elements, and such things are logical fictions. But an
unanalysable, or simple expression (that is, a
logically proper name) must signify an existent thing,
and in such a case Russell equates the meaning of the
expression with the thing itself, and the thing is a
genuine constituent of the world.	 [Pears (1972) p. 8]
In Dignãga's philosophy there is no equivalent to Russell's
theory of logically proper names, that is to say, a sub—set of
words which must signify existent things. Although Udayana
criticized the analysis of "this is a cow" in which both
svalakaa and mental construct are incorporated on the basis
that the svalakarja cannot be part of a qualified cognition, we
might ask whether or not Dignga's theory would have been
stronger had he allowed the svalakaiia to be referred to by
language. Sanskrit has only one word, artha, which can
ambiguously stand for "meaning", "signification", "denotation",
or "connotation" [Matilal (1971) p. 43 ].	 Dignaga rejects the
possibility that svalakaias can be named because:
Dignga thinks that words or names cannot directly
express the particular or datum. In order to refer to
a unique particular, one has to use a word or a name,
and to use a word or a name one has to use a concept as
the 'ground for its application' which is, according to
D1gnga, a conceptual construction.
Matilal (1971) p. 41
In order to avoid an endless regress, Russell denied this very
proposition, that every name can secure its reference only by
means of a "ground for its application". The point of Russell's
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logically proper names is that they are supposed to secure their
reference directly without the mediation of any descriptions.
The meaning of a logically proper name just is the thing which it
signifies. In Russell's system, logically proper names name
unanalysable simple particulars which he identifies with sense-
data.	 Like Dignãga's svalaka12as, sense-data cannot be known by
description. They can only be known by direct acquaintance, what
Russell calls "knowledge by acquaintance".	 Sense-data, again
like Dignãga's svalakaias, are momentary, although Russell does
admit of a "specious present". A sense-datum is thus seen as
being situated within time and is seen as having some duration.
Russell's programme was an attempt to demonstrate how language
could ultimately be analysed in terms of logically proper names
and logical functions, and hence how knowledge too is ultimately
of a logical or empirical nature. The possibility of naming
these simple particulars represents the contact between language
and the world and meets the requirement that analysis had to come
to an end at some point.
To return to the phrase "this is a cow", the thesis being
presupposed in an analysis such as Udayana's is that the
demonstrative pronoun "this" does refer to the svalakaa. In
Russell's terminology, the idea is that "this" can function as a
logically proper name in just denoting a svalakaia. Russell
himself, considered the possibility that a demonstrative such as
"this" could operate as a logically proper name but ultimately
rejected it on the grounds that, as a demonstrative pronoun, it
was not devoid of descriptive content, whereas logically proper
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names should have no descriptive content —their meanings just
are the things which they signify. Ultimately Russell was unable
to come up with an example of a logically proper name. Western
philosophers have found strange the idea that, if the meaning of
a name just is the object to which it refers, then this somehow
implies that the object's existence is necessary and a phrase
such as "a exists" becomes tautologous. In the case of a sense
datum, we can see how it might not make sense to name it and then
go on to deny its existence. Words can never become their
references, hence the division between language and svalakaias
in Dignga's system.
Russell's Logical Atomism was bedevilled by so many problems
and his understanding of language has been superseded in the
western tradition. One would not therefore want to use the idea
of a logically proper name to enable svalakaias to be referred
to by language. Russell's Logical Atomism is now mostly of
historical interest, but recently the idea of words whic.h
function only in a referring capacity has been resurrected in an
ironic twist to Russell's theory. Russell had rejected ordinary
proper names as being logically proper names, since he proposed
that they really functioned as disguised descriptions. This
orthodoxy has been questioned recently by several philosophers
who have proposed that ordinary proper names function in a way
that is akin to Russell's logically proper names:
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In opposition to the traditional theory, Kripke and
Donnellan argue that proper names refer independently
of identifying descriptions. One of Donnellan's major
contributions has been to show that reference can take
place not only in the absence of identifying
descriptions but even when the identifying descriptions
associated with a name do not correctly apply to the
individual to whom the name refers.
Schwartz (1977) p. 21
In Kripke's terminology, names are "rigid designators" which
means that they refer to the same individual in all possible
worlds whether or not that individual satisfies a particular list
of associated descriptions. Obviously those philosophers who
disclaim that the reference of names is not determined by
descriptions need to demonstrate an alternative means for
securing reference. Donnellan and others propose that reference
is determined in many cases by causal chains, but this is a
theory which still needs to be fully worked out. 2 ° The question
to be asked in connection with the phrase "this is a cow" is
whether the link between svalak?a1as and language could be made
through the acknowledgement of signs in the language which
function in a purely referential manner. If Dignga's idea that
language and absolute reality are totally divorced from each
other rests on the claim that all words depend on a "ground for
their application", then this is a claim which may be open to
dispute.21
Udayana's criticisms of the analysis of "this is a cow", in
which the two elements of the judgement are confused because of
non—comprehension of differences (bhedãgraha), treats the
confusion as if it were a perceptual error. Apart from the
criticism which we have just considered, that svalakaQas are not
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amenable to being included in a qualified cognition, Udayana also
wonders how two very different entities could be so confused.
When we talk about confusion between words and things, surely
we are not thinking of a perceptual confusion. Similarly, it
would seem that the confusion here is of a cognitive nature
arising from a misunderstanding of the relationship between
conceptual constructs and svalakaBas. In a perceptual error,
such as seeing a shell as a piece of silver, the way in which we
correct such an error is by taking a closer look at the object in
question. The very fact that we can clear up such errors
presupposes the possibility of non—erroneous perception, the
possibility, in this example, of arriving at the correct
judgement "this is a shell". This is not the way in
which we would clear up the confusion concerning the nature of
the judgement of "this is a cow". Rather, we would clear up such
a confusion by stressing facts of a logical nature. We might
point out the fact that you can't attach labels to things as
easily as people might suppose, that labelling presupposes a
whole background of conceptual thought which allows a particular
differentiation to take place. We would stress the differences
between words and things, that you can, for example, milk cows
but not the meaning of "cows". We would attempt to demonstrate
how it is through the use of language that we are able to
demarcate a portion of reality. We need to understand the role
which our perceptual experiences of 'cow' or 'blue', for example,
play in the meanings of the words "cow" and "blue" respectively.
The problem here is philosophical and not perceptual.
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Dignaga's emphasis on the differential nature of language
and the radical difference between conceptual constructs and
svalaka1)as were important insights in developing a theory of
meaning. Yet he does not answer the question of how apohavãda
can lead to successful activity in a world which is made up of
unique momentary instants. 22 Apohavda becomes most problematic
in relation to such a world.	 This would be a world devoid of
real resemblances between the svalak?aUas, a world devoid of any
enduring objects and hence devoid of any synthesising
intelligence, a world in which every occurrence of a word would
itself be unique, indeed, a world in which it is not clear what
could be meant by successful linguistic activity. Buddhist
philosophers who came after Dignãga focussed more on this
problem, namely —if apohavda is accepted as a theory of
meaning, how then does it succeed in a momentary world?
Sãntarakita's introduction of mental images was, as we have
seen, problematic in describing apohavda purely as a theory of
/
meaning. Where Sãntarakita's ideas become important though, is
in describing how, as a matter of fact, language relates to a
world of momentary svalakaias. Images come to play a causal
role in relating the individual to the world through the medium
of language.23
Udayana's Theory of Universals
In the Nyya system, the world is made up of relatively
stable objects which endure through time and which may be
classified into different types on the basis of real
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resemblances. Generality is an essential feature of the objects
of experience and recognition of that generality is an essential
feature of the experience itself, a fact reflected in the
preponderance of general words in the language. This is a view
of the world which makes more immediate sense than that of
Dignãga. It would seem that the very possibility of language
depends on there being real resemblances in the world and on our
physiological constitution as human beings to be sensitive to
those resemblances in similar ways.
	 A contemporary western
philosopher, Quine, sees it in the following way:
For surely there is nothing more basic to thought and
language than our sense of similarity, our sorting of
things into kinds. The usual general term, whether a
common noun or verb or an adjective, owes its
generality to some resemblance among the things
referred to. Quine in Schwartz (1977) p. 157
So, Nyya philosophers would also wish to say that many of the
resemblances which we see between different objects or between
the same objects at different times are real in the sense that
their origin is not just a product of mental construction but
that, in many cases at least, the generality in the structure of
language does actually reflect an external reality. 24 This is in
direct contrast to Dignga's view that the world and our
experience of it is characterized by particularity only, meaning
that universals belong entirely to the world of imaginative
construction.
Hence controversy over the nature of universals in Indian
philosophy in post—Dignga times becomes central to the debate
between the Naiyyikas and the Buddhist successors of Dignga
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over the nature of reality, whether or not it is particular and
momentary. Nyya philosophers are often called realists in the
sense that they posited the existence of universals as real
ontological entities. They came to hold a theory of universals,
however, which is more complex than this label would suggest. As
we shall see, when the Nyãya philosophers are attempting to
account for the basis of generality in language, they are not
just simply realist and we should understand that two separate
concerns are at stake here:
(1) The role of universals in the refutation of Digna's
theory of momentariness. It is in this respect that some
form of realism became important for the Nyya philosophers,
and they actually developed a realistic theory of universals
in relation to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness.
Hence a realistic theory of universals, not clearly stated
in early Nyãya thought, is gradually developed in relation
to its importance as a tool in the attack on the thesis of
momentariness, and culminates with the thought of Udayana in
such works as the Kiraiãvali and, as we have seen, the
ka!abhañgavda chapter of the ATV.
(2) The role of the universal in the Nyya account of how
general words get their meaning. In this case a realistic
theory of universals is not so crucial and we shall
certainly see that they understood that ontologically real
universals were not at the basis of every idea of
generality.
In summary, where universals are ontologically necessary is in
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their attack on Dignãga's theory of momentariness. The Nyya
analysis of "this here is that", or more specifically a phrase
such as "this is a cow", usually occurs in the context of
attacking the Buddhist theory of momentariness and hence the
emphasis is on the ontological existence of universals. 	 The
ontological existence of universals in Nyãya thought becomes
bound up with their defence of a stable external world, as the
following passage from Udayana's Pariuddhi shows:
The Realist, the advocate of enduring objects
possessing stability, should at any price vindicate the
reliability of our knowledge concerning the element
"that".	 Otherwise the whole universe will e c
pieces and torn apart. And the opponent should
likewise assail that reliability with all his might.
Indeed, only by repudiating it, will he disprove the
reality of universals, and thus it will become an easy
task for him to repudiate the reliability of that
thought construction which establishes a link between
the elements "this" and "that".25
Savikalpa—Pratyak?a
Since Dignãga's thesis involved the absolute uniqueness of
each svalakaita, obviously the judgement "this is a cow" is not
one which can be based on perception. The Nyãya philosophers
sought to refute this claim by demonstrating the real existence
of the universal.	 Their defence of a stable external world is
thus based on demonstrating a perceptual basis to the judgement
"this is a cow".	 As Jayanta says, "the very life of the
followers of the Nyãya consists in the theory of savikalpa-
pratyaka". 26	Hence the realism of the Nyya system involves
both that some universals are ontologically real entities and
that they are perceptible.	 The establishment of the real
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perceptible universal became the cornerstone of the Nyaya attack
against the Sautrãntika/Yogacãra theory of momentariness.27
In the early Nyya and Vaieika literature it is not clear
whether or not sãmnya was held to be objectively real. 28 In
post—Dignãga times, however, there is an increasing emphasis on
the objective reality of the universal, beginning with the clear
assertion of Pras"astapda that universals were eternal and
objectively real, and culminating in the Kiraiãvali of Udayana
(see p. 224). The tactic of establishing the universal as a
perceptible entity does not, however, achieve what the Nyãya
philosophers claimed - a proof of a stable external world - and
it also involves them in difficulties common to many theories of
realism.	 There are three main weaknesses in this theory of
universals:
(1) It is not clear that making universals perceptible
entities achieves what the Naiyãyikas hoped. This would
depend on the nature of perception.29
(2) As a theory of universals it involves all the problems
common to theories of realism which tend to treat universals
as if they were substances.
(3) As an all—round explanation of what is involved in
generality and our experience of it, it is inadequate.
I shall deal with each of these weaknesses in turn.
On the Nature of Perception
According to Gautama, perception is a cognition produced by
sense—object contact. 3 ° Hence the existence of external objects
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is something presupposed rather than revealed by perception.
This presupposition remains in the chain of reasoning which seems
to lie behind the Nyãya attempt to anchor a proof of a stable
external world to a demonstration of the perceptibility of
universals. The argument is that:
(1) Their proof of universals rests on their perceptibility.
(2) Their proof of a stable external world of objects which
can be classified into different types rests on the
existence of universals as ontological entities.
For this proof to succeed it is necessary that the nature of
perception is such that it is able to present to the senses
objects of continuity.	 Since many philosophers have disputed
this, the inquiry has to be taken a step further. The
fundamental question concerns the nature of perception —this is
the question which needs to be considered in addition to whether
or not universals are perceptible. 	 If the nature of perception
is itself momentary, the Naiyyika demonstration that universals
are perceptible would not achieve their goal. All they could
ever establish would be a series of similar perceptions of, for
examples, the cow universal.
COW UNIVERSAL	 4COW UNIVERSAL	 COW UNIVERSAL
If the Sautrãntika/Yogcãra theory of momentariness is tied to an
understanding of perception as momentary in nature, for the
Naiyäyikas to counter their arguments by demonstrating the
perceptibility of universals would be somewhat redundant.31
Problems in Theories of Realism
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The Naiyyikas were realists inasmuch as they believed that
some notions of commonness could be explained with reference to
the existence of universals. As we have already seen, these
universals were not Platonic forms existing in another order of
reality, but were amenable to direct perception in this world,
this being an important element in their attack on the Buddhist
theory of momentariness. There is, however, an element in the
Nyya theory similar to Plato's Theory of Forms since the
Naiyyikas postulate the existence of universals separate from
the individuals with which they become associated.
In making the universal directly perceptible, the Naiyãyikas
would seem to be overlooking the element of intellectual
abstraction involved in our understanding of universals. Both
Platonic and Aristotelean realism grapple with the problem of
empirical diversity whereas the Nyãya theory does not give this
problem much thought. For example, consider the formation of our
understanding of the universal "red". There are in the world a
large number of individual objects which we would agree to call
t? red t ,
 despite a considerable variation in their actual colour.
In Aristotelean realism, the knowledge of the universal "red" is
said to be rooted in sense perception, but the intellect is
important in forming a clear understanding of the universal
involved, through a process of intellectual abstraction.
	
Hence
apprehension of the universal is not a sudden once-and-for-all
business, given in a single process, but a gradual process. In
the Nyãya theory, by making the universal an object of direct
perception, there is no reason why it could not be fully grasped
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in just one single perception. Also, it would seem unable to
account for the variety in the different shades of red in the
particular example under consideration. It would seem that there
would have to be as many universals as there are shades of red.
Udayana seems to have been aware of this problem. In the
Kiranvali he states that a universal's existence cannot be
proved in the same way as an individual substance such as a
cow. 32 Perception of a universal comes from seeing that many
things have something in common. Udayana seems to be introducing
the idea that the intellect plays an important part in the
cognition of the universal, that universals cannot be perceived
in the same way that individual objects can.
In general, however, Nyya realism offers an account of
universals that falls somewhere in between Platonic and
Aristotelean versions of realism. On the one hand it embraces a
"separation thesis" in that universals are separate entities from
individual objects, whilst on the other hand s trniversals b&LQt1%
to the world of sense experience and not some transcendental
order of a more perfect reality. The Nyya philosophers devoted
much thought to explaining the relationship between a universal
and the individuals to which it is related.33
The Nyãya Account of Generality
We have already seen that the existence of universals plays
an important part in the Nyãya attack on the Buddhist thesis of
momentariness.	 Universals also have an important function
inasmuch as they can be invoked to explain the notion of
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commonness:
The main problem in the doctrine of universals seems to
be the following question: how or why are we able to
apply, as we generally do, the same name to different
and distinct individuals unless they are believed to
belong to the same category such that we can apply the
same name to them? Nyãya Realism claims that the
applicability of a general term to many individuals is
to be explained with reference to the existence of a
generic entity, a universal.
Matilal (1971) p. 62
Hence the Naiyãyikas sought to explain the notion of commonness
by postulating the real existence of one entity shared by all the
individuals of a similar kind. This, of course, raises the
problem common to all theories of Realism, of how one universal
can subsist in many individuals.
What is most interesting in the development of the Nyya
theory of universals is the recognition that there is no uniform
explanation for the notion of commonness, and from the time of
Uddyotakara onwards the Naiyyikas quite clearly stated that not
all notions of commonness should be construed as separate from
the individuals in which they are instantiated. Hence for the
Naiyãyika, there is a fundamental difference in the way in which
he would explain the notion of cowness and the notion of being a
cook, and it is only with reference to cowness that he would
invoke the existence of a real universal. 34 This division is
developed from the time of Uddyotakara onwards, culminating in
the conditions which Udayana lists in the Kirval! which must
be met by a universal if it is to count as real (see p. 224).
The distinction between "cookness" and "cowness" corresponds in
Nyya terminology to the updhi/iãti distinction.	 Those class
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properties which are not considered real are called
upãdhis or imposed properties. Those class properties which are
considered real are called jãtis.35
Once this idea was accepted, it might be thought that the
way was left wide open for the complete rejection of real
universals. Since commonness could be explained without
reference to real universals, then it could no longer be invoked
to justify their existence. One reason why this did not happen
is that, as we have already seen, real universals played an
important role in attacking the Buddhist thesis of momentariness.
In wishing to maintain the upãdhi/jãti distinction though, I
believe the Naiyãyikas had an important insight into the way
common nouns function. For them, the importance of maintaining
and including jãti in their terminology had to do with their
belief that our language was sometimes shaped by real divisions
in the world, rather than vice versa.
One of the main concerns in any theory of universals is to
explain the way in which general terms function in our language.
How are we able to apply the same word to different individuals?
More specifically, to return to our examples, on what basis do
we single out a person to be a cook, or an animal to be a cow?
Philosophers in both east and west have studied this problem.
What is clear though, is that this group of words makes up a
considerable proportion of words in the language, and that any
theory which does not take into account the complexity of this
group is liable to error.
Recently in the western tradition there has been a
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recognition of this fact, and traditional theories of meaning
concerning general terms have been criticized on the basis that
they are too simplistic and have treated all general terms as if
they functioned in a similar manner. 36 In the case of the debate
between the Naiyyikas and the Buddhists, the stock examples
used are the terms "cow" and "cook", both general words, but
other than that, words which may well function in different ways.
This means that often in the debate between the Buddhists and
Naiyyikas they are arguing at cross purposes, since the
Buddhists refer their arguments to the term "cook" and the
Naiyãyikas to the term "cow".
In western philosophy, traditional theories have been
rejected by such philosophers as Kripke and Putnam in favour of
semantic theories which seek to further analyse this group of
terms, and provide more complex theories of meaning which take
into account the various ways in which such terms function. If
we look at general terms we can distinguish several different
types. For example:
(1) Some, like "bachelor", admit of an explicit definition.
(2) Some, like "table" are much harder to define, although
some general vaguer definition can be given.
(3) Some are derived by transformations from verbal forms.
For example, a cook is one who cooks.
(4) Some general nouns are associated with natural kinds,
for example, a cow.
Nyya philosophers came to believe that general terms in a
suitable context are usually used to denote an individual
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C haracterized by the relevant class property.
	 For example, the
phrase "this is a cow", denotes an individual cow characterized
by the class-property "cowness".	 It will be the same for cooks
and bachelors too.	 The difference lies in the nature of the
class-property, as we have already seen, namely, that some class-
properties are considered real (jãti) and some are not (upãdhi).
This jãti/upädhi distinction, which the Nyya philosophers
make, seems to be a recognition of the fact that there is no one
uniform explanation for the way in which general terms function.
The point of the distinction seems to be in some cases that we
are responsible for the classification in question (upãdhi).
There is no separate observable universal in this case, but
rather we have found it convenient to group together a selection
of properties. In other cases the reverse is true; language is
reflecting divisions that belong to nature rather than culture
(jti).	 In this case general terms are applied on the basis of
an independently existing universal. This jti/updhi
distinction is interesting in the light of recent developments in
western philosophy which I now wish to examine.
In the traditional theories of western philosophy37general
terms can be used to denote an individual in a suitable context,
and whether or not a particular individual belongs to a certain
class is dependent upon it possessing certain requisite
properties. Hence whether or not we can truly say of an object
"this is a cow" will be dependent upon that object satisfying
some list of appropriate descriptions:
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To understand a term is to know how to apply it
correctly, but for this it is not necessary to know all
of the objects to which it may be correctly applied.
It is required only that we have a criterion for
deciding of any given object whether it falls within
the extension of term or not. All objects in the
extension of a given term have some common properties
or characteristics which lead us to use the same term
to denote them....The collection of a term's extension
is called the intension or connotation of that term.
Copi (1972) p. 125
According to this theory, whether or not something is of a
certain kind depends upon whether or not it has the required
characteristics. Formally speaking, intension determines
extension. The new theory of meaning concerning the nature of
general terms picks out a particular group as functioning in a
different manner than that described by the more traditional
theory:
The new theory of reference holds that descriptions, if
any, associated with natural kind terms do not have a
decisive role in deciding whether the term applies in a
given case. At best the descriptions associated with
such a terni are a handy guide in picking out things of
a kind named, but the descriptions do not determine
what it is to be of the kind.... Biological kinds are
determined by genetic structure, and other natural
kinds are similarly determined.
Schwartz (1977) p. 27
What this new theory does is to create a very clear division in
the way in which general terms function. Firstly, there are
those general terms for which the traditional theory holds.
Whether or not a particular individual can be characterized by a
term depends upon it satisfying a set of relevant descriptions.
Within this first group there are two subgroups. A very small
group functions like terms such as "bachelor", and whether or not
an individual is to be counted as such depends upon it satisfying
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a very precise set of descriptions. Putnam has recently pointed
out that:
What has happened is this: the traditional theory has
taken an account which is correct for the "one—
criterion" concepts, and made it a general account of
the meaning of general names. A theory which perhaps
correctly described the behaviour of three hundred
words has been asserted to correctly describe the
behavior of the tens of thousands of general names.
Putnam in Schwartz (ed.) (1977) p. 105
With the introduction of ideas such as Wittgenstein's "family-
38
resemblances" and the notion of "cluster descriptions", 	 the
traditional theory was given a greater subtlety and could then be
used to explain the way in which a much larger group of general
terms, such as "table", function. Whether or not an individual
is to be counted as such in this case depends upon it satisfying
a set of more or less loosely defined cluster of descriptions.
The way in which this group of terms function is, however,
essentially similar to the way in which a term like "bachelor"
functions. They are all cases in which the intension of the term
determines the extension of that term.
And secondly, there is a group of general terms which
function in an essentially dissimilar way to the above
categories.	 The so—called "natural—kind" terms name substances
without the mediation of a list of descriptions. In this case,
the descriptions do not determine which individuals belong to the
kind, although they may certainly be a handy guide to
identification, especially for the lay person. What counts here
is whether or not the individual is of the right "stuff". Thus,
for example, however much a creature looks like a cow, unless it
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is of the right genetic structure, it will not be a cow. Nor is
this new theory a mere refinement of traditional theories, just a
matter of replacing ordinary definitions with scientific ones.
To take the example of water - on the traditional theory, "water
is H20" would be analytic since it would be true by definition.
According to the new theory, it could be that we are mistaken as
to the molecular structure of water. What the new theory says
rather, is that once the discovery is made that water is H20,
then the statement "water is H20" will be necessarily true.
Anything that is not H20, however much it may resemble water in
other aspects, will not be water. Our certainty that water is
H20, however, is the certainty of a well established scientific
theory, and not the certainty that comes from knowledge of a
definition. Thus this new theory separates the notion of
analyticity and necessity, and the statement "water is
H20" is given as an example, if true, of a necessary a posterior!
synthetic proposition. The new theory more properly states that:
"water" has no definition at all, at least not in the
traditional sense, and is a proper name of a specific
substance. Schwartz (1977) p. 30
This new theory of meaning supports a scientific naturalism,
and grew out of studies in the philosophy of science. Although
languages were developed before the establishment of sciences,
underlying the basis of language is a substance metaphysic, the
idea that certain observable properties are consistently grouped
together on the basis of some underlying substance.	 With the
advancement of science comes the belief that we can know real
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essences of things. It is the belief that science enables us to
get at the hidden structure of the world which is only hinted at
in language (which is based on human interests and observable
properties). It is this that is taken into account by the new
theory of meaning in its thesis that natural kind words are
really proper names of substances. The observable properties are
the lay person's guide for identifying kinds but it is the
underlying "stuff" that is all—important. Where in two instances
all properties are the same, for there to be real identity of
kind there has to be identity of underlying stuff. 39 In the case
of other general words this is not the case - bachelors, cooks,
tables and so on. Here there is no underlying stuff; what is
essential for something to be a bachelor or a table is a
conformity to a set of descriptions. In this case the difference
between essence and accident is a question of definition and
terminology.	 In the case of natural kind words, the differences
between essence and accident is fixed by the surrounding
theoretical structure of scientific thought. Ultimately too,
what counts as a natural kind is relative to the appropriate
scientific discipline.40
The question to be considered now is how far does the
Naiyyika distinction between upãdhi and jãti conform to this
difference in the explanation of general terms in western
philosophy, and also to understand the wider significance of this
distinction in Nyya philosophy. Obviously there are major
differences between the thought of Udayana and the work of
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contemporary philosophers of science. Udayana did not share the
scientific achievements of our contemporary world, and also we
have to take into account the Nyäya insistence on the
perceptibility of universals. Udayana, however, does share with
modern scientific naturalism a substance metaphysic and a realist
epistemology, an intuition that underlying the consistent
grouping together of certain properties, there is some deeper
explanatory mechanism
41
Udayana lists in the KiraivalT the conditions which have
to be met for something to qualify as a jãti rather than an
upãdhi. They are as follows:
A j5ti must be simple.
A jãti must be realized in more than one individual.
Two jãtis will be counted as identical only if they are
instantiated in the same individuals.
A jti cannot be instantiated in another jti. 	 There must
be a category difference.
A jti occurs in individuals by means of a relation known as
inherence (samavãya).
There is a hierarchy of jãtis. 	 A particular jati may be
completely "nested" or contained in a higher ãti.42
If the extension of one proposed jti partially overlaps
the extension of another, then neither of these should be
considered as true jjtis.
	
This is known as the defect of
cross division (saiñkara).
The ultimate particulars of the system cannot be
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instantiations of any jãti.
The Relevance of Udayana's Conditions
Consider the following passage from Matilal:
Similarly the notion of belonging to a class expressed
by the predicate 'is a generic property' should not be
explained with recourse to another generic property.
It is true that we say "Cowness is a general property"
and "Horseness is a general property" and so one. But
'is a generic property' unpacks as 'is a REEL property
which exists (i.e. inheres) in many individuals', and
hence we need not construe its meaning as a separately
existing entity. One may point out that we can do the
exact same sort of 'unpacking' with respect to such
case as 'is a cow' and 'is a horse' and thus get rid of
the whole concept of generic property or real
universal... .Thus if we find some empirically
determinable CONDITION by virtue of which the
applicability of a general term to different
individuals can be satisfactorily explained we need not
derive a generic property from the meaning of such a
general term.	 But Nyãya claims that short of some
artificial definitions predicates like 'is a cow' or
'is a horse' cannot be explained away. Thus cowness
and horseness should be regarded as generic properties.
But this argument is not at all convincing.43
[Matilal (1971 p. 72]
It may not seem convincing at first sight, but becomes more so in
light of the recent developments in contemporary philosophy
concerning general terms. The thesis is put forward, as we have
already seen, that the meaning of natural kind terms is not to be
given by unpacking them, that is, by replacing them with a list
of properties or descriptions. The meaning of cow is not given
by "is a four—legged animal ...". It has already been stated
that the meaning of such terms is more properly understood by
considering them as proper names for substances. Matilal goes on
to comment:
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What Nyya is trying to say here might be understood in
the following way. A class—property must be simple,
non—complex or non—compound, in order to be construed
as a generic property. 	 {Matilal (1971) p. 72]
This would seem to accord with treating such terms as proper
names rather than as abbreviated descriptions. In separating a
group of general names from the totality of general names and
calling them jtis, a case can be made for saying that Udayana
had something in mind akin to the contemporary notion of natural
kind. This can be seen by examining in more detail some of the
conditions which he lists in relation to jãtis:
(1) A jãti is a natural, not "accidental" or "external"
property (aupdhika) of things.
(2) If a jãti is found in all and only those
individuals where another jãti is found, then they must
not be construed as two distinct jãtis. This would be
a natural result of seeing that a word such as
"cowness" functions as a proper name of a particular
substance, to which it refers directly without the
mediation of a set of descriptions. Udayana's
stricture would be true of contemporary natural kind
terms, were it not for the development of "possible
worlds" logic. Consider the following example:
Tcreature	 creature
with a heart	 with a kidney
same
extension
These two properties are different, yet in the actual world
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have the same extension. 	 They are not true natural kinds
(or jãtis in Udayana's terminology) since their meaning is
intensional. "Creature with a heart" and "creature with a
kidney" could point to different individuals since they have
different intensions and it is their intensions which
determine their extensions. A natural kind term's extension
is not so determined since they function as proper names.
As previously mentioned, if it were not for multi—world
logic, two natural kind terms with the same meaning would,
like jãtis, necessarily point to the same individuals.
(3) The same individual or individuals cannot be the locus
of two jtis unless one of them is totally included in the
other; otherwise there is the defect of overlapping
(sarñkara).	 The idea here is that natural kinds of words
have a biological, chemical or atomic essence.
	
As Matilal
has observed:
The Nyya doctrine of generic properties can be
said to be due to the instinctive inclination
toward the NATURAL classification of objects of
our experience. 'Overlapping' destroys in some
sense the natural order of classification.
[Matilal (1971) p. 76]
We can also see in this stricture some sort of
impenetrability principle operating, due to the objective
reality of the universal.
Concluding Remarks
Matilal, along with others, has linked the Nyya theories
concerning the universal with the organization of their society
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into castes:
....one might discover in the Nyãya doctrine of generic
property a remote influence of the socio—religious ideas of
the brahmins. Translated into biological terms, the above
principle of "non—overlapping' t becomes a principle which
opposes cross—breeding. There is thus some evidence that
the Nyãya bias for real generic properties was partially
influenced by the Brahmanical concept of an ideal social
structure where intermixture of classes is not to be
permitted.	 [Matilal (1971) p. 76]
The importance of the jãti/updhi distinction in relation to the
organization of society into castes goes beyond, I believe, the
stricture against marriage between different castes. Nyäya
philosophers were concerned to uphold the basis of the caste
system as founded in real divisions in the world. Buddhist
philosophy in general, and apohavãda in particular, denies the
basis in reality of the terms in the language used to signify the
caste divisions in society. There is no underlying reality
corresponding to the universal of being a brahmin (brãhmaiiatva).
According to Nyãya thought, brãhmaQatva is to be counted as a
jãti, implying that this is a simple property whose reality is
indicated by the way in which the term brãhmaiatva functions in
the language. In contemporary terminology, brãhmaiiatva is a
natural kind term. To be a brahmin is not to satisfy some set of
descriptions (as the Buddhists had proposed) but rather, it is
to be of the right substance. Hence however much one was to
outwardly emulate the behaviour of a brahmin, unless one was made
out of the right "stuff" one could never be counted as such. In
counting "brãhmaiatva" as a jãti, the Naiyyikas were upholding
as real the basis of the orthodox caste oriented society.
	
From
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an examination of which universals are counted as jãtis and which
are not, we can come to an understanding of the world—view of the
Naiyyikas.	 In some sense their "science" is embodied in this
distinction.	 Their intention to classify and use "brãhmaiatvã"
as a jãti term is an intention to settle a dispute concerning the
nature of caste in a particular way. Contemporary philosophers
of science recognize that finally, natural kind terms are
relative to a particular scientific theory and hence ultimately
reflect human interest as do our other methods of classification.
For the Nyãya philosopher, the normative aspect of natural kind
terms or jãtis was not understood in the same way in which they
understood the normative aspect of upãdhis. To be classified as
a jti was to be given some absolute independent reality.
This is interesting in light of recent studies of the caste
system by contemporary thinkers. Louis Dumont, a French
structuralist thinker, is noted for his studies of the caste
system and especially for his emphasis on its hierarchical
nature, such that a caste has no reality except in relation to
the whole. More recently, some scholars have indicated that
Dumont's analysis overlooks the importance of some kind of
biological substantialism as a factor in understanding the caste
system.	 E. Valentine Daniel has suggested in his recent work
Fluid Signs:
• . • .several principles have been identified as
underlying or generating the caste system, the most
popular being that of purity versus pollution.
Unfortunately, these present but half the truth....The
inability to go beyond or beneath caste arose from the
failure to see that jati meaning "genus" (the source
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concept of the ill—translated "caste") is not applied
to human beings only, but to animals, plants, and even
inorganic material, such as metals and minerals as
well....There is no better term than substance to
describe the general nature of these variously ranked
cultural units. In other words, differentially valued
and ranked substances underlie the system known as the
caste system, which is but one of many surface
manifestations of this system of ranked substances.
[E. Valentine Daniel (1984) pp. 1-2] 45
This understanding of the caste system can be clearly seen in the
Nyãya theory of the jtis, that in considering such distinctions
as brãhmaatva to be jãtis, they are in essence saying something
very similar to E. Valentine Daniel, that underlying the
different social groupings there is a corresponding difference of
substance.
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PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT1
Udayana's arguments against apohaväda
sbda1iñgavika1pã hi sãdhraath ripamanupasthpayanto
na tT!2akubj1karae'pi samarthã ityavivdath, bhyrtha-
sthitau sthirsthiravicrt.
tacc1ikath v, kro Va, bãhyath vastu veti trayab pak1.2
tatra na prathama1 pakab, taddhi na tavadanubhavadeva
tatha vyavasthpyath, tasyãlikatvänullekhãt. tathtve
v pravrttivirodht, na hyalikarneva tat ityanubhUyapy-
arthakriyrthi pravartate.
anyanivrttisphurannaia doa iti cet.
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION
Udayana's arguments against apohavda
Momentariness is not feasible because of the need for a suitable
explanation of the question of resemblance.
For, when conceptual cognitions arising out of words and
inference are not capable of demarcating what is the common
feature,then they are not capable of even bending a blade of
grass. This is indisputable from our considerations of
permanence and momentariness in our investigation of external
objects .3
Whether this common feature is an unreal entity, or is an image
[in the cognitionj or is a real external entity - these are the
three views to be decided.4
It is not the first of these views, because it cannot be
established as such by experience itself, for there is no
indication of it being a non—existent entity. 5 Or, if it were
so, it is contrary to purposive activity, for, a person desiring
some effect,having experienced it as non—existent, will not have
a tendency to act.6
"There is no fault here because of the manifestation of the
negation of other than that."7
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etadevãsat, vidhiriipasyaiva sphuratiãt. na hi
abda1iñgbhymiha mahidharoddes'e anagnirna bhavatiti
sphuraiarn api tvagnirastiti.
yadyapi nivçttimahaih pratyemiti na vika1pa, tathãpi
nivrttapadãrthollekha 8
 eva nivrttyullekhab, na
hyanantarbhãvitavis'eaiã viitapratitirnma, tato
yath smnyamahath pratyemityanuvyavasyãbhãve'pi.
sãdhãraiãkrasphuraiiãt vikalpadhib sãmãnyabuddhib pareth,
tathã nivrttapratyayãkipt nivrttibuddhirasrnkarn iti cet.
hanta, sdhãra kraparisphurae vidhiripatayã yadi
sãmnyabodhavyavasthã, kimytamasphuradabhãvkãre
cetasi nivrttipratitivyavasthyi.
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This is what is unreal, because the manifestation is positive in
aspect. For the situation is not that through seeing and hearing
that there is smoke on this part of the mountain one concludes
that "there is not non—fire there", but rather, "there is fire".9
"Even though the determinate cognition in his mind is not of the
form "I perceive the negation", even so, the negation is an
impression of the thing which is negated, just as a cognition of
a qualified thing includes the qualifier even though you don't
have a determinate cognition in the forsx of "I perceive t.'ne
universal". In the case of our opponent there is knowled of
the universal because of the appearance of the common feature in
the determinate cognition. Likewise for us there is knowledge of
the negation given in the cognition of what is excluded."
Alas, if there is a justification of the cognition of the
universal (smnya) as positive in nature in the appearance of
the image of the common feature, then what happens in the
establishment of the negation (nivrtti) in the cognition
(cetasi), which has the form of non—existence which does not
shine?10
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na hyagopoçlho yam iti vika1pa1 kim tu gauriti, tato
'nyanivrttimahath pratyemityevamãkãrãbhve'pi nivrttyãkra-
sphuraiiath yadi syt, ko nivttipratitimapahnuvita?
anyath tvatatpratibhãse tatpratiti vyavahrtiriti
gavãkre cetasi turagabodha ityastu.
na ca nivrttimtrapratibhãse'pi pravrttisambhavab, na
hyaghao nstityeva ghartht pravartate, api tu
ghao stiti.
aghaasya nivttiriti pratitau nyath doa iti cet.
na, ghaanivttyapratiksepe niyamanasyaivsiddheb.
tatpratikepe tu kastatonyo vidhib, niedhapratikepasy-
aiva vidhitvt?
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The determinate cognition is not in the form of "this is excluded
from non—cow" but rather, "this is a cow", but if there were the
appearance of the form of exclusion [in the cognition], even
though there is no judgement of this nature, namely, "I cognize
the exclusion of the non—thing", who would then disallow a
cognition (pratiti) of exclusion. But if, on the other hand, you
[the Buddhist] maintain that even when there is no mental
impression of that, we can talk about the perception of that,
then, when the form of a cow is present in the mind, let there be
a cognition of a horse also."
Nor can there be the possibility of a tendency to activity when
there is the cognition of the nivttti (negation of non—that)
alone. A person desiring a pot does not at all proceed to act
with the cognition "negation of pot is not there" but only with
the cognition "there is a pot".
"The negation is only of 'non—pot' in the cognition. If this is
the case then there is no such defect."
No. This restriction [in the form of 'only') is not established
unless the 'absence of pot' is also negated. If this is also
negated, what does it mean other than the positive nature (vidhi)
in the c ognition since negation of a negation is mere
assertion? 12
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nivrtteraparisphuraie gth badhãneti deito'vamapi
badhniyd iti cet.
na, bhavedapyevaih, yadyavo'pi gau syät, kintu gaur
gauravo' 'va iti. anyathä nivttävapi kutaste samãvãsa
iti, nivrttyantaraccedanavasthã, nivartyanivttti-
tadadhikaraiiãnãrh svarUpasñkarye pravrttisañkarab syt,
svarpabhedenaiva niyame vidhimãtrapratibhãse'pi tath
kith na syt.
svarffpabheda evnypoho anypohasvarUpatvdvidheriti
cet.
na, a1!kapake tadabhãvãt, tasya svarüpavidhvana1Tkatva-
prasañgt, sva1akaI2asya ca vika1pnãroht.
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"If the exclusion of all other things is not in your cognition,
one who is ordered by the statement 'tie the cow', he will tie
even the horse."
No, this could be possible only if a horse were also a cow, but
on the other hand we see "a cow is a cow and a horse is a horse".
If this were not so, where is the question of your belief in
exclusion? If it is because of another exclusion then there will
be an infinite regression. If there is a confusion of what is
excluded, the exclusion, and the substratum of the exclusion,
then again there will be a confusion in purposeful action. If it
is because of its essential nature that it is restricted then why
not accept the positive form in the cognition?'3
"The distinctive form is anypoha, and the positive nature is
because of the nature of anypoha."
No, because of the non—existence of a distinct form (tadabhãvt)
in the statement of its being unreal, because if the possession
of a positive form (svarpa) is attributed to the exclusion of
others (anypoha) then it [anypoha] cannot be an unreal entity,
and because the particular (svalakana) cannot appear in the
conceptual construction.'4
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api ca gãth badhäneti deito gavi pravtto ns've,
tadapratiteiii yadã tvavamupa1apsyate tadã tatra
pravrttyunmukho' pi gorabhävath pratityalva nivartsyatiti
kimanupapannam?
sydetat, na hyanubhavamavadhiiya bhavituth kamam iti.
ko vidhisphuraiamapahnutãm, t a du pasar1anib h it a s -
tanniedho'pi sphuratyeva?
anyath vidheravacchedakatvãnupapatteb, na hyanyato
/	 /	 .
viseyamavyavartayato viseaiatvam nama, na ca anyato
vyãvartanarii vyavacchittipratyyanãdanyat.
tato yathendTvarapuiJarikãdiabdebhyo guiibhtita-
n!1adhavaidividhi'ekhar pratitistadanyavyavacchedastu
tad	 sarvatreti cet.
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And further, a person ordered to tie up the cow with the
statement, "tie the cow", acts only towards the cow and not the
horse because the horse does not appear in his cognition
(tadapratteti), but when he sees a horse then, even though he is
ready to act in this matter, seeing that the cow is not there, he
turns back. What is wrong with this?15
"Let this be so, for discarding normal experience doctrine cannot
be possible. Who will be able to contradict the appearance in
the cognition of a positive form (vidhi) in which cognition the
negation of that positive form (tanniedho'pi) also appears,
being subordinate to that positive form (tadupasarjanibhitas)?
Otherwise, if this were not so, it would be impossible to give an
idea of the positive form as a delimitor, for a thing 'vhjh coes
not differentiate the thing to be differentiated from other
things is no more a qualification attribute (viearjatvam), for
the act of differentiating is not different from what conveys to
you the idea of the differentiation.
So, as in the case where from the words "indivara, puiicjarka"
there is a cognition in which the positive qualities blue, white
et ceteX. predominate with the exclusion of all qualities other
than these carried like a child in the womb of the positive form,
in all cases this is our point of view."6
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astu tãvadevath —vidhistu sphuratityatra samprati no
nirbandhab, anyathãvacchedyãvaccedakayorapratiter-
avacchittirapi na syãt, yathotpalãdãveva nHatvdy-
apratitau.
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Then let it be like this - it is forced on us now that there is a
positive cognition, otherwise, because of the non—cognition of
that which is to be distinguished and that which distinguishes,
[the cognition of] distinction cannot be made, as in the case
where there is non—cognition of blueness and so on in the example
of the lotus.'7
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FOOTNOTES TO TEXT D
1.	 ATV pp. 111-118 (1940 edition)
ATV pp. 275-289 (1939 edition)
2. tad refers here to sdharaiiath ripam - the common feature.
3. Udayana's account of causality and hence his proof of
permanent objects rests very much on the presence of the
universal inhering in each individual object. Conversely,
the Buddhist needs to demonstrate how in a momentary world
we are able to form an idea of resemblance between
individual events.
4. Many of the arguments which supply the pürvapaka in this
section can be found almost word for word in Jfãnari and
Ratnakirti. In his turn, Jfiãnari had been concerned to
defend Dharrnottara from Vcaspati Mira who had argued
against Dharmottara's views in his NVTT. (I am indebted to
Mr. Venugopalan of Deccan College for demonstrating this to
me in several cases.) In the opening of his section on
apohavda Udayana seems to be referring to the three
possibilities put forward by Dharmottara and presented by
Vãcaspati Mira in his NVTT.
(tasmt ea vikalpa viayab na j?ãnarii, jãnãkra v,
nãpi bãhyali iti ãstheyab alikab eva. tathãha
bhadantab dharmottarab, yat rpam ullikhyate
vikalpikay buddhyã viviktam aparaib na buddhib
na bahib.
Vãcaspati Mira p. 682 lines 22-26)
5. Udayana's argument here is that we don't experience common
features between individual entities as unreal. Again, this
can be traced back to Dharmottara whom Vãcaspati quotes as
saying, "api ca vikalpa viayab anubhyate eva vyavrtti
rripali". Vãcaspati Mira, NVTT p. 683 line 20. Vcaspatidoes not attempt to refute Dharmottara's claim that our
experience of commonness is one which is in the form of
exclusion. Hence Jfiãnari takes up this point again at the
beginning of his AP with this pürvapaka:
nanvapohab abdaliñgãbhyãm prakäyata ityanubhava-
badhitametat. Jffãnarimitra, AF p. 201 line 8
6. This argument of Udayana possibly refers to the Buddhist's
argument concerning purposeful activity (pravrtti) contained
in Vcaspati Mira's NVTT p. 684 line 19 and p. 685 line 4.
Vcaspati's reply can be found on p. 685 lines 5-8.
7. The Buddhist accepts that if there is to be purposeful
activity then it must be towards something, yet the Buddhist
accept the anugatarffpatvam (common form) of the
Naiyãyikas. The Buddhist tries to show that apohavda can
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be explanatory in this matter. Jfiãnari's arguments in this
matter reveal that he is concerned to oppose a purely
negative view of apoha.
8. nivrttapadãrthollekha as in the 1940 edition p. 112 line 13
seems correct here rather than nivrtti-
padrthollekha found in the 1939 edition p. 279 line 19.
9. This is found in Jffãnari as forming the pürvapaka:
tathãhiha mahidharoddee vahnirastTti abdallingd
v pratitirvidhirüpamevollikhanti lakyate. nnagnirna
bhavatiti nivrttimãtrammukhayanto yaccänubhava-
bãdhitath na tatra sãdhanãntaracint.
JuIãnarimitra, AP p. 201 lines 8-11.
10. Again this argument follows closely both JãnarT and
Ratnakirti in the AP and AS respectively.
atha yadyapi nivçttimahath pratyemiti na vikalpati,
tathãpi nivttapadrthollekha eva nivrttyullekhab,
na
tato yathã smãnyamahath pratyemiti vikalpbhãve'pi
sãdhãraiiãkãraparisphurad vikalpabuddhil smãnya-
buddhib pare?ãm, tath nivttapratyayakiptã
nivçttibuddhirapohapratitivyavahramãtanotiti cet?
JIãna'ri AP p. 201 lines 16-20.
The point being made here by the Buddhist is that in a
qualified cognition with the form "x is y" there is no
separate cognition of y—ness. The cognition would be "this
is a cow" and not "this is cow—ness".	 "Cowness" though is
implied by the qualified cognition.	 The Buddhist wants to
draw a parallel between this case and his own case. Hence
although there is no cognition with the form "I perceive the
nivrtti" this is given in the cognition of that which is
excluded (nivrtta).
"I perceive a cow"
	
perceive the nivçtta"
implies
17
cognition of cowness
implies
I7___
cognition of nivitti
IJdayana's retort here is that in his case the cognition is
positive because of the reality of the universal. The
universal can actually make an appearance in the cognition.
-in tne case oi me Buddhist though, the nivttti is a
negative entity which :annot therefore make such an
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appearance. This objection was known to Udayana's Buddhist
opposition. See Ratnakirti:
nanu sãdhrankraparisphuraie vidhiriipatay yadi
sãmãny abodhavyavasthã; tat kim ytam
asphuradabhvkãre cetasi nivrttipratitivyavasthyb..
Ratnakirti, AS p. 53 lines 13-14.
11. Udayana continues to explore the differences between his
case and that of his Buddhist opponent with regard to the
appearance of the universal and the nivrtti respectively in
the cognition. Udayana questions how there could be a
mental impression of exclusion, nivrtti, since this is
essentially a negative entity, and according to the
Buddhist's own position there can be no perception of
absence. If it were possible to have a mental impression of
the nivrtti then Udayana would accept its implication in the
judgement of what is excluded. Since there can be no mental
impression of the nivçtti, if the Buddhist insists that it
is presupposed in the cognition of the excluded things then
one might as well say that when the form of a cow is present
in the mind, let the cognition of a horse be there also.
Ratnakirti has exactly the same argument:
tato nivçttith ahath pratyemity evamãk5rbhve'pi
nivrtty äkrasphuranath yadi syit, ko nãma nivrtti-
pratitisthitim apalapet. anyathã'sati pratibhse
tatpratitivyavahtir iti aväkrepi cetasi turagabodha
ity astu.
Ratnakirti, AS p. 53 lines 14-16.
12. Udayana's point here is that in the case of someone wanting
a pot there will only be a positive response when that
person knows that a pot is there. The statement "There is
not non—pot" can be read as "There is not other than pots",
that is, anything which is not a pot is excluded from the
situation, but that doesn't necessarily assert that there is
indeed a pot there. The positive assertion of a pot being
there is made only if the absence of a pot is negated, that
is, "non—pot" must be read as "absence of pot". Udayana
asserts that if the statement is read in this way then this
is no different from the assertion "There is a pot".
13. The Buddhist then states one of his main arguments for the
apoha theory, that unless the meaning of "cow" excludes
horse et cetera, then statements such as "tie the cow" will
fail. In order for us to respond successfully to language
then, words must pick out their intended referent by a
process of exclusion. Udayana responds to this by bringing
to bear the argument of infinite regress. If, for example,
part of the meaning of "cow" is "non—horse" then the meaning
of this in its turn will be dependent on the exclusion of
"horse" and so on. Or, if "cow" excludes horse, that is,
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non—cow, and "horse" excludes cow, that is, non—horse, then
between these words there will be mutual dependency. Hence
there will be a confusion in our language—dependent
activity. These arguments are not original to Udayana,
being stock arguments of the Nyya philosophers, found in
Vãcaspati Mira's works for example.
14. The Buddhist continues to argue against the Nyãya view of
the universal by accepting a positive form in the cognition
for the common feature, but continuing to assert that this
is in the nature of anypoha. Udayana counters by saying
that something of a positive nature cannot be an alrka, that
is, an unreal entity, which was the original assertion of
the Buddhist. Yet Udayana portrays the Buddhist here as
being caught between the horns of a dilemma which is of his
own making. Only svalakaias have a positive nature and
these, according to Buddhist definition, cannot appear in the
constructive cognition (vikalpa).
15. Udayana here is stressing his point that it is with
reference to positive entities that we act. When we are
ordered to tie up the cow, we don't necessarily think of
horses because this is not part of our understanding on
hearing these words. Yet when we encounter a horse we are
able to see that it is not a cow, so we turn back.
16. Here we have an important admission on the part of the
Buddhist who is portrayed by Udayana as conceding an
important point, that to understand anyãpoha as wholly
negative in nature is not feasible.	 The Buddhist is here
portrayed as shedding and moving beyond the wholly negative
account of apoha which is said here to have originated with
Dignga.	 Our experience is not one of pure exclusion in
this matter, so whatever the received Buddhist doctrine says
(bhavitum), experience must take precedence.	 "Bhavitum"
refers to the views of Dignga and DharmakTrti and Juiãnari
is here portrayed as rejecting their views.
(kirtidiñnãgãdimate gaurayamityãdau vidhisphuraiäbhãve
'p1 jffãnariyã niedhavidvidhirapi tatra sphurat!ti
'yatrpohastadguratvena gamyat, ityatroktath tadapi
d ?a y ituth tanmatenafikate syãdetaditi I kaiamiti
4ãstramlti eab I tadupasarjanibhütab = vidhi-
vi 'eaijibhiitab, anyathä = vyavacchedasphurarjbhve,
gotvãdervidhervyavacchedakatvath na sydityartha b I
tadevãha nahtyãdin. Nãrãyani Commentary on the ATV (1940
edition) p. 117 note 1.)
To what extent this is an accurate portrayal of the Buddhist
position is a difficult matter (see main body of the
chapter). Certainly, some commentators would not accept
that Dignga held a wholly negative view of apoha [see
Sharma (1969) p. 52 footnote 14 for example]. Some
248
Kaabhañgavda II
FOOTNOTES TO TEXT D CONTD.
commentators have attributed the origin of this view, that
the nature of apoha is simultaneously both negative and
positive, to Ratnakirti. Whilst Ratnakirti certainly
espoused this view, according to the ATV, Jãna 'ri must be
credited with its formulation:
(na ca niedhyamaspçat pratItirnisedhyath spra1um-
arhati, tasya	 / na ca
niedhäntarameva niedhyam, itaretarrayaprasañt /
parnapekanirUpane tu vidhau nãyarh doa iti / tatab
pratitvitaretarrayatvamuktath sañkete sncãrya
yatparihttath jnarTya, tadetat rmyajanadhandhi-
karaam golakãdivat sthnntarasacãrt.
ATV (1940 edition) p. 118.
See Jnari AP p. 203.)
Ratnakirti and JãnarT were both concerned to stress that
neither the positive nor the negative element of apoha
should predominate and that they should not be understood to
be in a relationship of temporal succession but rather,
their relationship was one of logical interdependence. This
simultaneous cognition of both the positive and negative
elements of meaning is said by them to be matter of
experience. (Just as when we understand the term "indivara"
[blue lotusJ the elements "blue" and "lotus" are cognized
simultaneously, so too in every word the positive and
negative elements are understood simultaneously.)
Ratnakirti explicitly criticizes those views which emphasize
one aspect at the expense of the other:
(yattu go pratTtau na tadtmpartmeti sãmarthyãd
apoha pasanniciyata iti vidhivãdinm matarn;
anypohapratitau v sãmarthyt anypoho'vadhãryyate
iti pratiedhavãdinãm matam. tad asundaram.
Ratnakirti AS p. 54 lines 4-6.)
17. See Jnari AP p. 203 lines 20-22.
249
250
Karabhañgavda II
TEXT E
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT1
On the nature of vidhi: Arguments on the basis of pratyaka.
sphuratu vidhyallkamiti cet.2
na, vyghtt. kiciditi vidhyartho na kiciditi
c1Tkarthab.
sva1akaiasypya1ikatvaprasañgt. svarpamtraparãvttau
tu katharn vidhirnrna?
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION
On the nature of vidhi: Arguments on the basis of pratyaka.
At the end of TEXT D the Buddhist admitted that the nature of
anyãpoha needed to have some positive form (vidhi) if the
function of differentiating A from non-A was to be possible. The
question now arises as to the exact nature of this vidhi since
obviously the Buddhist will not accept the reality of the
universal. Hence in the judgement "this is a cow" the Buddhist
will now accept some positive form associated with the word "cow"
but will not accept the reality of an independent universal, nor
will he accept the possibility that the svalakaia could be
referred to by this judgernent.	 For Udayana, in the judgement
"this is a cow", an individual cow is being referred to as such
because of cowuess residiu as a 'ositi'e ttt in. ti
individual cow. For the Buddhist, who admits no such entity, his
analysis of "this is a cow" must demonstrate how language can
successfully point us to the empirical world, given his beliefs
in the unreality of the universal (or real resemblances) and in
the separation of svalakarja and language. Udayana now examines
the Buddhist position closely in order to understand what the
nature of his vidhi could be and how it could provide a link
between language and the world.
"Let it be asserted that the vidhi is an unreal entity."
No, because of self-contradiction. "Something" is the meaning of
vidhi and "not something" is the meaning of airka (an unreal
entity). If it is called an unreal entity merely because it
negates things other than itself then the momentary particular
(svalakana) will also have to be counted as unreal. And if the
exclusion of others is its essential nature then why do you call
it a positive entity?
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PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT
vidhyarhasyropitatvdayameva adoa iti cet.
na, sva1akarjavidhervika1psathsparãt, smnyavidher-
anupagamãt, parieãda1kavidhau virodhasyaiva sthiteb.
bhedãgrahãdvidhivyavahramtrametaditi cet.
sarnbhavedapyetat, yadi sva1akatiamapi vidhitvamapahãya
sphuret, yadi c1ikamapi niedharpatãrh parihrtya
praketa. na caivam. ubhayorapi nirathatay
prakãrntaramupdãyãprathanãt, aprathamãnariipasambhavcca.
kã1panikasypyathãthibhavasyta eva mIila eva nihitab kuhãrab.
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"There is no mistake because of superimposition inthe matter of
the aspect of the positive image."
No, because the positive image in the form of a svalakaia cannot
appear in the conceptual cognition, and also because you do not
accept the universal. Finally, there is a contradiction in
calling one and the same thing positive and unreal in nature.3
"I merely	 j "vidhi" because I don't comprehend the difference."
This could be possible only if the svalakaiia itself, abandoning
its positive aspect, could appear in the cognition, and only if
the unreal entity, also abandoning its nature of exclusion, could
appear in the cognition. But it is not so. Furthermore, with
respect to both vidhi and alika, because both of them have no
other natures in them apart from their own specific features,
they cannot take the help of another feature. Added to which,
they (vidhi and alika) do not have the option of not appearing in
the cognition.
Because the superimposition is postulated on the basis of
imagined properties, for this very reason the axe has been put to
the root itself.4
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sãdhraiiath ca rpath vika1pagocaral, na c1ikath tath
bhavitumarhati, tasya hi deakã1nugamo na svbhãvikab,
tucchatvt. na k1panika, tas y b ksatiikatvãt.
nãropitah, anyatrpyaprasiddheb.
bhedgrandekatvamatramanusandhryata iti cet.
na, bhãvikasya bhedasyãbhvãt, bhve vã kãlpanikatvasya
vyghãtãt.
pararnarthãsatati paramrthbhedaparyavasãyitvãt.
ropitasygrahnupapatte, abhedropnavakããcca.
ãropitsattvasya paramãrthasattvaprasa?igt.
ca tu bk o i n irmuk ta sya cãtiprasaijakatvãt, tadagrahasya
trailokyepi su1abhatvt.
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And, as the common feature is an object in a verbal cognition, it
cannot be an unreal entity, because it would not have a common
form running through space and time since it is non—existent.
Nor can the positive form be something which is postulated
because of momentariness. Nor can you say that it is something
which is superimposed because you have not established its
existence elsewhere .5
"Because of the non—perception of difference [in all these
cognitions] there arises the idea of uniformity."
No, because there is no real difference between them, or, if the
difference is real, then this contradicts your idea that each one
is conceptual.6
If the distinction is not really existent (that is, unreal) then
the result is that there is no real difference.
Also, it is logically impossible to non—cognize [a difference]
which is superimposed as well as the fact that there is no reason
to superimpose the identity.
And ifthe argument is that non—reality is superimposed onthe
difference, then this implies that the distinction is really
real.
If you say that [the non—perception of difference] is not any of
the above four types, then the result will be a wider application
in that it will be possible to perceive all things in the three
worlds as being non—different.
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1. ATV (1940 edition) pp. 119-123
ATV (1939 edition) pp. 302-304
2. vidhyallkarn is a karmadhraya compound; here the idea is
that the positive form has no reality.
3. The arguments which follow, that the positive aspect of
apoha is unreal are all on the basis of pratyaka
(perception).	 (Udayana deals with the arguments based on
anumna (inference) in the next section.) The arguments
based on pratyaka are in two sections, those which examine
the nature of an individual judgement "this is a cow" and
those which examine the nature of a sequence of such
judgernents. It must be remenbered that the reason why the
Buddhist introduced vidhi as an aspect of apoha was to
explain the relationship between language and the world,
that is, how language can enable us to interact successfully
with an independent reality consisting of momentary
svalakaas. Udayana first of all rejects the view that the
positive form is unreal and his reasons for doing so are
stated quite clearly. Apart from Udayana's criticisms, if
the positive aspect of apoha is just simply said to be
unreal then this does not explain satisfactorily the
relationship between language and the world of svalakaias.
The Buddhist then puts forward the view that the positive
vidhi is superimposed on the world of svalakaias. This is
said to be the view of Dharmottara and was severely
criticized by both Jfiãnari and Ratnakrti, who state that
this view of illusory externality (ropita bhyatvã) was
unrealistic (alaukikam), against the tradition of Buddhist
thought (angamam) and illogical (atãrkikiyai).
(etena yad Dharmottara: ãropitasya bhyatvasya
vidhiniedhãv ity alaukikam anãgamam atãrkikTyath
kathayati tad apahasitam.)
[Ratnakirti AS p. 60 lines 13-14]
Dravid (1972) puts it succinctly thus:
"The object of Dharmottara's conception having an illusory
externality is, according to Jfiãnari, neither empirical
(samvçti) nor ultimate (paramrtha). Empirical truth is
nothing but what is commonly accepted to be true
(lokäbhimna). Our judgments are commonly believed to refer
to external things. This belief is based on repeated
experience. The externality of empirical objects is never
believed to be illusory, as its cognition leads to the
fulfilment of volitional activity. So the externality of
the objects of our judgments is not a case of illusion. Nor
is the so called illusory externality a character of the
real, because the latter, by accredited tradition, is beyond
affirmation and negation."
[Dravid (1972) pp. 314-315]. See JfIãnar AP p. 229 for hia
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views on this matter.]
Udayana demonstrates that the superimposition of the
positive aspects of apoha on an external svalakaia is just
not feasible. The model for this idea is to be found in the
Prabhkara theory of error and is paralleled in the mistaken
judgement "this is silver" pronounced in the presence of a
shell. The error here is explained by the fact that the
idea of silver is superimposed on the shell appearing in the
cognition. Udayana points out that this model will not work
for several reasons. First of all, unlike the shell, the
svalakara cannot appear in the cognition expressed by the
words "this is a cow", for example. Secondly, the Buddhists
do not admit the reality of cowness which is supposed to be
superimposed on the svalakatia (whereas silver, although not
existing in the shell, is supposed to have a real existence
elsewhere). Finally, unlike the shell and silver, Udayana
points out that there is no similarity at all between
positivity and unreality.
4. Here the Buddhist is changing his position from saying that
there is an actual superimposition of the positive aspect of
apoha on the svalakaia to saying that there is only a
statement of superimposition. This would be an attempt to
avoid some of the problems pointed out by Udayana which
result from saying that there is an actual superimposition.
For example, there is now no need for the vidhi (which it
should be remembered is said to be unreal or alTka
throughout this whole argument) to be real like the silver.
In this case there is a non—comprehension of difference
between the positive aspect of the cognition and the
negative aspect. Their natures which are different are not
comprehended as such. In order for non—comprehension of
difference (bhedgraha) to occur, however, there should be
some common form shared by the two entities (smnyãkãra).
Udayana finds fault with this idea on four counts. Firstly,
the non—comprehension of difference could only happen if the
svalakaa could appear in the cognition without its
positive aspect and if the unreal aspect (alka) could
appear abandoning its nature of exclusion. 	 [The alika in
order to appear in the cognition must have some positive
form (vidhi).]	 Secondly, it would seem that this is
impossible since they are both essentially of positive and
negative natures respectively. The idea behind these two
points is that first, the two entities involved are
supposedly so different it is hard to see how
non—comprehension of difference could occur at all.
Secondly, the essential nature of a svalakaia is such
that it is not amenable to expression in a conceptual
cognition and the essential nature of exclusion
is such that it does not have any positive form which could
appear in a conceptual cognition. Udayana's third point is
that both entities must appear in the cognition because of
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calling it vidhyalika. The vidhi aspect is supplied by the
svalakaia and the alika aspect by anypoha. Hence if the
conceptual cognition is to be labelled vihdyalika then both
contributers must be present. This makes the possibility of
superimposition hard to understand if both elements are
present.	 Usually for superimposition to occur one element
must by absent (as in the caseof shell and silver). This
leads to Udayana's fourth point that in this case the
imagination would have to work against what is actually
present in the cognition. There has to be a non-comprehen-
sion of difference on the basis of imagined properties.
5. Udayana is here making the point that the common feature
cannot be an unreal entity since an unreal entity would not
satisfy what is required of a common feature, namely, that
it have a common form running through space and time
(deakãlnugamo). The common feature cannot either be the
result of postulation since the very nature of a cognition
itself is momentary. It might seem here that Udayana's
arguments themselves presuppose the real existence of
universals or common features rather than demonstrate their
existence. The Buddhist could say in opposition to Udayana
here that it is just because of the fact that cognitions are
momentary that common features running through space and
time are not possible, hence proving their point of view.
The question posed by Udayana here though is that we do have
an idea of common features running through space and time,
and hence it is incumbent on the Buddhist to show how we
could form such a notion in a world of momentariness.
6. The Buddhist reply to this point is that it is because of
the similarity between a sequence of momentary cognitions
that we form an idea of a common feature running through
space and time (which may remind some readers of a similar
idea put forward by David Hume). This idea was put forward
by Dharmakirti and quoted by Vãcaspati Mira.
(ekapratyavamar4asya hetutvãddhirabhedini
ekadhihetubhãvena vyakt1nãmapyabhinnat.)
This idea is put forward by Raja thus:
"The so-called objective world is made up of a succession of
such momentary particulars, like the still pictures of a
cinema. Strictly speaking, these momentary particulars
produce mutually different results, but since they produce
the same sensation they all appear as identical.
Dharmakirti says that the sensation of sameness is produced
by a repeated series of similar perceptions, and the same-
ness of the particulars is the consequence of the fact that
they produce the same sensation. The relative difference of
these particulars is not grasped, hence man imputes sameness
to them, by the common exclusion of all the others."
[Raja (1963) p. 181]
Udayana criticizes this account in four ways. Firstly, he
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says that if there is to be a real difference between
things, then the things themselves should be real. For the
Buddhist, however, the cognitions involved are only
conceptual, that is, there can be no real difference non—
cognition of which can lead to the idea of uniformity.
Udayana's second criticism is that if the Buddhist tries to
evade this criticism by saying that the difference between
the cognitions (vikalpa viayas) is not real, then this
results in their being one. The Buddhist is not portrayed
as saying that they are all the same, but there is a
difference between them which is superimposed, which in its
turn is not perceived, hence giving the idea of a common
feature running through space and time. Udayana's third
criticism is therefore to show the absurdity of this idea,
since anything which is superimposed is always grasped. You
cannot superimpose something and not perceive it!
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Chapter Five
BAHYARTHABHANGAVADA AND GUAGU1IBHEDABHANGAVADA: ON THE NATURE OF
PERCEPTION AND OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD.
But under the requirement of philosophic
consistency, and the impact of the perfectly
valid reflection that experience is always my
experience, and never part of some object
independent of me, the world shrinks to the
extension of my experience only, and I am
left with bundles of my sensations. What are
the natural consequences of such an
epistemological sophistication?
One plausible and natural reaction is
what one might call the 'Indian' one. It
runs roughly as follows: my experience of the
world is, alas, only my experience. 	 It is
not 'the real'. Moreover, the world
disclosed in my experience is one of misery,
precariousness, insecurity, which ends in old
age and death and within which no secure,
reliable, undeceptive goods can be found.
The flux and precariousness which make it so
unhappy a place, also make it most ill—suited
to be an object of knowledge.
[Geilner (1974) p. 114]
The Philosophical Background
Contrary to Geilner's caricature of Indian philosophy as
idealist in nature (a common misconception), as we have seen
there were several schools of Indian thought, such as Nyãya,
which strongly defended the existence of an independent, external
world. Indeed, Geilner's paragraph introduces four separate
theses which need to be kept distinct if one wishes to understand
the differences between the various schools of Indian philosophy.
These are namely:
(1) The world as a place of suffering
(2) The world as transitory in nature
(3) The world, that is the external world, as unreal
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(4) The external world as unknowable
The idea that the world is a precarious place full of suffering
became increasingly important in Upaniadic thought and, of
course, was from the beginning central to Buddhism. This worldly
pessimism is fully expressed in the opening of the Maitri
Upaniad:
O Revered One, in this foul-smelling, unsubstantial
body, a conglomerate of bone, skin, muscle, marrow,
flesh, semen, blood, mucus, tears, rheum, faeces,
urine, wind, bile and phlegm, what is the good of the
enjoyment of desires? In this body which is afflicted
with desire, anger, covetousness, delusion, fear,
despondency, envy, separation from what is desired,
union with the undesired, hunger, thirst, old age,
death, disease, sorrow and the like, what is the good
of enjoyment of desires? And we see that all this is
perishing, as these gnats, mosquitos and the like, the
grass and the trees that grow and decay .... Among
other things there is the drying up of great oceans,
the falling away of mountain peaks, the deviation of
the fixed pole-star,the cutting of the wind ropes (that
hold the stars in their places), the submergence of the
earth, the departure of the gods from their station.
In such a world as this what is the good of enjoyment
of desires?
[Maitri Upaniad verses
The suffering of the world arises from the fact that ultimately
everything in the world is subject to decay and is of no absolute
value. There is no doubt that this view of the world lies at the
heart of Indian soteriological thought, and whilst the responses
of such schools as Sautrãntika, Yogãcãra, Vaibhãsika and
Mãdhyamika in the Buddhist tradition and Advaita Vedãnta in the
Hindu tradition might seem to be more immediately in sympathy
with such a world view, it must also be stated that there is no
inconsistency between the realism of the Nyya school and the
idea that the world is a place of suffering and decay. 	 The
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scholar needs to be curious though about what role Nyya realism
could play in a soteriological framework which places small value
on the temporal world.2
Geliner conflates the next two theses, the view that there is
no external world and that the world is momentary in nature.
These two theses are quite clearly separated in the ATV where
Udayana examines the question of momentariness in the
ksanabhaflgavãda section and only moves on to consider the notion
of an independent, external world in the next section,
bãhyãrthabhañavãda. This is no accident, for in western
philosophy the thesis that the world is momentary in nature is
directly related to the idea that "nothing is ever present to the
mind but perceptions" [David Hume (1969) p. 1161. This one
premiss is the basis for both the argument that the world is
momentary in nature and the argument that there is no
independent, external world. Geilner has expressed it succinctly
thus:
The key premiss is a tautology: we only experience what
we experience.	 What we do not experience, we do not
experience. But tautological though this premiss may
seem, it also appears to be pregnant with the most
important consequences .... By considering carefully,
as Hume did, what we do and do not experience we note
that we do not - and could not - experience either the
permanent, persistent substantiality credited to
material objects by common sense, or t 1ne cansal 1its
which bind events, and which make the world predictable
and manipulable, to a degree at least sufficient for a
tolerable human habitat. The 'naive realist' attitude
towards both objects and towards the connections
between events, an attitude which had full confidence
in their inherent reality, is possible thanks to a kind
of confused double think, which conceives the gaps in
the series of data as, all at once, not being gaps
after all, but being permanently filled.	 But what is
the point of saying that objects are 'really there'even
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when no one is looking at them?	 How could you
establish this? You cannot look without looking. The
very terms of reference preclude an answer.
	 [Cellner
(1974) p. 73-74]
We have already dealt with the Buddhist arguments for the
momentary nature of the world, and the philosopher trained solely
in the western tradition will surely have been impressed there by
the absence of arguments relating the doctrine of momentariness
to the nature of our perceptual experience. Udayana was
concerned to refute a thesis of momentariness which his Buddhist
opposition had argued for on the basis of the nature of existence
and causality, rather than on the basis of the nature and
limitations of our perceptual experience. Hence in the
kaiiabhaflgavda chapter, Udayana's main opposition had been the
Sautrãntika Buddhists who upheld a thesis of momentariness in
combination with a thesis of the reality of the external world.
In that chapter, the nature but not the existence of the external
world was under dispute.3
In the bãhyãrthabhañga and guiagunibhedabhañga chapters of
the ATV, Udayana moves on to defend the existence of an external
world, independent of and external to an individual's private
experience. 4	The opposition shifts from being simply one of
Buddhist phenomenalism to one of Buddhist phenomenalism-cum-
idealism. 5 In these chapters, Udayana is concerned especially to
defeat the Yogcra school of Buddhism which put forward an
idealist interpretation of Dignga's philosophy.6
The relationship of the third and fourth theses, that is,
the existence and knowability of an external world, to the first
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two theses is also a complicated issue in Indian philosophy. 	 It
is not so much the transitoriness of the world which makes it an
unsuitable object of knowledge.	 Indeed, according to the
Sautrãntika Buddhist, such a world is grasped directly in
perception and hence "known". Rather, the Yogacra school
disputes the idea that we can know of an external world on the
basis that we can never perceive anything as separate from our
judgements. Indeed, for the Yogacra school, the very division
of internal/external makes little sense. Thus the argument that
"nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions", whilst not
a central issue in the debate over kaiatv, is central to the
Yogcãra dismissal of a knowable, external world.
Nyya realism argues for a position whereby we have direct
access to the external world, and where perception, rather than
throwing a veil of "sensedata" between us and the world, gives
us this direct access. Nyaya philosophers propose a theory of
perception that tries to overcome any divide between us and the
world. They would deny the existence of any mediating entities
such as "sense—data", for once entities such as these are
inserted between the observer and the "observed", then both the
idea of an external world and an object independent of its
qualities become undermined. By proposing that in perception we
are brought into immediate contact with the world around us, the
Nyãya school is arguing against a fundamental premiss common to
all forms of idealism that perception does not give us any direct
access to a world outside of itself. As J.N. Mohanty states:
It is well known that the Ny5ya advocates an extreme
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form of direct realism and maintains that what we
directly perceive are physical objects and not some
intermediate entities called variously by philosophers
'ideas', 'contents' or even 'sense data'.
[Mohanty (1970) p. 1831
In order to defend the Nyãya form of realism, in the
bhyãrthabhañga and guaguiibhedabhañga chapters of the ATV
Udayana considers all the major disputes between the realists of
the Nyya school and the phenomenalistic idealism of the Yogãcãra
school. I have grouped these overlapping arguments under three
caiu &eafins:
(1) The nature of perception
Here the arguments concern the nature of our judgements
about the world, whether or not perception can bring us into
direct contact with the world. The debate concerns the nature of
our awareness and how it could possibly grasp objects external
to it.8
(2) The nature of everyday oblects
Here Udayana is concerned to defend the existence of
objects such as tables and chairs. Udayana argues against a
regressive representationalism, in which it is claimed that such
everyday objects have to be inferred from our perceptual
experience which cannot present such objects directly but at best
give us a representative similarity. His main concern, however,
is to argue against a progressive phenomenalism in which objects
such as tables and chairs are said to be built up from the
elements given in perception. In arguing for his position,
Udayana utilizes arguments in which he attempts to show that an
object is more than the sum of its parts and that there is a
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real difference between an object and its qualities. 	 In order
to defend this distinction (guñaguñibheda), Udayana argues that:
(1) there is a correlation between our senses of sight and
touch, that the object which we see is the same object which
we can touch.
(ii) it is possible to perceive a whole (avayavin) through
perceiving a part of that object.
(iii) it is possible for us to perceive an object separate
from its qualities. He gives as examples the perception of
a conch shell as yellow by a jaundiced individual, and the
differing presentations of an object given to an individual
who changes her position with respect to that object.
(3) Knowledge of an external world
Udayana argues against a scepticism which claims that we can
never have a certain knowledge of a world external to us.
	 He
defends the role of the pramãiias, the instruments of knowledge,
in their capacity to give us such knowledge.
	 The argument that
our perceptions can give us a direct access to an external world
is also important in this respect. In order to defend the
possibility of knowledge about an external world,Nyãya needs to
have an adequate explanation for such phenomena as perceptual
illusions and errors, phenomena which Udayana also examines.
I will now examine some of these arguments in greater detail
by means of the following two translations taken from the
guaguiibhedabhañga chapter of the ATV.9
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TEXT F: On what we see and touch
(Translated pp. 286-300)
Udayana's basic argument in this portion of the text rests
on the notion that when we perceive an object, such as a table,
we have an intuitive understanding of it as being one object
(ekãrtha). This is not a position which he argues for. Rather,
it is this very premiss which is assumed, and his defence of
guiaguibheda, that an object is different from its qualities,
rests on the thesis that guiaguiibheda is the only viable
explanation for the basic awareness which we all have of one
object which we can both see and touch. Hence Udayana's strategy
is to offer our awareness of one object (ekãrthnusandhänam) as
self—obvious and then demonstrate that of five possible
explanations only guiaguiibheda can adequately explain this
phenomenon.'° The five possible explanations which he considers
are, in the following order:
(1)	 that the object of vision is the same as the object of
touch.
(2) that the object of vision and the object of touch form an
aggregate object (samudãya), which functions for all purposes as
one object.
(3) that the object is separate from its qualities which are the
objects of our organs of sight and touch.
(4) that the object does not correspond to reality.
(5) that the object is unreal.
According to Udayana's Buddhist opposition, each sense
faculty reigns over a separate and exclusive domain of objects, a
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theory known as vyavasthã. Just as we cannot taste sounds, so
too according to a strict vyavasth theory, we cannot see those
objects which belong to the domain of touch. Nyya philosophers,
on the other hand, do not apparently accept this strict
interpretation of the vyavasth theory. They accept that the
sense of taste and hearing are mutually exclusive, but maintain
that this is not the case with the senses of sight and touch.
For example, what we see and touch is one and the same rose,
whereas what we smell is the fragrance of that rose rather than
the rose itself. This theory in which an object may be known
through different means is known as the samplava theory.'1
In this section of the ATV , however, Udayana makes clear
that it is only by assuming a separation between an object and
its qualities that we can formulate the understanding which we
have of one object, such as a table, for example. I would like
to consider this thesis of gutaguiibheda in relation to the
samplava theory, and also to understand the role which the
gul)a/gu!iin distinction plays in Udayana's realism. Consider the
following passages from Professor Matilal's recent work,
Perception:
A follower of Nyãya is a direct realist and therefore
holds that we can grasp the same material body by both
the sense of touch and that of vision. Not only do we
see the material body, the chair, but also touch the
same body.
and:
Nyãya therefore allows 'mixture' (or samplava) in the
case of vision and touch, in the case of [perceptual]
judgement and inference. Nyãya would say that the same
property, shape of the thing, can be both touched and
seen (a point on which the Sautrãntika apparently, and
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rightly from the Buddhist point of view, disagreed).
Furthermore, Nyãya contends that the same thing, the
propertied object or the 'shaped' body is also seen
and touched by us.' 2 [Matilal (1986 p. 253]
Now in Udayana's first alternative, he considers the thesis that
our notion of one object results from the possibility of the
visual and tactile objects being one and the same. In discussing
this first alternative, Udayana demonstrates one way in which the
visual organ operates in a domain different from that of the
tactile organ. As he points out, we cannot touch colour;
otherwise a blind man would be able to see blue with his
fingers (see translation of TEXT F, pp. 286-287). Several
questions arise here in the context of the passages from Matilal
cited above:
(1) Since there is no mixing in respect of colour, would
that mean that we are seeing the colour of the table, and
not the table itself?
(ii) When it comes to talking of the shape of the table, is
this a case where there is 'mixing', in the sense that the
same quality can be both seen and touched? Professor
Matilal, it seems, asserts that this is indeed so according
to the samplava theory, and it is this fact which is the
basis for our understanding of the table as one object-
that is, that our idea of 'one table' is incumbent on our
being able to both seen and touch this shape.
Empirical evidence throws doubt upon whether this is indeed the
case. Professor Matilal himself, raises the Molyneux question in
the course of his discussion:
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Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by
his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of
the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as
to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the
cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and
sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made
to see: guaere, whether by his sight, before he touched
them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the
globe, which the cube?
[Locke (1964) p. 121]
Locke and Molyneux agreed that the answer was no, and apparently
in this they are supported by experimental evidence. Matilal
gives the following hypothetical answer that Nyya might offer in
explanation:
It would say that one sees, of course, the same cube
one touched before (when one was blind, for example),
but one's inability to use the same name N to name what
one sees now (assuming this to be a proven fact) can be
accounted for in a different way. It is certainly true
that for Nyaya that the person concerned sees N under
the circumstances. But seeing N is not the same thing
as seeing it as N.
	
Moreover to use N to name it we
need to see it as N. 	 For simply seeing N is not a
sufficient condition for our being able to judge it to
be N. The blind man suddenly gaining eyesight
miraculously may initially have difficulties in
identifying as N the cube he sees now, but after
another try (after, for example, touching it again
blindfolded and then seeing it again) he would be able
to bridge 'the gap' and claim that he grasps the same
object (thing) by both vision and touch.
[Matilal ( 1986) p . 254]
It is my contention that one cannot read this section of the
guiaguiiibhedabhañga chapter and maintain that Udayana's thesis
for our comprehension of there being one table, for example,
rests on an understanding of the saruplava theory in which visual
and tactile objects coincide. He does not specifically discuss
the quality of shape but rather colour - that a blind man cannot
see blue, but, if he were to assent to the idea that in the
perception of shape the organs of touch and vision have a common
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object then this renders the argument in the remaining portion of
this chapter superfluous. His contention is that it is only by
accepting the gura/guiin distinction that we can have a notion of
one object. By accepting the joint visual/tactile perception of
shape, alternative (1) would be an acceptable explanation and
there would be no need for alternative (3) and hence no
successful refutation of the b g dhaka - gunaguninorãbheda (non-
difference between an object and its qualities). On a reading
which gives this section coherency, one would have to say that
Udayana would side with Molyneux and Locke in the sense that a
blind person does not see the shape that a sighted person sees,
and that the shape which he feels is not the same sensory object
as the shape which the sighted person sees. The reverse of this
would also be true - someone who had no sense of touch could not
touch the hard edges of the cube with his eyes; otherwise it
would be possible to hurt someone by visually showing him the
point of a dagger. The visual perception of the cube involves
the visual sensation of a shaped mass of colour, whereas the
tactile perception involves tactile sensations of hardness and so
on. In the case of Udayana, I suggest, an agreement with
Molyneux on this question is not damaging to his realism because
his theory of realism does not depend on a theory of samplava in
which visual qualities can be grasped by the tactile organ. It
seems that Udayana quite categorically rules out alternative (1),
that our idea of one object arises from the visual and tactile
organs operating on common objects. Rather, he would want to say
that what we see is the same table that we can touch because the
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colour, shape, hardness,	 cetera are qualities which inhere in
one and the same object. Samplava here would mean that we can
see and touch one and the same material object, not that the
visual organ can grasp objects in the domain of the tactile organ
and vice versa. (Presumably the reason why we smell the
fragrance of the rose rather than the rose itself is because
smell is not a quality which inheres in the object itself.)
It could be claimed now that Udayana's position will lead
directly to phenornenalism, since an object in this situation is
merely an aggregate of qualities grouped together - a table will
be a composite object made up of visual and tactile forms. It
would seem that Udayana was aware of this danger, for in
alternative (2) he moves on to discuss and dismiss this as a
possibility, that an object such as a table could be a mere
aggregate (samudãya). The Phenomenalist needs to explain how "if
there are only parts, how can a mere plurality be referred to as
one object" [Mohanty (1970) p. 186]. The problem for the
phenomenalist here is to explain the basis for the unity which we
ascribe to physical objects, to distinguish between a unified
object such as a table and something which we would consider a
mere aggregate, such as a pile of apples.
The sense of unity ('This is one') and the sense of
plurality ('These are many') cannot refer to the same
object. The former refers to one object, not to a mere
aggregate.	 The latter to an aggregate, but not to a
unity. "But" it may be asked, "do we not refer to a
wood or to an army as one object, although the wood or
the army really is a mere aggregate of many different
things? Why then would it not be possible in a similar
manner to refer to a tree as one object though in
reality it is a mere aggregate?" To this, the Nyãya
replies in the following manner.	 It is true that we
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mistake from a distance, or on account of other doas,
a mere aggregate or a plurality for a unity, so that
instead of saying 'These are many', we say 'This is
one'. Such a sense of unity is no doubt erroneous.
But such an erroneous sense of unity is possible, only
if there are other cases, where our sense of unity is
right.	 [Mohanty (1970) pp. 186_187]13
In dismissing alternative (2), the object as an aggregate,
Udayana's strategy is to systematically undermine any principle
upon which the visual and tactile objects could be grouped
together. Udayana would contend that it is only because we
already have a sense of a unified object that we group together
our various perceptions of it. He examines in turn each of the
four possible principles which could be the basis for grouping
together a collection of perceptions, namely, their having a
common locus, a common effect, a common cause and even existing
at a common time. In each case Udayana carefully demonstrates
their inadequacy in the task of acting as a unifying principle.
(See translation of TEXT F pp. 286-295.)
Udayana's sense of realism is offended by the claim that
objects such as tables are unreal or have no true correspondence
with reality. For him, our successful interaction with the
objects of the world is a strong argument against such a claim.
In the course of arguing for this position he also has cause to
refer to his previous arguments defending the idea of the whole
(avayavin). 14
 The Buddhist assertion is that such a whole is
never perceived.	 For example, in our perception of a tree, all
we ever see are various parts of the tree. The notion of the
avayavin played an important role in Nyãya realism, and it had
been vigorously defended since the time of Gautama.' 5
 The whole
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resides in its parts and hence Nyya would dismiss the claim that
in order to see the whole we would have to see all of its parts.
Thus if I have a clear unobstructed view of the table, then I
see the whole table, even though there are parts of the table
which I may not be able to see. It is only in the case where my
view of the table is obstructed, when I can just see one leg, for
example, that it can be said that I only see part of the table.
Having a partial view of an object only makes sense in terms of
knowing what it means to have a view of the whole. The Nyãya
concept of avayavin is an important defence against the argument
which claims that we cannot really perceive physical objects, but
only infer or construct them on the basis of our perceptual data.
Thus in this section of the guiaguiibhedabhaflga, Udayana
focusses on the importance of the guua/guuin distinction for his
realism. His claim is that only the guiiin, the possessor of
qualities, can explain the correlation we experience between our
visual and tactile senses which work together to give us a sense
of unity.	 In this section, Udayana also gives a sense of the
relationship between the guia/guiin distinction and the notion of
avayavin. Avayavipratyaka (perception of the whole) is an
important defence against the Buddhist who claims that however
much Udayana argues against the idea of an aggregate object, all
he can do is replace it with an object which we can never
perceive. The guia/guin distinction emphasizes the distinctness
of the table from its qualities, the notion of avayavin
emphasizes the intimate connection between a whole and its parts.
Both are necessary for the defence of Nyãya realism.
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TEXT C: Cognition of an Object as separate from its qualities
(Translated pp. 302-310)
In this section of the guraguiibhedabhañga, tJdayana
discusses the central argument of the idealist Yogcãra school.
For the Yogãcra school, the distinction which we make between an
external reality and our perception of that reality is a mere
mental perception arising out of ignorance. Dharmaklrti
presented the case for his phenomenalistic idealism thus:
sahopalambhaniyand abhedonilataddhiyob16
The claim here is that "because they are always apprehended
together, there can be no distinction between blue and our
perception of it". Dharmakirti is making the point that
there is no reason to distinguish between blue and our awareness
of blue - if these two were different then it should not be the
case that they are invariably apprehended together. It is not so
much an argument against the external world but, rather, that the
very bifurcation itself of internal/external is mistaken.
Dharmakfrti's argument is effective both against a phenomena-
listic realism as well as Udayana's realism, for not only is it
an argument about the existence of qualities separate from our
apprehension of them, but also against the existence of an object
as separate from its qualities, since the object is never
perceived as separate from its qualities.
Before confronting this argument in the gutaguiibhedabhahga
section, Udayana had already considered it in the bhyãrthabhañga
section:
na grãhyabhedam avadhUya dhiyo'sti vrttil?17
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His reply to DharmakTrti ' s argument is that "there is no
awareness (which we have) that negates the difference between the
apprehended (object and the apprehension itself)". Hence in the
bhyãrthabhadga section, TJdayana appeals to a basic element of
our experience, that we experience objects as separate from our
perceptions of them. Just as in TEXT F, where Udayana began his
arguments with an appeal to an intuitive element of our
experience, that we experience such objects as tables as unified
objects, here too Udayana is appealing to what he considers to be
an intuitive aspect of our experience. Dharmakirti may claim
that there is no basis for making a distinction between an object
and our apprehension of it, but Udayana stresses that this is not
how things are. Whenever we perceive an object, then that
perception clearly marks the object as distinct from the
perception itself.' 8
 In the guiaguiiibhedabhañga section, Udayana
returns to this same argument but this time with the intention of
refuting DharmakTrti's claim on the basis of arguments.
Udayana's intention here is to demonstrate cases in which an
object is indeed perceived as separate from its qualities.
Udayana uses as his example the case in which a white conch
shell is perceived as yellow by a jaundiced individual. From the
point of view of a mutual joint perception (samasahopalambha),
which Udayana considers first, the conch shell and the whiteness
of the conch shell should always appear in the cognition
together. By introducing the example of the cognition of the
conch shell as yellow, Udayana intends to drive a wedge between
the conch shell and its quality of being white. 	 It might be
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thought that Udayana has misunderstood the full import of the
Buddhist argument here, which his counter-argument trivializes,
and does little to undermine the idealist thesis that an object
consistently appears in the cognition with its qualities. 19 It
does not matter much, it might be said, whether the conch shell
is seen as yellow or white. The important point is that it must
be seen as some colour, that we can never perceive an object as
other than an aggregate of qualities.
The point of Udayana's example, however, goes deeper than
the observation that objects can appear in different guises.
Both the Buddhist idealist and the Nyãya realist must be able to
accommodate within their world views an adequate explanation to
distinguish erroneous perceptions from non-erroneous ones. The
realist is challenged by the sceptic to say how we can
distinguish between erroneous and non-erroneous perceptions, a
distinction which he must be able to make if he is to uphold the
claim that perception can give us access to and knowledge of an
external world. Conversely though, it is also incumbent on the
idealist, given his lack of reference to any external world, to
explain the basis on which we classify some perceptions as
erroneous and some as not, for what is indubitable is that we do
make this distinction. Hence the strength of Udayana's example
is not just the point it makes that the conch shell can appear in
a perception without its qualifying whiteness, but also that the
Buddhist idealist must now provide a satisfactory explanation of
this phenomenon given (i) his wish to maintain a distinction
between erroneous and non-erroneous perceptions, and (ii) his
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non—acceptance of any distinction between an object and its
qualities.
Traditionally the Nyãya school held a theory of error known
as the anyathãkhyãti theory, sometimes translated as the
"misplacement" theory. 2 ° This is usually explained with
reference to the illusion in which I see a piece of coiled rope
as a snake. Nyãya insists that in this illusion there is a real
perceptual element, namely the perception of the rope. It is the
role of past experience, memory, associations and so on which is
responsible for turning this into an illusory experience. The
object of past experience, the snake, is triggered—off by our
perception of the rope, because of a similarity in their
appearance. By means of a non—physical connection (alaukika-
sannikara) between the memory of the snake and the eyes, the
rope is misperceived as a snake.
The gua/guiin distinction plays an important role in the
Nyãya theory of error. An erroneous cognition is a complex
judgement in which two elements are falsely united, in this case
a rope and "snakeness".	 In a judgement such as "a is b", a
relationship of qualificand and qualifier exists between the two
elements.	 The rope, the qualificand (guin) is qualified by
"snakeness", the qualifier (guia). This Nyãya theory or error
must not be confused with contemporary western theories which
postulate a sensory core common to the rope and the snake, the
so—called "sense—datum". In this type of theory what
characterizes the difference between a false and a veridical
perception depends on the particular theory of perception adhered
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to. For the representationalist the difference will lie in
whether or not the sense—datum correctly represents the object.
For the idealist a veridical perception will consist in coherency
with a whole web of such sense—data. Sense—data are not part of
the Nyãya theory, however, for as we have already seen in our
discussion of TEXT F, there is no admission of any such entities
as sense—data.	 Rather, the object is perceived directly.
Professor Matilal sums up the Nyaya position as follows:
Some sense—data philosophers believe that sense—data
are physical, or part of the material world, and hence
it may be claimed that what they are saying does not
differ from the position I am defending here.
G.E. Moore, for example, would consider that sense—data are
'properties t of the material object, sometimes of the
visible (front) part of the opaque physical object.
	 It is
important to realize the difference here. The features,
properties, parts and so on which I am invoking as the basis
of similarity are attributable (in fact,they may be said to
belong) to the material object in the same way as some
philosophers would attribute sense—data to the material
object, or to the physical occupant. But what the sense—
data philosophers say, and Nyãya does not say, is that they
are also the objects of our immediate perception, on the
basis of which perception we see the material object.
[Matilal (1986) p. 203]
Hence it is the object (guiin) which is directly perceived, a
perception made possible by the features which that object
possesses. On the basis of a similarity of such features with
another object there results a false characterization of that
object.	 Because of the fact that the object (gurjin) is always
perceived directly in Nyäya, there can be no mistaken perception
of that object. The mistake arises in ascribing something
falsely to the object of our direct perception. In terms of the
qualificand/qualifier (guiin/guia) relationship the mistake
occurs in wrongly ascribing a particular qualifier to a
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particular qualificand. It is a mistake of predication in which
the subject/predicate relationship is paralleled by the
gu1in/gua relationship.
Although the example of the yellow conch shell may be
particularly well—suited for Udayana's refutation of the Buddhist
thesis that an object always appears with its qualities, it is
problematic in terms of the anyathãkhyti theory of error. It
would seem that the conch shell just is seen as yellow, rather
than yellow being falsely ascribed to the shell on the basis of
some past association or resemblance. We neither superimpose
yellowness on the white shell nor do we mistakenly ascribe a
yellow colour to a white colour. Later Nyya thinkers dispensed
with the anyathkhyti theory of error for cases such as the
perception of the conch shell as yellow, in which there seems to
be instead a direct perception of the conch shell as yellow on
the basis of some physiological malfunction.2'
Udayana considers in TEXT G several other possible
explanations for the phenomenon of the yellow conch shell,
positions which a Buddhist opponent might hold. He first
considers the rejoinder that the yellow conch shell is not real
(see TEXT G pp. 302-303), in which case there is no question of
the conch shell appearing without its qualifying whiteness.
Udayana queries such a position, asking how can it be so since we
can pick up the conch shell in our hand. It fulfills all the
conditions of a real object and should be thus distinguished from
a truly hallucinatory object which cannot be so handled.
The next Buddhist rejoinder is that a yellow conch shell has
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come into being.	 Just as a white shell will always appear as
qualified by whiteness, so too a yellow shell will always appear
as qualified by yellowness. Once again this tactic aims to
undermine the distinction between an object and its qualities,
since in this explanation there is no perception of a conch shell
as separate from its colour. There are just white conch shells
and yellow conch shells. On this basis it would appear that the
perception of the conch shell as yellow could no longer be
counted as a misperception. Udayana refutes this suggestion by
recourse to the idea that the conch shell is a public object.
When the jaundiced individual sees the conch shell as yellow, a
non—jaundiced individual will still see it as white (see TEXT G
pp. 304-305).
Since Nyãya proposes a separation between the conch shell
and its colour, the case of the yellow conch shell can be
explained with recourse to the guia/uiin distinction, even
though the anyathãkhyãti theory was eventually felt by later
Nyãya thinkers to be an unsuitable model for this case. The
question which must be asked here is - What is the status of this
yellow appearance of the conch shell? Does it belong to the
shell or not? The type of explanation which this example demands
is actually part of a wider problem - how to explain the variety
of ways an object can present itself according to the condition
and situation of the percipient. A penny will appear elliptical
from a particular perspective, a tree will appear as large or
small depending on the proximity of the observer and the conch
shell will appear as yellow or white depending on the
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physiological condition of the percipient. We are already
familiar with the Nyãya thesis that we perceive the object
directly. Thus, in the case of the elliptical penny, we perceive
the penny directly, a perception made possible in this case by
the elliptical appearance of the penny. Similarly, we perceive
the conch shell directly, a perception made possible by its
yellow appearance. For the Nyaya thinker, however, a material
object is not to be understood as consisting of a set of such
potential appearances. The penny is round and the conch shell is
white, appearances which may be temporarily changed due to the
condition of the percipient. Professor Matilal discusses the
nature of these temporary appearances which he sees to be
temporarily produced through an interaction between the material
object and the percipient:
How do these particulars differ from the sense—data?
First, they are not mental, but external objects,
although they have been anomalously created by a mental
episode as one of its causal factors. Most sense—data
philosophers take sense—data to be mental, but the
Naiyãyika's particulars are not in the 'head' of any
person. Second, they are according to Nyãya not direct
and immediate objects of perception. He who sees an
elliptical penny does not see the elliptical shape
first, by virtue of which he sees the penny.	 He sees
simply the penny as elliptical.	 Third, these
particulars are not in any case part of the surface of
the object of perception.
	 They do not belong to the
object but are only attributed to it.
[Matilal (1986) pp. 217-218]
Professor Matilal's explanation offers a more detailed
explanation of how Nyãya realism might function. In TEXT C,
Udayana was concerned to break the link between an object and its
qualities, to demonstrate that only the gia/guiin distinction
can account for our fundamental awareness that it is one and the
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same object which we grasp throughout its various appearances.22
Concluding Remarks
The distinction between an object and its qualities is one
which had a wide—ranging importance in the realism of the Nyaya
system:
The conflict between nominalistic movements and
realistic movements in Indian philosophy may be
expressed in terms of a function of the distinction (or
distance) between dharma and dharmin. Generally
speaking, the clearer the distinction between the two,
the more realistic the theory becomes; if the boundary
between dharma and dharmin becomes vague, the theory
tends to become nominalistic.
[Tachikawa (1981) p. 101
The role of the dharma/dharmin relationship, that is the
relationship between a property (dharrna/guQa) and property
possessor (dharmin/guiin) has been carefully studied by Tachikawa
in his book The Structure of the World in Udayana's Realism. In
that work, he demonstrates how IJdayana in his LakaiiävalI
(written before the ATV) was able to classify all the categories
of the Vaieika system in terms of two concepts, namely,
samaveta (that which inheres in things) and samavetavat (that
which has things inhering in itself). In a later work, the
Kiraivali (written after the ATV), Udayana came to define
inherence in terms of the dharma/dharmin relationship which
replaces the samaveta/samavetavat relationship. For Udayana, his
realism is dependent on this relationship which binds together
all the elements of his universe. Hence the distinction between
an object and its qualities was not only important for maintain
the separation between the ãtman and its qualities (that is, the
momentary cognitions) but was also important for his particular
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brand of realism. The guiagutibhedabhariga chapter of the ATV may
be seen as an important step between the Laksanvali and the
Kiraiãval!.
The factors comprising the world are connected by in-
herence, which Udayana has defined in terms of the
dharma—dharmin relation. In his system dharma must be
distinguished from dharrnin so that the category of in-
herence is established.	 The clear distinction between
dharma and dharmin has become the basis of the
hierarchical structure of the world.
	 Differentiating
substance, quality, action, etc, from each other, may
be called 'horizontal differentiation'. What is im-
portant is that differentiation of this type is made in
terms of the differentiation between dharma and dharmin,
which may be called 'vertical differentiation'.
[Tachikawa (1981) p. 41]
Thus, the defence of ãtman in the Nyãya system has been clearly
bound up with its defence of realism. It will be the task of my
next chapter to understand the place of both its realism and its
understanding of tman in the wider context of Indian
soteriological thought.
286
Bhyãrthabhañgavãda/Guiaguribhedabhañgavda
TEXT F
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT1
On what we see and touch
guaguibhedabhañgavãdaprãrambha.
astu tarhi guaguiinorabhedãnnairãtmyam,
kanikajfinamãtrapari 'eäditi cet.
ucyate-asti tãvadiha daranaspars'anãbhym-
ekãrthãnusandhänam.2
tadidam (1) ekaikaviayarh vã syat; (2) samudãyaviayaih
vã; (3) tadatiriktaviayath Va; (4) vastvananurodhy-
akaraviayath v; (5) a1ikaviayath vã.
First Alternative considered: the object as a single entity
na tavadadya1, na hi yadeva rpath sa eva spara iti.
na ca ripam tvagindriyagrhyam, andhasyãpi
nTladipratyayaprasangat.
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On what we see and touch
Let us now begin the examination of the theory which says that
there is no difference between a quality and the thing which
possesses that quality.
"Let then 'the absence of an ãtman' be due to the qualifier and
the qualifier—possessor being identical. Because [in such a
case] it results in the momentary cognition alone."3
Well now, there is in this world an idea of one object
(ekrthãnusandhãnam) through a correlation between seeing and
touching .4
That (which the acts of seeing and touching relate to) could be
(1) a single object; (2) an object which is an aggregate; (3) an
object which is something different from the two acts; (4) an
object which is a conceptual construct and not in reality the
object which [the acts of seeing and touching] relate to; (5) or
an object which is unreal.
First Alternative considered: the object as a single entity
It is not the first alternative. 	 For it is not the case that
that which has visual form has also tactile form. For colour is
not perceived by the tactile senses, because in that case there
will be the contingency of even a blind man having a cognition of
the colour blue and so on.
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na caikameva vastu karaiiabhedenãnyathã prathata iti
yuktam, anãtmakatvaprasadgt, bhedãbhedavyavasthnupapatte'ca.
Second Alternative considered: the object as an aggregate
nãpi dvitiyab, sahi ekade 'atay vã ekakãlatay vã
ekakãryatay vã ekakãraatayã veti.
(1) (i) na tvadupdãnarpaikadeasambhavab, tayob
pratiniyatopdãnatvt, sambhave v tadeva dravyamiti
paryavasitath vivdena.
(1) (ii)
tat sambhavab.
(a) caku	 hyupalabhyamãne bhütale riipaviee
ghaopi cakuaivopalabhyamäno riipavieastadãdhra
iti akyate ni 'cetum, tayoradharottarabhvenaikajffãna-
sathsargitvt.
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And it is not proper to say that one and the same object appears
in the cognition differently because of a difference in the
sense-organ, because then [the object of cognition] would have no
nature of its own, and also because it would not be possible to
establish difference and identity.5
Second Alternative considered: the object as an aggregate
Nor is it the second alternative. This alternative [in which the
object is a group] could be interpreted as (1) [the two objects
of sight and touch] having one and the same place; (2) having one
and the same moment of time; (3) having one and the same effect;
(4) or having one and the same cause.6
(1) (i) There is no possibility of having the same place being
due to sharing one and the same cause, because the causes of
sight and touch are distinct, or in the instance where this is
possible, by logical reasoning, it results in that it is what. we
call substance.7
(1) (ii) Nor can the possibility of having the same place be
sharing as their substratum the ground cetera on which they
subsist.
(a) For, when the ground being of a particular visual form is
being perceived by the visual faculty, it is also possible to
discern that the pot too, which is perceived as having a
particular visual form, has that [ground] for its support because
being above and below each other they appear together in the same
cognition.
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tadadhikaranah sparãdayopiti tu kasya pramãiasya
viayab? nahi sparAdaya 'ckue cetasi caksati.
tvaco'yam vypra ityapi nsti, tathpi
bhta1aghaasparayorãdhãrãdheya bhãvapratiteb.
na ca samudãyayostatsanibhavaJ, parasparrayatvaprasaãt
ekdhãratyãth hi samudãyãnusandhãnath samudyãnusandhãne
caikãdhratnusandhnasarnbhavab— iti.
anavasthãprasañgcca —bhita1asyãpi samudyatvarh kiñkçtam-
ityanuyogãnivrtte.
ata eva naikaka1ataypi, tayorekakUatãyãi
pramãbhãvãt, bhve v rãsabhakarabhayorapyekakãlatayã
samudayatvaprasafiga, bhedägrahasya prak-tepyasambhavt.
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But which instrument of knowledge tells you that the object which
is given in its tactile form has that same ground as its support?
For the tactile form et cetera cannot be objects in a visual
perception.
(b) Nor is there the possibility [of the cognition] of the
supporter/supported relationship with regard to [colour and
touch] being grouped together because of the contingency of
mutual dependence. For, where there is [the cognition of] having
the same substratum there is also the cognition of both being
grouped together, and where there is the cognition of both being
grouped together there is the possibility of the cognition of
having one and the same support.
(c) [Nor is it possible] because of the contingency of infinite
regress.	 This is due to the unending questioning as to the
placement of the group, even in the case of the ground.8
(2) And so [the togetherness of colour and touch] cannot be due
to simultaneity because of the absence of any proof for this
simultaneity.	 Or, if it is asserted that there is a
simultaneity, then even donkeys and camels can be considered as a
group because of belonging to one and the same moment. 	 And in
this case such a non—comprehension of difference is not
possible .9
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ata eva naikakãryatayãpi, updeyarpasyaikasya
kãryasyãbhävät.
ekodakäharaalakaã arthakriyã ityapi na yuktam,
rüpãdyatiriktasyodakasynabhyupagamt ekaikasyãnekãhãryatve
pramuãbhãvãt, samudãyasya cãsiddheb.
ata eva naikakraiatayãpiti, nimittamantareia tu
samudyavyavahre'tiprasahga.
Third Alternative considered: the object as an entity distinct
from its visual and tactile forms.
trtiye tu na vivãdab.
Fourth Alternative considered: the object as a conceptual
construct.
nãpi caturthab.
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(3) And hence the object cannot be considered as an aggregate due
to having a common effect because of the absence of a common
effect in the case of the material causes such as colour and so
on.
It is also not proper to say that the common effect could be a
common purpose, such as holding water, because you could not
allow water to be any different from visual form et cetera; also
because there is no proof that each one of the effects has a
manifold cause; and also because it is not established still that
the object is an aggregate.1°
(4) Hence too it is not possible to say that the object is an
aggregate because of having a common cause.'' If we call
something an aggregate without a good reason then this would
result in the unwanted conclusion that we could call any object
whatsoever an aggregate.
Third Alternative considered: the object as an entity distinct
from its visual and tactile forms.
There is no argument with the third alternative.
Fourth Alternative considered: the object as a conceptual
construct
It is not the fourth alternative [that the object is without any
correspondence to an external reality].
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sa hi vijnanayamãs'ritya vã syãt, dvicandrãdivadvirñsavãdãdvã.
(1) dye tu ripãdiu kab pakapatab?
(2)prapterarthakriyasthite 'ca na dvitiyo'pi. te dye
rüpãdinämeveti cet. na teãm kintu tasyaiveti kith na syãt.
Fifth Alternative considered: the object as unreal
etenãlikaviayatãpi nirast.
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This [fourth alternative] could be either based on the doctrine
that there is no object apart from our cognition of it, or
because of the non—correspondence [of the object and the
cognition], like the perception of two moons, et cetera.12
(1) In respect of the first option, why do you have a
predilection for terms like colour, and so on?'3
(ii) It is also not the second option because there is the
attainment and fulfillment of our desired aims. If you say that
these two [that is, the attainment and fulfillment of our desired
aims] apply only to colour and so on, then I would refute this.
Rather, should it not be that [attainment of the desired aims]
belong to that which has those qualities?
(Udayana then considers two bãdhakas which his Buddhist opponent
attempts to bring against lJdayana's understanding of objects such
as tables and chairs, namely, that the world is momentary in
nature and that we can never perceive tixese objects as scx, kw.t
only parts of them. Udayana refers his opponent to the fact that
in previous sections of the ATV the whole (avayavin) and
permanence (sthiratv) have been successfully defended from the
attacks of the Buddhist.)
Fifth Alternative considered: the object as unreal
The fifth alternative, that the object of cognition is an unreal
object, is ruled out by the previous argument.'4
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1. ATV (1939 edition) pp. 712-720
ATV (1940 edition) pp. 320-325
2. ATV (1939 edition) has ekãrthänusandhnam here, the ATV
(1940 edition) reads ekrthapratisandhanam. The idea being
put forward here is that through our senses of sight and
touch we have an idea of one object, that we put together
the input from these senses (see pp. 268-269) for further
discussion on this topic).
3. The Buddhist argument here is that the absence of an ãtman
is to be understood as the absence of an ãtman as separate
from the momentary cognitions. The body, sense organs and
internal organ, have all been rejected as candidates for
being the tman so the remaining possibility for the
Naiyãyikas is that the tman could be understood as the
locus in which the momentary cognitions inhere. This too is
to be rejected by the Buddhist opposition, so that all that
remain are the momentary cognitions. This type of argument
which the Buddhist employs here is known as pariea, which
Matilal defines in the following way: "pariesa —of several
possibilities a,b,c...if all but one, say c, are rejected by
evidence to the contrary, c is automatically established."
[Matilal (1986) p. 185] The Buddhist thus attempts to
refute all possible candidates for the tman except the
stream of momentary cognitions; this will be the only
remaining possibility after all the others have been
rejected.
4. The idea put forward here is that we have a notion of one
object - our different senses of sight and touch operate in
such a way as to give us this basic understanding of
material objects. If the Buddhist rejects the thesis that
there is no difference between an object and its qualities,
then he needs to explain how else we could arrive at such an
understanding, built up from the separate faculties of sight
and touch. The argument in this chapter is concerned in
general with refuting the thesis of non—difference between
an object and its qualities (guiaguiinorabheda). If the
thesis that there is no ãtman (nairtmyam) is based upon
guiaguiinorabheda, then the refutation of that thesis will
undermine such an argument. Hence although this section
begins with a statement concerning the ãtman specifically,
as in the other sections, the argument is a general one in
its treatment of giaguiinorabheda. There is another aspect
to this argument which Udayana does not deal with in this
section, and that is the role which the ãtman might possibly
play in correlating the input from our different sensory
organs, for example, the role the ãtman might play in
correlating the object which I see with the object which I
am touching. It is in the final section (anupalambhavãda)
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that Udayana examines specifically the role played by the
tman as the synthesizer of all our experiences.
5. Udayana lists five possibilities as to how we could
formulate this notion of one object from the different
senses of seeing and touching, and proceeds to consider each
one of these in turn. 	 In the first alternative tJdayana
considers that the objects 	 touch and sight are identical.
TOUCH	 SIGHT
This first alternative mus be kept distinct from the third
alternative in which the visual and tactile objects are
considered to be qualities of the same object. In this
first option there is no qualified/qualifier distinction-
what we touch is what we see in the sense that a blind man
could 'see' blue with his fingers as if he were seeing it
with his eyes.	 Udayana argues that under these
circumstances we could never discriminate between the visual
and tactile nature of an object. (See the discussion of
TEXT F in this chapter for a more detailed discussion of
this alternative.)
6. In the second alternative, the objects, of our visual and
tactile senses, are considered as forming a group, on the
basis of which we form an idea of one single object.
TOUCH	 SIGHT
Udayana considers this second alternative as yielding four
possibilities - that they can be considered as forming an
aggregate object on the basis of (i) being in one place
(ekadeatayã); (ii) being in the same moment of time
ekakãlatayã); (iii) having one and the same effect
(ekakryatayã) ; and (iv) having the same cause
(ekakaraatayã). He proceeds in his usual systematic matter
to examine each one of these in turn.
7. "One-placeness" (ekadeatayã) can be interpreted in two ways
- according to the learned tradition (istram) it would mean
having a common cause. Udayana rejects this option [listed
as (1) (i) in the translation] since the arguments against
the first alternative will be also relevant here. He has
already successfully argued in that first alternative
that one cause cannot be responsible for both sight and
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touch unless of course the Buddhist were to admit the
possibility of the Nyya idea of substance.
8. The second interpretation of ekadeatay is according to
common understanding, that it means sharing a common
locality, on the basis of which the objects of sight and
touch may be said to form an aggregate [listed as (1) (ii)
in the translation]. Udayana gives three main arguments
against this interpretation [listed as (a), (b) and (c) in
the translation].
(a) When we see a pot we can see that it is also in a
particular relationship to the ground, and this is
information which can be given to us in one visual
cognition:
POT	 (dheya)
GROUND (dhra)
If, however, we were to close our eyes and just touch the
pot then we could not be aware of this relationship between
the supported pot and the ground (adhãra/dheya) unless we
were touching the ground at the same time. According to the
thesis that the object can be considered an aggregate on the
basis of a common locality, then when you touch just the pot
you should also be aware of its relationship to the ground.
Udayana points out here that there is no prama, no
instrument of knowledge, by means of which we could gain
such information from just touching the pot. The visual
knowledge of the ground which we gain from looking at the
pot cannot be part of the cognition that arises from just
touching that pot in the same place. If the visual and
tactile forms did share a common locality, then, since the
visual cognition of the pot yields information of its
relationship to the ground, then the tactile cognition of
the pot alone should also yield such information. Udayana's
main point here seems to be that visual knowledge cannot be
gained through the prama by means of which we gain tactile
knowledge.
C b) The second argument concerning common locality
postulates that it involves the fallacy of mutual dependency
(parasparãrayaprasañgt). In order to say that the visual
object (rüpa) is in the same place as the tactile object
(sparta) you need to be able to specify the place, that
is, they should have the same support (adhikaratiam).
But the ground (adhikaraiam) on which the pot rests is
itself established in relation to the pot. They cannot
be therefore established independently.
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(c) The argument concerning common locality would also
involve the fallacy of an infinite regress (anavasth-
prasarigãt). For example, the place of the pot is
established with respect to the table on which it rests, the
table in its turn has its locality established in relation
to the ground on which it rests and so on. Since each
object involved is in itself an aggregate (samudya),
Udayana states that the regress would be endless.
9. Udayana here rejects simultaneity (ekakãlatay) as the basis
on which the objects of touch and sight could be united.
According the Buddhist's own understanding of the momentary
cognition, then surely this would rule out the simultaneous
occurrence of visual and tactile cognitions. Udayana also
rejects this option on logical grounds, that "one-timeness"
(ekakãlatv5) cannot be a means (updhi) by which things can
be grouped together when there is clearly a cognition of
difference. The simultaneous cognition of donkeys and
camels would not be sufficient to group them together as a
unified aggregate object. Donkeys and camels may be grouped
together only by means of a category in which they are non-
different, such as both being animals. Udayana contends
that in this case no such possibility exists.
10. In the third option, it is suggested that the visual and
tactile objects may be grouped together on the basis of
having a common effect (ekakãryatay). The notion of common
effect is subject to two interpretations, either as the
effect of the aggregate or as the purpose for which the
aggregate may be used. The first interpretation has already
been ruled out by previous arguments (see preceding
footnotes 5 and 8(a) in this section). It has already been
ruled out, for example, that the visual object could enter
into a tactile cognition with the tactile object. It is
therefore the second interpretation which is given more
attention. The contention is that, for example, the visual
and tactile objects are united in a pot by the act of
pouring water. Udayana argues against this by pointing out
that water itself must be understood as an aggregate of the
visual and tactile objects. Given that this is the case, it
is by no means clear that each part of this aggregate should
have a manifold cause, that is, that the visual aspect of
water should be caused by both the visual and tactile
aspects of the pot. Rather, it is like four men lifting
a table; each individual supports one leg of the table.
Similarly, the visual aspect of the pot is responsible for
the visual aspect of the water and so on. [I am indebted to
Mr. Venugopalan for this analogy.] It could be argued
against Udayana here that he has not made a clear enough
distinction between the water itself and the act of pouring
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the water. It is not that the pot is in any sense a
material cause of the water but rather that the act of
pouring the water unites the visual and tactile aspects of
the pot. Similarly, although it may be said that each man
lifts just one leg of the table, they are still united by
their common task of lifting the table.
11. The arguments against this option have already been
considered by Udayana in section (1) (1).
12. Two interpretations of the fourth alternative are offered by
Udayana. The first is the idealist interpretation, that
there is no external object apart from its appearance in the
cognition. The second is that there is no correspondence
between the object constructed on the basis of our
perceptions and external reality, as in the case of double
vision where two moons are perceived, neither of which
corresponds to the real moon.
13. The point here is not too clear. It may be that Udayana is
saying that to talk of external qualities such as colour,
hardness et cetera makes little sense on an idealist view of
the world in which there is nothing but our perceptions.
This does not, however, seem to be an appropriate criticism
of idealism. Geilner makes a similar observation of such a
critical attitude towards idealism: "The 'phenomenalist'
doctrine of the empiricists, which restricts reality to
experience, and reduces all other entities to fictions which
refer to experiences indirectly, sounds paradoxical largely
because it seems to be saying that the world of sight is
real in some ultimate sense, whereas the world of touch, of
pressure—resisting three—dimensional objects occupying
space, is but a logical fiction." But he then goes on to
point out that: "The bundles should, rather, be seen as
including those experiences which we would normally describe
as, for instance, the clasping a small hard ball in the palm
of the hand - a very tactile, 'hard' and three—dimensional
'experience'. There is nothing in phenomenalism as such to
exclude such an experience, and to force us to make it
derivative from a two—dimensional, visual perception of a
squash—ball." [Geilner (1974) pp. 75-76J
14. It would appear that the argument referred to here is
specifically that of 4(i).
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Cognition of an Object as Separate from its Qualities
abhedasãdhanath bdhakamiti cet.
kirh tat?
sahopalambhaniyama iti cet.
na. samasahopalambhaniyamasyäsiddhe, pTtaañkhopalambhdau
vaityãnupalambhe'pi añkhopa1ambhãt.
nasau añkhab kintu à"añkha iva taimirikakeavaditi cet.
aho guiavadvidvea yattaimirikakeãli
/	 -	 .	 -karatalaparamarsapratiniyatarthakriyayorapayanna santi iti
vyavasthpayati, iha tu tatsarnbhave'pi
ubhra tãmã t rãnupa lamb hd it 1.
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Cognition of an Object as Separate from its Qualities
"There is a further counter—inference which will establish that
there is no difference between an object and its properties."
What is that?
"It is because both of them consistently appear together in the
cognition. "2
No, because there is no proof of such a consistent joint
cognition that operates both ways (samasahopalambha). For
example, in the case of a yellow conch shell [by a person
suffering from jaundice], there is perception of the conch shell,
even though there is no perception of whiteness.
"In that case, it is not really the conch shell, but only
something like a conch shell [that is being perceived], just like
the hairs which appear to a person with diseased eyes."
Oh, so much are you prejudiced against the possessor of
qualities! All that is established by your example is that the
hairs which appear due to the eye disease do not at all exist,
because you cannot touch them with your hand, nor do they have
the effectiveness [of real hairs]. In the present case you deny
[the existence of the shell] merely because there is no
perception of whiteness.3
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vyãpakatvditi cet.
vastunorvyptirupa1arnbhayorvã?
dye na vipratipatti.
na ca vyãpaknupa1abdhimãtreia vyãpyatadupalabdhi
nivartete, dahannupa1abdhau dhiimatadupalabdhyorapi
nivçttiprasañgãt. tannãpi vã kith na parikalpayasi dhfina
ivãsau na dhüma iti pãvakavattãnupalabdheriti.
tasmãnna vypakãnupa1abdhy vyãpyatadupa1adhyornivytti, kintu
vy5pakanivtte, s ctrsiddheti vãcyam, tadetattulyath
prakte'pi. upalabdhestu vy5ptirihaiva bhagn
vaityãnupa1ambhe'pi añkhopa1ambhãdityuktam.
syãdetat. prta eva añkha utpanna iti cet.
na, puruntareia 'vetasyaivop1abdheb.
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"[The non—perception of one thing in the joint—cognition] is
because of its being the pervader."
Is this concomitance between two existing things or between two
cognitions?4
In the first alternative there is no dispute.5
Nor [can you say that] by the mere non—cognition of the pervader,
the pervaded and the cognition of the pervaded become absent,
because that would result in admitting the absence of smoke, and
the cognition of smoke as well, just on the basis of the non--
cognition of the fire. In that case,why don't you assume, "this
is only like smoke, but not really smoke!", because of the non—
perception of the mountain [on which the fire burns].
In truth, you should say only that the absence of the pervader,
and not the absence of the cognition of the pervader, gives rise
to the absence of the pervaded. This has not been established,
and it is the same in the case [of the conch shell]. The
concomitance between the cognitions is broken here because there
is perception of the conch shell even though there is no
perception of whiteness - a matter we have already discussed.6
"Let this be so.	 It is just that a
	
conch shell has come
into being."
It is not so, because the white color is seen by other persons
[not suffering from jaundice].7
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npyasama eva sahopalambhaniyamo hetuh, anaikãntãt - abhäsvarath
hi rüpam bhãsvareia saha niyamenopalabhyate tato
b hi nn a e t i.
deaviccheda iti cet.
na, asiddheb, dehadehibhymanaikntãcca.
na tayoravicchedastadanupa1ambhe'pyupa1ambhditi cet.
tulyam - rüpãdyanupalambhe'pi tadvatmupa1abdheb.
tathãpi na viparyayali kadãpTti cet.
tulyam - nahi dehãnupalambhe dehyupalambhavaddehyanupalambhe'pi
dehasyopalambhasambhavab.
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Nor can you take as your reason the rule of unequal joint
cognition (asamasahopalambha), because the result is inconclusive
- non—luminescent forms are regularly perceived along with
luminescent forms and in this case the two are different.8
"The example must be from an instance where there is no
difference in location."
No, because it is not established and also it is inconclusive as
in the case of the body and the embodied.
"There is not a 'non—difference in location' [in the case of the
body and the embodied] because even when the embodied is seen the
body need not be seen."9
The argument is the same for me, because of the cognition of the
things that possess [colour] even though there is no perception
of the colour and so on.
"Even so, the reverse is not at any time possible."
The same applies to my argument. In your doctrine, it cannot be
said that, even though there is no perception of the embodied,
there is perception of the body, as you can in the case where
there is perception of the embodied, even though there is no
perception of the body.1°
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1. ATV (1939 edition) pp. 722-726
ATV (1940 edition) pp. 326-329
2. Here Udayana introduces a classic argument of the Buddhists
in favour of a phenomenalistic idealism. 	 The argument
derives from Dharmakirti - "sahopalarnbhaniyand abhedo
nilataddhiyob".	 This is discussed in the main body of the
chapter.
3. Udayana's response is to refute the claim of consistent
joint cognition by giving examples in which an object does
not always appear with its qualities. He discusses two
possible interpretations of sahopalambha; the first he deals
with is the stricter version, samasahopalambha, which
operates both ways, that is - Wherever there is A there is B
and wherever there is B there is A. In order to refute this
version of the thesis, Udayana gives the example of the
white conch shell which can appear separate from its quality
of being white in the instance of appearing to a person
suffering from a case of jaundice, in which case it would
appear as yellow. Udayana scoffs at the suggestion made by
the Buddhist that in this case it is not really the conch
shell that is being seen, because it is clearly real in that
we can touch it, pour water from it and so on. The argument
here centres on questions of illusory and mistaken
perceptions which are discussed in the main body of the
chapter.
4. The Buddhist opponent now moves on to consider cases which
would explain the non—appearance of one of the pair in the
cognition. We are now considering therefore the case of
non—equal joint perception known as asamasahopalambha. One
example of asamasahopalambha would be the relationship which
exists between a thing which pervades and the thing which is
pervaded, the vyãpaka/vyãpya relationship, illustrated by
the relationship which exists between fire and smoke. If
this is the suggestion, Udayana first asks if we are meant
to consider this to be a relationship between things or
perceptions of things.
5. Udayana does not disagree with the first option because this
of course would compel the Buddhist to admit the existence
of independently existing objects. It is true that when
there is no fire then there is no smoke, but this inference
assumes the independent existence of fire and smoke separate
from our awareness of them.
6. If the suggestion is that the vy5paka/vypya relationship is
to be understood as existing between perceptions, then
TJdayana demonstrates how this would be fatal to inferential
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reasoning, a consequence as unacceptable to the Buddhist as
to the Naiyyika. In the inference of fire from smoke there
is no perception of fire (the pervader) because of course
there would not otherwise be any need of the inference. But
that doesn't mean that one then says, "this is not really
smoke", which the Buddhist has claimed in the case of the
conch shell, saying that "this is not really a conch shell"
just because there is no perception of whiteness, the
pervader in this case. The parallels between the two are as
follows:
Wherever there is smoke there is fire
Wherever there is conch there is whiteness
Wherever there is the pervaded there is the pervader
It is the absence of the pervader and not the absence of the
perception of the pervader which leads to the absence of the
pervaded. In the case of the conch shell it has not been
established that whiteness is absent but only that the
perception of whiteness is absent.	 And in the absence of
that perception of whiteness, there is still perception of
the conch shell. Hence a vyãpaka/vyãpya relationship does
not exist between the perception of whiteness and the
perception of the conch shell.
7. The Buddhist tactic is now to admit that the conch shell
perceived by the jaundiced individual is real, but in this
case it is a yellow conch shell. This may seem to confirm
the Buddhist thesis that an object does not appear without
qualities. Udayana counters this by asking the Buddhist to
explain the fact that the same conch shell will be seen by a
non—jaundiced individual as white. It is not the case that
a yellow conch shell has come into being but rather that the
white conch shell is mistakenly perceived as yellow.
8. Here Udayana considers the rule of unequal joint cognition
(asarnasahopalambha), expressed as:
Wherever there is A there is B (but not wherever there is B
there is A).
This would be the version preferred by Udayana's Buddhist
opponent since it allows him to express his thesis without
falling into the trap of having to admit the separate
existence of the guiin. The idea is that the guiin cannot
appear in the cognition without the guia:
Wherever there is perception of guiin there is perception of
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the gua.
Udayana points out that this leads to an inconclusive result
and gives an example to demonstrate. We consistently
perceive non—luminescent objects along with their light
source. For example;
Wherever there is perception of the pot, there is perception
of the light source.
The pot cannot appear without the light source, whereas the
light source can appear without the pot. In this case then,
as Udayana points out, the separate existence of the pot and
the light source is accepted, so why not in the case of the
shell and whiteness?
9. The Buddhist now claims that this is not a fair example. An
appropriate example must be one in which the two entities
involved have a common location. Udayana replies that this
would still give an inconclusive result as in the case of
the body (deha) and the embodied (dehin) or body possessor.
Whenever we perceive our body we perceive the embodied
(which would be the alayavijflãna or storehouse—consciousness
in the case of the Buddhist opponent here), and the Buddhist
accepts a difference between these two. The Buddhist
replies that these two cannot have the same location because
we can perceived the embodied and yet not perceive the body.
10. ayana r&torts that this is exactly the point - because you
can see the shell and yet not perceive its whiteness,then
this shows that the two must be different. The Buddhist
tries to drive a wedge between the shell/whiteness example
and the body/embodied example by stating that in the
shell/whiteness case the reverse is not possible. You
cannot perceive the whiteness of the shell and not the shell
itself. Udayana points out that in this respect the two
cases are not dissimilar, for, according to the Buddhist's
own doctrine you cannot perceive the body and not the
embodied. (Udayana is referring here to the Buddhist theory
of svasathvedanam, in which all cognitions contain within
them their own self—awareness.)
____(body	 embodied..
A	 whiteness	 shell	 j B
In both cases the non—perception of A alongside the
perception of B is possible, whereas the perception A
alongside the non—perception of B is not possible.
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PLAN OF THE ARGUMENTS CONTAINED IN THE GUAGUIBHEDABHANGA
4 SECTION ONE: One object given through a correlation between
seeing and touching
Five possible explanations for this
1) each of the two acts relates to one object	 -bNo
2) each of the two acts relate to separate objects which
form an aggregate (samudãya)
L_3 Four possibi1itiesr--o (i) have a common locus----4No
F--' (ii) have a common time----- 4No
_$---4(iii) have a common effect---4No
L__4 (iv) have a common cause--.--4No
3) the object is something different from the two acts
of seeing and touching - UDAYANA'S POSITION
4) 1 the object has no correspondence to reality
Two possibi1lities j-ê (i) the object as unreal—+No
'1--4(ii) the object as having a
form not relevant to
itsreal form---------__---+No
5) the object as unreal - ruled out by (4)(i)
[Udayana's defence of sthiratv and avayavin used here]
CTION TWO:	 The consistent joint perception of an object with
its qualities
Two interpretations of this
1) samasahopalambha: joint mutual perception-------No,
because of
yellow conch real (arthakriyãkãrin)4	 perception of
yellow conch
non-appearance of whiteness
because of its being the
pervader ruled out
2) asamasahopalambha:wherever there is guia there is gjin--No
SECTION THREE:
	 One and the same object grasped from a distance
and close at hand by one observer
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Chapter Six
ATMAN IN NYAYA THOUGHT
But unless we believe that there is an tman
we can neither desire to discard suffering
nor can we obtain happiness. As long as we
perform actions we must do so with some goal
in mind.	 For example, we say, "1, desiring
the rewards of a life in heaven, should pur-
sue happiness and avoid suffering". If this
is not so, the desired result will not occur.
The antman doctrine thus leads to unorthodox
ideas. It is true that a person who believes
in the existence of ãtman will be attached to
those things that are beneficial for its
attainment and will avoid things which are
harmful to it, just as a person wanting
liberation will be attached to its causes-
like a person seeking happiness who will be
attached to its causes. If this were not so,
moka would not be possible.1
[Udayana ATY (1939) pp. 814-815]
In this chapter I intend to return to the categories which I
used in Chapter One to examine the nature of Upaniadic thought.
In that chapter I stated the importance of the Upariiads for sub-
sequent developments in Indian thought, even for such schools as
Nyãya which are considered to be less closely related to Upani-
sadic ideas than, for example, the Advaita Vednta and Sãiñkhya
schools. I also attempted to demonstrate in that chapter the
ways in which the various aspects of Upanisadic thought fitted
together to form a reasonably consistent understanding of the
cosmos. I now wish to do the same for Nyãya thought, or more
specifically for Udayana's thought, to broaden the discussion
from the more technical arguments examined in the previous three
chapters to a more general examination of the way in which the
arguments presented in the ATV fit together to form a character-
istically Nyãya world view. I also intend to examine the posi-
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tive arguments which Udayana used for his defence of tman
and to examine the role of ãtman in Nyãya thought. By using the
same categories as those which I used in my discussion of
Upaniadic thought (though not in the same order) I also hope to
demonstrate some aspects of the relationship between Upaniadic
and Nyya thought, and hence the place of Nyya in the wider
context of Indian thought.
(1) Psychology of the Nyãya system
In Nyya-Vai'eika thought the tman is said to be all-
pervasive and eternal - it is never born and never dies. 2 The
Nyya-Vaieika system, however, does postulate a plurality of
ätrnans, each of which is the seat of cognitive and volitional
activity. 3 Gautama lists the ãtman as first among the objects of
cognition 4 but, though an object of cognition (prameya), early
Nyãya-VaiIeika thought did not believe that tman could be known
directly through ordinary perception. 5
 Kada, reputed author of
the Vais'eika-SUtras, held that the tman cannot be perceived by
ordinary folk but only by yogis. Vãtsyãyana in his Nyya-bhya
held this view too. Ordinarily our knowledge of ãtman would
derive from two pramas, verbal testimony (abda) and inference
(anumna). For a yogi, however, there is a direct perception of
ãtman through a special mind-Self contact, a yogic samdhi which
is the last stage in the procedure of Self-cognition. 6 This idea
that, for ordinary folk at least, the ãtman is only inferable and
not perceptible is a characteristic of early Nyãya-Vaieika
thought and is abandoned later on. 	 By the time we come to
Udayana's ATV, the idea that the tman is perceived by the
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internal organs (manas) of normal people is well-established,7
and indeed seems an integral part of Udayana's proof for the
existence of the ãtman.
Anupalabdhi: Udayana's arguments against the Buddhist thesis that
the tman is not perceptible.
IJdayana's Buddhist opponent bases his final argument for the
no-Self (antman) doctrine on the thesis that it is never
perceived:
Let then the [doctrine of] no-Self [be upheld],
because there is no perception [of such an entity].
astu tarhi nairtmyam, anupalabdher
[ATV (1939) p. 739; ATV (1940) p. 334]
We need to distinguish between two aspects of this argument from
non-perception (anupalabdhi). Firstly, the Buddhist could argue
for the non-perception of ãtman on logical grounds - that the
existence of such an entity is logically impossible and hence
could never be perceived. 	 For example, if the Buddhist were to
successfully establish his thesis of universal momentariness,
then it would logically follow that an enduring tman could never
by perceived, since such an entity would be an impossibility. Or,
secondly, the Buddhist could argue from an experiential basis
that, as a matter of fact, no-one has ever perceived the ãtman.
As Udayana points out, this would not be a conclusive argument
but, at best, a basis for doubt. 8
 There are other things which
people do not a pprehend which nevertheless exist.	 Their exis-
tence, like that of the atman, would then have to be established
by argumentS . Udayana uses both means in his refutation of the
Buddhist thesis that the tman is never perceived. Firstly, he
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claims that we do indeed perceive an tman in ourselves and
secondly, he establishes its existence by means of arguments in
which he attempts to demonstrate that the ãtman must exist if we
are to explain certain facts about the nature of our experience.
TEXT H: On our perception of ãtman
(Translated pp. 362-369)
Udayana begins his refutation of the Buddhist thesis of
non-perception (anupalabdhi) by claiming that we do actually
experience the tman. Because of his response to the Buddhist
argument it might be thought that Udayana failed to appreciate
that the argument of anupalabdhi could have a logical force. It
should be remembered, however, that Udayana had, to his satis-
faction, already refuted the three restrictions (kaiabhañavãda,
bãhyrthabhañgavãda and guiiagui4bhedabhañgavda) which could have
provided the anupalabdhi argument with a logical basis.
Udayana's claim that we can experience the tman is made not
by demonstrating the existence of some extraordinary kind of
yogic perception, but rather, by demonstrating that the
perception of ãtman is an integral part of our everyday
experience, common to all people. (I will examine this shift
later in order to understand what significance this had for the
traditional soteriological importance of	 tman.	 See pp.
334-335).	 Udayana claims that we have a direct experience of
tman in the non-verbal, unmediated judgement of our own
subjectivity.	 The ãtman is the object of a judgement which
Udayana expresses as "I am" (ahamiti vikalpa).	 Udayana's claim
here is that the nature of the judgement in question is such as
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to make the existence of the tman indubitable. The Buddhist
opponent is committed to accepting that the objects of non-
propositional judgernents are real and,according to Udayana, it is
this type of judgement which we have here. Udayana compares our
perception of ãtman to our perception of colours, blue and so on.
Supposedly our perception of blueness carries with it the
certainty of its existence. Whatever we may go on to say about
blue, even if mistaken, presupposes the existence of the
unmediated experience of blueness.
It might be thought here that Udayana's argument is reminis-
cent of Descartes' well-known argument, "Cogito ergo sum", but
there is an important difference between the two. Udayana is
arguing that it is the very content of the experience itself
which gives us indubitable proof of the tman's existence.
Descartes' argument is of an inferential nature, that is, the
inference of "sum" from "cogito", and he has often been criti-
cized for the unwarranted nature of this inference. Lichtenberg,
for example, criticized Descartes for going too far in his proof.
The inference from "I think" should have been merely "therefore
there is a thought". 	 Udayana was criticized by his Buddhist
opponent in a way which parallels Lichtenberg's criticism of
Descartes.	 The Buddhist proposed to Udayana that his so-called
tman is only revealed insofar as we engage in acts of thinking.
Just as blue appears in the cognition solely because of blueness,
so too the tman appears in the cognition solely because of the
mental activity of thinking, that is, that there is a thought.
lJdayana's retort, however, is that we do not infer the tman
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from an act of cognition but rather, that in a cognition such as
"I know' (or "I think") we clearly experience two separate
elements, the subject, the ãtman, and the act of knowing. This
is not an inference but rather, according to Udayana, a direct
experience in which the two elements are clearly experienced as
separate, in the same way in which we would experience red and
blue as two separate colours. Udayana would say that to
paraphrase "I think" as "There is a thought going on" leaves out
half of the content of the original experience. 	 It is in this
respect that we can see a major difference between Descartes'
proof and what Udayana is saying here.	 Udayana's proof, if it
can be called a proof, consists solely in our direct experience
of the ãtman. His argument	 would actually only consist of the
latter part of Descartes' proof, that is,	 am" (ahamiti)
furnishes all the evidence we need. The ãtman exists because in
each of our mental acts we experience it directly. 	 It can be
seen here how the previous chapters of the ATV have lead to
Udayana's final claim for the existence of the ãtman. He has
already sought to establish that perception can give us direct
knowledge of objects as separate from our perceptions of them,
hence establishing the foundation for the possibility that we can
directly perceive our own ãtman in the judgement "1 am".
The problem with Udayana's claim is that it is very
difficult to argue about what people do or do not claim to
perceive. In the west, it is not uncommon to find people making
claims similar to that of Udayana:
my personal identity...implies the continued existence
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of that indivisible thing that I call myself. Whatever
this self may be, it is something which thinks, and
deliberates and resolves, and acts, and suffers.	 I am
not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling. 	 I am
something that thinks, and acts, and suffers."
[Reid in Perry (1975) P
. 10919
On the other hand, this is contradicted by those who claim to
have no such experience, for example, Derek Parfit:
Is it true that, in memory, we are directly aware of
what the Reductionist denies? Are we aware that each
of us is a persistent subject of experiences, a
separately existing entity that is not our brain and
body? Are we aware, for example, that each of us is a
Cartesian Ego? This is not a point that can be argued.
I do not believe that I am directly aware that I am
such an entity. And I assume that I am not unusual. I
believe that no—one is directly aware of such a fact.
[Parfit (1986) p. 223]
Here it can be seen that one person is blind to what another is
so convinced about. Like Reid, Udayana argues that the ãtman is
something different from our bodies, our senses and our stream of
consciousness, and our personal identity consists in this further
fact. Over and above any experience of knowing, remembering, and
so on, Udayana maintains that there is the agent, separate from
the action. "1 know" is like the expression "I cut" since,
according to Udayana, both the agent and the action are subject
to a direct, unmediated perception and are both experienced as
indubitably as we experience blue.'°
Even if it were accepted, for argument's sake, that we
are aware of ourselves as separately existing subjects of
experiences, there are still objections to assuming that such an
entity enjoys a continuous existence. It has been argued that
there is no way that I could know whether or not such an entity
continued to exist. 	 Both Locke and Kant have argued that there
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might be a series of such separately existing subjects:
But that which we call the same consciousness, not
being the same individual act, why one intellectual
substance may not have represented to it, as done by
itself, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some
other agent.
[Locke (1964) p. 214111
Derek Parfit has argued that as long as psychological continuity
was preserved we would not be aware of one of these entities
being replaced by another:
...when we have had a series of thoughts, the most that
we are aware of is the psychological continuity of our
stream of consciousness. Some claim that we are aware
of the continued existence of separately existing
subjects of experiences. As Locke and Kant argued, and
as our example seems to show, 12 such awareness cannot
in fact be distinguished from our awareness of mere
psychological continuity. Our experiences give us no
reason to believe in the existence of these entities.
[Parfit (1986) p. 224]
It is being argued here that one entity such as the tman could
replace another such entity and no-one would notice any differ-
ence. I will examine this argument further in relation to the
role which the tman plays in the operation of rebirth and karma.
(See pp. 329-335)
TEXT I: Arguments for ãtman on the basis of experience
(Translated pp. 370-376)
IJdayana does not discuss at great length our direct
experience of ãtman. Rather, in this final section, most of his
arguments are about the relationship between the ãtman and our
experiences in general. More specifically, he is concerned to
demonstrate the essential role of the ãtinan in uniting together
any individual's experiences.	 Udayana argues that without the
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ätman there can be no basis for the demarcation of A's
experiences from B's and C's experiences - and so on. The theme
of Udayana's arguments here is that without the ãtman, since
there is no basis for demarcating one individual's experiences
from another's, the basis for a person's identity is undermined.
Consider the following as a pattern of momentary mental events:
0	 0	 0	 0	 0
0	 0	 0	 0	 0
0	 0	 0	 0	 0
The question Udayana asks is why they should be linked as
follows:
—0	 )0-	 )0-	 )0	 A
—0	 )0-	 )0	 '0	 )0-	 B
—0	 )0	 )0	 0	 )0—	 C
C
A
B
The same kind of question has been asked by western philosophers:
If it (the mind) is regarded as a collection of
experiences, there is the problem, to which Hume
himself confessed that he could see no answer, of
showing how the collection is united. What is it that
makes a given experience a member of one such
collection rather than another? With any view of this
type, there is also the problem of identifying the
experiences themselves. In the ordinary way, we
identify experiences in terms of the persons whose
experiences they are, but clearly this will lead to a
vicious circle if persons themselves are to be analysed
in terms of their experiences. 	 [Ayer (1963) p. 84]
Udayana, in dealing with this question, considers the following
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arguments.
(1) The possession of different bodies is not perceived to apply
to a given continuum. (See translation pp. 372-375)
Udayana rejects the body as the criterion for demarcating
one mental continuum from another because of his belief in
reincarnation, that one person can have many lives and hence many
bodies. For Udayana, reincarnation demands that the continuity
of a mental series can survive a bodily change. (Naiyãyikas also
believed that a yogi could inhabit several bodies at once.)
Similarly, western philosophers who have upheld some version of
bodily identity as the criterion for personal identity have been
challenged with examples in which an individual seems to survive
a change in his or her body.'3
1n addition to this there are problems relating to the
identity of the body itself. What is to count as the same body?
Does someone who undergoes a heart—lung transplant, leg
amputation or plastic surgery thereby change their personal
identity? Clearly not - plastic surgery and a changed
appearance are no defence for a criminal brought to trial in a
court—of—law. Contemporary philosophers who uphold some version
of a physical criterion for personal identity have tended to
focus their attention on the brain:'4
What is necessary is not the continued existence of the
whole body but the continued existence of enough of the
brain to be the brain of a living person.
[Parfit (1986) p. 204]
In the case of the human body we obviously need to decide what is
to count as the same body. We have already discussed the problem
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of change versus continuity in relation to the Buddhist theory of
causality (see Chapter Three) and, as Udayana points out here,
the physical criterion is not open to his Buddhist opponent any-
way, given his doctrine of momentariness. A human body undergoes
many changes and is capable of different things at different
stages in its existence, like a seed in the granary and a seed in
the field, and hence the Buddhist cannot talk of the same body.
Udayana has already questioned the idea that the body can be
the object of the judgement "I am" (see TEXT H pp. 364-365). As
he points out, we already have a sense of our own identity which
is the basis for calling a body one's own, that is, our sense of
our own identity is prior to calling a body "mine". And of
course, for Udayana, that sense of identity resides in an
enduring tman.
(ii) The idea of a single agent is based on relations between
successive mental events. (See translation pp. 370-375)
Udayana also attacks the Buddhist view which tries to bind
the mental events together into one continuum on the basis of
internal relations between them (like a Humean theory in which a
person's identity is made to depend upon relations irrespective
of the body). 15 Our internal life is relatively chaotic, with so
many changes in our sequence of thought that it is difficult to
see how the relationship between all our mental events could be
reduced to some basic principle. As Barry Stroud says in
relation to Hume:
The novelty and lack of uniformity that we find in our
inner life make it difficult to see how Hume's appeal
to resemblance and causality could possibly be enough
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to explain why we come to have an idea of an individual
mind or self that endures through time. The true story
must be at least more complicated than he allows.
[Stroud (1977) p. 127]
Udayana examines closely the idea that the relationship of a
cause to its effect could explain the connection between the
individual momentary events of one continuum. The relationship
between a cause and its effect is typified in the relationship
between an object and the act which apprehends it. This, how-
ever, will not do for explaining the connections between a
sequential series of momentary events. Stroud made the following
point about Hume which is relevant here:
But the causality holding between impressions and their
corresponding ideas is not of the right sort to help
Hume solve the problem of how we come to ascribe
identity to ourselves. Those causal connections run
'vertically', so to speak, from the impression to the
idea, and then perhaps to other ideas and impressions.
What Hume needs is a causal chain that runs
'horizontally', as it were, along the whole series of
incoming impressions that we get from moment to moment.
Stroud goes on to argue that:
When I am having an impression of a tree I might turn
my head and get an impression of a building, but the
first impression is not a cause of the second.
[Stroud (1977) p. 126]
Thus, although a coherency is at times given to our sequence of
thoughts on account of our interaction with the objects of
apprehension, this is not the type of relationship that we are
looking for. Much of our thinking takes place in the absence of
objects of apprehension, and it would also create an unwanted
overlapping between different continua. We would not, for
example, want to group together into one continuum all those
mental events caused by one and the same sounding tuning-fork.16
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The Buddhist, like Hume, needs some kind of relationship
that runs 'horizontally' to link the events together into one
continuum. In this context Udayana cites a passage from
Jãnari's Kaijabhañgãdhyya and examines JuInari's thesis that
there are two types of causal relationship operative within
mental continua:
There are two types of continuum. 	 One has a single
basis because of a similarity [between the mental
events] and another which consists of change. The
first kind consists of the relation of a material cause
to its effect [in which there is a similarity between
the cause and its effect] and the second kind which is
a relation of cause and effect [in which there is no
such similarity].17
Udayana illustrates his case with the example of the transforma-
tion of wood into ash through its contact with fire. This suppo-
sedly, is a causal relationship of the second kind in which there
is no similarity between the cause and its effect. Hence the
Buddhist cannot link the wood with the ash on the basis of some
similarity in nature.
	 How therefore, Udayana asks, does the
Buddhist link the wood with the ash and not the fire? He cannot
do it on the basis of their belonging to the same continuum
because this is the very thing which needs to be demonstrated.
Udayana asserts that the relationship between the wood and the
ash can only be explained by defining the relationship between
them as one of material cause to effect, even though they are
dissimilar. In the same way, it is only by postulating the
existence of an ãtman that we can bring together dissimilar
events into one continuum.
The problem which Udayana addresses here is the very speci-
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fic question of what binds together a series of mental events
into one continuum. Take any mental event, 'c', what is it that
places it in continuum 'A' rather than continuum 'B'? It is
important to distinguish this problem from related issues in the
matter of personal identity and to pose three separate questions:
(1) What is it that groups together a series of mental events
into one continuum?
(ii) What is it that makes a person at two different times one
and the same person?
(iii) How do we get a sense of our own identity?
In answer to the first question the Buddhist has postulated that
it is possible to group together a series of mental events into
one continuum on the basis of internal relations between them.
Udayana has been concerned to show that such relations as cause
and effect are inadequate for this task, and that it is only by
postulating an enduring tman that we can demarcate one continuum
from another. For the Buddhist opponent, the answer to the
second question would be that the identity of an individual is
equivalent to the identity of a particular continuum, whereas for
Udayana the identity of an individual would be equivalent to a
particular g tman.	 The answer to these two questions does not
necessarily, however, provide an answer to question (iii). A
comment of Barry Stroud in relation to Hume is once again
relevant here:
Even if all the perceptions belonging to a single mind
were to inhere in a simple substance, that in itself
would not explain how we ever get the idea of a mind or
self in the first place. We would still need an
account of how various features of our experience
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combine with fundamental principles of the mind to
provide us with that idea. [Stroud (1977) p. 134]
As we have already seen, for Udayana the tman once again would
provide the answer to this question (see TEXT H). Our sense of
self is based on a direct unmediated experience of our ãtman
which is the object of the judgement "I am". The main focus of
lidayana's arguments, however, is not with this question of ho we
arrive at a sense of our own self.' 8
 For him the most important
question is to find a basis upon which the division between indi-
viduals can be clearly demarcated and any particular mental event
assigned to one individual. This shows clearly in his discussion
of memory. In western philosophy memory has played an important
role as a criterion for personal identity inasmuch as it makes us
aware of our continued existence over time. Memory may not be
sufficient in itself to relate together all the events of one
continuum, 19 but it certainly makes a considerable contribution
towards a sense of psychological connectedness which in its turn
is responsible for engendering a sense of self. Other western
philosophers have made use of memory in a different way, arguing
that in memory we experience our self directly. 2 ° For Udayana,
however, the importance of memory is that he sees it to be an
important argument against the Buddhist antman doctrine inasmuch
as he challenges the Buddhist to demonstrate how, given his
denial of an enduring tnian, he could limit the range of memory
to one continuum. Without the firm basis of an enduring tman, he
declares, there is no way in which a memory of 'c' at a later
time could be restricted to one and the same continuum. Hence one
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person could remember another's experiences, and once again the
boundaries between continua would dissolve. 2 ' In his discussion
of memory, Udayana does not consider the possibility that memory
could be responsible for engendering a sense of self-identity.
The atman and personal identity
The aim of Udayana's ATV, through his attack on the four
bädhakas raised by the Buddhists, has been to establish the tman
as an entity existing separately from our bodies, thoughts and so
on, and I believe that the importance of the tman for the Nyya
system is clearly associated with the requirement that personal
identity be determinate in all cases. In the final arguments of
the ATV, Udayana stresses the ontological rather than the
epistemological role played by the tman, and clearly, for
Udayana, the importance of the ãtman is its essential place in
maintaining a clear distinction between one individual and
another. He has argued that without the ãtman it is impossible
to bind all the mental events of any one continuum together, and
to limit the range of causal and memory relations between mental
events in a continuum to that particular continuum. In a recent
work, Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit has argued convincingly
and in great detail that the notion of a determinate personal
identity is defensible only on the grounds that our identity does
indeed reside in some entity that exists separately from our
bodies and thoughts. If we believe that our identity consists in
our bodies, or in the connections between our thoughts, or in
some combination between these two, then there are going to be
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cases in which questions of personal identity are not
decidable : 22
If we believe that our identity must be determinate,
must we believe that we are separately existing
entities?	 Having the first belief does not
imply having the second. We might believe both that
we are not separately existing entities, and that to
any question about personal identity, there must always
be an answer, which must be either Yes or No.
	
There
are some writers who accept this view.	 But I shall
argue that this view is indefensible. Only if we are
separately existing entities can it be true that our
identity must be determinate.
[Parfit (1986) p. 216]
For the orthodox Nyãya thinker, it was important that the
boundaries between individuals (used here in an empirical rather
than a normative sense) remain clear since they considered this
to be essential for the maintenance of the whole complex of ideas
relating to sathsãra, karma and moka (and hence the hierarchical
nature of Indian society). I shall now examine the role played
by ãtman in the mechanism governing rebirth and the operation of
karma.
First of all, it should be reiterated that the belief in
karma and reincarnation was a belief shared by both the Buddhists
and Naiyãyikas alike. Therefore reincarnation should not be seen
as a decisive proof for the existence of the ãtman, but rather as
something which the philosophers of the respective traditions
need to explain in accordance with their position on the
existence of the ãtman. Hence for Udayana, the importance of
reincarnation is that it really only makes sense in terms of an
enduring tman. His Buddhist opponent, on the other hand, seeks
to demonstrate the viability of reincarnation in the absence of
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an enduring 5tman.23
In Chapter One we encountered Yãjffavalkya who instructed
Artabhga on the nature of karma - that by good works a man
becomes good and by bad works he becomes bad (B.U. iii ii verse
13). The essential point about karma is that an event in an
individual's life be able to harbour consequences for that same
individual at a later time. Vãtsyãyana had argued in the
Nyãyabhsya (Book Three; Portion Two; sütras_ 4-6) that, even
within a single life, an enduring ãtman is necessary for moral
culpability to make sense. If an individual is being destroyed
and recreated every instant, then there is no—one to be held
accountable for a past crime. In the course of our discussion on
Udayana's defence of 5tman, we have already seen what would be
his main arguments in this matter. Unless one mental continuum
is kept absolutely distinct from another, the boundaries between
individuals will become unclear and hence there will be a
confusion of karma. Udayana has also argued against the
possibility of one mental event being able to engender
consequences later on in the continuum through the operation of
karmic forces (see Chap. 6 footnote 21).
Paul Griffiths, in his article "Notes Towards A Critique Of
Buddhist Theory", has criticized the Buddhists for incoherency in
the matter of karma and reincarnation. He sees one of the main
functions of Buddhist karmic theory to be an explanatory hypothe-
sis for the various conditions of sentient beings, and that one
of the truth claims inherent in this function is that "Each
individual undergoes more than one life", a statement which he
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labels as P3. He then rephrases P3 as, "Any given caused conti-
riuum of momentary states exhibiting sentience (i.e. an 'mdlvi-
dual') does not cease with death", in order to reflect more
accurately the Buddhist position, as statement which he labels as
P3'. He then criticizes the Buddhists for sliding between
these two statements:
This is especially often the case when Buddhist karmic
theory is being used as a means of social control, to
explain to people why they should follow the Buddhist
path and why they should observe the five basic
'çrcepts of ddhist ethics. It is easy to see why: if
you want to persuade someone that killing is not a good
idea because of the suffering undergone by the killer
as inevitable retribution, then P3 is a much more
powerfully persuasive tool than P3'. A strong sense of
identity across lives - much stronger than causal
continuity - is required when Buddhist karmic theory
is used as a means of social control. But when
philosophically pressed or when thinking about the
fundamental anãtman doctrine, Buddhist philosophers
tend to retreat to P3'.
[Griffiths (1982) pp. 283-284]
He then goes on to say:
We may note that this is a problem of which Buddhists
themselves have been, and are, acutely aware. Without
memory, continuity of physical identity and continuing
character traits and so on, does it really make sense
to talk of 'the same individual' undergoing a
multiplicity of lives.
[Griffiths (1982) p. 284]
and in a footnote to this section:
It should be noted that it may be possible to make P3
coherent by asserting a rather stronger concept of
personal identity than Buddhists - at least in their
orthodox moods - are willing to do. Thus if, for
example, the theory states that the reborn individual
has the possibility of memory of previous lives, then
we do have at least one criterion of personal identity
and P 3 begins to make sense. It would probably still
have to be rejected on the ground of implausibility,
but no longer on the ground of incoherence. This move
—of asserting a strong sense of personal continuity
and identity through many lives— is available to Hindu
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theoreticians, and is also often made by the Buddhists,
though for the latter it can only effectively be made
at the expense of the anätman doctrine.
[Criffiths (1982) P. 285 footnote 1]
Griffiths' complaints raise several important points. His
assertion is that Hindu theoreticians, of whom Udayana is one,
were able to utilize a stronger sense of identity and
continuity through several incarnations on the basis of their
belief in an enduring ãtman. Supposedly with the introduction of
the ãtrnan the doctrine of reincarnation becomes more meaningful
and more likely to exert a measure of social control over the
population. Indeed, Udayana himself does use an argument similar
to this and claims that the ãtman is an important incentive for
people to practice orthodoxy in their lives. 	 (See ATV (1939
edition) pp. 714-715; translated p. 312) It is not clear,
however, that the ãtman does make the doctrine of reincarnation
more meaningful in the way that Griffiths suggests, and I would
like to raise two points in relation to this.
Firstly, Udayana's major complaint against the Buddhist is
that he is guilty of an ontological failure. It is not so much
that the Buddhist's notion of a causal continuum results in a
weak sense of our own personal identity, but rather that he
cannot link mental events at all into one continuum on the basis
of internal relations between them. Hence Udayana is attacking
his Buddhist opponent not on the basis of the epistemological
consequences of the notion of a causal continuum (that is, no
real sense of our continued identity across time), but rather on
the basis of not being able to establish a causal continuum at
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all.	 Were Udayana to admit that mental events could be so
linked, then much of his disagreement with the Buddhist would
disappear. For Udayana, however, the chain of mental events,
stretching out across many lives, can only be strung together on
the thread of an enduring ãtmari.
Secondly, it is not clear that the 	 tman achieves
what Griffiths states, a stronger sense of personal identity.
That would only be achieved if the tman were to be identified
with my own sense of self-identity. As we have seen, the role of
the ãtman is more ontological than epistemological - the ãtman
does not necessarily give us memories of our former lives, nor
does it necessarily give us continuity of character traits. It
does not give the ordinary person a sense of 'myself' in another
incarnation. Because of this fact, it is not clear that the
postulation of an enduring gtman gives us any more experiential
contact with our former lives than the Buddhist thesis of a
causal continuum.
Griffiths states that the doctrine of reincarnation is pos-
tulated as an explanatory hypothesis for the diverse fortunes of
different individuals and consequently is supposed to involve the
truth claim that "There is no undeserved suffering", a statement
which he labels as P5. This is what Griffiths says of P5:
We may also note in passing, putting aside our philo-
sophical guise for a moment, that to most Western eyes,
and certainly to Christians, P5 is morally reprehen-
sible, even inhuman. But this is a different argument.
[Griffiths (1982) p. 287]
Griffith's point here seems to be that most Westerners would find
it morally repugnant to be held accountable for crimes of which
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they had no memory, for lives which they have no sense of ever
having lived, and in this respect I propose that the existence of
an entity such as tman would not make karmic theory any more
acceptable to him. This would only be the case if ãtman were
equated with a sense of "I" and the existence of ãtman meant
that we did actually remember our past lives (which clearly
most of us do not). Previously we noted that tmans might be
interchangeable and nobody would notice any difference (see pp.
318-319). Parfit has noted that:
the Cartesian Ego that I am might suddenly cease to
exist and be replaced by another ego. This new Ego
might 'inherit' all of my psychological character-
istics, as in a relay race. On this Featureless
Cartesian View, while you are reading this
page of text, you might suddenly cease to exist, and
your body be taken over by some new person who is
merely exactly like you. If this happened, no one
would notice any difference. There would never by any
evidence, public or private, showing whether or not
this happens, and, if so, how often.
	 We therefore
cannot even claim that it is unlikely to happen. And
there are other possibilities. On this view, history
might have gone just as it did, except that I was
Napoleon and he was me. This is not the claim that
Derek Parfit might have been Napoleon. The claim is
rather that I am one Cartesian Ego, and that Napoleon
was another, and that these two Egos might have
'occupied' each other's places.
[Parfit (1986) p. 228]
On traditional theories of tman there does not seem to be any
qualitative difference between one tman and another. Hence what
Parfit says about the Cartesian Ego would also hold true for the
ãtman. One tman could 'occupy' another's place in any sequence
of incarnations. The tman traditionally available to Hindu
theoreticians certainly does not provide the kind of continuity
of personal identity that Griffiths is looking for. The argument
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between Udayana and his Buddhist opponent, however, is clearly
about something different, and reveals their concern to be quite
different from that of Griffiths, namely, a concern with overall
order, rather than with the individual. 24 What concerns Udayana
and his Buddhist opponent is that there be some ontological basis
for a clear demarcation between continua. It would appear that
both Udayana and his Buddhist opponent would be morally satisfied
with the workings of karma so long as this is the case. Where
they disagree is on how this is to be achieved, whether by means
of the gtman or internal relations between mental events. The
way in which Griffiths judges the issue is similar to ways in
which the caste system has been judged. Dumont criticized in his
Homo Hierarchicus previous studies of the caste system for being
biased by an ethnocentricity that saw the world to be made up of
individuals imbued with all the values of western civilization.
In the same way, Griffiths is judging the morality of karma from
a viewpoint in which paramount importance is given to the
individual. Our sense of fair play may demand full memory of
lives which we may be held accountable for, but from the
soteriological point of view of traditional Indian thought, the
overall moral order of the cosmos is of supreme importance.
What is interesting in the case of Udayana though, is that
he does seem to waver between two senses of ãtman. In TEXT H, we
saw that he put forward an argument for the existence of tman
based upon our direct, unmediated experience of it. The tman
becomes the object of the judgement 1 am", and thus it would
seem that Udayana closely associates the ãtman with our sense of
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self-identity. In doing this, he is giving the individual tman
the kind of episternological significance that Griffiths thought
necessary for the doctrine of reincarnation to be morally
acceptable and meaningful. At the same time, it would also seem
that Udayana is in danger of departing from the soteriologically
significant understanding of tman. Traditionally, since
Upani.adic times, orthodox thinkers had equated moka with
some kind of realization of a transcendental Self, the ãtman. As
we have already seen (see pp. 32-34), this experience was an
extraordinary one, not encountered in ordinary states of
consciousness such as waking, dreaming and deep sleep. We also
saw (see pp. 41-46) that in the Upaniads there is an important
distinction between the ãtrnan and the ahathkãra or ego-
consciousness. Both of these tenets have been ignored by Udayana
in his defence of ãtman as experienced in the judgernent "1 am".
In this respect, early Nyãya thought was more in accord with
Upaniadic thought than later Nyya thought, since in early Nyya
thought the ãtman was to be known only through a special yogic
perception.	 In making his argument for a direct perception of
ãtman rest on the tman being the object of the judgement "I am",
Udayana is bringing the ãtman back to the realm of everyday
experience and also conflating the ãtman/aharhkãra distinction so
important in the Upaniads.	 Thus he is in danger of defending a
concept of ãtman that would cease to be significant for
traditional soteriological thought.	 Hence I would now like to
examine a second major category of Upanisadic thought in relation
to the Nyya system, that of moka.
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(2) Moka in the Nyãya system
The traditional roots of the Nyãya Vaieika systems are
especially apparent in those passages which are concerned with
moka, known also in these systems as apavarga (completion) and
nibse yasa (having no better). What the Nyya philosophers have
to say on this topic is closely connected to ideas which
had developed from the Upanisadic teachings, and there is no
doubt that the ãtman continues to play a central role in their
understanding of moka.
In the ATV, Udayana advocates a threefold path leading
towards moka, a tradition common since the time of the
Upaniads:
[First], hearing from the Veda about the existence of
Atman, [a person] should then determine by means of
syllogistic reasoning, which is all in accordance with
the Veda, that the real nature of the ãtman is to be
free of all that needs to be discarded [for the
attainment of liberation]. Then, a person, having as
his sole means firm conviction or faith [in the Atman],
sionld practice control of mind, control of the
external senses and detachment, should meditate on the
Atman through the rules of yoga which lead towards a
one-pointedness of mind and break the bonds of a
transmigratory existence.25
Thus first of all, one should gain knowledge of the tman from
the traditional texts, the Vedas. The minimal meaning of moka
in the Nyãya Vaieika systems is in accord with these
traditional teachings, that moka consists in liberating the
tman from any connections with the physical body. Both KarAda
and Gautama emphasize the relationship between karma and moka-
it is because of karma that an ãtman becomes embroiled in a
physical body and moka comes about when this undesirable union
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is broken once and for all. 26 Hence one needs to know about the
gtrnan, what causes it to be caught up in the cycle of birth and
death. One needs to know what types of behaviour will aid the
process of liberation and what types of behaviour will impede it.
Udayana states that the recognition of an ãtman provides the
necessary incentive for persons to order their conduct
appropriately, and hence we can see that the tman functions as
an important locus for ordering codes of conduct. It becomes the
absolute standard against which actions are to be judged.
Whereas the Buddhists saw the belief in an enduring ãtman to be
an impediment to achieving freedom from the cycle of existence,
orthodox thinkers believed that without such a belief there would
be neither an impetus for seeking moka nor an impetus for moral
conduct. 27
Secondly, one should substantiate traditional teachings by
means of a process of ratiocination. The originality of Nyya
thinkers in relation to moka lies in their emphasis on the
importance of correct knowledge in this process. Nyya
philosophers were concerned to defend the propriety of such an
emphasis, which was sometimes questioned by other orthodox
thinkers, and in this passage Udayana is concerned to stress that
syllogistic reasoning is quite in accordance with the Vedas. I
believe this emphasis on correct knowledge is crucial for
understanding the rationale of the Nyãya system, and I shall
consider it fully in the concluding sections of this chapter (see
pp. 339-360).
Thirdly, the aspirant should utilize the techniques of yoga
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to achieve one—pointedness of mind which comes about as a result
of meditating on the ãtman. Nyãya adds little to the tradition
of yogic practice. Just as Nyãya was considered by the orthodox
schools to be the authority on logical reasoning, so too Nyaya
recognized the expertise of the Yoga system on matters of
spiritual practice and accepted the practical disciplines
outlined in the Yoga Slitras. In both the Nyäya and
Vaiesika systems, however, there is less emphasis on the
experiential aspect of moka, and a marked reluctance to fully
equate mok?a with some blissful state of consciousness. Nyya
philosophers do discuss the experiential aspects of moka.
Gautama equates moka with deep sleep and freedom from pain.28
Similarly, Vãtsyãyana states that moka consists in freedom from
fear, a condition which he equates with brahman, thus referring
his teachings back to the Upaniads. 	 Vãtsyyana, however, is
concerned to refute the view that in moka the tman enjoys an
experience of eternal pleasure. 29 This is a teaching echoed
throughout the Nyya and Vaieika texts. Vcaspati Mi'ra states
that in the state of final liberation there is cessation of both
pleasure and pain. l3ence only the wise will be able to fully
appreciate such teachings. Vyomaiva states that "bliss" in
relation to moka should be understood to just mean an absence of
pain, 30 and Udayana too defines moka as the final cessation of
sorrow. 3 '	 What is important in the Nyãya VaiIesika systems,
however, is that moka is not fully defined by describing a
particular state of consciousness.	 Certainly, it is
characterized by certain ex p eriential qualities, such as freedom
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from pain, but an essential element of moka consists in
attaining correct knowledge. Again and again we read in the
texts of the Nyya \Taieika systems that it is through correct
knowledge of the categories of their systems that liberation will
/
be attained.	 Such views culminate with Sivditya's negative
definition of moka as, "the absence of sorrow together with the
posterior absence of false knowledge which is the cause of
sorrow, which posterior absence is produced by true knowledge".32
Moksa in the Nyaya Vaiesika systems equals a particular state
of consciousness plus a particular understanding of the world.
Indeed, moka in these systems cannot be fully understood apart
from under standing the role which knowledge plays in these
systems. I shall now turn in the final section of my thesis to
discuss the role which knowledge plays in the Nyãya system since,
as I have already mentioned, I believe it is through this
category that we can come to an overall perspective of the
system.
(3) Knowledge in the Nyãya system
We saw in the introduction that some critics, by showing the
largely logical nature of the Nyya system, assumed that it was
thereby disassociated from any soteriological context and somehow
qualified as "pure" philosophy. There is no doubt though that
the Nyäya system did concern itself with soteriological matters.
Paul Williams has noted:
One can see at a glance the amount of space devoted to
moral and soteriological concerns. The Nyya—Vaieika
was fully committed to liberation, but its conception
of liberation involved emphasising perhaps to an ex-
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treme degree the role of knowledge in this project. As
Potter says, "while the Naiyãyikas did not equate the
good life with the reflective life, they did feel that
one would not find his appropriate path eventually in
liberation without understanding the truths about
reality enshrined in Nyãya—Vaieika doctrine, and
without mastering the methods of investigation taught
in the system [Potter (1976) p. 191."
[Williams (1978) pp. 279-2801
The final task of my thesis will be to understand the
significance of this marriage between traditional soteriological
thought and their original contribution that knowledge of the
Nyya categories must also be a necessary component of final
liberation. The relationship between the quest for moka
(sometimes known as atmavidyã - the study of tman) and logical
reasoning is long and complicated, beyond the scope of this
thesis. We do need to ask, however, if theories of liberation
and disputation were related prior to their incorporation into
the NyãyasUtras, and hence whether the Naiyãyikas were innovators
in making such knowledge an essential part of liberation.
Early history of logical thought in India
Paul Williams mentions that the emphasis on knowledge in the
Nyya system:
reflects an old Indian tendency which can be traced
back at least as far as the earlier Upani.ads where
freedom from rebirth results from knowing something.
[Williams (1978) p. 280]
The atmavidyã tradition of the Upaniads, however, although a
gnostic tradition, had little place for logical thought in its
scheme of things. An analysis of early ideas about liberation
as conceived in the Upaniadic atmavidyä tradition (see Chapter
One), shows that moka, although achieved through knowledge, was
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the prize of ritual and experiential adeptness, rather than any
logical skill. It is true that there was a great deal of debate
in the early classical tJpaniads, but the "rationale" of these
discussions, whilst not illogical, would be intelligible only to
those well versed in the mechanics of Vedic sacrificial thought.
It would seem, however, that logical thought in India evolved
out of this situation in which there was a great deal of
religious debate, a situation clearly portrayed in the Upaniads.
First, the Upaniads continued to be preoccupied with
questions concerning the correct performance of the sacrifice,
despite their growing interest in questions concerning moka.
The correct performance of the sacrifice had originally been the
responsibility of the brhman priest officiating at the sacrifice
and such matters were dealt with in the Brhmaia portion of the
Vedas. This interest was later taken up as the specific concern
of the Piirva Mmiñs school. Jaimini's MImäthsãstras, which is
the earliest extant text of the Piirva M!mãths school, aim to
clarify the notion of one's dharrna (duty) in the light of Vedic
injunctions. In posing Vedic instructions as an infallible means
for knowing dharrna the author had to deal with such questions as,
"What are the valid means of knowledge?", and "What is the
relationship between a word and the thing which it signifies?".
It is from such questions that a basis for inferential reasoning
begins to emerge. Thus inferential reasoning, like many other
sciences in India - astronomy, grammar, phonetics and astrology,
for example - grew out of the need for greater knowledge and
accuracy in relation to the sacrifice. It is interesting to note
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that it is in this context that the word "nyya" makes its first
appearance, a word which has since become more associated with
the Nyya school itself. The rules propounded in the Piirva
MLIiãIñSã school were known as yyas.33
Secondly, as the teachings of the Upaniads became
integrated into the orthodox brahmanical schools, it became
necessary to defend such teachings from the attacks of the
heterodox schools such as the Buddhists.
	
The doctrinal
differences and social implications of Buddhism especially, led
to this type of confrontation with the brahinanical orthodoxy,
necessitating each side to sharpen its ideas in the face of the
attacks from the opposition.
Thirdly, alongside this rivalry there was also a rivalry
within each of the orthodox and heterodox traditions. For
example, after the death of the Buddha, Buddhism became subject
to internal dissension, and we find the Buddhists settling
matters of doctrine by the traditional means of calling together
an assembly for debate. The accounts that we have of the so-
called Buddhist Councils are somewhat mythical, but we do know
that they led to the formulation of rules to govern the course of
debate and also generated a technical vocabulary in association
with this. The earliest record of such a schemata is to be found
in an Abhidharma text, the Kathvatthu, which is part of the
Buddhist Pall Canon. This text Is traditionally associated with
the Third Buddhist Council reputedly called by Aoka in the
seventeenth year of his reign (252 B.C.) when the Sathgha was
threatened by the entry of "heretics" into the order. 	 The
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Kathãvatthu lays down specific schemas for making inferences and
contains certain technical terms (for example, upanaya, nigraha)
which can be also found in the Nyãyasiitras of Gautama but with a
more specialized meaning. Characteristic of the K-athãvatthu is
the lack of any metalanguage concerning logic and also a
dialectic which is somewhat cumbersome and repetitive. Randle
has concluded from this:
that logic was preceded by attempts to schematise dis-
cussion, attempts which were inevitable in view of the
habit of organised public discussion which prevailed in
early India, but which could not succeed until the
nerve of argument had been separated from the irrele-
vances in which the early methodology obscured it, and
plainly exposed in a formulation of the syllogism
Assuming that the Buddhist culture of the period was
not inferior to contemporary Brahmanical culture, we
can assert that logic did not exist in India at the
period of which the Kathãvatthu is representative;
though some of the terms which afterwards became
vehicles of genuinely logical conceptions were already
being used systematically in connection with a metho-
dology which was not yet logical, and which may not
unreasonably be thought to have been separated by
several generations from the beginnings of logic
proper.
[Randle (1930) pp. 14-151
The Kathvatthu, however, certainly represents a genuine proto-
logical phase in that it recognizes the validity of any
particular conclusion to be dependent on its relationship to a
specific pattern of preceding premises. The nature of the
technical vocabulary used in association with the debate also
shows some recognition of the separation of form from content.
In all these example the relationship between logical
thought and the quest for moka (or nirva in the case of the
Buddhists) was an external one in that it grew out of a defence
of such beliefs rather than being an integral part of the path
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towards liberation. Indeed, in the Upaniads, what references
there are to logical thought manifest some degree of antagonism
towards its being a proper means for attaining moka. 34 In the
beginning, however, the discipline of logical thought was
intimately bound up with the subject matter dealing with the
pursuit of liberation. But once the separation between form and
content is recognized, it allows for the extension of logical
reasoning into other areas, since it frees it from a religious
context. It implies an understanding of logical reasoning to be
an underlying structure common to many modes of thought, with a
universal application.
There is some evidence that this had actually happened
before the Kathãvatthu, and that logical reasoning was indeed
known as a separate discipline where it went by the name of
änvTkikT.	 This conjecture is based upon passages from the
Arthastra, a text concerned to instruct kings in politics and
diplomacy. In that text, Kautilya lists ãnvlk?ikT, alongside
the triple Veda, commerce and statecraft, as one of the four
sciences which a king should know.	 This text was supposedly
composed by Kau'ilya, who was a minister at the court of
Candragupta Maurya, grandfather to Aoka. 	 This would place it
between 321-292 B.C., making it a text considerably earlier than
the Kathvatthu. If we accept this early date, it would mean
that logical reasoning began to emerge as a separate discipline
at the end of the fourth century B.C.
Even if the authenticity of Kauilya's text is accepted, the
Arthas'ãstra should not be read in isolation from the general
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intellectual developments of the time. Many scholars have
debated whether or not Kautilya's use of nvkiki should be
understood to include atmavidyã. 35
 I do not believe that we can
settle this question by a philological analysis of the text
alone, and we need to read Kautilya in the light of what we
already know about atmavidyä and ratiocination up to this
point. 36
 What is significant about the Arthastra is not so
much any self—declared statement about nvikik on the part of
Kautilya, but rather the very fact that here we have the
inclusion of subject matter hitherto only associated
with religious debate, in the more secular context of a treatise
about statecraft. The very fact that Kautilya took such a step
is in itself historic since it initiates the secularization of
logical thought and would inevitably lead to an awareness of its
independence from religious thought.
Finally, we should also remember that when we talk of
logical thought in the context of Kauilya, we are not talking of
a fully developed logical system. We know from other sources,
such as the Kathvatthu, that logical thought at that time
constituted no more than a collection of rather ad hoc rules for
debate. Indeed, Kautilya himself included such rules at the end
of his treatise, comprised of thirty—two technical terms known as
tantrayukti. It is doubtful whether in the time of ICautilya
logical thought had developed to a point where it had enough
self—understanding to see itself as a separate discipline. This
would have to wait until the development of a distinctive
methodology which only came about later with the formulation of
346
Atman in Nyya thought
syllogistic reasoning.	 It should also be remembered that
nvlkiki never became a widely used term in Indian thought,
where the term darana became more commonly used.37
Origins of the Nyya system
It has been suggested that the Nyãya system grew out of the
concern for formulating rules of debate. As the volume of debate
between the different schools increased, so too did the numbers
of manuals outlining its proper conduct. We have already
mentioned the Ka thãvatthu and the list of tantrayukti in the
Arthastra. 1'yãya most probably began as one such vda-
g'astra (scientific treatise concerned with debate). Several such
vãda traditions have been traced, 38 and all vãda presentations
have an essentially similar structure. In the first part, ideas
which deal with the analysis of disputation were discussed, and
in the second part, false arguments and reasons for defeat were
examined.	 The vãda expositions did not have their own
metaphysics or physics, nor were cosmological doctrines of
liberation usually expounded by such treatises. Rather, they
were tools of debate for systems which did hold views on such
matters.
The Nyãyastras began as one such vdaãstra. Although
finally redacted sometime around the second century of the
Christian era, they were certainly not the work of one author,
and scholars have identified certain sections as being older than
others. Professor Oberhammer has identified ãdhyãyas (chapters)
I and V as forming the oldest core of the Nyyastras since
together they bear a marked resemblance to the form of a
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vãdaastra. 39	Yet even in these sections there are certain
differences from the more usual vda expositions, and Oberhammer
proposes that ãdhyyas I and V must have already undergone some
elaboration because of their unusual arrangement of topics. 	 In
the Nyãyasiitras a discussion of the means of knowledge (prarnia)
is given prime importance. In the first slitra, sixteen
categories are listed, the first two being pramãia (instrument of
knowledge) and prameya (object of knowledge). 	 This has been
noted by several scholars and Matilal states that this:
brought the epistemological theory in the forefront
of the philosophical discussion or debate. In this
regard, the final version of the siitra-text differs
from other available Vãda-sãstras.
[Matilal (1977) p. 78]
Oberhammer also notes that the relatively detailed explanation of
a cosmological doctrine of liberation in the first dhyya is
also unusual for a vãda treatise. 4 ° In the Nyyasiitras, the
rules governing debate are once more given in the context of the
pursuit of rnoka, rather than in the more secular context of
treatises on medicine and statecraft. What is more, the
relationship between the two is now an intimate one. It is not
just that the rules of debate can be used to defend a particular
doctrine of liberation but rather, it is stated at the beginning
of the work that nireyasa comes about as a result of correct
judgement of the sixteen categories listed in the same slitra.
Another important aspect of the Nyãyasiitras is that it is
obviously only concerned about knowledge of things which are
relevant for the attainment of liberation. 	 In this respect,
Pradeep Gokhale has noted an important difference between the
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Nyyasiitras and the Vaieikasiitras. In slitra one of the
Nyyasiitras the sixteen following categories are listed: means of
knowledge, object of knowledge, doubt, purpose, example, tenets,
members of an inference, tarka, ascertainment, discussion,
sophistry, cavil, fallacies of reason, quibble, futile rejoinder
and ways of losing an argument. In siltra nine the objects of
knowledge (prameyas) are listed as self, body, sense organs,
object, judgement, internal organ, activity, defect, rebirth,
fruit, pain and release. Gokhale states that the prameyas of the
Nyãyasfftras are not meant to be an exhaustive classification of
all that there is to know, but rather, a classification of all
that needs to be known for the pursuit of liberation. In the
Vaieikasiitras, however, the categories listed in sfftra one are
meant to be such an exhaustive classification:
It is clear from the list that these prameyas are the
important factors of human life, rather than being the
important factors of the objective world. The
Vaieikas were interested in finding out and analyzing
the factors of the objective world, and they were
looking at the subjective world, so to speak, as a
small part of that objective world, not always as its
center. But Gautama seems to support that the basic
facts of human life, (for example, we have a body, we
sense certain objects, we act, we experience pains, we
are capable of emancipation, and more) form the real
problems of philosophy. In this way Gautama's
conception of philosophy is anthropocentric. On the
contrary, the Vaieikas' concept of philosophy, at its
outset, is cosmocentric.
[Gokhale (1982) pp. 208-209]
Thus in the Nyãyasütras a vãda exposition is transformed from
being a mere organon of debate into a work wanting to put forward
a clear philosophical position. From its early beginnings, Nyãya
was concerned to bring together the art of logical reasoning with
349
Xtman in Nyya thought
the pursuit of liberation and make the former an integral part
of the pursuit of the latter.
As the Nyya system continued to develop, both these
concerns with liberation and formulating a rational
epistemological system were maintained. The ãdhyyas II, III and
IV added later maintain an interest in cosmological matters
whilst also discussing in greater detail the instruments of
knowledge. In his Nyãyabhãya, Vãtsyäyana must be credited for
establishing once and for all that these two aspects of the
system must be maintained. In his commentary on sütra one of the
Nyãyasiitras, he answers an objection that only the first two of
the sixteen categories need to be listed since between them they
contain the other fourteen, in the following way:
This may be so. But four sciences are taught for the
welfare of man, of which logical reasoning (ãnvikiki),
also known as nyãya, is one. Each one has a different
subject matter. Its [that is, nyya's} subject matter
are the categories of doubt, etc. Without the separate
instruction of them, [nyya} would be merely atmavidy
as in the Upaniads.41
Alongside this must be read his commentary on slitra nine in which
the prameyas were listed:
Though apart from these there are many other prameyas
(objects of knowledge), such as substance, quality,
action, commoness, individuality and inherence, yet it
would be impossible to enumerate all such objects
severally. What this siltra intends is to mention
specifically only those objects whose right knowledge
will bring release, and whose wrong knowledge will lead
to rebirth.42
Hence Vtsyãyana is stating quite clearly that the proper subject
matter of Nyãya is to be the pursuit of moka, but that inoka
will be attained as a result of subjecting the relevant
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categories to a rational enquiry. In this respect Nyya will be
different from the pursuit of moka typified by the tmavidy
tradition of the Upaniads.
I would now like to conclude my thesis by quoting at length
Udayana's ATV in order to examine more fully this relationship
between the pursuit of moka and the practice of logical enquiry:
Concluding Remarks
When [the tman] is being contemplated upon through
yoga, first of all only external material objects
appear [to the aspirant]. On the basis of this, the
doctrine of Karma MimAthsã is arrived at, against which
is pitted the materialist philosophy of Cãrvãka. In
support of this materialist philosophy there are
statements such as, "The Self—creator created the sense
organs looking outwards", and in order to avoid
such false views [there are statements] such as,
"Beyond karma". Then the tman in the form of external
objects [appears to the aspirant], based on which the
doctrine of the Tridaxins comes as a final conclusion,
against which is pitted the Yogcra doctrine. In
support of this [Yogacãra doctrine] there are
statements such as, "All this is only the Self",
against which [there are statements] such as, "Without
smell, without taste, etc.". Then [appears to the
aspirant] the absence of all [external] things, based
on which there is the conclusive doctrine which is
actually only the initial stage of the Upaniadic
doctrine, against which there is the opposing doctrine
of the nihilists, the	 nyavãdins and Nairãtmyavädins.
In support of this opposing doctrine there are such
statements as, "In the beginning all this was nothing",
and to counteract this [there are statements] such as,
"Those people who kill the tman enter the blinding
darkness." Then appears [to the aspirant] the
distinction [between the ãtman and external objects],
based upon which there is the conclusion of , the
Sãthkhyas, against which is pitted the view of the Skta
doctrine. In order to justify this opposing doctrine
there are statements such as, "Beyond matter", and to
oppose this [there are statements] such as, "There is
nothing else as existent".
	
Then appears
the ãtman alone, based upon which there is the final
doctrine of Non—Duality In support of this [there are
statements] such as, "From which words return along
with the mind without ever reaching it". This state is
not to be discarded.	 To support it [the statements]
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are, "Some say he does not see and he becomes one". In
order to discard even this view [there is the
statementj, "There is neither non—duality nor duality".
Then, because of the complete subjugation of all
karmic traces, even though [the ãtman] is in isolation,
it is never viewed as either "this" or "this" On the
basis of this comes the final doctrine of the Upaniads
since this view is the principle entrance to the city
of liberation. Through that [liberation] there arises
an automatic extinction [of suffering], on the basis of
which comes the final doctrine of Nyya. To justify
this there are statements such as, "Then he who becomes
desireless, whose desire is only tman, who has thus
attained all desires, he being brahman itself attains
to brahman. His vital breath does not go out. It gets
dissolved in itself." Hence, even though a person is
keen to practice this contemplation of the tman, he
should enter the path to liberation only through proper
means, discarding all wrong means. For it is said
regarding proper and improper paths, that [ordinary
persons who wish to pursue the path towards the
goal],who are apprehensive of delusions should 'fix the
arrow to the bow with reference to the target'.43
In this remarkable passage Udayana describes a path to
moka which encompasses and ranks all the rival systems, both
orthodox and non—orthodox, into a hierarchy which culminates in
the perfection of the Nyya teachings. The path which he
describes includes both the meditative techniques of yoga, as
well as the discursive processes of reasoning. The aspirant is
to take the ãtman as his object of meditation, and Udayana
describes five successive states in this meditative process:
(1) only external objects experienced as real
(2) the tman experienced in the form of external objects
(3) the absence of all external objects experienced
(4) the distinction between the ãtman and external objects
experienced and
(5) the ãtman alone experienced.
It would seem that Udayana intends that each of these successive
352
tman in Nyãya thought
stages should correspond to a level of meditation in which these
different ways of seeing the tman are existentially realized.
In addition, for each level of meditative experience, Udayana
names two rival philosophical schools which result from a
discursive reflection on the experience. Only one of the pair
named for each level of experience expresses a world view
acceptable to the orthodox tradition, whilst the other expresses
a rival world view which is not acceptable. Yet it is important
to note that both systems are in accord with the original
experience and arise directly out of it, and both systems can
tt sayings £roc th Upaniads for their justification.
Indeed, Uday-aiza himself presents the orthodox (upasathhãra)
andopposing views (utthära) along with Upanisadic statements
which support the respective views.
Several important conclusions about the role of reasoning in
the meditative process can be drawn from this passage. Firstly,
it is clear that for Udayana the quest for moka includes not
only the traditional methods of yogic meditation, but also
discursive processes of reasoning in which the aspirant tries to
make sense of those experiences. He presents a path which
consists of two integrated methods, contemplative and discursive.
Paul Williams has noted that:
One aspect which Potter and other thinkers fail to
sufficiently emphasize, however, is the extent to which
the investigation of things through reasoning and
critical debate was itself considered a form of
meditative activity in India. Perhaps it was an early
state of discursive meditation, but Gautama clearly
states that liberation can be reached through
discussion and it is clear that the division between
meditation and philosophical investigation cannot have
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been too clearly marked.
[Williams (1978) P. 280]
Secondly, it is clear that the method of logical reasoning
is important as a corrective device to help the aspirant 'fix the
arrow in the bow with reference to the target'. According to
Udayana's presentation of the path towards moka, it would be
possible to arrive at an unorthodox world view on the basis of a
particular meditative experience, but with the aid of logical
reasoning the acceptable view can be shown to be superior. It is
interesting to note that by giving Upaniadic statements in
support of both systems in each pair, Udayana is thereby in a
subtle manner undermining the usefulness of the scriptural
tradition in resolving each dispute.
The path which Udayana describes is similar to many other
so—called "mystical" traditions in that it describes a step by
step process towards a final goal - a "ladder of perfection",
that is, a highly structured discipline consisting of both
discursive and contemplative processes. Whether or not Udayana
was really recommending or describing an actual path to be
followed by the aspirant is highly debatable. More likely, in
this passage he is presenting a theoretical arrangement in which
he is able to tidily organize all his rival systems. Even if it
is rather an idealized account, it does show the way in which
Udayana saw the role of reasoning to be a crucial part of the
spiritual life. The way in which logical reasoning and
traditional yogic techniques fit together in Udayana's outline
can be profitably explained with reference to contemporary
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studies of mysticism.
In his schema, Udayana makes a distinction between the
experience and its interpretation, where the interpretation of an
experience is dependent on factors external to the experience
itself - the most important of which here would be the
aspirant's religious doctrinal beliefs. Hence a Buddhist would
be likely to interpret an experience one way, and a Hindu
another. Since the work of Steven Katz on mysticism, 44 however,
contemporary scholars have become especially sensitive to the
importance of the beliefs held by an individual in shaping the
type of religious experiences he or she will have.
Interpretation does take place after the experience, but the
experience itself has already been shaped by beliefs held prior
to it. Katz denied the possibility that any mystical experiences
could transcend the boundaries of their particular religious
traditions. Hence scholars with views similar to those of Katz
would find Udayana's schema unacceptable inasmuch as it portrays
a sequence of meditative experiences to be held in common by
rival traditions.
Katz's work on mysticism has been questioned in more recent
studies on the subject - in particular his basic premise that
experience must always be specific to a particular doctrinal
tradition. Philip Almond postulates that there is a certain type
of experience which may be held in common by different
traditions:
the occurrence of contentless experiences provides
therefore a counter—balance to the somewhat
deterministic view of model five that all mystical
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experience is totally dependent on its context. It
suggests rather that there are mystical experiences
which, by virtue of their contentlessness, are
identical irrespective of the cultural milieu in which
they occur. In so far as we are speaking of
contentless mystical experiences, there is a unanimity
and a universality which transcends the cultural
context in which they occur.'t
[Almond (1982) p. 176]
Almond does not deny that there are many mystical experiences
which are inseparable from their religious context. He also says
that, although this type of contentless experience may be found
in different traditions, it will have a different role in each
tradition:
The contentless experience is compatible with a number
of conflicting doctrinal systems, and herein lies its
appeal for those who, like Radhakrishnan, argue for the
thesis of the unity of all religions by appeal to it.
Again, only extra—experiential criteria could resolve
the problem of conflicting duty claims in
religious systems grounded in a common experience that
transcends their respective contexts.
[Almond (1982) p. 186]
Almond suggests that such an experience occurs in Theravda
Buddhism, SAihkhya Yoga and Advaita Vedãnta, among others.
Whether or not this is absolutely the case is not crucial
for my argument. What is important, though, in relation to
Almond's argument is that on a experiential level the difference
between Udayana and his Buddhist opponents is less clear than in
other areas. The antipathy between the Naiyyikas and their
Buddhist opponents was a disagreement between ways of looking at
the world, not a disagreement concerning the experiential aspects
of moka and nirvãia. It is obvious from Udayana's schema that
experience plays an important but limited role in the attainment
of moka. He portrays Buddhists and Hindus as sharing a common
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platform of meditative experiences, revealing that for him at
least the disagreement with the Buddhists is over the
interpretation of such experiences and their role in attaining
liberation. For the Naiyãyikas, moka itself does not consist of
having a particular experience. Rather, it is characterized by
an absence of suffering, freedom from rebirth and having a
correct knowledge of the Nyya system in conjunction with the
experience of the tman alone. 	 Similarly, the Buddhist nirva
is not reducible to having a particular experience. Hence,
whilst it might be the case that the Buddhist and Hindu
traditions share experiences which in virtue of their
contentlessness are similar, it is wrong in the case of both
traditions to reduce liberation to such experiences.
Klmond's thesis is important in that it indicates that
disagreement between traditions which feature such types of
experience usually lies in doctrinal matters external to the
experience itself. If we talk of the Nyya concept of mok?a in
terms of freedom from suffering and freedom from rebirth, then it
is so similar to the Buddhist concept of nirvãia that we might
wonder at the antipathy which each tradition felt for the other.
Rather, I believe that the antagonism arose from the very fact
that for each tradition, Nyãya and Buddhist alike, 'having the
right view' was also an essential part of spiritual liberation.
What Steven Collins has said of the antman doctrine is important
in this respect:
As a socially institutionalised system of symbols,
Buddhist theory functions as a reference point which
orients, and provides a criterion for, the general
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religious outlook and practices of the ordinary
Buddhist; in this sense,the anattä doctrine's crucial
importance is to provide an intransigent symbolic
opposition to the belief system of the Brahmin
priesthood, and therefore to the social position of the
Brahmjns themselves.
[Collins (1982) p. 12]
This passage indicates the real source of the tension between the
Naiyãyikas and their Buddhist opponents, namely the position of
the brahmins within the hierarchical society of India. This was
not only a source of tension between the Buddhist and the
orthodox tradition, but it was also a problem within the orthodox
tradition itself in its attempt to place the quest for moka in
the context of a carefully ordered society.
At first sight the realism of Nyya somehow seems out of
place and somewhat contrived in the 'ladder of 'perfection'
constructed by Udayana at the end of his ATV. It becomes clear
only when we consider this tension in the orthodox tradition
itself as well as the tension between the orthodox brahmins and
the Buddhists. In this respect, it is interesting and somewhat
surprising to see that in Udayana's ranking Advaita Vedãnta comes
second only to Nyya as being a final expression of the truth.
(Indeed Udayana himself is sometimes labelled an Advaita Vedänta
philosopher.) Udayana portrays the Nyäya and Advaita Vednta
systems as both arising from the experience of ãtman alone.
Nyãya is portrayed as the final doctrine of the Upaniads, going
beyond the non—duality of Advaita Vednta. The realism of the
Nyãya school seems a long way from the teachings of the Advaita
Vednta school which denies, from an absolute point of view,the
reality of the empirical world which the Nyaya system argues for
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so strongly. The apparent inappropriateness of Nyya realism in
this schema which Udayana presents, again reflects the tension
between the soteriological teachings concerned with moka and the
teachings concerned with the order of society, that is, teachings
related to dharma.
In the Manusmrti, we see the quest for moka being tamed by
ordinances which laid down when the pursuit of moka was proper.
Moka was made subservient to dharma in that only male brahmins
who had seen the birth of their first grandson could properly
renounce the world and seek liberation. 45 Despite its idealism,
Advaita Vednta was a system of the brahmanical orthodoxy, in
which the empirical world was reconciled with the all—embracing
unity of brahman through its doctrine of two levels of truth,
empirical and absolute. Advaita Vednta by no means advocates a
universal renunciation of the world in the pursuit of moka.I
believe that whilst lJdayana held that Advaita Vedãnta system in
great respect, he viewed that system as leading all too easily to
a situation in which the proper ordering of society would be
neglected. For Udayana, the Advaita Vedãnta system did not make
a strong enough case against the Buddhists and others who
challenged the brahmins' preeminent position in society.
As we have seen, already in the Upaniads one finds
knowledge associated with mystical power. Originally that power
derived from the knowledge of sacrificial equivalents, i.e., the
knowledge of brahmin priests, custodians of the ritual. However,
once the emphasis shifted to an experiential knowledge, the
position of brahmins was threatened.
	 Power now might be
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understood to belong to the spiritual adept. In addition, the
Upaniads seem to have taught that the quest for moka was more
important than anything else, more important than following the
rules of society.
The Nyya system, I contend, represents one more attempt of
brahmanical orthodoxy to contain the pursuit of moka within safe
boundaries whilst not being antagonistic toward it. Most of the
Nyya philosophers were themselves brahmins 46 and their system
works both to re—appropriate the power of knowledge for
themselves and to give their superior position in society a basis
in reality. In this way they were able to counter the threat
posed by both the Buddhists and antinomian trends within their
own tradition.
The Nyãya emphasis on knowledge worked jointly with the
realism of the system to maintain the position of brahmins.
We have already seen in the Upani?ads that a belief in some
mystical connection between language and the world was at the
root of sacrificial thought. Although Nyãya philosophers
discarded such theories of language, they incorporated into their
philosophy some belief in a correspondence between language and
the world, a belief that, in many cases at least, the divisions
of language reflected real divisions in the world. Labelling a
feature as a jti rather than an updhi meant endowing that
feature with an independent reality. Hence by making brãhmaiiatv
a jti, the Nyàya philosophers were declaring that their social
position was based upon an independent reality, a natural fact.
We have also seen in the ATV how the very defence of tman was
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tied to the whole realist platform. 	 In turn, the existence of
the tman itself became another plank in the argument for the
rightful superiority of brahmins. Because the Nyya system
taught that there are a plurality of ãtmans, Naiyäyikas could
maintain that personal identity was determinate, and consequently
that the difference between a brahmin and a non—brahmin was
absolute. It is interesting to see how often Udayana uses
examples of hierarchical relationships in his discussions of the
existence of ãtinan, namely, the father/son relationship and the
teacher/pupil relationship.
In the Manusmrti, there is an antagonism towards logical
reasoning because it was felt that it could be used to question
and undermine orthodox beliefs. 47
 The Naiyyikas, however,
turned this situation around by bringing logical reasoning to the
service of brahmins. Moka could not be reduced to
experience, but could only be attained when the experiential
process was accompanied by an intellectual understanding which
recognized the validity of the Nyãya world view - and hence the
reality of the empirical world. 	 Without endorsing this Nyya
view of the world, an aspirant could not attain moka, whatever
experiences he had attained in meditative practice.
	 As we have
seen, in the Nyãya system the defence of realism included a
defence of the reality of the different orders of society. The
Nyãya philosophers thus succeeded in making an acceptance of the
orthodox view of society an integral part of the path to moka,
just as Manu in his own way had done. In addition, this emphasis
on knowledge also meant that the pursuit of moka was available
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only to those who would have the opportunity of gaining access to
this type of knowledge, that is, the brahmins.
There is no doubt that there is a tension in the Nyãya
system between its realism and its adherence to traditional
soteriological teachings, but this is a tension inherent in the
orthodox tradition itself and which was inevitable given the
juxtaposition of teachings about moka with those upholding a
social hierarchy. Like other religious traditions, Hinduism
could not be based on the indeterminateness and anarchy of
private religious experience. The Nyya system represents one
attempt to solve this classic dharma/moka conflict of orthodox
Hinduism.
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TEXT H: On our perception of atman
PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT1
athtmasadbhve kith pramãriarn?
pratyaksameva tvat, ahamiti vikalpasya prãtiabhçnmtrasiddhatvt.
na cäyam avastukab sandigdhavastuko vã, as'ãbdatvdapratikepãcca.
na ca 1airigika, ananusathhita1ifigasypi svapratyayät.
na ca smrtiriyam, ananubhiite tadanupapatteb.
anãdivãsanvaãdandirayamavastuko vikalpa ityapi na yuktarn,
ni1ädivika1pasdhrayãt.
iha tu	 pramãiãntare'pi kab sam'vãso yato
nilãdivikalpesu samvãsaki syãt.
vihãyãgantukamapi kiffcit kraiarh vcyam,
taccAptãnãptaabdau vã 1ifigatadbhsau vã pratyakatadãbhãsau
veti.
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TEXT H: On our perception of ãtman
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
"By what means then do we come to know of the existence of
ãtman?"
Well, it is actually direct perception, because the judgernent "I
am" establishes the 'bearer of breath' alone [as its object].2
And this [judgement] is neither one without an object nor one
whose object is doubtful, because of the non—verbal and
unmediated nature [of the judgement "I am"].3
Nor is it [a judgement] of an inferential nature, because even in
an incorrect inference there is a basis in experience.
Nor is this [judgement] a memory, because of its non—arisal in
the case of it not being experienced.
It is also not right to say that this judgement is without an
object because it is produced by the power of beginningless
impressions, because of its similarity to judgements about blue
et cetera. 4 If an unreliable means of gaining knowledge based on
karmic impressions, different from the p ramãias, is postulated
[to explain our knowledge from the judgement "I am"], what is the
reliable basis by means of which there could be confidence in our
judgements about blue and so on?5
Thus, having abandoned this doctrine of karmic impressions simply
[being the basis for the judgement "I am"], some additional cause
[for its arisal] must be stated. That could be (i) verbal
authority, either reliable or unreliable, (ii) inference or (iii)
direct perception. And just as judgements about blue take place
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PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT
tatra yath prathamamadhyamaprakrbhvãnni1avika1pa'-
caramath ka1pamä1ambate tathãhamiti vikalpe'pi.
tatryath pratyakapabhvitve skdeva savastukab,
tadãbhse tu müle'sya pãramparyt savastukateti.
srrdivastuko'pibhaviyatTti cet.
nà. nirupadhiarrrendriyabuddhitatsamuday1ambanatve
'tiprasañgät.
svasambandhiniariradvayam syditi hi vãcyam, tatra kab
svãrtha iti vacanTyam?
ananyatvarh svattvath sarvabhvãnm, tathã ca yad tenaiva
tadanubhffyate tadã pratyetub pratyetavyãdavyatirekdahamiti
syat.
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION
in the absence of the first and second alternatives because they
are based on the third [perception], so too in the judgement "I
am". In the case when the character of this [judgement] changes
after the first direct perception, it still has an object because
of its original basis [in perception]. So, when there is a
change in the basic form of that [non—propositional perceptual
judgement] it still has an object [even when, as a result of such
alteration there is an erroneous grasp of that object], because
of its original basis in direct perception.6
"[The judgernent 'I am'] has the body, 	 cetera, as its object."7
No. This would result in the excessively broad conclusion that
the judgement ["I am"] could be based on any physical body,
senses, intellect or combination of these.
If [the Buddhist] were to say that this [judgement] is related
only to the body et cetera which is one's own, then what does the
expression "one's own" (svãrtha) mean here?
For the "owness" of all beings is that they are not other [than
they are], and so when that [ãtman] is experienced by means of
that [sense of "owness"] then one has the notion which would be
expressed in the judgement "I am", since there is no reason to
logically exclude such a judgement.8
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PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT
ata eva ghaãdayo na kadcidananynubhavitrkã iti na
kadpyahamãspadamiti cet.
evarn tarhi	 pratyayab Iarirdãvaroparpa
eva tatab pratyeturanyatvt.
buddhau mukhya eveti cet.
na, tasyi	 bhinnasya karturahath
cchinadbhTtivadahath jnãmityanubhavãt.
ni1âdipratyetavyakaravat pratipattyakaropi pratipatter-
evayamatma tatha bhasata iti cet.
tarhi pratyetavyapratipattyakarayostulyayogaksematvat
siddham na samihitam.
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"Because there is no unchanging experiencer for such things as
pots, it is not clear who makes such judgements. Thus there is
never any basis for the judgement "1 am"."9
This is not so because, according to your own position, the
notion of "1 am" is superimposed on the body et cetera so that
you have already assented to the idea that the tobject of the
judgement "I am"] is something other than the body.'°
"The judgement N1 am" has only the intellect [buddhi] as its
object."
No, because the buddhi is experienced only insofar as it acts,
and one experiences the agent as separate from the action [which
is performed].	 In this respect the expression "I know" is like
the expression "I cut".
"The way in which actions should be cognized is the same as the
way in which blue is cognized, so that the tman appears only
because of action."
If this is the case, then because of the equally secure
possession of both the action and what should be assented to [on
the basis of it], what we desire is established.11
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1. ATV (1939) P p. 743-749
ATV (1940) pp. 336-340
2. Here the 'bearer of breath' (prãiabht) refers to the tman.
Hence Udayana's point will be that our consciousness of
ourseif as revealed in the judgement "1 am" is in fact a
direct perception of the tman.
3. A judgeinent without an object would be one about a hare's
horn or a round square, for example. 	 A judgement with a
doubtful object would be one which appeared in a dream, for
example.	 Udayana is dismissing the possibility that our
perception of ãtmari could be linked to either of these two
examples. (For example, if the Buddhist were to
successfully establish his thesis of momentariness, then an
enduring ätman would be like the round square, a non-
existent and impossible object.) 	 The basis of Udayana's
claim is that our awareness of	 tman is direct and
unmediated. In this case the Buddhist must admit that the
ãtman exists because he too is committed to the idea that
the objects of direct, unmediated perception (nirvikalpa-
pratyaka) are real.
4	 In all these examples, the comparison is made with
judgernents concerning colour. Thus mistaken judgements
about blue, for example, presuppose some real basis in
experience. Udayana claims that this judgement cannot be a
memory since it cannot occur unless it is actually being
experienced. The point here semms to be that memories can
take place in the absence of the original object which is
being remembered, whereas in the case of blue, for example,
when it is remembered it is also experienced. Even if
karmically produced forces delude us into an experience of
ãtman, we must be experiencing something, as in the case of
blue. (Colour judgements are, according to the Buddhist
opponent, products of direct perception - non-verbal,
unmediated and thus necessarily veridical.)
5.
	
	 Udayana is pointing out here that it is incumbent on the
Buddhist opponent to point out the difference between
judgernents about blue and judgements about ãtman. If he
postulates that our direct, unmediated perception of tman
is the result of karmically produced forces, then he must
also postulate some reliable means which could tell us that
this is not the case for judgements about blue. If our
faith in direct, unmediated perception in undermined, then
this undermines the very basis for all the instruments of
knowledge (pramaias).
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6. It might seem superfluous here for Udayana to mention verbal
authority and inference, having already made clear that
there is a direct awareness of tman. He is, however,
referring here to the views of early Nyya thought in which
it was believed that the tman was known through inference
and verbal authority.
7. The Buddhist is here portrayed as accepting that there is a
direct perception of something which IJdayana maintains is
tman.	 His task now is to identify the ãtrnan with some
other object, such as the body.
8. Udayana's point here is that there has to be some basis on
which we would say "my body".	 My body belongs to 'me'
because we can already make a decision about its ownership.
The sense of "I am" is logically prior to the judgement
that this is my body. The Buddhist, according to Udayana,
has been unable to give any logical reasons to exclude the
notion of the ãtman, which is thus the basis for the
judgement "I am", and hence the basis for decisions
concerning what is and is not mine.
9. The Buddhist draws Udayana's attention to inanimate objects,
such as pots, which retain their identity even though there
is no ãtman inhering in them. So the tman is unnecessary
for decisions concerning personal identity.
10. TJdayana now retorts that if this is so, then the Buddhist
will be contradicting his own position. If he has as his
thesis that in the judgement "1 am" there is a
superimposition of "I" on the body, then this must mean that
"I" has some existence elsewhere (as in the case of shell
and silver).
11. The Buddhist now says that the intellect (buddhi) is the
object of the judgement of "1 am". LJdayana's point here is
quite clear - that in the judgement "I know" both the agent
and the act of knowing are directly perceived as separate.
The Buddhist opponent wants to say that just as in the
judgement "this is blue", blue appears solely because
of blueness, so too in the judgement "I know", the ãtman
appears solely because of the act of knowing. Udayana
retorts that the example concerning blue operates more in
his favour because, just as in the case where we perceive
blue because of blueness, so too we perceive the separate
existence of the act of knowing and the knower. It is like
seeing two separate colours.
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PARALLEL SANSKRIT TEXT1
kab punaratra nyyah? pratisandhänam.
tathyamidamityasiddham, atathya?Ica viruddham, aviiam
anaikntikamiti cet.
na. hetvarthãnavabodht. nahi pratyabhijãnamãtram - atra
vivakitam. tat kirh kryakãraiiayorekasantãnapratiniyamah.
so'pi viruddha iti cet.
eo'pi na vivakito nab..
kas tarhi? prvãparadhiyamekakarttay vinicaya.
eo'pi	 iti cet.
na. sthairyasthitau tadabhãvät.
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION
What then is our reason [for upholding the existence of tman]?
It is correlation (pratisandhnam).
"The truth of this (1) is not established, (2) is not true,
(3) is contradicted, (4) is based on non—distinction, and finally
(5) [correlation] is not predicated of a single object."2
No. Because of the absence of understanding the relationship
between objects and their causes. We do not wish to say in this
matter that only recognition occurs. It should be further asked
how the relationship between a cause and its effect can be
limited to one continuum.
"It has been contradicted."
For us there is no wish to assert it.
What then? It is based on the idea that there is a single agent
operating in successive mental events.
"This [idea of a single agent] relating to successive mental
states occurs simply as a result of the existence of acts of
apprehension together with their objects."
No.	 Because of the non—existence of that [act of apprehension]
when [the mental continuum] is stable and unchanging.
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kaiikatve'pi naikajtiyatve sati tadutpattirevopdãnopdeya-
bhvab.
iycãryadhiymapi tathbhvaprasañgt.
bhedagrahe satiti cet.
na. prakçte'pi tadãbhãvt.
arrabhedãgrahastavadastiti cet.
na. bhinnajanmajffãnavyãpteb.
anupa1abdhapitkenpi b1enãtiprasañgt.
ekãdhãratay tath niyama iti cet.
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Since mental events are momentary, there can be no single locus.
Therefore only the relationship of cause and effect can exist
between mental events, as in the relationship between acts of
apprehension and their objects.
This would result in the possibility that the thoughts of a
teacher could also be those of his pupil.3
"[ Th e identity of the continuum] exists in the non-apprehension
of the difference [between mental events]."
No.	 Because even in the case of material objects there is no
such non-apprehension of difference.4
"Well, the possession of different bodies is not perceived to
apply [to a given continuum]."
No. Because of the knowledge [which people have] that they have
had many lives.
Also it would result in the excessively broad conclusion in the
case of the son whose father is not perceived [that they would be
part of the same continuum].5
And it would result in the conclusion of a changed entity in the
case where a pot is turned into a cup.
"[ Continu it y of identity] is assured [in such cases as pots and
cups] because of a common substratum."
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na. tasya vástavasya kaiikatvapake'pi viamasamaynãth
kaiãnmabhãvãt, kalpanikasya tvatiprasajakatvt.
'arirabuddhyorapi samnadeatabhimnt.
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No.	 Because according to your own view of momentariness, there
can be no continued existence of different moments, and further,
the same conclusion would also apply to fictional objects.
Finally, [according to your own view of momentariness], the idea
that bodies [are substances that] continue to occupy the same
place is one that is erroneously ascribed to those mental events
that perceive bodies.
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1. ATV (1939 edition) pp. 752-757
ATV (1940 edition) pp. 342-345
2. The Buddhist gives five reasons for not accepting
correlation (pratisandhnam) as a reason for accepting the
existence of tman. Apart from (1) not being established
and (2) not true, the Buddhist claims that (3) it is
contradicted by the Buddhist belief that what the Naiyãyika
perceives as the tman is actually a series of separate
events, and (4) the idea of correlation is not any different
from the erroneous idea of the ãtman for (5), correlation
belongs not to a single tman but to a series of momentary
events.
3. Udayana is concerned to say that correlation here means more
than the traditional argument based on recognition
(pratyabhij?Ina), that we can remember things from our past.
(For example, since Gautama, the Naiyãyikas had argued that
only the tman could account for the behaviour of a newborn
baby whose behaviour, such as sucking at the mother's
breast, they claim, exhibits knowledge that must have been
gained in a former life.) Udayana's argument here is more
specifically concerned with the relationship which exists
between the mental events of one continuum - what is it
that binds a particular mental event to one continuum rather
than another? Udayana also asks how, if the relationship
between the mental events is to be one of cause and effect,
it could be limited to one continuum. As the Buddhist
himself admits here, the relationship of cause and effect is
not able to distinguish the events of one continuum from
those of another. Udayana claims that it is only on the
basis of an enduring ãtman that we can adequately group
together the events of one continuum.
4. The Buddhist opponent here claims that it is because of the
non—perception of difference between mental events that we
group them together. As Udayana observes, this is hardly
likely for, even in the case of relatively stable material
objects, our experiences are always changing.
5. Here the Buddhist introduces the criteria of bodily
identity, that the body differentiates one continuum from
another. This is problematic from an Indian point of view,
with its belief in reincarnation and the continuity of
identity over several bodies.
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1. There are some materialistic systems, such as Crvãka,
which do not accept the world—view circumscribed by the
sathsãraIkarma/mok.a complex. Even such systems,
however, do present a metaphysical description of the
cosmos and man's place within it.
2. In some classifications of the orthodox schools,
Buddhism and Jainism are included:
bauddham naiyyikaiñ sãthkhyath lainam vaieikath tath/
jaiminlyam ca acJ vidhni darana//
Haribhadra Sun	 (c. 1168 A.D.)	 $acldarsana—samuccaya
verse 3. From at least the twelfth century A.D.
Brahinanical circles excluded Buddhism and Jainism from
the list of orthodox systems:
gotamasya kãtiadasya kapilasya pata'jaleI vyãsasya
jaiminecpi dar4anãni aJ eva hi/I
From the Haya ra—pa'cartra (introduced into Bengal
by Räjã Nallãla Sena c. 1158-1170 A.D.). This verse is
also quoted in the Gurug!t of the Viva—sra—tantra.
In this passage the acJdarana are listed according to
their supposed founders and are namely: Nyya,
Vaieika, Säthkhya, Yoga, Vedãnta and Pflrva—Mlmrhs.
3. For example, the term vedntadar'ana includes both
aftkara's advaitavednta as well as the enormously
complex traditions of the	 aivite and Vairavite
schools. But, there are several schools which do not
fit into this classification, such as Kashmiri aivism.
It must also be remembered that the terms Buddhism and
Jainism cover many distinct schools of thought.
4. It is a complex issue to determine the criteria by
which a school is judged to be orthodox - an ãstika
system. The reason given is that those schools are
orthodox which admit assent to the authority of the
Vedas. The Vedas are such a complex body of texts that
such an assent does not carry with it any doctrinal
implications. Some scholars have attempted to
demarcate the orthodox schools on the basisof holding
some doctrine in common, for example: "The Buddhist
theory of 'nosoul' is therefore fundamentally 'a
denial of the theory of substance (adravya—vda)
against which all the orthodox schools, realistic or
idealistic, stand arrayed .... the existence of a
permanent or abiding substratum (sthira—dharmin) is an
essential tenet of all the orthodox systems. It is
diametrically opposed to the Buddhist theory of the
flux of point instants (kaia—bhañga—vãda)"
[Shastri (1964) p. 157]
5. Such scholars as Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan postulated
that together they directed us toward the truth: "They
all help us to see some aspect of truth. This
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conception led to the view that the apparently isolated and
independent systems were really members of a larger
historical plan." [Radhakrishnan (1957) pp. 349-350J It
should be understood, however, that each system would see
itself as the final expression of a truth only partially
grasped by the others. Hence the Nyya philosophers would
not see their system as only a partial expression of the
truth, to be viewed in conjunction with the ideas expressed
by the other acJdarana, but rather, they would consider
that it perfected the partial visions grasped
by the other aJdar'ana. For example, Udayana in his ATV
postulates stages of realization through which one has to
pass, namely: Cãrvka and Karma-MTmãthsã, Yogacra and the
Vedãnta of Bhskara, the nyavãda scho9l of Buddhism and
Vednta in general, Sãthkhya and the Sãkta cult, Advaita
Vednta and Nyaya, which he calls the "final Vedãnta" and
considers superior to all the other stages. 	 See ATV (1939
edition) p. 935.
6. In contemporary philosophical studies, the division
between a western and eastern philosophical audience is
somewhat false. There are many leading philosophers of
Indian origin, such as Professors Matilal and Mohanty,
who are completely steeped in the western tradition and
world-renowned exponents of it. The analytical
tradition has spread throughout the world and books
such as Alfred Ayer's Language Truth and Logic are
standard reading in nearly all philosophy departments
world-wide. There are still, however, in India today,
traditional pandits who know relatively little about
the western tradition and whose training is in
traditional Nyãya or Buddhist logic. And of course,
many philosophers trained in the western tradition are
completely ignorant of Indian philosophy.
7. For example: "....many schools of philosophy have
literally nothing to do with moka. Nyya, Vai'eika
and Mmãths5 would predominately come within this
group." [Krishna (1965) p. 50] and: "No doubt we shall
find metaphysical construction and discussion of the
good life among these schools but their first
principles, their approach to their enquiries are those
of epistemology and logic." [Warder (1970) p. 8]
8. Dasgupta (1969) p. 278
9. See Quine's "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism" [Rosenberg
and Travis (1971) p. 63]. He argues in this article
against the distinction "between truths which are
analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of
matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic, or
grounded in fact", a distinction which he sees to be
one of the dogmas of empiricism.
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10. See Geliner (1974) P. 84
11. Modern western logic has been strongly influenced by
mathematical models in its construction of formal or ideal
languages. This raises questions "about the extent to which
any ideal—language analysis with its necessary and
legitimate restrictions of the multiple semantic values of
natural language terms does generate sufficiently and
legitimately accurate expressions which describe both what
is required for formal argumentation and what is presupposed
ontologically, epistemologically (etc.) in the multiple
historical uses of such terms in natural languages."
{Daye in Katz, N. (1981) p. 611
12. Ruegg (1970) p. 308
13. Daye in Katz, N. (1981) p. 61
14. Daye in Katz, N. (1981) especially pp. 64-74, where he
shows how the translation of an Indian inference from
the Buddhist Nyyaprave 'a into predicate calculus
distorts the inference involved.
15. See Dumont (1970) especially p. 135, where he proposes
that "on the whole we have two persons in one: the
empirical subject of speech, thought and will, the
indivisible sample of mankind, and the independent
autonomous moral being, as found first of all in our
own ideology of man and society" and "unless we
disentangle these two aspects, the empirical as a
general but infra—sociological datum and the
ideological and normative as characteristic of our own
type of society, we remain within our own society: we
succumb to sociocentricity." It was this distinction
that led to his brilliant analysis of the Indian caste
system in Homo Hierarchicus (1980).
16. Paul Griffiths' paper, "Notes Towards a Critique of
Buddhist Karmic Theory", is fairly typical of a more
critical approach to the subject matter. In that paper
he states that while it is important to understand the
views expressed in the subject matter, there comes a
time when it is proper to subject them to critical
judgement. [Griffiths (1982) especially p. 277]
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1. "All Hindus accept two basic principles: the sathsra
belief in the transmigration of souls and the related
karman doctrine of compensation. These alone are the
truly "dogmatic1' doctrines of Hinduism, and in their
very interrelatedness they represent the unique
theodicy of the existing social, that is to say, the
caste system." [Weber (1958) p. 118] Thus Weber sees
the karrna/sathsãra doctrine as providing justification
for the caste system, which is the reason for its
universal acceptance. Whilst agreeing with the
universality of the karma/sathsãra doctrine, I am not
postulating that the reason for this is to provide a
validation of the caste system. Indeed, the place of
the karma/sathsãra dyad as a consciously held idea
governing the daily life of the Indian villager is one
which has been brought into question by anthropologists
working in the field [see Pocock (1973) p. 38 ]. What I
am postulating is that this complex of ideas provided a
basic conceptual apparatus within which Indian thinkers
operated. To what extent it was a self—conscious part
of Nyya thought is something which obviously has yet
to be determined.
2. vrtyas were heterodox priests mentioned in the Vedic
hymns [Atharva Veda Book XV]. Possibly, Raikva, the
man with the cart, mentioned in the C.U. IV i-ui was
such a wandering vrtya.
3. "The overlap of the sacrificial and eschatological
aspects of the loka concept is developed in the notion
of the 'three births' of a man: he is born first from
his parents: for a second time when he performs the
sacrifice - this means both the first 'initiation'
(upanayana) into one of the three privileged classes of
Aryan society which were entitled to use the
Brahmanical ritual, and also the initiation (dik)
into each sacrifice which confirmed and continued this
membership: and lastly for the third time when he is
placed on the funeral pyre: 'when a man is born [again]
from there [into the next life] that is his third
birth'. If we remember that the eschatological side of
'being born into another loka' has developed to the
point at which we left it at the end of the last
section, with a final second death inevitable at the
end of any life in a loka after death, it is now
perhaps not surprising that, just as after a sojourn in
a ritually sacred loka the sacrificer returns to human
society, so after a second lifetime in a second loka
after death, it is imagined that there is a return to
earth, to the world of human society."
[Collins (1982) pp. 48-49]
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4. There is some suggestion that the doctrine of
transmigration had its source in heterodox teachings.
In the B.U., when the doctrine of transmigration is
first introduced, Gautama, a brahmin priest, is told
"This wisdom has never yet reached brahmins before
you". The evidence on this point though is far from
conclusive.
5. When Yjavalkya introduces this idea to Artabhga, he
draws him aside with the comment, "We two alone will
speak about this. We should not speak of this in
public". Some have interpreted this desire for secrecy
as more evidence for a heterodox source for the idea of
transmigration.
6. For example, Maitrey, Yjava1kya's wife, begs for
spiritual instruction rather than material settlement
when Yãjffavalkya announces to her his intention to
renounce his status as a householder (B.U. II iv).
Also in the Katha Upaniad, Naciketas passes up a boon
of wealth, long life and sons for instruction from Yama
on an individual's fate after death.
(Katha Upaniad I verses 20-29)
7. The four legitimate aims of life (pururtha) are
listed in the dharmic literatures as being moka
(release), dharma (righteousness), artha (material
wealth), and kma (pleasure). For the world-renouncing
samfiysin, moka tends to dominate the other three,
whilst the dharmic literature makes the pursuit of
dharma of dominant importance.
8. Translation by Zaehner (1966) p. 10. All translations
of the Upani.ads in this chapter are also from this
book.
9. "It is by speaking, sir, that a friend is recognized.
By speech, Your Majesty, the g-Veda, Yajur Veda, Sma
Veda, the Atharva Veda, [the hymns ofj the Angirases,
the collection of stories, the ancient tales, wisdom,
the secret doctrines, the verses, the aphorisms,
commentaries and commentaries on commentaries, what is
offered up in sacrifice and as an oblation, food and
drink, this world and the next and all contingent
beings are cognized. Speech it is, sire, that is the
highest brahman. And speech does not forsake the man
who, knowing thus, reveres it; all beings flow into
him. He becomes a god and goes to the gods." (B.U. IV
i verse 2) Other passages expressing this idea are:
B.U. I iv verse 10; I iv verse 15; I v verses 16-17; I
v verse 21; IV i verses 2-7; IV iv verse 11; IV iv
verses 23-25; V vii; V viii verses 1-4; V xiv verses 1-
3; VI i verses 1-6; C.U. IV v-vu and xi-xv.
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10. atha trayo viva lokb, manu y a-lokab, pitr-lokab,
deva-loka iti. so'yam manuya-lokaI putreiiaiva
jayyati....karmanã pitr-lokab, vidyay deva-lokali,
deva-loko vai loknãth rethab: tasmd vidyãm
praathsanti.
11. brahrna vã idam agra sit, tad ãtrnãnam evvet, aham
brahniãsmti: tasmãt tat sarvam abhavat....tad idam
api etarhi ya evath veda, aham brahmsm!ti sa idath
sarvam bhavati.
12. sa ya etam evath vidvth catu-kalarh pãdath brahmaijab
prakãavãn ity upste prakasavan asmiml loke bhavati
prakdavato ha lokã jayati, ya etam evath vidvãth
catu-kalarh pdam brahrnaiab prakãavn ity upãste.
13. Yjavalkya, iti hovca. yad idath sarvam mtyunptam,
sarvath mçtyunbhipannam, kena yajamno mrtyor ãptim
atimuc yata iti: hotr rtvijã, a g nina, vaca: V2 vai
14. ....yat sãk?ãd aparokd brahrna, ya ãtmã sarvntarab,
tam me vycakveti.
15. ... .athkmayamnaIi, yo'kãmo nikma pta-kma
ãtma-kãmab, na tasya prn utkrmanti, brahmaiva
san brahmpyeti.
16. na drer draãram pa4eb, na ruter rotrarh
na mater mantrath manv9Lthãb, na vij.äter
vijtara vijãnIy1i, ea ta tm sarvntarab, ato'
nyad rtam. tato ha uastas cãkrãyal2a upararma.
17. "If we analyse the principles of thought on which magic
is based they will probably be found to resolve
themselves into two: first, that like produces like, or
that an effect resembles its cause; and second, that
things which have been in contact with each other
continue to act on each other at a distance after the
contact has been severed."
	 [Frazer quoted
in Skorupski (1976) p. 136] The first of these two
principles gives rise to homeopathic magic, the second
to contagious magic. For a discussion of theories of
magic, see Skorupski (Ibid.) Chapter 9.
18. nãntab-prajftam, na bahi prajam, nobhayatab-praffiam,
na prajiiãna-ghanam, na prajifam, nãprajIiam, adrtam,
avyavahryatn, agrãhyam, alakanam, acintyam,
avyapadeyam, ektma-pratyaya-sram, prapaicopaamam,
ntam, ivam, advaitam, caturtham manyante, sa tmã;
sa vijiIeya1i.
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19. amãtra ' caturtho'vyavahryab prapaffcopas'ama ivo'
dvaita evam authkãra tmaiva, sathviaty ãtmanà'tmnaiñ
ya evarfi veda.
20. All the priests who took part in the Vedic sacrifice
were brahmanical priests, but the one who carried the
specific label "brahman" was the one who had this
supervisory function.
21. For example, B.U. i ii verse 2. In this verse we have
an example of heat being generated from the practice of
severe asceticism; tapas literally, warmth, heat.
22. Katha Upaniad III. This is the famous metaphor of the
chariot in which the senses are likened to the
chariot's steeds. The point of the metaphor is to show
the necessity of curbing the senses in order to escape
the attractions of worldly life.
23. "To start with, much imprecision and difficulty arise
from failing to distinguish in the 'individual':
(1) The empirical agent, present in every
society, in virtue of which he is the main
raw material for any sociology.
(2) The rational being and normative
subject of institutions; this is
peculiar to us, as is shown by the
values of equality and liberty: it
is an idea that we have, the idea
of an ideal.
For sociological comparison, only the individual
in the full sense of the term must be taken as such,
and another word should be used to designate the
empirical aspect." [Dumont (1980) p. 9]
24. We cannot say that the Upaniads "invented" the idea of
the individual or ego consciousness. I have already
discussed the social changes taking place in Indian
society which contributed towards the emergence of the
individual in a social sense. Heesterman (1964) links
changes in the form of the Vedic sacrifice with the
introduction of the individual into Indian thought:
"The outcome does not depend any more on others, but
everything depends on the crucial execution of the
automatically working ritual. This has led to an
excessive development of ritual science; but on the
other hand it meant a breakthrough in that it set the
individual free from the oppressive bonds of
reciprocity which tied him to others, the rivals. This
was achieved through the symbolical and numerical
equivalences. Where there was opposition there was now
equivalence."	 [Heesterman (Ibid.) p. 14]
	 The use of
symbolic equivalences in the sacrifice resulted in a
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fundamental change in its form, from the older agonistic
sacrifice to the classical sacrifice in which this rivalry
was eliminated. The rival need no longer be included as an
active participant in the ritual because he can be
represented and overcome symbolically. The use of symbolic
equivalences which allowed for elements in the sacrifice to
be interiorized facilitated in some sense the emergence of
the individual, since it freed him from relations of
reciprocity. Hence we have here at least three contexts in
which we have discussed the evolution of the "individual";
the speculative, the social and the ritual. To what extent
these are related is a further issue.
25. seyaih devataikata, hantham imãs tisro devat
anena 1ivenã'tmanã'nupraviya nma—rüpe vyãkaravãiiti.
26. yath, saumya, rnadhu madhukrto nistihanti,
nänãtyayänãth vrkãtiãth rasãn samavahãram ekatãth
rasath gamayanti.
te yathã tatra na vivekath labhante, amuyãhath
v r kasya raso'smi, amuyhath vçksasya rasosmTti,
evam eva khalu, saumya, imãI sarvh prajb sati
sampadya na viduki, sati sampadyãmaha iti.
sa ya eo'nim aitadtmyam idath sarvam, tat satyam,
sa	 tat tvam asi, vetaketo, iti; bhya eva
m	 bhagavn, vijãpayatv iti; saumya, iti hovca.
27. Vãtsyyana Nyyabhäya; in the examination of siitra I
he states: "An objection is raised: 'The mention of
doubt and the rest apart by themselves is superfluous
because all these, being included either among 'the
Means of Knowledge' or among 'the Objects of
Cognition', cannot be regarded as different from
these'. This is true; but for the good of living
beings have been provided the four sciences ... each of
these sciences deals with a distinct set of subjects,
and each has its own dIstinc t method of treatment; and
as a matter of fact, Dou bt and the rest form the
subjects dealt with by the science of Logic;
consequently if all the se were not distinctly
enunciated, it would appear that this science dealt
with the ãtman only, like the Upaniads."
Translated by Jha (1915) Vo1	 rr. 173-174
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1. A Nyya philosopher is known as a "Naiyyika".
2. The sequence of commentaries is as follows:
Nyãya Sütras	 Gautaina	 (150-200 A.D.)
Nyãyabhãya	 Vtsyãyana	 (300-300 A.D.)
Nyãya—vãrttika	 Uddyotakara	 (500-600 A.D.)
Nyãya—vrttika-
tãtparya—yikã	 Vãcaspati Mira(850-1000 A.D.)
Nyãya—vãrttika—
tãtparya—ik—
pariuddhi	 Udayana	 (1000-1100 A.D.)
[The dates given indicate the most likely time period
within which a particular philosopher was active.
Source of dates: Matilal (1986), pp. xiv—xv]
Together these works are known as the Quintette.
Dignaga (400-550 A.D.), the great Buddhist logician,
was the focus for Uddyotakara, who was himself
countered by Dharmakirti.	 Vãcaspati Mira wrote his
commentary to answer Dharmakirti's criticism of Nyya.
3. Potter (1977), p. 521.
4. For a discussion of Udayana's origins see D.C. Bhattacharya
(1958) p. 5.
5. The first version of this story is based on an Udayanacarita
contained in the Bhaviyapur apariita Chapter XXX. This
is quoted in the introduction to the Nyyavrttika
(Chowkhaniba Edition, 1916, by Vindhyesvariprasada).
Bhattacharya (1958) uses this for his source to recount the
tale (pp. 5-6), as does Thakur (1959) pp. 32-33. The self—
burning story was recited by Vidhyabhuana (1893) pp. 20-21.
In this version of the story, Udayana took a Brahmin and a
Buddhist to the top of a hill and threw them both off.
Whilst they fell, the Brahmin declared that there was a God,
the Buddhist that there wasn't. The Buddhist dies - taken
to be a sign of the falsity of his argument. Udayana was
denied audience with the Lord Jagannãtha because of the
death of the Buddhist, so he went to Varansi, where he dies
by self—immolation. The source of this version of the story
is said to be Tibetan.
6. For example, at the court of Janaka, King of Videha: see
B.U. iii i verse 1.
7. See Bhattacharya (1958) p. 1 and p. 39, where he discusses
the relationship between Udayana and Gaflgea.
8. "Indian Pandits in Tibet", S.C. Vidhyabhuana, Journal,
Buddhist Texts Society, (1893), p. 21.
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9. "Date of Vãcaspati MiAra and Udayancãrya", Bhattacharya
(1945) pp. 353-356.
10. The order of composition has been reconstructed by
Bhattacharya (1958) pp. 2-5, and is one which most scholars
find acceptable.
11. ATV (1939) p. 10
12. ATV (1939) p. 20
13. The term 'xent' is used here in the sense of a mental
event, an episode of cognitive awareness which would include
both non—verbal perceptual events as well as verbal
thoughts. Hence the occurrence of the thought 'There is a
tt o te at' siLL be counted as a verbal judgement,
whilst a non—verbal perception of the cat on the mat will be
a non—verbal judgeruent. In the Nyãya system, knowledge is
understood to be episodic in character. A cognitive
awareness, when true, qualifies as knowledge or a knowledge
episode (prama). For a full discussion of this, see Matilal
(1986) Chapter Four.
14. ATV (1939) p. 710
15. See Matilal (1971) pp. 127-129
16. For a brief introduction to Indian logic, see Daye,
"Buddhist Logic", in ed. Prebish (1975).
17. For a brief but clear introduction to the elements of philo-
sophical argument in India, see Matilal (1 86) pp. 69-93.
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1. Knowledge of brahman was salvific, yet at the same time one
is already brahman. Obviously there is some tension here—
the fact that one is already brahman would seem to render
the quest for moka superfluous.
2. Although meditation is an important element in the Buddhist
tradition, the Buddha rejected the yogic systems of
meditation as being not wholly adequate for the attainment
of liberation, since he regarded such systems as leading to
still changeable states of consciousness. He also rejected
asceticism as a possible path to liberation and felt that
once one abandoned the quest for Self, one would eventually
be released from a source of frustration. See Carrithers
(1983) pp. 39-52
"The emotional tone of the teaching of non—Self was that of
a calm arid relieved detachment. It was a liberation which
transcended the frustrated strivings of those who revolve
around a Self 'like a dog to a post'."
[Carrithers (1983) p. 46]
3. dye vãva brahmao rüpe, mrtaih caivãmürtam ca, martyath
cãmtarh ca, sthitaih ca, yac Ca, sac ca, tyac ca.
[B.U. iii ii verse 1]
4. For a more detailed exposition of these rival theories, see
Shastri (1964) pp. 234-245.
5. The basic metaphysics of the Nyya system were indebted to
the Vaieika Stras and Praastapda's Commentary on that
work, the Padrthadharmasarhgraha.See Padärthadharmasariigraha
(1963) pp. 314-331 for comments on kärydravya and pp. 773-
781 for comments on the inherence relation (samavya). The
Nyãya theory of change is closely bound up with maintaining
the distinction between a substance (dharmin/guiin) and its
attributes (dharmas/guias). A substance can persist through
change because of this separation between guia and guiin.
This relationship was very important in TJdayanats
metaphysics - for example, in the Lakatiavl, he attempts
to describe the structure of the world in terms of two
categories, samaveta, or that which inheres in things, and
samavetvat, or that which has things inhering in it. As we
shall see (Chapter Five), this distinction was another
important plank both in Udayana's defence of ãtman and in
his defence of a realist epistemology. Musashi Tachikawa
sees that: "The conflict between nominalistic movements
and realistic movements in Indian philosophy may be
expressed in terms of a function of the distinction (or
distance) between dharma and dharmin. Generally speaking,
the clearer the distinction between the two, the more
realistic the theory becomes; if the boundary between dharma
and dharmin becomes vague, the theory tends to be
nominalistic." [Tachikawa (1981) p. 101
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6. A position argued for by Betty Heimann in her article,
"Within the framework of Indian religion: the main dogma of
Buddhism", and by Theodore Stcherbatsky in his book The
Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word
Dharma.
[Heimann (1961) and Stcherbatsky (1926), reprinted 19701
7. Richard Robinson (1967) rightly notes that:
"Emptiness is not a term outside the expressional system,
but is simply the key term within it. Those who would
hypostatize emptiness are confusing the symbol system with
the fact system.	 No metaphysical fact whatever can be
established from the facts of language."
[Robinson (1967) p. 49]
8. For example, according to Abhidharrna theory, no dharma can
occur in two moments. Ngãrjuna postulates that no dharma
could therefore exist at all, because each moment is
susceptible to being segmented into several sub—moments.
See Robinson (1967) p. 44. Dignga's svalakaias are not to
be thought of as existents in spatio—ternporal framework,
for otherwise they too will be subject to this critique of
Nãgãrjuna. For Dignga, the world of space and time arises
from mental construction. See Shastri (1964) pp. 343-344.
9. Several Nyya thinkers previous to Udayana had been active
critics of the Buddhist thesis of momentariness. Notable
among these Nyya philosophers were Jayanta, in his
Nyyamaffjari, Trilocana, whose works are lost to us,
Bhãsarvajfa, in his Nyyabhiiana, the text of which has
recently become available, and Vãcaspati Mira, in his
Nyya—värttika—tãtparya1ik. ridhara, a philosopher of the
related Vaihika school, also contributed greatly in the
Nyãyakandali.
10. Sometimes "svabhãvahetu" is translated as "identity" [see
McDermott (1969) p. 28 ], but this is not an adequate
translation.	 Richare Hayes has traced the development of
this term from DharmakTrti's Pramãiavrttika to his
Nyyabindu and Hetubindu.	 He demonstrates that the inter-
pretation of svabhãvahetu by DharmakTrti's commentators
changes from one in which the svabhãva is the property to be
confirmed, to one in which it is the confirming property:
"For in Dharmakirti's verse the svabhva is the property to
be confirmed and therefore the property that pervades the
confirming property.	 But on the interpretations of
Kariakagomin and Manorathanandin, the svabhva is the con-
firming property and therefore the property that is pervaded
by the property to be confirmed." [Hayes (1987) p. 326]
11. In his paper, "Arthakriyã", Nagatomi (1967-1968) discusses
the meaning of arthakriyã in Dharmaklrti's philosophy and
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concludes that this term has a double meaning in
Dharmakirti's works: "useful action" and "causal power".
Nagatomi also argues that "useful action" was the primary
meaning of this term. [see Nagatomi (1967-1968) P. 63] He
admits that in the case of Jnari and Ratnak!rti the
emphasis shifts to the second meaning, "causal power", and
gives the following reason for this:
"their main objective was to defend Buddhism against the
criticisms levelled by their opponents, the Naiyäyikas in
particular, on such topics as universal momentariness,
non—existence of a permanent God, etc. 	 In so doing they
were led by force of context to lay tnore eniphasis on the
ontological aspect of arthakriy, namely 'causal power',
which we have located in Dharinakirti's own dialectic."
[Nagatomi (1967-1968) p. 71]
12. See ATV (1939 edition) pp. 118-156.
13. The Law of Contradiction could be stated in such a way as to
make the metaphysical argument for momentariness somewhat
redundant.	 See Matilal's discussion of the Law of
Contradiction (1971) pp. 60-62. By introducing the notion
of the "delimitor", the Law of Contradiction can be
formulated in different ways with respect to different
delimitors. The delimitors have the function of defining
the scope of the relevant properties. Hence two properties
may be contradictory with respect to a particular delimitor
and not contradictory with respect to another.
14. Hence one could say that the same object cannot be
associated with different times t1 and t2 according to a
strict formulation of the Law of Contradiction. Thus
although the strict formulation of the Law might be
particularly well suited to the Buddhist thesis of
momentariness, it should hardly be cited as evidence Lor it.
To say that existence is momentary because of a particular
formulation of the Law of Contradiction seems arbitrary in
the least and would then seem to be a matter of terminology
rather than a point of metaphysical significance. The
argument offered by Jffãnari, though, does not, as far as I
can see, depend on a strict interpretation of the Law of
Contradiction, but rather on demonstrating the spontaneous
nature of causal efficacy.
15. The Nyãya philosophers implement a threefold classification
in order to clarify the different ways in which different
types of cause contribute to the production of the effect.
From the point of view of a seed these would be:
(1) Substantial or Inherence Cause (samavãyikraiia)
In a sense this is considered the cause par excellence.
Thus the seed would be the substantial cause of the sprout.
(2) Non—inherence cause (asamavyikraia)
This is not so clearly defined as the above category. All
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the qualities which inhere in the samavãyikraiia and which
are considered essential for the production of the effect
come under this category. Thus the conjunction of the
different parts of the seed would be counted as such.(3) Efficient Cause (nimittakraiia)
This includes other relevant conditions, such as the planter
of the seed. This classification became subject to further
refinement, for example the subdivision of category (3) into
sadhãranakraiia, or general instrumental factors, and
asadhãranakãraia, or specific instrumental factors.
16. The suffix 'tvam' is a device used in the Sanskrit language
to form a neuter abstract noun from a stem, which may be
either noun or a compound formation. Hence añkura (sprout)
with the addition of tvam becomes añkuratvam (sprout—ness).
See Coulson (1976) p. 154.
17. See Mackie (1962) and Rescher (1961).
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1. For example, Vãcaspati Mira states that one and the same
entity may be the object of both a perceptual and a
qualified cognition. There is no incompatibility between
these two - it would be so only if the Buddhist had proved
his thesis of momentariness. Hence language is able to
refer directly to reality.
(yattãvad uktamartha sãmarthyajatvbhilapasathsargyogya-
pratibhãsatvayorvirodha iti / tatra brrnab / syãd virodho
yadi svalakaiamevãrthab, na tvetadasti I upapdayi?yate
ca paramãrthasij jãtyãdi mantramartha sthemabhajamabhilap-
sathsargayogyam, tena taijanitam jnam arthasãmarthyajath
cãbhilãpasarhsargyogyapratibhãsath ceti na virodhab.
Vcaspati Mira, NVTT p. 117 lines 12-15)
Jayanta states that the very life breaths of the Naiyyikas
depends on their defence of savikalpa-pratyaka.
(Naiyyikãnãm ca savikalpapratyakamayã12 priãb.
JayantaBhaça, NyyamajarT, (1936) p. 81)
Jayanta goes on to say the Buddhist thesis concerning the
constructive nature of savikalpa-pratyaka rests on their
thesis concerning the momentary nature of the world. If the
thesis of momentariness can be disproved, then their
arguments concerning the nature of savikalpa-pratyaka can
also be discounted. Just as sunlight can illuminate dust
particles invisible in ordinary light, so too can the use of
language and memory illuminate the object in the savikalpa-
pratyaka. The sunlight does not make the dust particles
lose their reality and so too, the use of memory should not
make the object under consideration lose its reality.
[Jayanata Bhaa, Nyyarnajari, (1936) p. 88]
2. "Perception" (pratyaka) is free from conceptual
construction (kalpan)."
[Dignaga, Pramasamuccaya in Hattori (1968) p. 27]
3. Construction (kalpanã) was given a wider interpretation by
Dignãga to include mental construction which may take place
on a non-verbal level. For example, a pre-linguistic child
may possess some constructive faculty. This issue is raised
by Matilal.	 [Matilal (1971) p. 37]
4. "Erroneous cognition (bhrnti-jna) is not a true
perception because it arises from conceptually constructing,
for example, water, etc., out of such things as vapor
floating over sand."
[Dignãga, Pramasamuccaya in Hattori (1968) p. 28]
Stcherbatsky stresses this point in his Buddhist Logic Vol.
I, pp. 153-161.	 See also Franco, "Once Again On
Dharmak!rti's Deviation from Dignga On Pratyakãbhsa",
Journal of Indian Philosophy 14 (1986) pp. 78-97.
vast us u
mit
abhvãvaghiti yvat.
definiti9nby	 ________________________
avyapadeS yam,	 _________________________
ra, NVTT, p. 108 lines 22-283]	 /
ge there is an attempt by 'Tcaspati Misra to
classification with Gautama's original
linking nirvikalpaka-pratyaka with the term
and savikalpika-pratyaka with vyavasäy±maka,
way to preserve a continuity in the tradition.
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5. Gautama's full definition is as follows:
"Sense perception is that cognition which is produced by the
contact (sannikara) of the object with the sense organ,
which is incapable of verbal expression, which is not
erroneous (avyabhicra), and which is well-defined
(vyavasytmaka)."
indriyrthasannikarotpannath jãnamavyapadesyam-
avyabhicãrivyavasãytmakarh pratyakam. 	 [Gautama,
Nyãyasütras I. 1.4 in NVTT, p. 93]
6. For a translation of Vãtsyãyana's commentary on this sitra
see Jha (1915), Vol. II, pp. 111-117.
7. See Praastapda, Padrthadharmasathgraha (1963) p. 443.
Praastapda makes a distinction between (1) just perceiving
a thing in its own nature and (2) perception which arises in
dependence on qualifiers such as universals, individuators,
substances, qualities and motions, and which gives rise to
such judgements as, "this white earthy substance, which is a
cow, is moving".
8. Vãcaspati Mira credits his teacher, Trilocana, with
introducing this distinction into Nyya teachings.
Unfortunately there are no extant works of Trilocana.
iha dvay! pratyakajãtiravika1pikã savikalpikã ceti /
tatrobhayindri yãrtha sannikarotpannarh jãnamavyabhicãriti
lakatiena sathghtpi svaabdenop.tt	 / tatra
vi p ratti p attestatrvikal p akãvb tadamavvaDadevam iti.
savika1pikãysa vyavasytrnakarniti / tatra v
vi6esanamupalak?aiath v I nama1tydi tatkarmma
vyapade4yath vieyamiti yvat / tadyath clittho'yaih
gaurayarh uklo'yath karpajdalumãnayam gacchatyayamiti
sarvam hi savikalpakaib
pravarttate / avidyamãnafn vyapadeyath yasmithstad-
avyapadeyam itv gdi svarThvaãhi na tu iãtvdTi
vieaiiaviey
[Vãcaspati Mi ____
In this passa
reconcile his
hoping in this
9.	 I use here the same term as Matilal.
[Matilal (1971) pp. 77-83]
e
10. nirvikalpena prathamãkasannipãtajanmanã jtimad-
vastuvedan gt tatropalabdhe ca na sathbandhasya abdasya
smaraath tath	 ca tacchabdbhidheya jãtiviiadravy-
vaghTndr iyãrthasannikar?a janmavikalpapratyayo
gaurayamityevamãkãro jyataiti ced.
[NVTT, p. 115 lines 25-27]
Translated in Stcherbatsky's Buddhist Logic Vol. II, p. 265.
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11. "now
the means of cognition are (immediate and mediate,
namely) perception (pratyaka) and inference
(anumna).
There are only two because the object to be cognized has
only two aspects.
Apart from the particular (svalakaia) and the universal
(smãnya-lakana) there is no other object to be cognized,
and we shall prove that perception has only the particular
for its object and the inference only the universal."
[Dignga, Pramãiasamuccaya in Hattori (1968) p. 24]
12. Dignaga's five qualifiers are nãmari, jãti, gua, kriya and
dravya. For a discussion of this, see Matilal (1971) p. 35.
13. Udayana states that a difference in judgement does not
affect the identity of a particular object. The difference
in judgements rather, arises from a difference in function.
The savikalpa-pratyaka serves only to identify the object
as being of a particular type [ATV (1939 edition) p. 344].
The idea here is that one and the same object may be subject
to various means of cognition. See Chapter Five pp. 268-275
for similar discussions regarding the senses of sight and
touch.
14. Jayanta, Nyyamajari (1936) pp. 88-92.	 Translation from
Matilal (1971) p. 80.
15. This is an approach typified by such philosophers as Austin,
Searle and the later Wittgenstein.
16. Here I am indebted to "Apoha and Pratibh" by Hattori
[Hattori (1979) p. 61-73] See p. 235 TEXT D for Udayana's
comments on this idea.
17. na prarnanantaram sabdam anumanat tatha hi tat krtakatvadivat
svartham anyapohena bhasate.
Dignga, Pramiasamuccaya, Chapter 5, verse 1, cited in
Kamalasila, Tattvasamgrahapanjika (1968) p. 539 lines 17-18.
18. See Chapter Four footnote 23.
19. Vcaspati Mira proposed a solution to this difficulty in
his NVTT. He proposed that the "this" referred not directly
to the svalaka . ia but to some shadowy counterpart caused by
the original svalakaia. Since this would be an unreal
particular, confusion between it and an unreal sm5nya-
lakaija would seem more likely. The insertion of such a
shadowy particular, however, raises further questions. What
is the status of the shadow particular? To be consistent
with Dignga, it has either to be a svalakaia or a mental
construction. If it is just a further svalakaiia (even if
more "shadowy"), then the original problem remains and the
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insertion of mediating svalakai2as could go on ad infinitum.
If, on the other hand, this shadowy sva1akaia is a mental
construct, then the problem of the relationship between
absolute and constructed reality still remains.
20. See Donnellan (1966) and Evans (1973) for definitive
outlines of this theory. They propose that objects are
named as such on the basis of an association which is
established by means of a causal chain with some kind of
initial baptism, whether informal or formal. Schwartz
associates these theories with Kripke's idea of the "rigid
designatortt:
"Kripke makes the same point about names and in addition
claims that they are rigid designators. 'Rigid designator'
is a term coined by Kripke to mean a designator, such as a
name or description, that refers to the same individual with
respect to all possible worlds in which the individual
exists. If a name is a rigid designator, then it refers to
the same individual when being used to describe counter-
factual situations as it does when used to describe the
actual world. This means that a name will refer to the same
individual whether or not he satisfies some list of commonly
associated descriptions." [Schwartz (1977) p. 22]
Copi discusses this idea in his paper, "Identity and
Necessity", in Schwartz (1977) pp. 66-101.
21. "Dignãga thinks that words or names cannot DIRECTLY express
the particular or datum. In order to refer to a unique
particular, one has to use a word or a name, and to use a
word or a name one has to use a concept as the 'ground for
its application'. The MEANING of a word is the 'ground for
its application' which is, according to Dignãga, a
conceptual construction. The only way a name can identify,
or refer to, a particular is through negation and
elimination of other concepts." [Matilal (1971) p. 41]
22. "In short, the apohist formula, 'The meaning of "cow" is not
non—cow', seems no more informative than saying 'The meaning
of "cow" is cow (or cowness).' 	 It is far from clear how
Dignga would respond to this objection. This is no doubt
because in Dignãga's hands the apoha theory is motivated not
so much by the desire to explain our ability to apply words
to things, as by the desire to explore what struck him as an
important analogy between linguistic apprehension and the
inferential cognition.	 It seems to have been left to
Dignãga's successors to formulate a non—circular explanation
of our ability to use language in successful practice."
[Siderits (1985) p. 141]
23. Thus, as we have seen, Sntarakita's introduction of mental
images was in response to criticisms by Kumãrila.
(siddha ced gaurapohyeta goniedhtmakaca sa1 I
tatra aureva vaktavva na1vah nratisidhvate I
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sa ced agonivttyãtmã bhaved anyonyasath4rayah /
siddhaced gaurapohãrtham vthpohaprakalpanam /
gavyasiddhe tvagaurnsti tadabhav gtu gaub kutab /
umrila, lokavrttika (1898) verses 83-85)
Sãntarakita's response is found in the abdrtha
park	 of the Tattvasathgraha.	 He puts forward what is
essential a causal theory of meaning in which an image
evoked by the word has the causal efficacy to exclude all
those images associated with the exclusion class. His
theory is based on two different types of negation,
paryudãsa, in which the negation contains an affirmation of
the contrary, and prasaiya-pratiedha, which is just pure
negation. In relation to the apoha theory, the svalakaia
itself functions ontologically to exclude all else and is
considered an example of paryudsa negation known as
paryudsa arthtmaka. The svalakaa is the cause of an
image which functions to exclude all those images connected
with the exclusion class. For a good summary of Jflãnar's
and Ratnakrti's positions regarding the relationship
between empirical activity and conceptual cognition, see
Dravid (1972) pp. 315-316 and pp. 327-339.
24. Vcaspati makes the point that there is a conformity between
language and external reality and that universals have an
external reality, even though of course it cannot be said
that names of things actually inhere in the objects.
(dravyãdapi hi bhedab sdhayiyate team / yathã ca
bhede'pi teãth tadvcakãn	 sãmãndhikarayath
tathopapditamadhastt. 	 Vãcaspati Mira, NVTT, p. 117
lines 15-16)
.,25. Udayana, Parisuddhi (1924) p. 588
Translation from Schterbatsky's Buddhist Logic Vol. II, p.
282 footnote 1.
26. See Chapter Four footnote 1
/
27. See Sridhara, Nyãyakandali (1895) line 4.
(tatra yadi	 akyãmab pramãienasmãnyam upapãdayituth
tadsaty api	 adbasathstagrãhakatve tad visayath
vikalpajinam indriyrthajatvãt pratyakam eva syt.)
28. For a detailed analysis of early Nyya and Vaie?ika
literature on this topic, see Shasrti (1964) pp. 310-314.
It would seem that in the Vaieikasfftras, objective reality
was not ascribed to the universal.	 The highest universal,
satt	 (existence), is held to reside only in the first
three of the six Vaiseika categories, namely: substance,
quality and motion.
"sad iti yato dravyag	 akarmasu sã satt."	 [Kanãda,
Vaie?ikasütras 1.2.3. (1 1)1
In early Nyya Vaiesika thought, an object was
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characterized by two aspects, the general (sãmnya) and the
particular (vie?a). These terms were relative terms
inasmuch as one and the same property could sometimes
function as a sãmãnya and at other times as a viea. In
the Vaieikasütras they are stated to be dependent on the
intellect:
"smnyath viea iti buddhyapekam." 	 [Kanda,
Vaieikasiitras 1.2.3. (1961)]
The way was paved for the universal becoming an objective
reality when smãnya assumed the function of causing both
comrnoness and differentiation instead of these two being
relative aspects of the same object. The idea that these
were relative entities persisted in the writings of later
Nyãya thinkers such as Uddyotakara and ridhara.
29. This is part of a general Nyya view concerning the
authority of perception.
"The entire argument of the Realist is pivoted on the
supposition that class—concepts and identity of nomenclature
will be unaccountable if the objective existence of
universals is not admitted, and this supposition is a
necessary corollary of the more fundamental assumption that
all our knowledge is derived from sense—data presented in
perception."
[Mookerjee (1935) p. 95]
30. See Chapter Four footnote 5.
31. See TEXT E. It is interesting to see how Udayana turns the
momentary nature of perception to his advantage. Usually
the momentary nature of all our perceptions is thought to
make it difficult to demonstrate the existence of anything
which endures. Udayana turns the traditional argument on
its head by placing the onus on his Buddhist opponent to
show how we could possibly form an idea of a universal,
given the momentariness of all our perceptions.
32. See Udayana's Kiravali (1911-1912) pp. 134-135.
33. Sastri (1964) pp. 334-342, deals with this problem in
considerable detail.
	
The Buddhists put forwayd various
objections to the idea of real universals. Srdhara, a
Nyãya philosopher, cites the Buddhist objection as follows:
"Some people propound the following view: the common notion
with reference to different objects establishes the theory
of the universal.	 But that notion does not cognize two
independent entities namely, smnya and viea, as it does
in the case of 'a man with a stick'. Neither does it
cognize the relation of sãmnya and viea as that of a
qualifier and qualificana, because the cognition does not
take the form: 'this cow is qualified by cowness'. As a
matter of fact, the cognition in question comprehends only
one identical object, because in the expression 'this is a
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cow', only one entity is referred to.
	 The two [the
individual and the universal] have no separate forms."
atraike vadanti bhinnevanugat buddhi. smänyath
vyasthpayati sa ca pratipiiJafn danç1apurusaviva na
svãtantryeiia sãmãnyaviáealakaje d ye vastuni pratibhsayati
np I tay orv iesaavi.e?yabhavam gotvl otvavãnityevam-
anudayt / kintu tdätmyagrhii prattiriyam
gaurayamityekãtmatparmarãt ubhayoranyonyaprahãnera
svarpãntarbhvãcca.	 [SrTdhara, Nyyakandali (1895) p.
315; translation from Sastri (1964) pp. 331-332] See TEXT D
pp. 234-235 for Udayana's comments on a related argument.
The Buddhists also objected that a universal cannot move
from one place to another in order to take up residence in a
particular because universals are supposed to be motionless;
the universal could not occupy the same place as the
particular because otherwise it would be manifested in that
place; the universal cannot be understood as coming into
existence at that place at the same time as the particular
because universals are supposed to be eternal; one universal
cannot subsist in many particulars in Its parts because
universals are supposed to be partless; a universal cannot
subsist in a particular in its entirety because that would
leave other particulars devoid of that same universal.
Udayana defends the Nyya position in the ATV (1939 edition)
pp. 401-414.
34. Uddyotakara (1915) pp. 315-317 states that all notions of
comrnoness need not be explained with reference to real
universals (j5ti). For example, there is no real universal
on account of which a group of people who cook can be called
"cooks".
35. Sridhara was the first Nyãya philosopher to use the word
"updhi" in the s,ense of Imposed property. Bhattacharya
(1958) p. 8 dates Srdhara at about 991 A.D.
36. In relation to common nouns, Putnam in Schwartz (1977) p.
103 suggests that, "(1) traditional theories of meaning
radically falsify the properties of such words; (2)
logicians like Carnap do little more than formalize these
traditional theories, inadequacies and all; (3) such
semantic theories as that produced by Jerrold Katz and his
co—workers likewise share all the defects of the traditional
theory. In Austin's happy phrase, what we have been given
by philosophers, logicians, and "semantic theorists" alike,
is a "myth—eaten" description."
37. For example:
"The heart of the traditional theory of meaning is described
by Putnam in the following way: 'On the traditional view,
the meaning of say, 'lemon', is given by specifying a
conjunction of properties. For each of these properties the
statement 'lemons have the property P' is an analytic truth;
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and if P1, F2, ....P	 are all of the properties in the
conjunction, then 'anything with all of the properties P1
is a lemon' is likewise an analytic truth."
["Is Semantics Possible?" p. 103].
The conjunction of properties associated with a term such as
"lemon" is often called the intension of the term "lemon".
This intension determines what it is to be a lemon. Thus
according to traditional theories, intension determines
extension. In the first section of "Meaning and Reference",
Putnam also discusses traditional theories of meaning. It
was in the ancient and medieval traditions, he says, "that
the concept corresponding to a term was just a conjunction
of predicates, and hence that the concept corresponding to a
term must always provide a necessary and sufficient
condition for falling into the extension of the term"
[Schwartz (1977) p. 14]
38. Schwartz explains the notion of a cluster theorist in the
following way:
"It was natural for many traditional theorists to extend
their treatment to cover ordinary proper names. It is on
this aspect of traditional theories that Kripke focuses.
According to the conjunction theorists and cluster
theorists, each meaningful proper name has associated with
it a set of descriptions. The unique thing that satisfies
the descriptions or, in the case of the cluster theorist,
enough of the descriptions is the referent of the name.
When one uses a name the intended referent is determined by
the descriptions that are associated with the name being
used. As examples of the traditional conjunction theory
applied to proper names, Kripke cites Russell and Frege,
whereas he mentions Wittgenstein and Searle as examples of
cluster theorists. The cluster theory of proper names has
seemed more plausible to most philosophers than the strict
conjunction view of Russell, but Kripke says that the
cluster view is just a refinement of the older theory."
[Schwartz (1977) p. 18-19]
39. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see "Meaning
and Reference", by Putnam in Schwartz (1977) pp. 119-132,
especially pp. 120-124, where he discusses the example of a
Twin Earth in which a liquid called "water" with all the
same properties as water on our earth, actually turns out to
have a different chemical formula. Putnam claims that in
this case the liquid on Twin Earth would not therefore be
water after all. He also discusses the idea of a "division
of linguistic labour":
"Every linguistic community...possesses at least some terms
whose associated criteria are known to only a subset of the
speakers who acquire the terms."
[Putnam in Schwartz (1977) p. 126]
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40. Copi in "Essence and Accident" says:
"There is a certain relativity implied in this account,
although it is quite different from those previously
discussed. Our notion of what constitutes the real essence
of a thing is relative to the science of the day. Centuries
hence, wiser men will have radically different and more
adequate terms, and their notions will be closer
approximations than ours to the real essence of things."
[Copi in Schwartz (1977) p. 1901
41. Udayana lists six impediments restricting the 	 ati
(15tibdhaka) in the Kiravali (1911-1912) p. 161.
(vyakterabhedastulyatvath saflkaro' thãnavasthitib/
rpahãnirasambandho jãtibãdhakasarhgrahab//)
Earlier in the same text (pp. 118-123), he says that a jãti
is a natural and not an accidental property of things.
42. This condition differs from the previous condition in which
it was stated that a jãti cannot be instantiated in another
jti, since there must be a category difference. The
category difference referred to here would be, for example,
the subject/attribute distinction. Hence "cowness" can only
be instantiated in an individual, and not in another jãti
such as "animal—ness", although it is contained or nested in
"animal—ness".
43. Matilal expresses a different view to this in his more
recent work, Perception, (1986) pp. 398-403.
44. Having decided that brãhmaiatvã is a jãti, the Nyya
philosophers then had the problem of explaining why it
wasn't perceptible. Jayanata, in the Nyyama?jar (1936) p.
204 line 15, says that perception in this case needs to be
elped by the declaration of someone in authority.
Sridhara, in the Nyãyakandali (1895) p. 13, likens it to the
example of needing an expert in precious stones to be able
to identify a particular gem. (It is interesting to note
that here we have the idea of a "division of linguistic
labour" that Putnam proposed in his paper "Meaning and
Reference". See footnote 39 above.) ridhara concludes his
comments with the idea that differences in caste can often
be hard to perceive owing to the similarity between human
forms which has the effect of masking caste differences. It
is interesting to note that in contemporary western
philosophy the new theory of reference has had an important
influence on issues outside of theories of meaning. Much
discussion centres on which terms are natural kind terms and
which are not (just as the Naiyãyikas, for example, would
want to dispute that brhmaxatv is a natural kind term,
that is, a jti). For example, in the philosophy of mind in
contemporary western philosophy, some philosophers have
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argued that psychological terms are rigid designators of
natural kinds, which influences their understanding of such
terms as "dreaming" and so on. [See Schwartz (1977) pp. 34-
41]. In the case of brãhmaatv5, the whole Naiyyika
understanding of caste hinged on the fact that it was a jti
and not an updhi. It is for such reasons that the
jti/upãdhi distinction was important for Nyãya thought.
J.F. Staal holds that the theory of jtisathkara shows a
marked extensional character (that is, the theory that there
can be no cross division between j5tis). In his article,
"The Theory of Definition in Indian Logic", he states that
this theory treats the relationship between the extensions
in an extensional way rather than in an intensional way.
Tachikawa (1981) in response to Staal poses the question:
"nobody can deny that the theory of jãtisathkara possesses
the extensional character insofar as cross—division of
extension is dealt with in that theory. But for what
purpose does Udayana propose that theory? Why does he have
to differentiate between two kinds of universal?"
[Tachikawa (1981) p. 50 footnote 43]
In the case of brhmariatv we gain an idea of what can hinge
on this distinction. Brhmatiatvä is a rigid designator in
that it always refers to the same "stuff" independently of
the "stuff's" superficial phenomenal properties. This was
an important element in their arguments against the
Buddhists; attempt to reinterpret the caste system.
45. For a similar thesis see McKim Marriott's article, "Hindu
Transactions: Diversity without Dualism" in ed. Bruce
Kapferer (1976) pp. 109-141.
"Hindu and in general Indian, South Asian society has
developed transactional thinking perhaps further than has
any other. It exhibits an elaborate transactional culture,
characterized by explicit, institutionalized concern for
givings and receivings of many kinds in kinship, work and
worship. Hindu thinking about social transactions viewed
from the modern West may seem peculiar for the biological
substantialism on which it builds, and for its special
orientation to questions of rank."
[Marriott in Kapferer (1976) p. 109]
401
Footnotes to Chapter Five
1. bhagavann asthi-carma-snãyu-majjã-mihsa-ukra-oiita
le
durgandhe nibsresminarTre kirfi kãmopabhogai? kma-
krodha-lobha-moha-bhaya-videryesaviyognia-
samprayoga-kut-pipsãiar5 mtyu-roga-okãdyair abhihate
asmin 4arre kith kãmo-pabhogai? sarvath cedaih kayiu
p aymo yat heme datha-ma akã d aya s-ta-vanaspatayodbhiIta-
pradhvathsinah .vnyniñ oaiam mahãrtjavãnth
sikharitim prapatanath dhruvasya pracalanarh vra4canam
vtarajjünth nimajjanam pthivyãi sthnd apasarapam
suriãm ity etad-vidhosmin sathsre kirñ kmopabhogai
yair ev4itasyasakd ihvartanam dyata ity uddhartum
arhasi, andhodapnastho bheka ivTham asmin sarhsãre
bhagavan tvath no gatis tvath no gatih.
2. The Upaniads do not definitely say that the world is
illusory.	 This was another question left for later systems
to argue. Both the momentariness and illusoriness of the
world, however, are more in accord with the kind of
disdain for the world expressed in the Maitr! Upaniad.
Hence the place of Nyya realism in relation to the tradi-
tional soteriological teachings needs to be understood.
That is, can Nyya realism be understood as a soteriologi-
cal device, other than to preserve the reality of the ãtman?
3. This can be seen in the nature of the arguments found there,
namely, (i) stable versus momentary objects, (ii) the
existence or not of the referents of empty subject terms,
and (iii) the existence or not of real universals and the
related arguments concerning nirvikalpa-pratyaka and
savikalpa-pratyaka (simple and qualified perceptions).
4. There is a distinction to be made between an external world
and a world independent of our perception of it:
"For realism, the familiar physical object not only exists
but also exists independently. This crucial expression
'independently' means that if by chance all the sentient
creatures were annihilated our familiar physical objects
would still continue to exist in the same way."
[Matilal (1986) p. 15]
Hume made a similar distinction:
"We ought to examine apart these two questions, which are
commonly confounded together, viz. Why we attribute a
CONTINUED existence to objects, and why we suppose them to
have an existence DISTINCT from the mind and perception."
[Hume (1969) p. 238]
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5. For example:
"But the major dispute in classical India was not so much
between direct realism and the representative theory, as
between direct realism and phenomenalism-cum-idealism."
[Matilal (1986) p. 14]
6. We do not know whether Dignãga himself was a Sautrãntika or
a Yogäc5ra. This is still disputed and debated by different
schools of Buddhism, especially in the schools of Tibetan
Buddhism. As Matilal points out:
"In Dignga's system the place of the absolute reality is
taken by the unique particulars (svalakaias). Each barest
particular can be interpreted either as an internal
consciousness-moment or an external point instant depending
on whether a Yogcrin or a Sautrntika is the interpreter."
[Matilal (1971) p. 39]
7. Mohanty admits that there are some qualifications to this
which do not, however, affect the basic realism of the
system:
"In its theory of savikalpa perception, however, Nyya is
led to grant a peculiarly intermediate status to certain
epistemic entities. This does not affect the basic dir ct
realism of the system which is maintained with the help of
the theory of nirvikalpa perception in which an object is
directly given free from all epistemic adjuncts."
[Mohanty (1970) p. 183]
8. The different schools of Hinduism and Buddhism held
different views about the nature of awareness and its
relation to an external reality. Nyaya philosophers are
characterized as nirãkãra-jiãna-vãdins in that they regarded
awareness to be essentially formless. One awareness is
distinguished from another on the basis of the object
(grãhya) grasped by the awareness (grãhaka). Nyãya
philosophers would identify the object grasped in our
awareness with an aspect of external reality. For a good
summary of the Buddhist schools on this matter in relation
to their respective theories of error, see Matilal (1986),
pp. 183-190. Udayana deals with this enormously complex
topic in the first part of his Bhyãrthabhañga chapter, ATV
(1939 edition) pp. 429-569, (1940 edition) pp. 189-253.
9. The Bähyrthabhañga and Guiaguiibhedabhañga chapters of the
ATV together discuss many issues in relation to realism.
There has not been the space here to cover these topics
comprehensively. Matilal's recent work, Perception, (1986)
is a detailed examination of the realist/idealist
controversy in India.
10. Hence for Udayana our grasp of physical objects is a 'given'
- it is on this basis that we must build our theories about
the world. In this respect Udayana may be compared to
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Strawson:
"This general realist view of the world is reflected,
Strawson claims, in tour ordinary perceptual judgements',
and should not be accorded the status of a theory, for its
acceptance is the very condition for the sensory experience
to be understood as what it is, viz, as what supplies the
data or evidence for such a theory." [Matilal (1986) p. 9]
This premise was the basis for Strawson's book,
Individuals.
11. See Matilal (1986) pp. 252-254.
12. Matilal has just previously discussed the Sautrãntika
position which states that there is nothing that is a shape
separate from the mass of colour which we see; otherwise, if
there were a visually perceived shape, this would go against
the Buddhist dictum that each sense faculty has its own
domain of objects (for one shape would be both seen and
touched). According to the Sauträntika position, the visual
shape is only a nominally existent entity.
[Matilal (1986) pp. 250-251]
13. Mohanty is here describing an argument contained in the
Nyyasiitras 2.1.31 and taken up by Vtsyãyana and
Uddyotakara in their commentaries on this siltra.
14. Udayana's arguments for the defence of avayavin are to be
found in the ATV (1939 edition) pp. 586-613 and pp. 636-
662, (1940 edition) pp. 258-275 and pp. 286-301. Udayana
argues for the notion of the avayavin in a way that we have
encountered in the Guiaguiibhedabhadga chapter, namely, that
we experience the avayavin directly as a single entity and
not as an aggregate of its parts. This is like his argument
for our seeing and touching one and the same object - this
is just the way we experience the world.
15. Nyyastras 2.1.31-37 and 4.2.4-16. 	 See also Vãtsyyana's
and Uddyotakara's commentaries on these sütras.
16. This line of DharmakTrti is often quoted by his commentators
and opponents and can be found in the Pramtiavinicaya which
survives in Tibetan translation.
17. Udayana ATV (1939 edition) p. 529, (1940 edition) p. 230.
18. Early Nyya philosophers also dealt with the problem of how
to overcome the gap between our sense organs and the
external object. For example:
"From the elements come the olfactory, gustatory, visual
and auditory sense organs. These elements are respectively
earth, water, fire, air and k 'a. Their objects are
respectively smell, taste, colour, touch and sound."
Nyyastras 1.1.12-14.
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It would seem that by making the sense organs of the same
substance as that which is to be perceived, the early Nyãya
philosophers are trying to overcome the distance between the
external object and the perception of it. They are treating
what is essentially a logical gap with a physical remedy.
19. Bhävivikta first introduced the argument that an object can
be perceived without its qualities, for example, when it is
in the shade. This view is ascribed to him by ãntaraksita,
which is our only source since there are no extant works of
Bhãvivikta (520-580 A.D. according to Oberhammer). As
mentioned though, Udayana's argument is more than the fact
that an object can appear separately from its usual
qualities. His argument has more to do with giving an
adequate explanation of perceptual error, for an object
always appears with some qualities.
20. I follow here Matilal's translation of this term.	 See
Matilal (1986) p. 201.
21. For example, see Vardhamãna's Nibandhaprak 'a (1911) p. 397,
where he concludes that the yellowness of the conch shell is
just presented perceptually and there is no reason to invoke
the device of similarity to explain this error.
22. In the concluding section of the Guriautibhedabhahga
chapter of the ATV, Udayana discusses the perception of a
tree from near and afar by two different observers. He
claims that in such cases only the guia/guiin distinction
can explain how it is the same tree that is being seen, even
though it has a different appearance for each of the
observers. See ATV (1939 edition) pp. 730-735, (1940
edition) pp. 330-333.
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1. anãtmadar'ino mumukutvavy5hãtãt.	 na hytmnamaprati-
sandhãya	 kaciddubkaiñ hãtumicchet sukharh vvãptum.	 maya
svargapavargaphalabhãgin	 bhavi tavyamityprãyasya
yãvadabhiyogamanuvtteh, ananuvrttãvabhiyoganivttau
phalsiddhe. iyarh ca nairtmyadttirnstikyath dpayet,
tacca prabalaviayatiãparilutamanarthamanantarh prasuvita,
na cedevath kuto 'yavajjvam sukharh jTved' ityãdayo'pi
nibañkapralpb.
ATV (1939 edition) p. 814, (1940 edition) p. 371.
2. See Vaisesikasutras 	 III .2.4-5
3. Kaida, reputed author of the Vaieikasiitras, states that
the ãtman can be inferred from such marks as breathing
upward, breathing downward, shutting the eye, opening the
eye .....pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort. The
Nyãyastras 1.1.10 state that the marks of the gtman are
desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and judgement.
4. In the Nyãyasiitras 1.1.9, Gautama lists the objects of
knowledge as ãtman, body, sense organs, objects, judgement,
internal organ, activity, defect, rebirth, fruit, pain and
release:
t ma a r r en d r I y art ha bud d him an a I p r a yr t t i d o a p r e ty a b h v a p ha 1 a -du b khapavargastu prameyam.
5. Vaieikastras III .1.1-9, 14, and III .2.4-5. In his
commentary on the Nyayasfftras 1.1.10, Vãtsyyana states that
the atman is not known by perception but by the marks which
Gautama lists in 1.1.10.
6. Vaieikastra Ix .13-17.
7. As early as Bhavivikta (520-580 A.D.) we find the view
expressed tht the ãtman can be perceived. Bhavivikta is
mentioned by Sntarakita as holding the view that since the
ahathkra is seif-cognizable, the atman is perceptible, and
hence its existence is proved. Vyomaiva in the Vyomavati,
his commentary on the Padarthadharmasathgraha (950 A.D.),
affirms this view that the ãtman is perceptible since it
appears in judgements about the ahanlkãra.
8. astu tarhi nairtmyam, anupalabdheriti cet.	 na,
sarvãdçteca sandeht tvadtervyabhicratal.
ATV (1939 edition) p. 739; (1940 edition) p. 334.
9. H.D. Lewis and C.A. Campbell are the two leading
contemporary exponents of this view in western philosophy.
Campbell puts it this way:
"There is, indeed, an apprehended relationship in virtue of
which I call experiences 'mine', but it is not a
relationship of experiences to one another. It can, I
think, only be stated as a relationship of experiences to
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me, an identical subject conscious of having or owning them;
a relationship of 'belonging to'."
[Campbell in C. Vesey ed., (1973), p. 16]
10. This argument was first used by Vtsyyana in the
Nyãyabhya 3.1.1 where he states that the ãtman is
different from the sense organs and that a statement such as
"he knows" should be interpreted as being similar to a
statement such as "he cuts with an axe".
11. See also Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, translated by
N. Kemp Smith (1964), p. 342, especially footnote a.
12. Parfit uses an example from the realm of science fiction to
argue his point. He considers a situation in which a
replica of a person is created on Mars by pressing a green
button. Before the person presses the button he thinks,
"snow is falling", and then his replica suddenly becomes
conscious in his cubicle on Mars. This replica has all the
memories of the original person's life and is conscious of
just having had the thought, "snow is falling". 	 He then
concludes, "so it must be cold". Parfit contends that the
replica is now in the exact state of mind as the person on
earth who had had the same two thoughts"
"When my Replica is in this state of mind, he would believe
that both these thoughts were had by the same thinker,
himself. But this would be false. I had the first thought,
and my Replica only had the second. This example is only
imaginary. But it seems to show that we could not tell,
from the content of experiences, whether we really are aware
of the continued existence of a separately existing subject
of experiences. The most that we have are states of mind
like my Replica."
[Parfit (1986) p. 224]
13. Western philosophers admit that claims about reincarnation,
and also numerous fictional examples in which people seem to
change physical identity, are not nonsensical. This must
mean that the notion of personal identity is at least
conceptually separate from physical identity. Many
philosophers would then claim, however, that such cases are
parasitic on the fact that personal identity must in general
involve bodily identity.
14. The reason behind this attention on the brain is the
assumption that all of a person's psychological features
depend upon the states of the cells in his brain. See
Parfit (1986) pp. 234-236, in which he discusses the
inadequacies of a physical basis for a determinate personal
identity. He uses examples of varying degrees of transplant
of brain tissue.
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15. Hume, of course, was tackling a different problem than that
with which Udayana was concerned. Hurne is looking for those
features of our experience which cause us to have a sense of
our own identity, whereas Udayana is looking for principles
by means of which all the events of any particular continuum
can be bound together into that continuum. See Stroud
(1977) pp. 118-140 for a discussion of the problem which
Hume tackled.
16. That is, if several people were to hear a sounding tuning
fork, then identical sensations would be the effects of a
common cause. Yet we would not want to group them together
just because they were all effects, B, of cause A.
17. abhrãntab sammataikãvasãyab prakrtivikriye vã tatau
hetuphalasyopãdãnopdeyalaksaiiamiti.
Udayana ATV (1939) p. 760; (1940 edition) p. 345.
athavã abhrntal sammataikãvasyab praktivikriye ubhau
hetuphalasyopãdãnopadeya lakaiiam.
Jina6rimitra Kaiiabhañgdhyya in the Jiiãnar-
mitranibandvali p. 73 lines 19-20
18. See Chapter Six footnote 15 for a comparison with Hume's
approach. Udayana's argument that we have a direct
unmediated experience of the tman is reminiscent of his
arguments relating to the concept of the avayavin (the
whole) and his arguments relating to the unity of the object
which we see and touch. In all these cases his appeal is to
a direct unmediated experience that this is the case.
19. "The most promising suggestion is that the bundles are tied
together by means of memory; but this meets with serious
difficulties.	 In the first place, it is exposed to the
charge of circularity; for it is plausible to argue that
remembering an experience already implies thinking of it as
an experience of one's own: and even if this charge can be
met, it is clear on other grounds that memory alone 'will not
suffice.	 For not every experience can be remembered;
otherwise each piece of remembering, which is itself an
experience, would have to be remembered, and each
remembering of a remembering and so on ad infinitum."
[Ayer (1963) p. 114]
20. "Memory proper involves the recognition of the past
occurrence as one in which I find the consciousness of the
person I am now. I relive, as it were, the past event, or
recapture it, in the form which involves the peculiar
awareness I now have of myself as one unique being wholly
incapable of being any other."
[Lewis, H.D. (1970) p. 241]
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21. Udayana maintains that only an enduring tman can limit the
range of memory to one continuum. The Buddhist poses a
karmic force as the carrier of memory. Udayana claims that
there is no basis for restricting the range of this force to
one continuum	 that is, the karmic force could produce a
memory in another continuum. Udayana also maintains that
there is no room in the continuum for the simultaneous
operation of this karmic force alongside the cause
and effect relationship governing the sequence of mental
events in that continuum. Udayana's arguments here are
similar to those he used in relation to the Buddhist notion
of kurvadrüpa, where (i) he argued that there was no room
for both the kurvadrUpa and the seed moment to operate in
the same series and (ii) he argued that there was no way
the Buddhist could restrict the activity of the kurvadrilpa
to the seed.
22. Parfit in this work systematically undermines both the
physical and psychological, or some combination of the two,
as providing a basis for a determinate personal identity.
His aim is to demonstrate how an acceptable morality can be
built up on the basis of the idea that our personal identity
is not what matters. Parfit himself, compares his view to
those of the Buddhists. The Nyya belief would therefore be
coherent according to a Parfit—type thesis, inasmuch as
Nyãya philosophers hold together a belief in an enduring
ãtman and the belief that our personal identity is
determinate.
23. See Parfit (1986) p.227. Parfit believes that
reincarnation could be cited as evidence for the existence
of a Cartesian Ego but believes that the right kind of
evidence for reincarnation is lacking. As stated in this
chapter, both the Buddhists and Naiyyikas believed in
reincarnation and Udayana's argument is that only by
positing the existence of the tman can the belief in
reincarnation be defended.
24. In this context I am using "individual' t
 in a normative
sense. Griffiths is concerned that our sense of who we are
be preserved from one life to the next.
25. ruteb rutvtmãnarh tadanu samanukrntavapuo vinicitya
nyãyãdatha vihataheyavya tika ram upsit 4raddhamadama-
virmaikavibhavo bhavocchi tyai cittapraxidhivihitair-
yogavidhibhib.
ATV (1939 edition) p. 935, (1940 edition) p. 447.
The idea of a threefold path is found in the Upaniads, for
example, in the B.U. 2.4.5 we read	 tma v g are rotavyo
mantavyo nididhyãsi tavyaI.	 Udayana's words "rutvã",
vinicitya' t and	 correspond to the Upanisadic
"4ravana", "manana" and "nididhysana".
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26. Kanãda says in the Vaieikastras VI.2.18-19 that the
absence of contact of demerit and merit with the body
results in liberation.
27. "Since anyone attempting to attain or witness an eternal
unchanging Self was, in the Buddha's view, bound to failure,
the doctrine of the Self was an invitation to further
suffering: 'such (a doctrine of the eternal Self) is merely
a sensation, a writhing in discomfort, of the venerable
ascetics and Brahmans who neither know nor see, and who have
fallen victim to desire (for such a Self)'. So to give up
such a doctrine was to give up a potent source of
frustration. The emotional tone of the teaching of non-Self
was that of a calm and relieved detachment. It was a
liberation which transcended the frustrated strivings of
those who revolve around a Self 'like a dog tied to a
post' ."
[Carrithers (1983), p. 46]
It is interesting to see similar views expressed by non-
Buddhists who hold some version of a no-Self theory:
"When I believed that my existence was such a further fact,
I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass
tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at
the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my
view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared."
[Parfit (1986), p. 281]
As we have already seen, the tman was important for Udayana
because he believed that without such an entity, there would
be no goal to strive for, and nobody would have any reason
to pursue mok.a. (ATV (1939 edition), p.814; (1940
edition), p. 371. See p. 312 for translation.)
28. Nyyasiitras 1.1.22; 4.1.59-68.
29. Nyäyabhäsya 1.1.22.
30. Vyomavati (1924-31), p. 20.
31. ATV (1939 edition), p. 915; (1940 edition), p. 437:
kab punarayarii mokab?
	 tyantika dubkanivrttirtmanab.
32. Saptapadrth, ed. and translated by D. Gurumurti, Adyar,
Madras, Theosophical Publishing House, 1932, p. 51. There
were exceptions among the Nyya philosophers to this view,
most notable Bhsarvajffa, who held that moka was a blissful
condition.
33. See Apastamba, Dharmastras, 2.4.8.13; 2.6.14.12. In these
two passages Apastamba settles contested points on the
authority of those who know the nyâya, which in this context
refers to the Piirva Mmãthsã school.
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34. For example:
"Venerable Sir, I know the g Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sãma
Veda, Atharvaia as the fourth (Veda), the epic and the
ancient lore as the fifth, the Veda of the Vedas (grammar),
propitiation of the fathers, the science of numbers, the
science of portents, the science of time, logic, ethics and
politics, the science of the Cods, the science of sacred
knowledge, the science of elemental spirits, the science of
weapons, astronomy, the science of serpents and the fine
arts. This, Venerable Sir, I know. But Venerable Sir, I am
only like one knowing words, and not a knower of the Self.
[C.U. 7.1.2-3.	 Translated by Radhakrishnan (1953),
pp. 468-469]	 In this passage Radhakrishnan translates
vãkovkyam as "logic". Dasgupta (1969), p. 276, seems to
think that vkovkyam signified some kind of art of
disputation:
"It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyaya
are to be found in the disputations and debates amongst
scholars trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic
texts for use in the sacrifices and also in those
disputations which took place between the adherents of
different schools of thought trying to defeat one another.
I suppose that such disputations occured in the days of the
Upaniads, and the art of disputation was regarded even then
as a subject of study and probably passed by the name
vkovkya."
I would only add here that the mention of vkoväkyam in this
text really predates the period which saw the
crystallization of thought into distinct schools. The
disputes as recorded in the Upaniads, as already stated,
are disputes based strongly on a mastery of Vedic
sacrificial lore rather than on purely logical skills.
Thus, even if we take the meaning of vãkovãkyam to be the
art of disputation, we should not take the unjustified step
of thinking thereby that it involves the study of logical
thought. I would rather take the meaning of vãkovãkyam here
;o be more akin to the significance which it has in the
Satapatha Brhmaia, a text written before the Chãndogya
Upaniads, where it refers to certain set portions of the
Veda which are in dialogue form [atapatha Brãhmal2a
4.6.9.20]. In the Katha Upaniad 1.2.9, once again we read
that knowledge of the
	
tman is not to be reached by
reasoning, where here the word used is tarka, a term which
later came to mean a type of logical argumentation. Once
again, however, we should not equate the later meaning of
the term with its earlier usage. What is important though
is to notice that in both of these passages väkovãkyam and
tarka are being dismissed in the context of the pursuit of
knowledge concerning the tman.
four sciences
commerce and
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35. Kauilya introduces nvTkiki as one of the
which a king should know about:
"The sciences are ãnvikiki, the triple Veda,
statecraft."
ãnvlk?ikT trayi vrtt da i)4a ni t iceti vidyb.
[Arthastra, 1.2.1]
Kauilya then goes on to say that:
"nvikik consists of sthkhya, yoga and lokyata."
(sãrhkhyam yogo lokyatam cetyãnvlkiki.)
[Arthaãstra, 1.2.10]
Kauilya says of ãnvTkiki that it bestows excellence in
speech and action and illuminates like a lamp all the other
branches of knowledge. These passages from Kautilya have
been the subject of a great deal of scholarly debate, beyond
the scope of this thesis, although I shall briefly review
some of the scholarship on this matter.
Jacobi (1918) postulates that Kautilya meant by nviksikT
just pure ratiocination separate from tmavidyã because he
includes lokyata in his list of schools that counted as
ãnvTkikL Lokyata was a name applied specifically to the
materialist Cärvka school which was counted as a heterodox
school. Jacobi postulates that Kauçilya included this in
his list because he wanted to emphasize that ãnvik?ikT was
to do with method rather than content, and by including a
heterodox school he was able to accomplish this. According
to Jacobi, at the time of Kauilya ãnvik?ikT was a disci-
pline separate from atmavidyã.Later on ãnvikikl came to
include atmavidy as a result of an orthodox response to
Kauilya.
Kane (1968, Vol. I, p. 225) disagrees with and questions the
basic premise of Jacobi's argument, that lokyata here means
the materialist school, since its meaning did change from
time to time. Kane, however, does agree with Jacobi's
conclusions that nvTkikT in the context of Kautilya does
not include ãtmavidya.
Dasgupta arrives at a di
seem that his interpretati(
text. He reads, "sthkhyam
enumerating four different
the first three to be consi
of this,he thinks this pas
Nyãya went by the name of
ded that this passage show
Nyäya school was not yet :
pretation, Dasgupta needs
also be classified as one
concluding that the Nyya
consisted of two branches
logical reasoning.	 He
portion was added to m
acceptable. Hence Dasgupt
chronology but disagrees a
fferent conclusion, but it would
n is based on a misreading of the
yogo lokãyatam cetynvTkikI", as
systems, rather than as listing
ituents of the last. On the basis
age shows that in Kauilys's time
ãnvTkikT (whereas Jacobi conclu-
that at the time of Kauilya the
early formed). Given his inter—
to explain why nvikikT should
f the four vidys. He does so by
;ystem in Kaul3lya's time already
- ãtmavidy and the science of
also thinks that the tmavidyã
ke the logical portion more
i agrees with Kane's and Jacobi's
to when this took place.
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Sastri (1964, p. 88) disagrees with this chronology. He
thinks that in the beginning invTkikT included ãtmavidy,
but that as time went on the logical part came to be
emphasized at the expense of the tmavidy portion.
36. Even if the authenticity of Kauilya is accepted, the
Artha4ãstra should not be read in isolation from the general
intellectual developments of the time. [For a review of the
scholarship concerning the dates of the Arthaãstra, see
Kane (1968), Vol. I, p. 247.] It would seem that gradually,
as a result of the extent of religious debate at that time,
rules regarding disputation were formed. The usefulness of
such rules in other areas must have been quickly recognized,
as is attested by the fact that such rules were soon
included in treatises on statecraft, the Artha gstra, and
medicine, the Caraka Sathhita.	 it is interesting to see in
the latter that the examples used to illustrate points of
debate are drawn from both medical and religious disputes,
thus revealing the heritage of logical thought in India.
When we are looking for precise boundaries of demarcation
between the ãtmavidyã tradition and ãnvTkikT, we should
also remember that Kauilya was concerned with the practical
task of instructing princes, not with laying down precise
definitions of intellectual disciplines. This point is made
by Hacker (1958), p. 82, in his comments on this passage.
37. See Matilal (1986), p. 73, for a discussion of this matter.
For an interesting account of the meanings of darana,
nvTk.ikT and philosophy, see also Halbfass (1981),
pp. 296-327. Halbfass agrees with Hacker in that he also
criticizes Jacobi's clear identification of ãnviksiki with
logical thought. He also makes the point that, "the sense
of both concepts, nvikiki and darana, not only depends on
an understanding of Indian philosophy; it has to do with
European self—understanding and with the philosophical
dialogue between India and Europe as well."
38. Oberhammer (1963) compares some of the early vãda
expositions which he sees to be the sole genuine sources of
the earliest period of Indian logic. In the course of his
article, he establishes three such traditions:
"(a) the tradition of the Nyyasiitras (b) the tradition of
the Yogcra—dialectics and (c) the tradition of the
ten—membered proof mentioned by Paksilasvãmin in his
commentary on the NyyasUtras 1.1.32."
[Oberhammer (1963), p. 102]
39. "The tradition of the NyyasUtras takes its origin from a
form of vãda—doctrine which seems to be presupposed by
Caraka. The vda—exposition of Caraka itself is already a
younger state of development and corresponds roughly to the
"pre—form" of the first and fifth Adhyãyas of the present
Nyyasiitras, though not identical with it. Through a
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re—arrangement of the usual set of dialectical topics this
earlier form was then changed into the vda—manual which has
been supposed by W. Ruben and G. Tucci to correspond to the
first and fifth Adhyãyas of the NyyasUtras. This manual
was later enlarged by adding the second Adhyãya or at least
parts of it (most probably after Nãgarjuna) and later on the
third and fourth Adhyya of the Nyyasiitra."
[Oberhammer (1963), pp. 102-1031
40. Oberhammer (1964, p. 303
41. ims tu chatasro vidyb pçthak prasthãnãb priabhtm-
anugrahãyopadiyante, ysth caturthTyam nvik.ikT
Nyãyavidy; tasyãb pthakprasthnãb samaydayaFj padarthãb;
tesãm pthagvacanam antarenãtmavidyãmtram lyam syd,
yathopaniadab.
Here Vtsyãyana is identifying his system of Nyãya with
Kautilya's nvTk?iki.
42. kim p unab prameyavieaviayatvät nãyain prameyavieab
prameyavi'seah prameyamãtrasya p ramãalakao ena
bhoditatvat prameyavisesavadharana na sidhyati, tat prameyam
yadanena yathavatparij1yamanamapavargãya/
apar
ayameva siitrãrtha iti/atrãpi yathvacanath vigraha
[Nyãyabhya 1.1.9J
43. upsyamne tasminprathamath bahirarthã eva bhsante
yãnritya karmamTmrñsopasathhrab crvkasamutthnaica,
tatpratipdanrthaih 'parfl'ci khni, itydi, taddhnãrtharh
'parafn karmabhya, itydi/ath.rthkãrab yamritya
traidaicjikamatopasaihhãrah yogcärasamutthnaca,
tatpratipãdanrthath 'ãtmaivedath sarvam' ityãdi,
taddhnãrthath 'agandharasam' itydi/athãrthbhãvab,
yamritya vedntadvramãtropasan1hãrab,
nyatvanairtmyasamutthna?1ca, _tatpratipidanãrtham
'asadevedamagra ãsta' itydi, taddhänãya 'andhantamab
pravianti ye ke cantmahano jan' itydi/tato vivekab,
yamUritya sthkhyamatopasathhrab, aktisattvasamutthnaffca,
tatpratipdanãrthaffca 'prakrteh parastt' itydi, taddhnya
'nãnyat sat' ityãdi/tatab kevala tmã prakãate
yamrityadvaitamatopasathhrab, tatpratipãdanrthath 'na
pa4yatTtyhurekbhavati' ityãdi, taddFfãnrthafn 'ndvaitath
npi ca dvaitamt itydi/tatab samasta sathskrbhibhavt
kevalopi na vikalpate, yamritya caramavedãntopasathhra,
tatpratipdanrthaih 'yato vco nivartante aprpya manas
sahetydi/sã cãvasth na hey, mokanagaragopuryamãiatvt,
nirviantu tasya svayameva/ yamritya nyäyamatopasathhr
tatpratipãdanrthafn atha yo nikãm tmakãma ptakmab sa
brahmaiva san brahmpyeti na tasya pr	 utkrmanti tatraiva
samavallyanta'	 vihya
puradvrarh pravieta, yato
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mrgavimrgasammrgasammohamadkamãnairucyate 1akyeja
dhanu	 yoga' iti.
ATV (1939 edition) pp. 935-936; (1940 edition) pp. 448-451.
44. See Katz, "Language, Epistemology and Mysticism", in Katz
ed., (1978) pp. 22-74.
45. Manusmti VI 2
46. Udayana was of course a brahmin and seems to have been
associated with a royal court. See Williams (1978) p. 294
for a review of other Nyya philosophers.
47. Manusmyti IV 30
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